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Introduction
Why do some country pairs trade more than others? Which trade policies are successful
in fostering bilateral exchange? What determines whether two countries start to trade
with each other at all? And how do international trade linkages influence the effective-
ness of efforts against the inherently global problem of climate change? This dissertation
aims to contribute to our understanding of these questions, drawing on what is known
as the gravity model of international trade. I will present (i) econometric advances that
allow a closer link between model and empirics than previously possible, (ii) theoretical
extensions that explicitly incorporate environmental concerns into quantitative trade
models, and (iii) specific applications of the proposed methods and extensions, investi-
gating for instance whether sharing a common currency leads countries to trade more
with each other or by how much the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement in reducing
global greenhouse gas emissions is harmed by the United States’ (US) withdrawal.
The general idea of gravity in international trade is simple: the closer and larger two
countries are, the more they will trade with each other. Or put formally:
Xij = A
Y β1i Y
β2
j
distβ3ij
, (1)
where Xij denotes trade flows from country i to j, A is a “gravitational constant”, Y
denotes a country’s economic size (typically captured by its gross domestic product, GDP),
dist represents the physical distance, and βk > 0 (k ∈ {1, 2, 3}) are the corresponding
elasticities.
Tinbergen (1962) was the first to estimate a trade gravity equation.1 Today, gravity
is the standard approach to estimate the determinants of bilateral trade flows and an
important tool for (trade) policy evaluation. The success story of the gravity model
can be credited to two main factors: its impressive empirical performance and its solid
1The very first gravity application in economics was a migration study conducted already in the 19th
century by Ravenstein (1885, 1889).
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Figure 1: The Gravity of Bilateral Trade Flows
theoretical foundation.
Leaving the role of economic theory aside for a moment, the empirical persuasiveness of
gravity is illustrated in Figure 1. It displays the positive bilateral trade flows between
166 ex- and importing countries in 2006 against a very simple ad-hoc measure of the
country pairs’ “gravitational force”, namely the product of their gross domestic products
divided by the bilateral distance.2 The pattern is clear: the higher the gravitational force
between two countries, the larger the trade flow between them.
A first straightforward approach to improve upon this fit and gain further insights into
the drivers of bilateral trade flows is to actually estimate coefficients for GDPs and
distance rather than simply imposing unit elasticities (as has been done for Figure 1).
Note that in order to do so, one has to make an econometric choice, namely which
estimator to use. While it was long common practice to take the logarithm of equation
(1) and estimate the resulting linear expression with ordinary least squares (OLS),
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that the resulting estimates are biased and
suggest a nonlinear Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator instead.
A second way to better capture the pattern of bilateral trade flows is to generalize the
notion of distance and include other aspects beyond being physically apart that may
also influence trade costs between two countries, e.g. whether these countries share
a common language, have a colonial history, or whether they are joint members of a
regional trade agreement. In doing so, one can infer the effect of these additional vari-
2Variables on both axes are in logarithms. The data is taken from Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010).
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ables on bilateral trade by learning from the deviations from the systematic relationship
illustrated in Figure 1.
Third, panel data can be used to gauge the different drivers of bilateral trade flows more
precisely. As pointed out by Baier and Bergstrand (2007), they are particularly attractive
if the effect of trade policies is estimated which are likely to be endogenous. For instance,
two countries may decide to sign a trade agreement precisely because they face high
trade barriers and finally want to make use of their full trade potential. Observing
trade flows over multiple periods allows the inclusion of country pair fixed effects
and therefore to control for all observable and unobservable time-invariant bilateral
characteristics.
Up to this point, economic theory was absent from all considerations. Equation (1) is not
derived from any theoretical trade model, but rather based on its intuitive appeal only.
However, the ad-hoc nature of gravity specifications along the lines of (1) has important
limitations. These limitations become evident when considering a thought experiment
by Krugman (1995): Imagine two small European countries — say Belgium and the
Netherlands — being taken out of the heart of Europe and put on Mars. Their bilateral
distance does not change, but still we would expect them to trade more with each other
than before as they become remote vis-a`-vis the rest of the world and therefore do not
have other trading partners anymore. The thought experiment illustrates that the simple
gravity structure given in equation (1) lacks an important component — remoteness.
However, while exemplifying that remoteness matters, it is not informative about how it
can be captured when using gravity to estimate trade determinants. It is here that the
embedding of gravity into trade theory becomes crucial for the first time.
In two seminal papers, Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) derive theory-consistent gravity equations in a Ricardian and an Armington
(1969)-type framework of international trade, respectively. These equivalent gravity
equations capture the notion that bilateral trade flows indeed depend on relative bilateral
trade costs rather than on the absolute level. Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch (2013) and
Chaney (2008) show that the same gravity equation also holds in a Krugman (1980)-type
model with homogeneous firms and a Melitz (2003)-type heterogeneous firm model
with a Pareto productivity distribution. Feenstra (2004) argues that the “multilateral
resistance terms” (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), which formalize the ex- and
importers’ overall remoteness discussed intuitively above, can be econometrically taken
into account with two sets of fixed effects, namely exporter and importer fixed effects.
Following the same logic in a panel data environment (see e.g. Baldwin and Taglioni,
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2007), economic theory asks for the inclusion of exporter-time and importer-time fixed
effects. Fally (2015) shows that if the gravity equation is estimated using the PPML
estimator, the estimated fixed effects can be directly translated into the theoretical
multilateral resistance terms.
A theory-consistent estimation procedure for gravity equations that takes into account
the nonlinear structure and uses panel data to tackle the potential endogeneity of trade
policy hence demands a PPML estimator with three sets of high-dimensional fixed effects.
However, for large samples, computational issues associated with these exporter-time,
importer- time, and country pair fixed effects currently recommended in the gravity
literature3 have limited the choice of estimator, leaving an important methodological gap.
To address this gap, in the first chapter of this dissertation, which is joint work with Mario
Larch, Yoto Yotov, and Tom Zylkin, we introduce an iterative PPML estimation procedure
that facilitates the inclusion of these fixed effects for large data sets and also allows
for correlated errors across countries and time. We apply this procedure to analyze the
effect of a common currency on bilateral trade in a comprehensive sample with more
than 200 countries trading over 65 years. In our analysis, we build on the contribution
by Glick and Rose (2016) who — based on OLS estimation of a log-linearized gravity
equation — find that sharing a currency generally fosters bilateral trade flows and that
the Euro has been especially successful compared to other currency unions, increasing
its members’ bilateral trade by 50%. It turns out that our innovations flip the conclusions
of their otherwise rigorously specified linear model. Most importantly, our estimates for
both the overall currency union effect and the Euro effect specifically are economically
small and statistically insignificant.
One of the often cited advantages of the PPML estimator is that zero trade flows can
be included in the estimation, because the gravity equation is estimated in its original
multiplicative form rather than after linearizing it by taking the logarithm. Country
pairs not trading with each other at all are an important feature of international trade
data. For example, in order to plot Figure 1, more than a quarter of the observations
had to be omitted because zero trade flows cannot be depicted on the logarithmic
scale used. However, in spite of the prominent role of zeros in the data, the previously
mentioned trade theories that give rise to a structural gravity estimation with PPML and
the according sets of fixed effects do not actually predict any zero trade flows (only in
the theoretical case of infinitely high trade costs). For example, the consumers “love of
variety” that motivates international trade in the Armington (1969)-type model ensures
3See Yotov, Piermartini, Monteiro, and Larch (2016) for a compilation of best practice recommendations
in gravity estimation.
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that consumers in any country want to consume at least a small amount of products
from all other countries and the Pareto productivity distribution typically assumed
in Melitz (2003)-type heterogeneous firm models ensures that there is always a firm
productive enough to overcome the fixed costs of exporting and serve any foreign market.
One important strand of extensions of gravity models therefore deals with the explicit
incorporation of zero trade flows into gravity theory. Prominently, Helpman, Melitz, and
Rubinstein (2008) and Eaton, Kortum, and Sotelo (2013) consider versions of Melitz
(2003)’s heterogeneous firm model of international trade and introduce zero trade
flows by considering a truncated productivity distribution and a finite set rather than a
continuum of firms, respectively. Just as at the intensive margin, economic theory shows
that there are unobservable exporter(-time) and importer(-time) characteristics that can
be controlled for using fixed effects in the estimation. Similarly, endogeneity concerns
with respect to trade policy again suggest the inclusion of bilateral fixed effects. However,
in a binary choice setting, these fixed effects pose an additional econometric challenge,
namely an incidental parameter problem. This problem — first identified by Neyman
and Scott (1948) — describes the phenomenon that for most nonlinear estimators, the
inclusion of fixed effects (i.e. of a set of nuisance parameters the number of which
increases with sample size) leads to asymptotically biased estimates. Furthermore,
the literature on the firm-level exporting decision (see e.g. Das, Roberts, and Tybout,
2007) stresses the role of market entry costs which introduce a dynamic feature to the
consideration as today’s cost (and therefore probability) of serving a market depends on
yesterday’s activity in the respective market. Econometrically speaking, this potentially
induces true state dependence at the aggregate extensive margin of trade, too, asking
for the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the empirical specification. In such
a dynamic model, the incidental parameter bias is potentially amplified.
In the second chapter of this thesis, which is joint work with Amrei Stammann and Julian
Hinz, we document that the aggregate extensive margin of bilateral trade exhibits a high
level of persistence that cannot be explained by geography or trade policy. We combine
the heterogeneous firm model of international trade with bounded productivity by Help-
man, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), with features from the firm dynamics literature (see
e.g. Alessandria and Choi, 2007; Das, Roberts, and Tybout, 2007), to derive expressions
for an exporting country’s participation in a specific destination market in a given period.
The model framework asks for a dynamic binary choice estimator with two or three
sets of high-dimensional fixed effects. To mitigate the incidental parameter problem
associated with nonlinear fixed effects models, we characterize and implement suitable
bias corrections. Extensive Monte Carlo simulations confirm the desirable statistical
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properties of the bias-corrected estimators. Empirically, taking two sources of persistence
— true state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity — into account using a dynamic
specification, along with appropriate fixed effects and bias corrections, changes the
estimated effects considerably: out of the most commonly studied potential extensive
margin determinants (joint WTO membership, common regional trade agreement, and
shared currency), only sharing a common currency retains a significant effect on whether
two countries trade with each other at all in our preferred estimation. The empirical
applications of the first two chapters hence jointly imply that a common currency makes
two countries more likely to trade with each other, but does not affect the extent of their
bilateral trade flows.
As outlined up to this point, the first half of this dissertation deals with the theory-
consistent estimation of the determinants of the in- and extensive margins of bilateral
trade using gravity models and econometric challenges associated with it. However,
gravity’s success story is not limited to the estimation of trade determinants. Rather,
the theoretical foundations for the gravity equation by Eaton and Kortum (2002) and
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) additionally paved the way for a second important
area of application: general equilibrium (GE) policy analyses. Having embedded the
trade determinants into a sound economic theory, it is possible to solve for the trade
and welfare effects of a policy change. First of all, one can investigate changes in trade
costs: Eaton and Kortum (2002) consider for instance a scenario in which all trade costs
are infinitely high, such that all countries move to autarky. Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) simulate the absence of an international border between Canadian provinces and
US states. But while gravity estimation is all about the determinants of bilateral trade
costs, GE analysis based on gravity is not restricted to trade cost changes. For example,
a second application by Eaton and Kortum (2002) is the international spreading of
gains from new technology in one country via trade and hence looks at the multilateral
implications of a unilateral shock. The second half of this thesis is related to the role
of gravity as quantitative trade theory, i.e. as a tool for policy analyses. Specifically, it
presents gravity model extensions that incorporate environmental aspects and therefore
allow a theory-founded quantitative GE analysis of the interplay of climate policy and
international trade.
An international perspective on climate policy is essential because any climate policy that
is not implemented on a global scale runs the risk of facing so-called “carbon leakage”
(Felder and Rutherford, 1993). This refers to the phenomenon that part of the emission
reduction achieved by a country or region undertaking a mitigation effort is offset by
increases in emissions by other countries. One important channel for carbon leakage is
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the shift of emission-intensive industries from countries undertaking climate policies (e.g.
pricing carbon emissions) to other countries that gain comparative advantage in such
industries by not internalizing the costs associated with the occurring emissions. Clearly,
a gravity model that incorporates a sectoral structure and emissions from production
is a viable candidate for the analysis of these GE trade effects, complementing the
widespread use of large-scale computable general equilibrium (CGE) models in the
trade and environment literature (see e.g. Bo¨hringer, Balistreri, and Rutherford, 2012,
for an overview of CGE models in this field). One trade policy that may potentially
mitigate carbon leakage is the introduction of so-called carbon tariffs, the idea of which
is to compensate carbon price differentials between trading partners by levying import
duties that depend both on the given differential and the amount of carbon emissions
embodied in the good that is traded.
In the third chapter, which is joint work with Mario Larch, we contribute to the discussion
regarding the potential of carbon tariffs to restore competitiveness, avoid carbon leakage,
and reduce global carbon emissions. To analyze the effects of carbon tariffs on trade,
welfare, and carbon emissions, we develop a multi-sector, multi-factor structural gravity
model that allows an analytical and quantitative decomposition of the emission changes
into scale, composition, and technique effects following Grossman and Krueger (1993)
and Copeland and Taylor (1994). Our analysis shows that carbon tariffs are able to
reduce world emissions, mainly via altering the production composition within and
across countries, hence reducing carbon leakage. This reduction comes at the cost of
lower world trade flows and lower welfare, especially for developing countries. Applying
our framework to investigate the effects of the emission reduction pledges made by the
Annex I countries in the Copenhagen Accord, we find that combining national emission
targets with carbon tariffs would increase the Accord’s effectiveness by lowering the
leakage rate from 13.4% to 4.1%.
The second main channel of carbon leakage acts via the international energy market.
For instance, if the European Union decides to extend the Emission Trading Scheme to
more sectors and/or to lower the available number of certificates in the covered sectors,
this will lower the European demand for fossil fuels. This negative demand shock will,
however, drive down prices for fossil fuels on the world market and therefore create
an incentive for all other countries to use more fossil fuels, again offsetting part of the
mitigation effort, similarly to the production shift channel discussed above.
The threat of carbon leakage makes evident the advantage of global cooperation in the
fight against climate change. If all countries have binding emission reduction targets,
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there is no place emission-intensive production can shift to in order to avoid carbon
taxation and there are no countries that use falling fossil fuel prices to shift towards
more carbon intensive production. For this reason, the supposedly global coverage of
the Paris Agreement might have been the accord’s major strength. However, the US
have already announced that they are going to withdraw from the agreement and a
number of signing countries have so far failed to ratify, eliminating the intially truly
global character of the treaty.
In the fourth chapter, which is again joint work with Mario Larch, we investigate the
implications of unilateral withdrawals from the Paris Agreement. Countries that drop
out of the Paris Agreement harm the effectiveness of the international initiative to
lower greenhouse gas emissions in two ways. First, by canceling their own reduction
commitments, they fall back on a business as usual emission path, directly reducing the
extent of the global emission reduction. Second, carbon leakage may occur in response
to the climate policy of Paris member countries, actually increasing the withdrawing
country’s emissions above the level it would have experienced in the complete absence
of the Paris Agreement. This leakage in turn occurs via the two channels discussed
above: emission-intensive production is shifted from the committed to non-committed
countries and the climate policies of Paris members lower their fossil fuel demand,
driving down energy prices and hence leading to more energy-intensive production in
non-committed countries. We extend the multi-sector structural gravity model with
emissions from production developed in the third chapter by a constant elasticity of
fossil fuel supply function (as suggested in the CGE context by Boeters and Bollen, 2012)
that allows us to capture the energy-market leakage channel without relying on a fixed
resource in the production process. The resulting model remains tractable enough to
still allow the decomposition of emission changes into scale, composition, and technique
effects. We use the extended framework to simulate the consequences of unilateral
withdrawals from the Paris Agreement. We find that a US withdrawal would have the
strongest effect, eliminating a third of the world emission reduction, while a potential
Chinese withdrawal would imply the highest leakage rate (12.1%). We find leakage to
be primarily driven by technique effects that are induced via the energy-market leakage
channel. Both the overall magnitude of the reduction losses and the relative importance
of the different leakage channels have significant policy implications.
To summarize, this thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of the drivers and
effects of international trade flows in two distinct ways. First, it offers solutions to
econometric challenges that arise in the estimation of trade cost determinants both at
the extensive and the intensive margin, i.e. both in determining which country pairs
Introduction 9
are likely to trade with each other at all and in identifying factors that lead country
pairs to trade more or less with each other. Second, it incorporates environmental
aspects into quantitative trade theory models in order to foster the understanding
of the role of international economic exchange in shaping the success or failure of
international greenhouse gas mitigation efforts. Both strands of the thesis rely on a
common theoretical ground: the gravity model of international trade.

1Currency Unions and Trade: A PPML
Re-assessment with High-dimensional
Fixed Effects1
1.1 Introduction and Motivation
To us, a plausible methodology to estimate the currency union effect
on trade involves panel estimation with dyadic fixed effects. We [. . . ]
await computational advances to be able to estimate the Poisson
analogues. (Glick and Rose, 2016, p. 86)
Writing at the beginning of a transformative period in the empirical study of international
trade, Rose (2000) reported the stunning finding that sharing a common currency more
than triples trade between countries. While this estimate was regarded as puzzlingly
high at the time, it succeeded in stimulating a vibrant and ongoing empirical literature
1This chapter is joint work with Mario Larch, Yoto Yotov, and Tom Zylkin. It has been published under
the same title in the Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 2019, 81(3), 487–510. Thomas Zylkin is
grateful for research support from the NUS Strategic Research Grant (WBS: R-109-000-183-646) awarded
to the Global Production Networks Centre (GPN@NUS) for the project titled “Global Production Networks,
Global Value Chains, and East Asian Development”. We thank Andy Rose, Joa˜o Santos Silva, three
referees, the handling editor James Fenske, as well as participants at the European Trade Study Group
2017 in Florence and the workshop “International Economics” 2018 in Go¨ttingen. Note: The procedure
presented in this chapter is implemented in Stata and freely available via ssc (to install, type “ssc install
ppml panel sg, replace”) or at https://econpapers.repec.org/software/bocbocode/S458249.htm (ac-
cessed on August 16th, 2019).
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investigating the trade-creating effects of currency unions (CUs), having garnered over
3,100 citations since its original publication in google scholar and 356 citations in Web
of Science Core Collection. This literature has notably included frequent re-examinations
of the original evidence by Rose himself—such as Glick and Rose (2002, 2016)—as well
as fervent interest in whether the European Monetary Union (EMU) in particular, as the
largest CU to date, might have had similarly remarkable effects.2
Parallel to this literature, the past two decades have seen the development and wide adop-
tion of many new econometric best practices for consistently identifying the determinants
of international trade. These have most notably included the use of Poisson Pseudo-
Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimation to address issues related to heteroscedasticity
and zeroes (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006), time-varying exporter and importer
fixed effects to account for changes in the “multilateral resistance” constraints implied
by theory (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Feenstra, 2004; Baldwin and Taglioni,
2007), and time-invariant pair fixed effects to absorb unobservable barriers to trade
(such as bilateral history) and to address the endogeneity of trade policy variables due
to time-invariant unobserved bilateral heterogeneity (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).3
Aiding these developments, empirical researchers working in trade have also benefited
from a new-found consensus on the theoretical underpinnings of the gravity equation
(Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 2012) as well as recent computational ad-
vances that permit swift estimation of linear models with a large number of fixed effects
(Carneiro, Guimara˜es, and Portugal, 2012; Correia, 2016a).
Reassuringly, as these new methods have filtered into the literature on currency unions,
they have led to more reasonable and reliable estimates. In their latest instalment,
2Along with Glick and Rose (2002, 2016), some of Rose’s other work in this area includes Rose (2001),
Rose (2002), and Rose (2017). Contributions by Persson (2001), Nitsch (2002), Levy-Yeyati (2003),
Barro and Tenreyro (2007), de Sousa (2012), and Campbell (2013) are examples of reactions to Rose’s
initial finding. Finally, Micco, Stein, and Ordonez (2003), Baldwin and Taglioni (2007), Bun and Klaassen
(2007), Berger and Nitsch (2008), Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010a), Eicher and Henn (2011), Olivero
and Yotov (2012), Herwartz and Weber (2013), and Mika and Zymek (2018) specifically investigate the
effect of the EMU. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010a) and Rose (2017) survey each of these literatures.
3Of course, endogeneity of common currencies may also arise from time-varying bilateral effects. Our
investigation does not tackle these sources of selection into currency unions.
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which emphasizes the use of time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects as well as
time-invariant pair fixed effects, Glick and Rose (2016) find—under their most rigorous
specification—that CUs generally increase trade by 40%, that CU entry and exit have
symmetric effects on trade, and that the EMU—which could not be included in earlier
studies—has promoted trade more than other CUs.4
Doing their due diligence, Glick and Rose (2016) also experiment with PPML estimation
with two-way (exporter-time and importer-time) fixed effects.5 However, as captured in
the opening quote, they are unable to obtain estimates for one particularly important
and desirable specification: the case of a PPML model with a full set of fixed effects (i.e.,
with pair fixed effects also added to the exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects
from the two-way model).6
In this paper, we pick up where Glick and Rose (2016) leave off. The main technical
challenge we overcome is Glick and Rose (2016)’s preference for as large a sample as
possible, covering trade between more than 200 countries over 65 years and therefore
necessitating the use of more than 50,000 fixed effects. In order to clearly demonstrate
the importance of our methods, we employ the same dataset as Glick and Rose (2016)
and we rely on the same theory-consistent gravity model with added pair fixed effects,
reflecting the latest developments in the gravity literature noted above. Thus, the
differences in our results are driven exclusively by the following two innovations.
First (and most importantly), we present an iterative PPML algorithm that specifically
4Glick (2017) demonstrates that these results are robust to controlling for EU membership and further
shows that there is heterogeneity in the trade effects between new and old EMU members.
5Glick and Rose (2016) include these results in an earlier working paper available online (Glick and
Rose, 2015). They still estimate a generally positive “additional effect” for the EMU versus other CUs, but
find the overall CU effect disappears over time, echoing an earlier finding by de Sousa (2012).
6Even before Glick and Rose (2016), computational challenges with PPML have been quietly simmering
for some time. For example, Bratti, De Benedictis, and Santoni (2014) study the impact of immigrants on
trade and note that “[t]he use of [...] the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator [...]
clashes with the use of a large set of fixed effects that hamper convergence.” Henn and McDonald (2014)
find PPML “impracticable [because] convergence of PPML is usually not achieved with fixed effects of a
dimensionality as high as ours.” And in their services trade handbook, Sauve and Roy (2016) explain that
“[u]nfortunately, PPML estimation with several high-dimensional fixed effects led to non-convergence [...]
even with the application of different work-around strategies suggested in the recent literature.” Dutt,
Santacreu, and Traca (2014), Kareem (2014), and Magerman, Studnicka, and Van Hove (2016) share
similar frustrations.
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addresses the computational burden of the three different types of high-dimensional
fixed effects (“HDFEs”) that need to be computed to obtain consistent point estimates of
Glick and Rose (2016)’s preferred specification.7 Second, with these consistent point
estimates in hand, we take advice from Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011) and Egger
and Tarlea (2015) and base our inferences on standard errors that are clustered on all
possible dimensions of the panel—here, exporter, importer, and time—and similarly
show how such “multi-way” clustering techniques may be adapted to the HDFE PPML
context.8
These two methodological changes—changing the underlying estimator and method of
clustering—lead to dramatic reversals in what we would otherwise consider the current
benchmark estimates from the literature. Unlike the vast majority of studies, we do not
find that the average effect of CUs on trade is statistically significant. This is for two
main reasons. First, multi-way clustering generally leads to more conservative inferences
of all estimates. Using standard, “robust” error corrections, for example, the overall
CU effect is positive and measured with high precision. Second, the implications of
switching from OLS to PPML are especially pronounced for our estimates of the EMU
effect, which disappears with the PPML estimator. However, for all CUs other than the
EMU, we find (as much of the literature had until more recently) the effect of sharing
a currency has been very large and highly significant, increasing trade by more than
100%.
We are not the first to document either a small EMU effect (c.f., Micco, Stein, and Or-
donez, 2003; Baldwin and Taglioni, 2007), or, indeed, an insignificant EMU effect (c.f.,
Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2010a; Olivero and Yotov, 2012). However, other method-
ological differences aside, these studies have mainly relied on relatively small samples.9
7The algorithm we present draws on an earlier method devised by Guimara˜es and Portugal (2010) for
PPML with two-way HDFEs. It was originally programmed by Zylkin (2017) and is available in Stata via ssc
(to install, type “ssc install ppml panel sg, replace”) or at https://econpapers.repec.org/software/
bocbocode/S458249.htm (accessed on August 16th, 2019).
8While the current focus is on currency unions and trade, the methods we describe are equally
well-suited to a wide variety of other applications that call for the estimation of a gravity model.
9A notable exception is Mika and Zymek (2018), who also show that the EMU effect vanishes using
PPML with many countries. In their paper, the computational issues surrounding PPML are addressed
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As Glick and Rose (2016) and Rose (2017) rightly point out, using a sample with many
countries and years is in principle always the most sensible approach. However, in
practice, it is also this preference that contributes to the large difference in estimates. As
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) highlight, OLS estimation of the log-linearised gravity
model will in general be inconsistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity. We investigate
the degree of heteroscedasticity in Glick and Rose (2016)’s data by plotting estimation
residuals against expected trade values for different benchmark subsamples split by
development status, regions, and size. This analysis reveals that trade flows involving
the many smaller, poorer countries needed for a comprehensive sample are noticeably
more heteroscedastic than trade flows involving other countries. The inclusion of these
countries in Glick and Rose (2016)’s data (and in other similarly large data sets) should
therefore be expected to exacerbate the difference between PPML and OLS estimates, a
pattern we can confirm by comparing coefficient estimates for different subsamples. We
also use the example of the EMU effect to demonstrate that the addition of very small
countries that contribute only a tiny portion of world trade can have a noticeable impact
on OLS estimates of a currency union even if they are not part of the currency union,
whereas PPML estimates will tend to discount the addition of such countries.10
We now turn to describing our HDFE PPML estimation procedure. The following sections
then add our estimates and conclusions.
by “artificially balancing” bilateral trade (such that the usual “exporter-time” and “importer-time” FEs
become only “country-time” FEs) and by only using more recent years. Glick and Rose (2016) question
whether these adjustments lead to truly comparable results. Our findings, however, support those of Mika
and Zymek.
10Indeed, Glick and Rose (2016)’s own sensitivity analysis—replicated in Table A.2 of Appendix A.7—
makes it plain that linear estimates of the EMU effect do depend non-trivially on which non-EMU reference
countries are included in the sample. Another recent follow-up study by Campbell and Chentsov (2017)
adds further emphasis on this point.
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1.2 PPML with High-Dimensional Fixed Effects
Following the latest developments in the gravity literature, we now describe and im-
plement a PPML estimation procedure that can be used to obtain estimates for a large
number of exporter-time, importer-time, and exporter-importer (“pair”) fixed effects.
We also discuss how to resolve the subsequent technical challenge of how to obtain
multi-way clustered PPML standard errors in the presence of these fixed effects.
1.2.1 Estimation Procedure
Let Xijt denote trade flows from exporter i to importer j at time t. wijt is a vector
containing our covariates of interest, including currency unions and other controls. With
exporter-time (λit), importer-time (ψjt), and exporter-importer (“pair”) fixed effects
(µij), the estimating equation is
Xijt = exp (λit + ψjt + µij + b′wijt) + νijt, (1.1)
where νijt denotes the remainder error term. This specification is in line with the best
practices for panel gravity estimation recommended by Yotov, Piermartini, Monteiro, and
Larch (2016) and has appeared in a number of recent empirical studies on the effects
of trade agreements, albeit only with smaller samples.11 Our goal is to obtain PPML
estimates for coefficient vector b for large samples in the presence of these three high-
dimensional fixed effects. To fix ideas, we first write an expression for the corresponding
estimate of b, denoted by b̂, in the form of a generalized PPML first-order condition:
b̂ :
∑
i
∑
j
∑
t
[
Xijt − exp
(
λ̂it + ψ̂jt + µ̂ij + b̂′wijt
)]
wijt = 0. (1.2a)
11See, for example, Dai, Yotov, and Zylkin (2014), Bergstrand, Larch, and Yotov (2015), Anderson,
Vesselovsky, and Yotov (2016), Anderson and Yotov (2016), and Heid and Larch (2016) who investigate
samples with 13 to 41 regions or countries. Some of these papers facilitate estimation of this specification
by further making the simplifying assumption that the pair fixed effect µij applies symmetrically in both
directions. Thanks to the algorithm introduced in this paper, these compromises are no longer necessary.
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Noting that the PPML first-order condition for a group fixed effect equates the sum of the
dependent variable with the sum of the conditional mean for that group, the remaining
first-order conditions associated with (1.1) may be written as [resume]
λ̂it : Yit − eλ̂it
∑
j
exp
(
ψ̂jt + µ̂ij + b̂′wijt
)
= 0, (1.3a)
ψ̂jt : Xjt − eψ̂jt
∑
i
exp
(
λ̂it + µ̂ij + b̂′wijt
)
= 0, (1.3b)
µ̂ij :
∑
t
Xijt − eµ̂ij
∑
t
exp
(
λ̂it + ψ̂jt + b̂′wijt
)
= 0, (1.3c)
where Yit ≡∑j Xijt and Xjt ≡∑iXijt respectively denote the sums of all flows associated
with each exporter i and importer j at time t.12
Along with (1.2a), these equations could be used to solve the complete system in terms
of b̂, eλ̂it , eψ̂jt , and eµ̂ij by extending the “zig-zag” algorithm demonstrated in Guimara˜es
and Portugal (2010) for the case of two-way HDFEs.13 However, to follow more closely
the actual methods used, and to emphasize the tight connection linking estimation with
theory, it is useful instead to re-write our system of equations in the form of a “structural
gravity” model a` la Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). To do so, first define
Ψit ≡ Yit/
√
XWt
eλ̂it
, Φjt ≡ Xjt/
√
XWt
eψ̂jt
, Dij ≡ eµ̂ij , (1.4)
where XWt ≡ ∑i∑j Xijt denotes total world trade at time t, to be used as a scaling
factor.14 We make these substitutions because, after plugging these definitions into (1.1),
we arrive at a new version of our estimating equation that closely resembles the famous
12Most empirical applications, including the present one, tend not to include “self-trade” (i.e., “Xii”)
in the estimation. Thus, in our case, Yit is i’s total exports and Xjt is j’s total imports. However, Yotov,
Piermartini, Monteiro, and Larch (2016) describe several applications in which including Xii might be
appealing. The algorithm allows for either possibility without loss of generality. Furthermore, either
approach is compatible with structural gravity (c.f., eq. (17) in French, 2016).
13The PPML Hessian is negative definite (Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon, 1984). Thus, so long as
a solution for b̂ exists—a finer point we discuss further in Appendix A.4—it is guaranteed to be unique.
However, the fixed effects in (1.3a)-(1.3c) are only determined up to 2N + T normalizations, where N
and T respectively denote the numbers of countries and time periods.
14The utility of this scaling factor is that, as in the analogous system used in Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003), imposing Dij = Φjt = Ψit = 1 (with b̂ = 0) equates to a world where trade frictions do not affect
choice of trade partner. We thus may use Dij = Φjt = Ψit = 1 as natural initial guesses for the fixed
effects when first solving for b̂.
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“structural gravity” equation of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003):
Xijt =
(
YitXjt
XWt
)Dijeb̂′wijt
ΨitΦjt
+ νijt.
And, furthermore, we may also now re-write our system of first-order conditions as
follows:
0 =
∑
i
∑
j
∑
t
Xijt − (YitXjt
XWt
)Dijeb̂′wijt
ΨitΦjt
wijt, (1.5a)
Ψit =
∑
j
Xjt/XWt
Φjt
Dije
b̂′wijt , (1.5b)
Φjt =
∑
i
Yit/XWt
Ψit
Dije
b̂′wijt , (1.5c)
Dij =
∑
tXijt∑
t
(
YitXjt
XWt
)(
eb̂
′wijt
ΨitΦjt
) . (1.5d)
In (1.5b) and (1.5c), Ψit and Φjt are analogues of the “multilateral resistances” from
structural gravity. As in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) (and the vast subsequent
literature following Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), they capture the general equilib-
rium effects of trade with third countries. The form of these constraints is well-known
and Fally (2015) has previously shown they naturally derive from the FOC’s of PPML
with two-way fixed effects. The new term we add, however, is Dij in (1.5d), the “pair”
fixed effect recommended by Baier and Bergstrand (2007). As with our other fixed
effects, we may obtain this last term by equating sums: in this case, pair-wise sums of
actual and fitted trade flows over time, as in (1.5d).
With this system in place, the steps to follow are exactly as outlined in (1.5a)-(1.5d).
That is: (i) given initial guesses for {Dij,Ψit,Φjt}, compute a solution for b̂ using (1.5a);
(ii)-(iii) Update Ψit and Φjt using (1.5b) and (1.5c); (iv) update Dij using (1.5d); and
(v) return to step (i) with new values for {Dij,Ψit,Φjt}, iterating until convergence.15
15One way to obtain b̂ in step (i) would be to solve for it directly via a nonlinear solver. However, an
even more efficient approach is to modify the procedure so that b̂ can be solved for using iteratively
re-weighted least squares (IRLS), inspired by Guimara˜es (2016) and further discussed in Appendix A.1.
Appendix A also covers other important details such as how to compute clustered standard errors and how
to implement the pre-estimation “existence check” recommended by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010a)
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1.2.2 Standard Errors
Of course, computing the point estimates themselves is just one part of the overall
high dimensionality problem we must overcome in obtaining inferences. Estimating
standard errors also poses a significant technical challenge in this context. Even though
in principle we may readily construct from our iterative procedure the complete Hessian
matrix associated with our estimation, the usual method of inverting the Hessian to
obtain the estimated Poisson variance matrix is likely to be impractical, because of the
number and variety of the included fixed effects. Fortunately, recent advances in the
related literature offer better alternatives. For the slightly simpler case of a PPML model
with two-way HDFEs, Figueiredo, Guimara˜es, and Woodward (2015) show how the
high dimensionality associated with this latter problem may be efficiently discarded by
recognizing the variance-covariance matrix of a Poisson regression is proportional to
that of an appropriately weighted linear regression, such that the Frish-Waugh-Lovell
theorem may then be applied. This same strategy also extends naturally to the case of
three-way HDFEs, as we show in Appendix A.3.
More generally, however, our emphasis on standard errors stems from our desire to
incorporate assumptions about error correlation (or “clustering”) patterns that are most
reasonable for our data and model. Again, we draw on recent innovations. In particular,
Egger and Tarlea (2015) convincingly argue that standard errors for a panel-data gravity
model should allow for simultaneous correlations across all three main dimensions of
the panel—exporter, importer, and time—by implementing the “multi-way” clustering
methodology first introduced in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011). Adopting the
logic of Egger and Tarlea (2015), it is reasonable to believe there are auto-correlations
across time within countries having to do with inertia in trade, as, e.g., bilateral trade
responds sluggishly in the short-run to long-run changes in local prices. A similar
logic applies to possible cross-sectional dependence within time periods, as general
equilibrium price linkages across countries may not fully reflect an idiosyncratic shock
in the high-dimensional fixed effects context.
20 Chapter 1: PPML with High-dimensional Fixed Effects
to trade at time t.
For added motivation, we also note that clustering simultaneously on i, j, and t actu-
ally allows for correlation in the error term within all six possible cluster dimensions
{i, j, t, it, jt, ij}. It thus explicitly nests the typical practice of assuming errors are solely
clustered across time within each country-pair ij. For this reason, we will expect multi-
way clustering to lead to more conservative inferences, just as in Egger and Tarlea
(2015). The details for implementing multi-way clustering in our setting largely follow
Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011), requiring only some slight modification to account
for the high dimensionality mentioned above. Again, for brevity, we leave these specifics
to Appendix A.3.
In sum, our methods allow us to rapidly obtain estimates and flexibly clustered standard
errors for our key parameters of interest, even for data structures that would ordinarily
be too large for direct estimation to be feasible. Applying three-way FEs to Glick and
Rose (2016)’s data, for example, will require us to account for more than 50,000 fixed
effects.16 Thus, their data will serve as an interesting test, which we now turn to.
1.3 Re-assessing the Effects of Currency Unions
Following Glick and Rose (2016)’s notation, we define CUijt—a dummy variable equal
to 1 if i and j share a common currency in year t—as our main regressor of interest.
Thus, we may re-produce Glick and Rose’s preferred specification with three-way fixed
effects either in its original OLS form,
lnXijt = λit + ψjt + µij + β′zijt + γCUijt + ijt, (1.6)
16Table A.1 of Appendix A.6 summarizes computation times for different sample sizes (both in terms of
countries and years considered) for the ppml-command of Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011) and the HDFE
ppml panel sg-command of Zylkin (2017). The gains in terms of whether and how fast convergence
is achieved will obviously vary with the specific soft- and hardware used to implement the procedure.
The main takeaway from Table A.1 is that there are substantial speed and feasibility gains using our
suggested estimation procedure for high-dimensional fixed effects models compared with previously
available methods.
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or in the form of our own preferred alternative, using PPML:
Xijt = exp (λit + ψjt + µij + β′zijt + γCUijt) + νijt, (1.7)
where, in either case, zijt denotes a set of non-CU controls (namely dummies indicating
the presence of regional trade agreements and current colonial relationships17) and the
final terms (ijt and νijt) denote residual errors.
To motivate our preference for PPML, we note, as Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006)
have, that imposing the OLS moment condition E[lnXijt − ̂lnX ijt|·] = 0 does not also
imply that E[Xijt − X̂ijt|·] = 0. As a consequence, OLS estimates of γ will only be
consistent when the OLS error term ijt is homoscedastic, whereas PPML is consistent
under much more general circumstances. Since trade data are generally taken to be
heteroscedastic—a supposition we will later confirm—OLS is likely to be biased and
inconsistent, with the bias increasing in the degree of heteroscedasticity.18 For some
further motivation, we also note that, unlike with PPML, OLS first-order conditions
for the exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects λit and ψjt do not re-produce the
adding-up constraints (1.5b) and (1.5c) typically implied by theory; instead, they equate
sums of log trade flows with sums of fitted log flows.
1.3.1 Main Results
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 1.1 reproduce the right panel of Table 5 from Glick and Rose
(2016). Columns (4) to (6) estimate the same specifications but with PPML. Additionally,
17Note this last variable is mainly identified by former colonies gaining independence during the period.
It is debatable whether the trade effect of a country’s independence is appropriately captured by this
dummy. We therefore re-ran our main specifications after dropping all colonies from the sample (reducing
the number of observations by 70%). Our results are both qualitatively identical and quantitatively similar.
18Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2011) provide an extensive discussion of this point as well as a
comparison study of PPML versus a range of other nonlinear estimators. While PPML implicitly assumes
that the variance of νijt is proportional to the conditional mean, this assumption only affects the efficiency
of the estimator and PPML turns out to generally perform adequately even when this assumption is not
met. Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2016) and Jochmans (2017) have documented favourable small-sample
properties for PPML with two-way FEs. We note that similar investigations for the case of three-way FEs
would be valuable additions to the literature.
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Table 1.1: Linear Specification vs. PPML
Linear Specifications PPML
All CUs Disagg. EMU Disagg. CUs All CUs Disagg. EMU Disagg. CUs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All CUs 0.343 0.130
(0.018)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗
{0.080}∗∗∗ {0.081}
EMU 0.429 0.432 0.030 0.027
(0.021)∗∗∗ (0.021)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗
{0.149}∗∗∗ {0.149}∗∗∗ {0.092} {0.091}
All Non-EMU CUs 0.298 0.700
(0.025)∗∗∗ (0.025)∗∗∗
{0.097}∗∗∗ {0.172}∗∗∗
CFA Franc Zone 0.583 0.137
(0.100)∗∗∗ (0.108)
{0.186}∗∗∗ {0.307}
East Caribbean CU -1.637 -1.014
(0.106)∗∗∗ (0.081)∗∗∗
{0.334}∗∗∗ {0.319}∗∗∗
Aussie $ 0.389 0.168
(0.196)∗∗ (0.121)
{0.248} {0.282}
British £ 0.554 1.004
(0.034)∗∗∗ (0.034)∗∗∗
{0.101}∗∗∗ {0.234}∗∗∗
French Franc 0.874 2.096
(0.083)∗∗∗ (0.062)∗∗∗
{0.269}∗∗∗ {0.302}∗∗∗
Indian Rupee 0.522 0.082
(0.115)∗∗∗ (0.149)
{0.110}∗∗∗ {0.308}
US $ -0.051 0.014
(0.063) (0.022)
{0.229} {0.066}
Other CUs -0.104 0.788
(0.058)∗ (0.052)∗∗∗
{0.247} {0.247}∗∗∗
RTAs 0.395 0.392 0.389 0.167 0.169 0.168
(0.009)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗
{0.062}∗∗∗ {0.061}∗∗∗ {0.061}∗∗∗ {0.076}∗∗ {0.075}∗∗ {0.076}∗∗
CurCol 0.262 0.275 0.248 0.733 0.545 0.303
(0.032)∗∗∗ (0.032)∗∗∗ (0.033)∗∗∗ (0.059)∗∗∗ (0.050)∗∗∗ (0.042)∗∗∗
{0.155}∗ {0.159}∗ {0.170} {0.288}∗∗ {0.251}∗∗ {0.150}∗∗
N 877,736 877,736 877,736 877,736 877,736 877,736
# of clusters
exporters 212 212 212 212 212 212
importers 212 212 212 212 212 212
years 66 66 66 66 66 66
(Pseudo-)R2 0.855 0.855 0.855 0.987 0.987 0.987
Park-Test (p-value) - - - <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Notes: Columns (1) to (3) of this table reproduce the right panel of Table 5 from Glick and Rose (2016). Columns
(4) to (6) estimate the same specifications but with PPML. 877,736 observations for more than 200 countries for the
years 1948 to 2013. All columns include (roughly) 11,000 exporter-time, 11,000 importer-time, and 32,000 pair FEs.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by exporter, importer, and year in curly brackets. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. See text for further details.
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we report for each coefficient two types of standard errors: in parentheses we report
Huber-White heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Huber, 1967; White, 1982) as in
Glick and Rose (2016); in curly brackets we report multi-way clustered standard errors
clustered by exporter, importer, and year, as advocated by Egger and Tarlea (2015).19
For all PPML specifications, as suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and
Manning and Mullahy (2001), we perform a Park (1966)-type test for the hypothesis
that the multiplicative gravity model can be consistently estimated in the log-linearised
form. We obtain a p-value less than 0.001 in all cases, implying that the adequacy of
estimating the constant-elasticity model in log-linear form is strongly rejected. As a
goodness of fit measure, we also calculate the squared correlation coefficients between
observed and predicted dependent variable values (which coincides with the R2 in the
linear case). The R2 values we obtain are 0.855 for the linear model and 0.987 for
PPML, in line with the typical good fit of gravity models.20
Our main observations from the estimates themselves are as follows. First, note that the
main effect for CUs is substantially smaller than in Glick and Rose (2016) (compare, for
example, columns (1) and (4).) If multi-way clustered standard errors are used, it also
becomes statistically insignificant.
Second, our PPML estimates for the EMU effect in columns (5) and (6) are even less
favourable. The estimated EMU coefficients—0.030 and 0.027, respectively—are an
order of magnitude smaller than the corresponding linear model estimates shown in
columns (2) and (3). Furthermore, when clustered standard errors are used, the EMU
loses significance.21
19Note that we drop singleton groups (i.e. fixed effects groups with only a single observation) in order
to avoid artificially low standard errors due to an overstated number of clusters (see Correia, 2015). This
is achieved with the dropsingletons-option in the ppml panel sg-command.
20Note that the higher values for PPML are not only driven by its better fit, but also by considering the
correlation of the levels of (fitted and observed) trade flows rather than of their logs as in the OLS case.
21Olivero and Yotov (2012) find the Euro effect is only significant when one accounts for slow, dynamic
adjustments over time. On the other hand, Berger and Nitsch (2008) argue the Euro effect is biased
upward by not accounting for long-term trends in European trade. For this reason, it is worth mentioning
that our results are robust to using pair time-trends, lagged CU and EMU terms, and/or wider time
intervals.
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Third, for all other currency unions except the EMU, PPML leads to significant positive
effects and the magnitude is nearly tripled versus Glick and Rose (2016), suggesting
a trade-promoting effect of e.700 − 1 = 101.3% (versus e.298 − 1 = 34.7%). The strong
positive result for the “net EMU effect” from Glick and Rose (2016) thus completely
reverses, suggesting the EMU has been a major disappointment in this regard. The
negative net EMU effect we observe could be for several reasons. For example, the EMU
countries are mainly developed countries that already had comparably strong and stable
individual currencies and were already well-integrated economically. It may be that the
types of transaction costs that currency unions alleviate may be more pronounced for
countries that are less integrated with one another and/or have weaker currencies to
start with. Or, as de Sousa (2012) has argued, it could also be that the importance of a
common currency for trade has generally fallen over time due to increased globalization,
with the surprising lack of an EMU effect being part of a broader trend.22 However, it is
worth noting that estimates of the effect of non-EMU currency unions are potentially less
reliable, because a substantial part of the identifying variation is due to currency union
dissolutions that coincided with political events such as warfare, communist takeovers,
or colonial independence (Campbell, 2013).
Finally, other individual CU estimates, shown in column (6), are also affected, to varying
degrees. In particular, we see the large PPML estimate for non-EMU CUs is driven by the
British £, the French Franc, and “other CUs”.23 The finding of very large heterogeneity
in the trade effects across different currency unions is in line with previous findings by
Eicher and Henn (2011) and Glick and Rose (2016). However, an additional note of
caution is in order (aside from the potential confounding with geopolitical events) for
the estimated effects of individual non-EMU currency unions: they tend to be identified
based on very little variation in the data. For example, the effects of the French Franc,
the East Caribbean Dollar, and the Australian Dollar are estimated based on the variation
22We investigate how the non-EMU effect changes over time in Section 1.3.3 and find further evidence
that the currency union effect has generally fallen over time.
23Note we treat missing observations in the Glick and Rose (2016) data set as missing for both our linear
and PPML specifications. As PPML allows zero trade flows, we also run specifications (4)-(6) treating all
missing observations as zero trade flows, presented as robustness check later on.
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in bilateral trade flows between only six, four, and three countries, respectively.
In sum, our PPML estimates of the trade-promoting effects of currency unions in Table 1.1
(and of the EMU and other individual currency unions in particular) are very different
than their OLS counterparts. Given the large magnitude of these differences, it is
only natural to wonder: Why do the two estimators give us such strikingly different
results here? And is there anything about this particular setting—with an unusually
large sample of countries—that would lead these estimates to offer such diverging
conclusions? We address these questions next.
1.3.2 Comparing OLS and PPML Estimates for Different Samples
Because the data set from Glick and Rose (2016) we work with is notably very large,
there is likely but one main reason behind the difference in the OLS and PPML estimates
we obtain. As our Park test results have confirmed, OLS is an inconsistent estimator
in this context because it suffers from a heteroscedasticity-induced bias that does not
disappear in large samples, whereas PPML can be shown to be consistent.24
Thus, to investigate why the difference in estimates is as large as it is, we need to be able
to say something about the pattern of heteroscedestacity and why it might induce an
especially large bias for this particular sample. Recall that OLS estimates are consistent
in the special case where the OLS error term (ijt) is homoscedastic.25 A useful way of
visualizing how far off the data is from satisfying this assumption is to use what Tukey
24Another reason sometimes cited in the literature for why PPML and OLS estimates differ is that the
implied moment conditions of OLS estimation make the regressors orthogonal to the difference between
the observed and fitted logged trade flows (i.e., lnXijt− ln X̂ijt), whereas the moment conditions used by
PPML establish orthogonality to the deviations in levels (i.e., Xijt − X̂ijt). For this reason, Eaton, Kortum,
and Sotelo (2013) and Head and Mayer (2013, 2014) conclude that PPML will assign more importance to
larger trade flows relative to OLS. However, these implied weighting differences should affect only the
efficiency of each estimator in small samples; for large samples, the consistency properties of the two
estimators should explain most of the difference in an otherwise correctly specified model.
25This special case of a homoscedastic error term from the log-transformed model corresponds to
the situation described in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) where the conditional variance from the
multiplicative model is proportional to the square of the conditional mean. Both estimators should be
consistent when this assumption is satisfied; thus, we would expect them to give similar results in this
context.
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(1977) calls a “wandering schematic” diagram. To create this diagram—demonstrated
in Figure 1.1—we first group all residuals from the estimation into 20 equal-sized bins,
with each bin collecting observations with similar predicted trade values. We then
sort these bins from smallest to largest predicted value and construct modified box
plots summarizing the distribution of the error term within each bin. As the top left
panel of Figure 1.1 shows—in a visual confirmation of our earlier Park test results—the
residuals from our main OLS specification (i.e., from column 2 in Table 1.1) are clearly
not homoscedastic. In particular, both the boxes for each bin (reflecting the first and
third quartiles of the distribution) and their associated whiskers (reflecting the adjacent
values) grow steadily smaller from left to right as we consider observations with a higher
expected trade value, implying that the variance of these residuals is inversely related to
the conditional mean across the entire sample.26 Note that this does not imply that the
differences between observed and fitted trade flows get smaller for larger trade flows. It
rather implies a decrease in the percentage difference.
To say something about the “degree” of heteroscedasticity using this type of analysis,
it is first necessary to offer some concrete benchmarks for comparison. Glick and Rose
(2016)’s robustness analysis offers us some standard ways of restricting the sample
that are convenient for this purpose. Drawing on Glick and Rose (2016)’s Table 8, the
alternative country subsamples we use are: “industrialized countries plus present/future
EU” (countries with an IFS code below 200 plus all current EU countries); “upper income”
(countries whose GDP per capita exceeds the World Bank “upper income” threshold of
$12,736); “rich and big” (countries with a GDP per capita of at least $10,000 and/or a
GDP exceeding $10 billion), and one sample each for OECD members and for current
and future EU members. Figure 1.2 presents comparisons of OLS and PPML estimates
for these various subsamples, along with 90% and 95% multi-way clustered confidence
bounds. From these comparisons, it is easy to see that OLS estimates of the EMU
effect are only positive and significant for the full sample; otherwise, the OLS estimate is
26The adjacent values of a distribution, which occur at a distance 1.5 times the inter-quartile range past
the nearest edge of the “box”, are a standard concept used in data analysis to determine where the tails of
the distribution lie.
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Figure 1.1: Visualizing Heteroscedesticity in the Data: OLS Residuals vs. Predicted Log Trade Flows,
Binned by Size.
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Figure 1.2: Comparing OLS and PPML Results Across Different Country Samples (with 90% and 95%
Multi-way Clustered Confidence Bounds).
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Figure 1.3: Density Plots of Expected Log Trade Values, by Subsample.
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Figure 1.4: The Effect of Varying the Reference Group of non-EMU Countries on EMU Coefficient
Estimates
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generally much closer to the PPML estimate and is near-zero and statistically insignificant
for all subsamples except the “present/future EU” subsample, where it is negative and
significant. For non-EMU CUs, we generally observe the PPML estimate is somewhat
larger than the corresponding OLS estimate across each of these subsamples, consistent
with our results for the full sample. It is also apparent that OLS estimates of both CU
variables are generally more sensitive to varying which countries are used, whereas
PPML estimates are relatively more stable across different subsamples.
The remaining panels of Figure 1.1 then show how the heteroscedasticity in the data
changes when we restrict the sample to any of these benchmark country groupings. As we
observed earlier for the full sample, all the different subsamples feature observations with
smaller predicted values exhibiting higher variance than other observations. However,
unlike with the full sample, the heteroscedasticity in these subsamples is mainly limited
to the observations with smaller expected values versus the rest of the sample. With
the exception of the full sample, the righthand-sides of each of these panels are at
least close to homoscedastic. As Figure 1.3 suggests, this is likely because the full
sample includes disproportionately more observations with smaller expected trade
values, which generally seem to exhibit more variance and more heteroscedasticity than
other observations. We can therefore plausibly conclude that moving to a comprehensive
sample from any of these benchmark subsamples fundamentally alters the pattern of
heteroscedasticity and amplifies the bias affecting the OLS estimates.
Continuing further with our analysis of these subsamples, another result from Figure
1.2 that draws our curiosity is the close correspondence between the OLS and PPML
estimates of the EMU effect across all the samples we consider except for the full sample.
The similarity between estimates for the sample of current/future EU members is
particularly interesting to us because this sample already includes all the EMU members;
the only difference with the larger sample is that the larger sample also adds many
non-EU countries to the “reference group” of trade partners against which within-EMU
trade is compared in order to identify the EMU effect. Or, more precisely, the addition
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of more reference group countries mainly affects the estimation via the exporter-time
and importer-time fixed effects λit and ψjt. Since trade with a smaller trade partner
contributes more to the sum of a country’s total log trade flows (the key moment used to
identify these fixed effects in OLS) than to its total trade in levels (the key moment used
in PPML), it’s conceivable that at least some of the divergence in estimates reflects the
relatively higher importance that OLS places on the many smaller non-EMU countries
present in the full sample.
To explore in more detail how differences between linear and PPML estimates evolve
with the composition of the reference group, Figure 1.4 plots estimates from both the
linear model and PPML starting with the EU as a whole and then adding one country
at a time ranked by 2013 GDP. These estimates reveal that adding more and more
(smaller) countries leads to a continually rising OLS estimate—even for the addition of
the world’s tiniest economies—while the PPML estimates stabilize after the inclusion of
around 40 additional countries. Based on the preceding discussion, this divergence is
by no means surprising: as we add smaller and smaller countries to the sample, we are
tending to make the data more heteroscedastic, thereby amplifying the bias in the OLS
estimate. However, we also note that the PPML and OLS estimates shown in Figure 1.4
are usually influenced in the same direction whenever the next-largest country is added
to the sample. As such, the PPML and OLS estimates shown in the figure both seem to
agree that trade has fallen between EMU members relative to their trade with the rest of
the EU as well as with the six largest non-EU economies (the US, China, Japan, Brazil,
and India), which together constitute more than two-thirds of world non-EMU GDP.
Intra-EMU trade appears to have risen, however, relative to trade with smaller partners,
starting with the seventh largest non-EMU economy (Canada). To interpret our earlier
results in light of these patterns, the positive and significant overall OLS estimate of
the EMU effect we observe appears to be heavily influenced by the apparent decline
in trade between the EMU and the many smaller non-EMU countries in the sample
relative to intra-EMU trade. Since PPML naturally discounts the addition of smaller
reference group countries, and since this pattern is nowhere to be found for the EMU’s
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most important outside partners, this feature of the data could help explain some of the
difference between the PPML and OLS estimates of the EMU effect.27
1.3.3 Other Robustness
To add some final experiments, we consider here the possible role played by zero trade
flows (which cannot be included in log-linear models) as well as some possible omitted
temporal factors such as lags, trends and anticipation effects. We also examine how the
effect of currency unions has changed over time.
Missing and Zero Trade Flows. As noted earlier, in order to obtain the main estimation
results, we treated missing observations in the Glick and Rose (2016) data set as missing
for both our linear and PPML specifications. Omitting zero trade flows could potentially
lead to a sample selection problem biasing our results. If a currency union induces
country-pairs to start trading (versus not at all), estimates based on positive trade
flows only may lead to a downward bias of the estimated effect of currency unions on
trade. While OLS cannot handle zero trade flows without further adjustments, such as
adding a small, arbitrary number (see e.g. Linnemann, 1966) or applying the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation (see e.g. Kristja´nsdo´ttir, 2012), they can be directly
included into the PPML estimation. In Table 1.2, we therefore show the results of
re-estimating specifications (4)-(6), now treating all missing observations as zero trade
flows. The results indicate that including zero trade flows hardly affects the estimates.
Most importantly, estimating the gravity equation in its multiplicative form still erases
the EMU effect. The one small change from our earlier results is that the general CU
effect now remains marginally significant even when clustering at the exporter, importer,
and year dimension.
27To investigate this intuition, we ran our OLS main specification (column (2) of Table 1.1) with the
product of GDPs as weights. Indeed, the results from the weighted OLS regression are more similar to
the PPML estimates than the unweighted ones. Most importantly, the estimated EMU coefficient is 0.335
(compared to 0.429 and 0.030 for unweighted OLS and PPML, respectively) and the estimated currency
union effect for all other CUs is 0.450 (compared to 0.298 and 0.700 for unweighted OLS and PPML,
respectively).
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Table 1.2: PPML with Missings as Zero Trade Flows
All CUs Disagg. EMU Disagg. CUs
(1) (2) (3)
All CUs 0.153
(0.010)∗∗∗
{0.083}∗
EMU 0.0521 0.0489
(0.010)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗
{0.095} {0.095}
All Non-EMU CUs 0.728
(0.026)∗∗∗
{0.180}∗∗∗
CFA Franc Zone -0.126
(0.100)
{0.354}
East Caribbean CU -0.877
(0.083)∗∗∗
{0.296}∗∗∗
Aussie $ 0.384
(0.119)∗∗∗
{0.226}∗
British £ 1.060
(0.035)∗∗∗
{0.239}∗∗∗
French Franc 2.096
(0.063)∗∗∗
{0.308}∗∗∗
Indian Rupee 0.170
(0.147)
{0.304}
US $ 0.0183
(0.022)
{0.051}
Other CUs 0.766
(0.053)∗∗∗
{0.250}∗∗∗
RTAs 0.159 0.160 0.159
(0.009)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗
{0.077}∗∗ {0.077}∗∗ {0.076}∗∗
CurCol 0.827 0.630 0.387
(0.064)∗∗∗ (0.055)∗∗∗ (0.047)∗∗∗
{0.291}∗∗∗ {0.257}∗∗ {0.156}∗∗
N 1,610,165 1,610,165 1,610,165
# of clusters
exporters 213 213 213
importers 213 213 213
years 66 66 66
Pseudo-R2 0.986 0.987 0.987
Park-Test (p-value) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Notes: This table reproduces the results from Table 1.1 after treating
all missing observations in the sample as zeroes. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by exporter, importer,
and year in curly brackets. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. See
text for further details.
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Time Periods. Our main specifications rest on the strong assumption that the influence
of the currency unions on trade has not changed over the last seventy years. But
some recent evidence provided by de Sousa (2012) suggests this may not be a good
assumption. In addition, since the EMU does not begin until relatively late in the sample,
it is worth investigating whether our estimates change if we use a more recent time
series that is more centred on the EMU specifically.
We thus use Table 1.3 to investigate how the effects of currency unions change over time,
both for our full country sample as well as for the benchmark subsamples considered in
Glick and Rose (2016)’s Table 8 and in our own Figure 1.2. The estimates using all years
from 1948-2013 for all subsamples are given in the first column; estimates presented
in subsequent columns then experiment with how CU effects vary when the sample
period begins in either 1985 or 1995 and/or ends in 2005.28 Consistent with our earlier
Figure 1.2, we find that no single subsample leads to a positive significant effect for the
Euro and that the large and positive non-EMU CU effect is robust for all samples with a
large time span. For samples beginning in 1985 or 1995, however, the non-EMU effect
is always statistically insignificant when multi-way clustered standard errors are used.
This latter set of findings lends support to de Sousa (2012)’s earlier observation that the
trade-promoting effect of currency unions seems to have weakened significantly over
the course of the 20th century. As discussed in de Sousa (2012), one plausible reason
for the decreasing effect of currency unions may be increased international economic
integration, both in terms of trade and financial globalization. However, we also note
that subsamples without observations prior to 1985 include only very few observations of
country-pairs leaving or joining non-EMU currency unions. Thus, we find no significant
effects (or even cannot identify the effects) for some subsamples.
Quadrennial Data. Because trade flows may require some time to adjust to changes in
trade costs, Cheng and Wall (2005) have suggested using intervals of several years rather
28The corresponding OLS results, which largely replicate Glick and Rose (2016)’s Table 8, are provided
in Table A.2 in Appendix A.7.
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Table 1.3: PPML Estimation of Different Subsamples
1948-2013 1985-2013 1995-2013 1948-2005 1985-2005 1995-2005
All countries
EMU 0.030 0.006 0.010 -0.055 -0.063 -0.052
(0.010)∗∗∗ (0.010) (0.013) (0.013)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗
{0.092} {0.058} {0.038} {0.082} {0.050} {0.034}
All Non-EMU CUs 0.700 0.084 0.052 0.685 -0.002 0.009
(0.025)∗∗∗ (0.027)∗∗∗ (0.031)∗ (0.025)∗∗∗ (0.030) (0.035)
{0.172}∗∗∗ {0.073} {0.087} {0.156}∗∗∗ {0.056} {0.072}
Industrial countries plus present/future EU
EMU -0.138 -0.055 -0.009 -0.200 -0.122 -0.075
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗ (0.014) (0.017)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗
{0.081}∗ {0.055} {0.037} {0.080}∗∗ {0.046}∗∗∗ {0.034}∗∗
All Non-EMU CUs 1.159 -0.188 0.007 1.066 -0.050 0.018
(0.043)∗∗∗ (0.147) (0.268) (0.041)∗∗∗ (0.145) (0.172)
{0.270}∗∗∗ {0.366} {0.160} {0.232}∗∗∗ {0.282} {0.095}
Upper income (GDP p/c ≥ $ 12,736)
EMU -0.076 -0.027 -0.002 -0.134 -0.089 -0.063
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗ (0.015) (0.015)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗
{0.073} {0.052} {0.037} {0.066}∗∗ {0.043}∗∗ {0.032}∗∗
All Non-EMU CUs 0.762 0.743
(0.130)∗∗∗ (0.107)∗∗∗
{0.232}∗∗∗ {0.194}∗∗∗
Rich Big (GDP≥$ 10bn, GDP p/c≥$ 10k)
EMU -0.055 -0.025 -0.004 -0.108 -0.088 -0.073
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗ (0.015) (0.015)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗
{0.077} {0.053} {0.038} {0.073} {0.043}∗∗ {0.032}∗∗
All Non-EMU CUs 1.312 1.223
(0.059)∗∗∗ (0.055)∗∗∗
{0.321}∗∗∗ {0.256}∗∗∗
OECD
EMU -0.103 -0.047 -0.027 -0.140 -0.092 -0.069
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.016)∗ (0.016)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗
{0.071} {0.054} {0.040} {0.067}∗∗ {0.042}∗∗ {0.032}∗∗
All Non-EMU CUs 1.214 1.171
(0.062)∗∗∗ (0.370)∗∗∗
{0.439}∗∗∗ {0.365}∗∗∗
Present/future EU
EMU -0.305 -0.068 0.021 -0.448 -0.192 -0.060
(0.017)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗∗ (0.017) (0.026)∗∗∗ (0.018)∗∗∗ (0.017)∗∗∗
{0.099}∗∗∗ {0.055} {0.041} {0.124}∗∗∗ {0.084}∗∗ {0.063}
All Non-EMU CUs 1.157 1.131
(0.054)∗∗∗ (0.052)∗∗∗
{0.517}∗∗ {0.469}∗∗
Notes: This table reports robustness estimates of the findings of Specification (5) with respect to country
sample and period of investigation, as in Table 8 of Glick and Rose (2016). RTAs and CurCol are included in
the regressions, but their coefficient estimates are not shown for brevity. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors clustered by exporter, importer, and year in curly brackets. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
See text for further details.
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Table 1.4: PPML with Time Trends, Leads, and Lags
Intervals Trends Lags Leads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EMU 0.022 -0.058 -0.056 0.020
(0.020) (0.023)∗∗ (0.025)∗∗ (0.028)
{0.091} {0.072} {0.070} {0.048}
All Non-EMU CUs 0.701 0.387 0.181 0.556
(0.050)∗∗∗ (0.050)∗∗∗ (0.071)∗∗ (0.067)∗∗∗
{0.176}∗∗∗ {0.133}∗∗∗ {0.080}∗∗ {0.164}∗∗∗
RTAs 0.178 0.125 0.077 0.216
(0.018)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗ (0.018)∗∗∗ (0.020)∗∗∗
{0.086}∗∗ {0.052}∗∗ {0.060} {0.083}∗∗∗
CurCol 0.619 0.347 -0.026 0.605
(0.117)∗∗∗ (0.096)∗∗∗ (0.108) (0.148)∗∗∗
{0.300}∗∗ {0.285} {0.134} {0.279}∗∗
EMUt−4 0.083
(0.026)∗∗∗
{0.035}∗∗
All Non-EMU CUst−4 0.488
(0.062)∗∗∗
{0.140}∗∗∗
RTAst−4 0.146
(0.017)∗∗∗
{0.063}∗∗
CurColt−4 0.674
(0.118)∗∗∗
{0.232}∗∗∗
EMUt+4 -0.031
(0.026)
{0.074}
All Non-EMU CUst+4 0.219
(0.076)∗∗∗
{0.126}∗
RTAst+4 0.019
(0.021)
{0.060}
CurColt+4 -0.040
(0.144)
{0.173}
N 221,170 221,170 217,462 196,559
# of Clusters
Exporters 212 212 212 211
Importers 212 212 212 211
Years 17 17 16 16
Pseudo-R2 0.987 0.995 0.987 0.986
Park-Test (p-value) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Notes: Column (1) of this table reproduces the results of column (5) of Table
1.1 but using the data in four year intervals. In addition, we add bilateral linear
time trend in column (2) and lags and leads in columns (3) and (4), respectively.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by exporter,
importer, and year in curly brackets. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. See
text for further details.
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than yearly data. Following this advice has become general practice in the regional trade
agreements literature (see for example Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Bergstrand, Larch,
and Yotov, 2015) and a similar argument conceivably applies to currency unions as well.
We therefore re-estimate our main specification based on 4-year intervals instead of
using consecutive years. As can be seen from column (1) of Table 1.4, this hardly affects
our point estimates and standard errors, even though we only use about a quarter of the
data.29
Time Trends. The inclusion of bilateral fixed effects only captures bilateral time-
invariant heterogeneity. One step towards capturing bilateral unobservables in a more
flexible way is to interact the pair fixed effects with the linear variable year in order to
account for pair-specific trends, as suggested in the EMU context by Bun and Klaassen
(2007) and for the estimation of regional trade agreement effects by Bergstrand, Larch,
and Yotov (2015). The estimates from column (2) of Table 1.4 demonstrate that the EMU
effect continues to be insignificant when these bilateral linear time trends are added,
while the effect of all other CUs is about halved.30 A possible explanation is that when
not controlling for bilateral linear time trends, part of the CU effect captures common
changes in bilateral unobserved heterogeneity among CU members. The addition of this
time trend also requires a further extension to our PPML estimation procedure, which
we provide in Appendix A.5.
Lags. As discussed above, our failure to find a significant EMU effect could plausibly be
because trade adjusts slowly to the introduction of a common currency rather than all at
once. On top of using 4-year intervals, an additional way to explicitly capture sluggish
adjustments and phasing-in effects of trade policies is to follow Baier and Bergstrand
(2007)’s suggestion of adding lagged explanatory variables. After adding lags of all
variables, the contemporaneous EMU effect is still insignificant (see column (3) of Table
1.4.) However, the lagged value is now small, positive, and statistically significant. The
29The OLS results for all specifications of Table 1.4 are presented in Table A.3 in Appendix A.7.
30These results and all subsequent results in Table 1.4 continue to use every four years (as in column 1).
Our results are similar if we use every year.
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combined EMU (defined as the sum of the contemporaneous effect and the lagged effect)
is 0.027, which is again not statistically different from zero (std.err. = 0.093). For all
other CUs, both the contemporaneous and lagged value are positive, and statistically
significant. Their joint size of 0.668 (with std.err. = 0.188) is not statistically significantly
different from the value from column (1).
Leads. Lastly, in column (4) of Table 1.4, we estimate specifications including the leads
of all variables. A possible interpretation of this experiment is as a placebo test, as we
should not see any effect of CUs that are not already in place. Indeed, for the EMU, the
lead effect is close to zero and statistically insignificant. For the other CUs the lead is
marginally significant, but substantially smaller than the contemporaneous coefficient.
The significance of the lead variable could hint at an endogeneity problem or capture
anticipation effects or the impact of any other unobserved drivers of trade. Hence, while
our analysis demonstrates the effectiveness and empirical relevance of our methods,
we again note that estimates of the effects of the non-EMU CUs—both here and in the
literature more generally—should be interpreted with at least some caution.
1.4 Conclusions
We make three main contributions. First, we offer practical methods to overcome impor-
tant challenges with the estimation of structural gravity models with high-dimensional
fixed effects and clustered standard errors using PPML. Second, these innovations lead
to very different conclusions about the effects of currency unions on trade, especially
with regards to whether the Euro has had a statistically significant effect on trade. Third,
we identify a cautionary example where OLS and PPML gravity estimates differ to an
especially dramatic degree. We relate this difference to the underlying heteroscedasticity,
which renders OLS inconsistent and which increases in the number of small countries
included in our sample. Notably, the increasing divergence between estimates for larger
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samples with more small countries indicates that the computational issues we resolve in
this paper would otherwise limit a researcher’s choice of estimator precisely when this
choice seems to matter most.
2Persistent Zeros: The Extensive Margin
of Trade1
2.1 Introduction
What induces country pairs to trade? In 2006, still more than one quarter of potential
bilateral trade relations reported zero trade flows. Figure 2.1 breaks down the share of
nonzero trade flows in 2006 along the percentiles of four different ad-hoc indicators of
“trade potential”: bilateral distance; product of GDPs; “naive” gravity, i.e. the product of
GDPs divided by their bilateral distance; and the latter when excluding country pairs
in FTAs, with common currencies or common colonial history. The x-axis indicates
the potential trade volume, i.e. the joint economic size and/or proximity of any two
countries. All four plots paint a common picture: the black dots, covering all country
pairs, show a strong general relationship between trade potential and actual nonzero
trade. The blue and red dots split the country pairs according to whether the two did
or did not engage in trade in the previous year. The clearly separated pattern for the
1This chapter is joint work with Julian Hinz and Amrei Stammann. We thank Tanmay Belavadi,
Daniel Czarnowske, Miriam Frey, Mario Larch, and Yuta Watabe for helpful comments. Note: An R
implementation of the estimators developed in this chapter will be provided on CRAN and is currently
available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 2.1: Determinants of the Extensive Margin of Trade — Gravity and Persistence.
two groups highlights a remarkable persistence of trade relations, even after controlling
for differences in trade potential in terms of distance, size, and bilateral trade policy.
More than 75 percent of those country pairs in the lowest percentile of trade potential
trade again in 2006, provided they already did so in 2005. On the other hand, even
comparably large and close pairs are likely not to trade in 2006 if they did not trade in
2005 either.2,3
2Note that throughout the paper, “country pair” refers to a directed pair of countries, i.e. Germany-
France and France-Germany are two distinct country pairs.
3The years 2005–2006 are the last available in our data set. A very similar pattern emerges for
other points in time (see Figure B.1 in Appendix B.1 where the same graph is reproduced for the years
1990–1991). If longer time intervals are considered, a similar picture remains, but the relationship
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In this paper we examine the determinants of the extensive margin of international
trade, explicitly taking its persistence into account. We combine a heterogeneous firms
model of international trade with bounded productivity with features from the firm
dynamics literature to derive expressions for an exporting country’s participation in
a specific destination market in a given period. These expressions depend on partly
unobserved (i) exporter-time, (ii) destination-time, and (iii) exporter-destination specific
components, as well as on (iv) whether the exporter has already served the market in
the previous period, and on (v) exporter-destination-time specific gravity-type trade cost
determinants. We estimate the model making use of recent advances in the estimation
of binary choice estimators with high-dimensional fixed effects to address (i)-(iii). The
inclusion of fixed effects in a binary choice setting induces an incidental parameter
problem, potentially aggravated by the dynamics introduced by (iv). To mitigate this
bias, we characterize and implement new analytical and jackknife bias corrections for
coefficients and estimates of average partial effects in our specifications with two- and
three-way fixed effects. Extensive simulation experiments demonstrate the desirable
statistical properties of our proposed bias-corrected, two- and three-way fixed effect
logit and probit estimators. The empirical results provide evidence that both unobserved
bilateral factors and true state dependence due to entry dynamics contribute strongly
to the high persistence. Taking this persistence into account changes the coefficients
considerably: out of the most commonly studied potential determinants (joint WTO
membership, common regional trade agreement, and shared currency), only sharing
a common currency has a significant effect on whether two countries trade with each
other at all.
Our paper builds on recent insights from three flourishing strands of literature. First,
our paper is related to the literature on the extensive margin of international trade.
A number of theoretical frameworks have sought to propose mechanisms behind the
decisions of firms to export, and their aggregate implications of zero or nonzero trade
flows at the country pair level. Analogous to the intensive margin counterpart, these
becomes considerably weaker (see Figure B.2 in Appendix B.1 for the years 1997–2006).
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theories have established gravity-like determinants, such as two countries’ bilateral
distance, a free trade agreement, a common currency and joint membership of the WTO.
Egger and Larch (2011) and Egger, Larch, Staub, and Winkelmann (2011) append an
extensive margin to an Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)-type model by assuming
export participation to be determined by (homogeneous) firms weighing operating
profits and bilateral fixed costs of exporting. This results in a two-part model in which,
given a country’s participation in exporting to any given destination, trade flows follow
structural gravity. Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) build a model of international
trade with heterogeneous firms. Here, the volume of trade between two countries can
change either because incumbent firms expand their operations, or because of new
competitors entering into a market. Eaton, Kortum, and Sotelo (2013) move away
from the arguably simplifying notion of a continuum of firms and develop a model of a
finite set of heterogeneous firms. Here no firm may export to a given market because of
their individual efficiency draws. Our model proposed in this paper directly builds on
Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) and extends it by features from the literature
on firm dynamics.
In this firm-level literature, Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) develop a dynamic discrete-
choice model in which current export participation depends on previous exporting, and
hence sunk costs, and observable characteristics of profits from exporting. Alessandria
and Choi (2007) extend this line of research and develop a general equilibrium frame-
work that takes sunk costs and “period-by-period” fixed costs into account, showing
that, contrary to previous partial equilibrium evidence, aggregate effects are negligible
for the US. More recent works have looked at new exporter dynamics (Ruhl and Willis,
2017), emphasizing that sunk costs may be relatively smaller and continuation costs
relatively larger than previously assumed. Bernard, Bøler, Massari, Reyes, and Taglioni
(2017) stand somewhat in contrast to this finding, showing that first and second year
growth rates may suffer from a bias because of different entry dates throughout the
year. Berman, Rebeyrol, and Vicard (2019) note the important role of “demand learning”
and firms’ updating of their future demand and market participation. In a similar vein,
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Piveteau (2019) develops a model in which new firms accumulate consumers — or fail
to do so — determining entry and exit. While these newer models feature rich firm-level
predictions, they require tailor-made econometric models for their estimation. Our
model abstracts from the specific role of new firms and has the advantage of yielding an
econometric specification and demanding an estimator that remains general and flexible
to be applied in other contexts.
Second, our paper builds on advances in the literature on the gravity equation and
the intensive margin of international trade. With the advent of what has now been
coined structural gravity (Head and Mayer, 2014), the gravity framework has gained
rich microfoundations. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Eaton and Kortum
(2002) each formulate an underlying structure for exporting and importing countries
that in estimations can easily be captured by appropriate two-way country(-time) fixed
effects, as first noted by Feenstra (2004) and Redding and Venables (2004). Although
not theoretically motivated, since Baier and Bergstrand (2007) it has furthermore
become standard to include country pair fixed effects to tackle unobservable bilateral
characteristics. Estimating the model introduced in this paper similarly calls for at least
two sets of fixed effects, specific to exporters and importers in a given year. Additionally,
and following Baier and Bergstrand (2007), there is no reason to believe that bilateral
unobservables should not be a problem in the context of the extensive margin. Our
preferred estimation of the model thus includes the “full set” of fixed effects that has
become standard in the estimation of gravity models of the intensive margin of trade:
exporter-year, importer-year and bilateral fixed effects that leave only bilateral-time-
specific variation for the estimation of parameters of interest.
Third, the paper builds on and contributes to the literature on the econometrics of
generalized linear models (GLMs) with fixed effects. Recent advances in this literature
have made it possible to go beyond ordinary linear models in the context of high-
dimensional fixed effects by providing fast and feasible algorithms (see Guimara˜es and
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Portugal (2010), Stammann (2018), and Hinz, Hudlet, and Wanner (2019)).4 As known
since Neyman and Scott (1948), the inclusion of fixed effects potentially introduces
an incidental parameter problem, leading to biased estimates. In the last few years,
there have been a number of advances to correct this bias, and a variety of approaches
have been proposed (see Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2018) for a recent overview).
Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2016) develop analytical and jackknife bias corrections for
nonlinear maximum likelihood estimators in static and dynamic models with individual
and time effects for structural parameters and average partial effects. In Ferna´ndez-Val
and Weidner (2018) they generalize their previous findings and show that the order
of the bias induced by fixed effects in a wide family of models translates into a simple
heuristic p/n, with n being the sample size and p the number of estimated parameters.
Recently, Czarnowske and Stammann (2019) show how analytical bias corrections can
be efficiently implemented in a high-dimensional fixed effects setting using the methods
described by Stammann (2018).
Our paper is complementary to computational and econometric contributions on the
estimation of the intensive margin of trade. Larch, Wanner, Yotov, and Zylkin (2019)
present a feasible procedure to estimate pseudo-poisson (PPML) models with three
high-dimensional fixed effects. Correia, Guimara˜es, and Zylkin (2019) generalize this
estimation procedure to arbitrary sets of fixed effects. Weidner and Zylkin (2018)
investigate the incidental parameter problem in three-way fixed effects PPML models
under fixed T asymptotics and suggest an appropriate jackknife bias correction. We
contribute to this literature by characterizing and implementing analytical and jackknife
bias corrections for our specific two- and three-way fixed effects in the context of
binary choice models. This helps us mitigate the bias induced by estimating our theory-
consistent model, requiring exporter-time (it), importer-time (jt), and in our preferred
4Stammann, Heiß, and McFadden (2016) have shown in the context of binary choice models with
individual fixed effects that a weighted version of the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem (Frisch and Waugh
(1933), Lovell (1963)) can be incorporated in a standard Newton-Raphson optimization procedure. This
result paved the way to derive a computationally efficient algorithm for all GLMs with high-dimensional
multi-way fixed effects (see Stammann (2018)). More recently, Hinz, Hudlet, and Wanner (2019) offer a
different way to partial out fixed effects using a modification of the Gauss-Seidel algorithm proposed by
Guimara˜es and Portugal (2010).
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specification bilateral fixed effects (ij).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we build a dynamic
model of the extensive margin of international trade. The model yields aggregate
predictions that can be structurally estimated using a probit model with high-dimensional
fixed effects. In Section 2.3 we describe the estimator and bias correction procedure. We
show its performance in Monte Carlo simulations in Section 2.4, before finally estimating
the theoretical model in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 An Empirical Model of the Extensive Margin of Trade
As a theoretical foundation for our econometric specification, we consider a stylized
dynamic Melitz (2003)-type heterogeneous firms model of international trade. Following
Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008, henceforth HMR) we assume a bounded
productivity distribution, like a truncated Pareto in HMR’s case. We deviate from HMR
by explicitly stating a time dimension and, unlike in the standard Melitz setting, separate
fixed exporting costs into costs of entering a new market and costs of selling in a given
market (as in Alessandria and Choi, 2007; Das, Roberts, and Tybout, 2007).
There are N countries, indexed by i and j, each of which consumes and produces a
continuum of products. The representative consumer in j receives utility according to a
CES utility function:
ujt =
(∫
ω∈Ωjt
(ξijt)
1
σ qjt(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
) σ
σ−1
with σ > 1. (2.1)
where qjt(ω) is j’s consumption of product ω in period t, Ωjt is the set of products
available in j, σ is the elasticity of substitution across products, and ξijt is a log-normally
distributed idiosyncratic demand shock (with µξ = 0 and σξ = 1) for goods from country
i in country j and period t (similar to Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz, 2011). Demand in
country j for good ω depends on this demand shock, j’s overall expenditure Ejt, and the
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good price pjt(ω) relative to the overall price level as captured by the price index Pjt:
qjt(ω) =
pjt(ω)−σ
P 1−σjt
ξijtEjt,
with Pjt =
(∫
ω∈Ωjt
ξijtpjt(ω)1−σdω
) 1
1−σ
.
Each country has a fixed continuum of potentially active firms that have different
productivities drawn from the distribution Git(ϕ), where ϕ ∈ (0, ϕ∗it]. The productivity
distribution evolves over time and firms’ ranks within the productivity distribution can
also change from period to period, though firms that in the last period did not export to
a market already served by a domestic competitor are assumed not to directly jump to
being the country’s most productive firm in the next period.5 Each period, a firm can
decide to pay a fixed cost fprodit and start production of a differentiated variety using
labour l as its only input, such that lt(ω) = fprodit + qt(ω)/ϕt(ω). A firm’s marginal cost of
providing one unit of its good to market j consists of iceberg trade costs τijt and labour
costs wit/ϕt(ω). Firms compete with each other in monopolistic competition and charge
a constant markup over marginal costs. Therefore, the price of a good ω produced in i
and sold in j is:
pijt(ω) =
σ
σ − 1
τijtwit
ϕt(ω)
.
A firm’s operating profits in market j are hence given by:
p˜iijt(ω) =
1
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
τijtwit
ϕt(ω)
)1−σ
P σ−1jt ξijtEjt.
If a firm wants to export to a market j in period t, it has to pay a fixed exporting cost
f expijt . The exporting fixed cost is higher by a market entry cost factor f entry ≥ 1 if the
firm has not been active in the respective market in the previous period. For tractability,
the entry cost factor is assumed to be constant across countries and time. Capturing the
5Note that we could in principle also allow for new firm entry into the pool of potential producers
without changing our final expression for the extensive margin as long as the new entrants cannot become
the country’s most productive firm right away.
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export decision by a binary variable yijt(ω), i.e. equal to one if the firm decides to serve
market j in period t, we can formalize a firm’s realized profits in market j as follows:
piijt(ω) = yijt(ω)
{
p˜iijt(ω)− f expijt (f entry)[1−yij(t−1)(ω)]
}
.
In the absence of entry costs, a firm would simply compare its operating profits to the
fixed exporting cost and decide to serve a market if the former are greater than the latter.
With market entry costs, a firm might be willing to incur a loss in the current period if
expected future profits from that same market outweigh the initial loss. Firms discount
future profits at a rate δ per period. To keep things tractable and allow us to derive a
theory-consistent estimation expression below, we assume that firms expect their future
operating profits from, and fixed costs of serving, a given market to be equal to today’s
values, i.e. Et[p˜iij(t+s)] = p˜iijt and Et[f expij(t+s)] = f
exp
ijt ∀s ∈ N.6 The current value of today’s
and all future operating profits from market j is then given by
∑∞
s=0(1− δ)sp˜iijt = p˜iijtδ . A
firm will decide to serve a destination market if these discounted expected profits exceed
the sum of today’s and discounted future fixed costs of entry and exporting, given by
f expijt (f entry)(1−yij(t−1)(ω)) +
∞∑
s=1
(1− δ)sf expijt =
f expijt
δ
(
1 + δ(f entry − 1)
)(1−yij(t−1)(ω))
.
Given this model setup, the question whether a country exports to another country at
all can be considered by looking at the most productive firm (with ϕ∗t ) only. Denoting
that firm’s product by ω∗, we can capture the aggregate extensive margin by the binary
variable yijt as follows:
yijt = yijt(ω∗) =

1 if
(
1
σ
(
σ
σ−1
τijtwit
ϕ∗
it
)1−σ
Pσ−1jt ξijtEjt
)
fexpijt (1+δ(fentry−1))
(1−yij(t−1)) ≥ 1,
0 else.
(2.2)
Country i is hence more likely to export to country j in period t if (i) bilateral variable
6Note that our final expression for the extensive margin also holds if firms instead expect their operating
profits from serving an export market to grow at a constant rate g¯ < δ.
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trade costs are lower; (ii) wages in i, and hence production costs, are lower; (iii) the
productivity of the most productive firm is higher, again reducing production costs; (iv)
competitive pressure, inversely captured by the price index, in j is lower, corresponding
to the idea of inward multilateral resistance coined by Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) in the intensive margin context; (v) the market in j is larger; (vi) bilateral fixed
costs of exporting are smaller; or (vii) i’s most productive firm already served market j in
the previous period and therefore does not have to pay the market entry cost. Note that
(i) to (iv) all act via higher operating profits and depend on the elasticity of substitution
between goods. The higher this elasticity, the stronger the reaction of profits to changes
in any of these factors. At the same time, a higher elasticity reduces the mark-up firms
can charge and hence makes it generally harder to earn enough profits to mitigate the
fixed costs of exporting. Further note that the importance of the entry costs depends
on the discount factor. Intuitively, if agents are more patient, the one-time entry costs
matter less compared to the repeatedly earned profits.
In order to turn equation (2.2) into the empirical expression that we will bring to the
data, we take the natural logarithm and group all exporter-time and importer-time
specific components and capture them with corresponding sets of fixed effects. Further,
we need to specify the fixed and variable trade costs. In keeping with the existing
literature, we model them as a linear combination of different observable bilateral
variables, such as geographical distance, whether i and j are both WTO members,
or whether i and j share a common currency. In our most general specification, we
additionally include country pair fixed effects. Following Baier and Bergstrand (2007),
this is common practice in the estimation of the determinants of the intensive margin
of trade in order to avoid endogeneity due to unobserved heterogeneity. Further, these
bilateral fixed effects may capture (part of) the strong persistence documented above.7
7If the trade costs further include any exporter(-time) or importer(-time) specific components, these
are captured by the aforementioned corresponding sets of fixed effects.
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We then arrive at the following econometric model:
yijt =

1 if κ+ λit + ψjt + βyyij(t−1) + x′ijtβx + µij ≥ ζijt,
0 else,
(2.3)
where κ = −σ log(σ)− (1−σ) log(σ− 1)− log(1 + δ(f entry− 1)), λit = (1−σ)(log(wit)−
log(ϕ∗it)), ψjt = (σ − 1) log(Pjt) + log(Ejt), βy = log(1 + δ(f entry − 1)), x′ijtβx + µij =
(1− σ) log(τijt)− log(f expijt ), and ζijt = − log(ξijt) ∼ N (0, 1). The error term distribution
implies that a probit estimator is the appropriate choice to estimate our model. Al-
ternatively, we could deviate from Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) and assume a
log-logistic distribution for the idiosyncratic demand shocks, which would lead to a logit
specification.
Our theoretical framework implies a flexible empirical specification that can reconcile
the extensive margin estimation with the stylized fact presented in Section 2.1. Note
that we chose to make a number of simplifying assumptions in order to achieve the clear
theory-consistent interpretation of specification (2.3). An alternative interpretation of
equation (2.3) as a reduced-from representation of a more elaborate and realistic model
(similar e.g. to how Roberts and Tybout, 1997, motivate their empirical consideration)
is equally justifiable. At the same time, while our model is written along the lines
of Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), which remains the benchmark for the
empirical assessment of the (aggregate) extensive margin of trade, it is not decisive for
our empirical specification that zero trade flows result from a truncated productivity
distribution instead of a discrete number of firms (as in Eaton, Kortum, and Sotelo,
2013) or from fixed exporting costs in a Krugman (1980)-type homogeneous firms
setting (as in Egger and Larch, 2011; Egger, Larch, Staub, and Winkelmann, 2011).
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2.3 Binary Response Estimators with High-Dimensional
Fixed Effects
Having set up the empirical framework, we now turn to the estimation procedure.
As equation (2.3) demands two- or three-way fixed effects to capture unobservable
characteristics, we describe how to implement suitable binary choice estimators. In a
first step, we review a recent procedure for estimating probit and logit models with high-
dimensional fixed effects. In a second step, we characterize appropriate bias correction
techniques to address the induced incidental parameter problem.
2.3.1 Feasible Estimation
In this subsection, we sketch how to estimate structural parameters, average partial
effects (APEs), and the corresponding standard errors in a binary response setting in
the presence of high-dimensional fixed effects. Let Z = [D,X], where D is the dummy
matrix corresponding to the fixed effects and X is a matrix of further regressors. Note
that X may also include predetermined variables. Further, let α denote the vector of
fixed effects, β the vector of structural parameters, and θ = [α′,β′]′. The log-likelihood
contribution of the ijt-th observation is
`ijt(β,αijt) = yijt log(Fijt) + (1− yijt) log(1− Fijt),
where αijt = [λit, ψjt]′ in the case of two-way fixed effects and αijt = [λit, ψjt, µij]′ in
the case of three-way fixed effects.8 Further, Fijt is either the logistic or the standard
normal cumulative distribution function. See Table 2.1 for the relevant expressions and
derivatives.
8Note that we use for brevity notation for balanced data.
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Table 2.1: Expressions and Derivatives for Logit and Probit Models
Logit Probit
Fijt (1 + exp(−ηijt))−1 Φ(ηijt)
∂ηFijt Fijt(1− Fijt) φ(ηijt)
∂η2Fijt ∂ηFijt(1− 2Fijt) −ηijtφ(ηijt)
νijt (yijt − Fijt)/∂ηFijt (yijt − Fijt)/∂ηFijt
Hijt 1 ∂ηFijt/(Fijt(1− Fijt))
ωijt ∂ηFijt Hijt∂ηFijt
∂η`ijt yijt − Fijt Hijt(yijt − Fijt)
Note: ηijt = x′ijtβ+λit+ψjt or ηijt = x′ijtβ+λit+ψjt+µij
is the linear predictor.
The standard approach to estimate binary choice models is to maximize the following
log-likelihood function:
L(β,α) =
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
`ijt(β,αijt)
using Newton’s method. The update in the r-th iteration is
θr − θr−1 = (Z′Ω̂Z)−1Z′Ω̂νˆ , (2.4)
where (Z′Ω̂Z)−1 and Z′Ω̂νˆ denote the Hessian and gradient of the log-likelihood, re-
spectively, and Ω̂ is a diagonal weighting matrix with diag(Ω̂) = ω̂.
The brute-force computation of equation (2.4) quickly becomes computationally de-
manding, if not impossible.9 Thus Stammann (2018) suggests a straightforward strategy
called pseudo-demeaning, which mimics the well-known within transformation for linear
regression models. The approach allows us to update the structural parameters without
having to explicitly update the incidental parameters, which leads to the following
9In a balanced data set (I = J = N) with two-way fixed effects the routine requires to estimate
≈ 2NT fixed effects associated with a 2NT × 2NT Hessian. In the case of three-way fixed effects, the
number of parameters to be estimated is even ≈ N(N − 1)× 2NT . In a trade panel data set with 200
countries and 50 years, the number of fixed effects in the latter case amounts to 59800 parameters.
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concentrated version of equation (2.4)
βr − βr−1 =
(
(M̂X)′Ω̂(M̂X)
)−1
(M̂X)′Ω̂(M̂νˆ) , (2.5)
where M̂νˆ is the concentrated gradient, M̂X is the concentrated Hessian, and M̂ =
IIJT − P̂ = IIJT −D(D′Ω̂D)−1D′Ω̂ is known as the residual projection that partials out
the fixed effects. After convergence of the optimization routine, the standard errors
associated with the structural parameters can be computed from the inverse of the
concentrated Hessian.
Since the computation of M̂ itself is problematic even in moderately large data sets,
Stammann (2018) proposes to calculate M̂νˆ and M̂X using the method of alternating
projections (MAP), which only requires repeatedly performing group-specific one-way
weighted within transformations. This approach is feasible, since these within trans-
formations translate into simple scalar transformations (see Stammann, Heiß, and
McFadden, 2016).10 Note that all expressions containing M̂ or P̂ can be calculated
efficiently based on the MAP.
Next, we address the estimation of APEs. An estimator for the APEs is
δˆk =
1
IJT
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
∆̂kijt ,
where the partial effect of the k-th regressor ∆̂kijt is either ∆̂kijt = ∂F̂ijt/∂xijtk in the case of
a continuous regressor or ∆ˆkijt = F̂ijt|xijtk=1 − F̂ijt|xijtk=0 in the case of a binary regressors.
Another question that arises in the context of APEs is how to calculate appropriate
standard errors, even in the case of high-dimensional fixed effects. A possible candidate
is the delta method, but in its standard form it requires the entire covariance matrix,
which we do not obtain using the pseudo-demeaning approach. However, as outlined
in Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2016) and Czarnowske and Stammann (2019) in the
10For further details, we refer the reader to Appendix B.2.1, where we sketch the MAP for our application
of two-way and three-way models, and provide the entire optimization routine corresponding to equation
(2.5).
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context of individual and time fixed effects, it is possible to use a concentrated version
of the delta method. In the following we present the feasible covariance estimators for
our two-way and three-way error structure.11 An appropriate covariance estimator for
the APEs of the two-way fixed effects model is
V̂δ = 1
I2J2T 2

 I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
̂¯∆ijt
 I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
̂¯∆ijt
′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
v1
+
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
Γ̂ijtΓ̂
′
ijt︸ ︷︷ ︸
v2
 , (2.6)
and of the three-way error component model
V̂δ = 1
I2J2T 2

 I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
̂¯∆ijt
 I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
̂¯∆ijt
′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
v1
+
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
Γ̂ijtΓ̂
′
ijt︸ ︷︷ ︸
v2
+ 2
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
s>t
̂¯∆ijtΓ̂′ijs︸ ︷︷ ︸
v3
 , (2.7)
where in both cases ̂¯∆ijt = ∆̂ijt − δˆ, ∆̂ijt = [∆̂1ijt, . . . , ∆̂mijt]′, δˆ = [δˆ1, . . . , δˆm]′, and
Γ̂ijt =
 I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
∂β∆̂ijt −
(
P̂X
)
ijt
∂η∆̂ijt
′ Ŵ−1 (M̂X)
ijt
ωˆijtνˆijt −
(
P̂Ψ̂
)
ijt
∂η ˆ`ijt ,
with Ψ̂ijt = ∂η∆̂ijt/ωˆijt, and ∂η ˆ`ijt defined in Table 2.1. To clarify notation, ∂ιg(·)
denotes the first order partial derivative of an arbitrary function g(·) with respect to
some parameter ι. Note, that the term v2 refers to the concentrated delta method. The
terms v1 and v3 are in the spirit of Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2016) to improve the
finite sample properties. These are, on the one hand, the variation induced by estimating
sample instead of population means (v1). On the other hand, if we are concerned
about the strict exogeneity assumption (as we are in the case of dynamic three-way
error structure models), the covariance between the estimation of sample means and
11The corresponding asymptotic distribution of the estimators is provided in Appendix B.2.3.
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parameters is another factor that should be incorporated (v3). These computationally
efficient covariance estimators can be readily applied not only to uncorrected APE
estimators, but also to the bias-corrected APE estimators, which we will introduce below.
2.3.2 Incidental Parameter Bias Correction
As in many nonlinear estimators, standard fixed effects versions of the logit and probit
models suffer from the well-known incidental parameter problem first identified by
Neyman and Scott (1948). The problem stems from the necessity to estimate many
nuisance parameters, which contaminate the estimator of the structural parameters and
average partial effects. It can be further amplified by the inclusion of a lagged dependent
variable. Note that this induces an incidental parameter problem even in the linear three-
way fixed effects setting (see Nickell, 1981) — and hence in our case also affects a linear
probability model specification. Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2018) derive the order
of the bias induced by incidental parameters to be given by bias ∼ p/n, where p and n
are the numbers of parameters and observations, respectively. The literature suggests
different types of bias corrections to reduce this incidental parameter bias. Jackknife
corrections, like the leave-one-out jackknife proposed by Hahn and Newey (2004), or
the split-panel jackknife (SPJ) introduced by Dhaene and Jochmans (2015), are the
simplest approaches to obtain a bias correction, at the expense of being computationally
costly. In contrast to analytical corrections, their application only requires knowledge
of the order of the bias to form appropriate subpanels that are used to reestimate the
model and to form an estimator of the bias terms. For analytical bias correction (ABC),
it is necessary to derive the asymptotic distribution of the maximum likelihood estimator
(MLE), in order to obtain an explicit expression of the asymptotic bias. This is then
used to form a suitable estimator for the bias terms. Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2016)
propose analytical and split-panel jackknife bias corrections for structural parameters
and APEs in the context of nonlinear models with individual and time fixed effects. In
the following two subsections, we adapt and extend the bias corrections of Ferna´ndez-Val
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and Weidner (2016) to our two-way and three-way error component.12
Two-way fixed effects
The two-way fixed effects case with exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects is
closely related to the two-way fixed effects models with a classical panel structure and
individual and time fixed effects or with a pseudo-panel ij-structure and exporter and
importer fixed effects as discussed by Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2016) and Cruz-
Gonzalez, Ferna´ndez-Val, and Weidner (2017), respectively. It is straightforward to
see that in our case the overall bias consists of two components that are due to the
inclusion of importer-time and exporter-time fixed effects, respectively, and takes the
form B1/I +B2/J .13
The form of the bias suggests to separately split the panel by I and J , leading to the
following split-panel corrected estimator for the structural parameters:
β̂
sp = 3β̂I,J,T − β̂I/2,J,T − β̂I,J/2,T , with (2.8)
β̂I/2,J,T =
1
2
[
β̂{i:i≤dI/2e},J,T + β̂{i:i≥bI/2+1c},J,T
]
,
β̂I,J/2,T =
1
2
[
β̂I,{j:j≤dJ/2e,T} + β̂I,{j:j≥bJ/2+1c,T}
]
,
where b·c and d·e denote the floor and ceiling functions. To clarify the notation, the
subscript {i : i ≤ dI/2e}, J, T denotes that the estimator is based on a subsample, which
contains all importers and time periods, but only the first half of all exporters.
In order to form the appropriate analytical bias correction, we need to specify the
asymptotic distribution of the MLE, which we show in Appendix B.2.3. The analytical
bias-corrected estimator β˜
a
is formed from estimators of the leading bias terms that are
12We do not elaborate on the leave-one-out jackknife bias correction because the large number of fixed
effects in our panel structure makes it unnecessarily computationally demanding.
13See Appendix B.2.3. We also report the appropriate Neyman and Scott (1948) variance example in
Appendix B.2.2 as an illustration.
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subtracted from the MLE of the full sample β̂I,J,T . More precisely:
β˜
a = βˆI,J,T −
B̂β1
I
− B̂
β
2
J
, with B̂β1 = Ŵ−1B̂1, B̂β2 = Ŵ−1B̂2, and
B̂1 = − 12JT
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
∑I
i=1 Ĥijt∂η2F̂ijt
(
M̂X
)
ijt∑I
i=1 ωˆijt
,
B̂2 = − 12IT
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
∑J
j=1 Ĥijt∂η2F̂ijt
(
M̂X
)
ijt∑J
j=1 ωˆijt
,
Ŵ = 1
IJT
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
ωˆijt
(
M̂X
)
ijt
(
M̂X
)′
ijt
,
where ∂ι2g(·) denotes the second order partial derivative of an arbitrary function g(·)
with respect to some parameter ι. The explicit expressions of Hijt and ∂η2Fijt are
reported in Table 2.1.
The split-panel jackknife estimator works similarly with APEs as with structural parame-
ters. We simply replace in formula (2.8) the estimators for the structural parameters
with estimators for the APEs. The following analytically bias-corrected estimator for the
APEs is formed based on the asymptotic distribution presented in Appendix B.2.3:
δ˜
a = δ˜ − B̂
δ
1
I
− B̂
δ
2
J
, with
B̂δ1 =
1
2JT
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
∑I
i=1−Ĥijt∂η2F̂ijt
(
P̂Ψ̂
)
ijt
+ ∂η2∆̂ijt∑I
i=1 ωˆijt
,
B̂δ2 =
1
2IT
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
∑J
j=1−Ĥijt∂η2F̂ijt
(
P̂Ψ̂
)
ijt
+ ∂η2∆̂ijt∑J
j=1 ωˆijt
.
δ˜ are the APEs evaluated at bias-corrected structural parameters and the corresponding
estimates of the fixed effects. Note that the latter can be obtained by reestimating
the model using an offset algorithm as in Czarnowske and Stammann (2019). The
covariance can be estimated according to equation (2.6).
Three-way fixed effects
Having adapted the two-way fixed effects bias correction of Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner
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(2016) to the ijt-panel setting, we now move on to the more difficult case of extend-
ing the consideration to three-way fixed effects. Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2018)
conjecture, based on their previously discussed formula, bias ∼ p/n, that the bias is
of order (IT + JT + IJ)/(IJT ) and of the form B1/I + B2/J + B3/T . Intuitively, the
inclusion of dyadic fixed effects induces another bias of order 1/T because there are
only T informative observations per additionally included parameter. We support their
conjecture by providing the appropriate Neyman and Scott (1948) variance example in
Appendix B.2.2 and propose novel analytical and jackknife bias corrections for three-way
fixed effects models.
For the split-panel jackknife bias correction, this bias structure implies that we add
an additional splitting dimension, leading to the following estimator for the structural
parameters:
β̂
sp = 4β̂I,J,T − β̂I/2,J,T − β̂I,J/2,T − β̂I,J,T/2, with (2.9)
β̂I/2,J,T =
1
2
[
β̂{i:i≤bI/2c,J,T} + β̂{i:i≥dI/2+1e,J,T}
]
,
β̂I,J/2,T =
1
2
[
β̂{I,j:j≤bJ/2c,T} + β̂{I,j:j≥dJ/2+1e,T}
]
,
β̂I,J,T/2 =
1
2
[
β̂{I,J,t:t≤bT/2c} + β̂{I,J,t:t≥dT/2+1e}
]
.
Combining insights from the classical panel structure in Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner
(2016), the pseudo-panel setting in Cruz-Gonzalez, Ferna´ndez-Val, and Weidner (2017),
and the three-way fixed effects conjecture by Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2018), we
formulate a conjecture for the asymptotic MLE distribution in the three-way setting
(which we present in Appendix B.2.3) and propose to extend the analytical two-way
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bias correction by a third part B̂3, such that
β˜
a = βˆI,J,T −
B̂β1
I
− B̂
β
2
J
− B̂
β
3
T
, with B̂β3 = Ŵ−1B̂3
B̂3 = − 12IJ
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
(
T∑
t=1
ωˆijt
)−1 ( T∑
t=1
Ĥijt∂η2F̂ijt
(
M̂X
)
ijt
+2
L∑
l=1
(T/(T − L))
T∑
t=l+1
∂η ˆ`ijt−lωˆijt
(
M̂X
)
ijt
 .
L is a bandwidth parameter and is used for the estimation of spectral densities (Hahn
and Kuersteiner, 2007). In a model where all regressors are exogenous, L is set to zero,
such that the second part of B̂3 vanishes and all three estimators of the bias terms are
symmetric. Otherwise, for instance in the dynamic model, Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner
(2016) suggest conducting a sensitivity analysis with L ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Again, for the APEs the split-panel jackknife estimator is formed by replacing the
estimators for the structural parameters with estimators for the APEs in formula (2.9).
The analytically bias-corrected estimator, based on our conjecture for the asymptotic
distribution provided in Appendix B.2.3, is given by
δ˜
a = δ˜ − B̂
δ
1
I
− B̂
δ
2
J
− B̂
δ
3
T
, with
B̂δ3 =
1
2IJ
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
(
T∑
t=1
ωˆijt
)−1 ( T∑
t=1
−Ĥijt∂η2F̂ijt
(
P̂Ψ̂
)
ijt
+ ∂η2∆̂ijt
+2
L∑
l=1
(T/ (T − l))
T∑
t=l+1
∂η ˆ`ijt−lωˆijt
(
M̂Ψ̂
)
ijt
 .
The last part of the numerator is again dropped if all regressors are assumed to be
strictly exogenous. As previously mentioned, standard errors can still be obtained from
equation (2.7).
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2.4 Monte Carlo Simulations
In this section, we conduct extensive simulation experiments to investigate the properties
of different estimators for both the structural parameters and the APEs. The estimators
we study are MLE, ABC, SPJ and a (bias-corrected) ordinary least squares fixed effects
estimator (LPM).14 Our main focus are the biases and inference accuracies. To this end,
we compute the relative bias and standard deviation (SD) in percent, the ratio between
standard error and standard deviation (SE/SD), the relative root mean square error
(RMSE) in percent, and the coverage probabilities (CPs) at a nominal level of 95 percent.
For the simulation experiments we adapt the design for a dynamic probit model of
Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2016) to our ijt-panel structure for the two cases with two-
and three-way fixed effects.15
2.4.1 Two-way Fixed Effects
The simulations in this section correspond to a theory-consistent estimation of the
extensive margin outlined in Section 2.2, taking into account unobserved, time-varying,
exporter- and importer-specific terms as well as dynamics, but not allowing for bilateral
unobserved heterogeneity. Specifically, we generate data according to
yijt = 1[βyyijt−1 + βxxijt + λit + ψjt ≥ ijt] ,
yij0 = 1[βxxij0 + λi0 + ψj0 ≥ ij0] ,
where i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , N , t = 1, . . . , T , λit ∼ iid. N (0, 1/16), ψjt ∼ iid. N (0, 1/16),
and ijt ∼ iid. N (0, 1).16 Further, xijt = 0.5xijt−1 + λit + ψjt + νijt, where νijt ∼
iid. N (0, 0.5), xij0 ∼ iid. N (0, 1). To get an impression of how the different statis-
14Details on LPM and our suggested bias correction in this context are given in Appendix B.2.4.
15Further simulation experiments including static panel models are presented in Appendix B.4.
16Since {λit}IT and {ψjt}JT are independent sequences, and λit and ψjt are independent for all it, jt,
we follow Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2016) and incorporate this information in the covariance estimator
for the APEs. The explicit expression is provided in the Appendix B.2.3.
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tics evolve with changing panel dimensions, we consider all possible combinations
of N ∈ {50, 100, 150} and T ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40, 50}. For each of these combinations we
generate 1, 000 samples.
Tables B.4 – B.9 in Appendix B.3.1 report the extensive simulation results for the
exogenous and predetermined regressors, respectively. The left panels contain the
results of the structural parameters and the right panels the results of the APEs. In the
following, we focus on the biases and coverage probabilities for N ∈ {50, 150}, which
we visualize in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 for better comprehensibility.
First of all, we start by analyzing the properties of the different estimators for the
structural parameters. MLE exhibits persistent biases that do not fade with increasing
T but with increasing N . This result is as expected, since MLE is fixed T consistent
as shown in Appendix B.2.3. Further, its CPs are too low and decreasing in T . The
bias-corrected estimators clearly perform better than MLE. First, they reduce the bias
considerably. ABC shows basically no bias for any considered sample size. SPJ performs
slightly worse. Second, the bias corrections also dramatically improve the coverage
probabilities. Whereas the CPs of ABC are close to the nominal value in all cases, the
CPs of SPJ are somewhat too low for the exogenous regressor in the case of N = 50.
Next, we turn to the estimators of the APEs, where we now also consider LPM. It turns
out that MLE, as well as the two bias-corrected estimators, are essentially unbiased.
This is particularly noteworthy for MLE, since it exhibits a non-negligible bias for the
structural parameters. Remarkably, LPM displays persistent biases that — differently
to the nonlinear estimators — do not vanish with larger N . The bias is very small
for the exogenous regressor but for the predetermined regressor it ranges between 5
and 6 percent.17 These persistent biases also explain that LPM delivers too small CPs
that decrease in T . Contrary, the CPs of the three nonlinear estimators are close to the
nominal value in most cases.
17We found that the predicted probabilities of LPM exceed the boundaries of the unit interval consider-
ably. This, in turn, affects the APEs for binary regressors, since they are based on differences of predicted
probabilities.
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Figure 2.2: Dynamic: Two-way Fixed Effects — Predetermined Regressor
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Figure 2.3: Dynamic: Two-way Fixed Effects – Exogenous Regressor
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All in all, our two-way fixed effects simulation results demonstrate that the bias-corrected
estimators work extremely well in this context — for both structural parameters and APEs
and both bias and coverage probabilities. Between the two, the analytical correction
slightly outperforms the split-panel jackknife correction. If the interest lies only in APEs,
the MLE estimator works well, too, but for the structural parameters it shows bias and
essentially useless coverage probabilities. LPM performs clearly worse than the probit
estimators and should — given the availability of the nonlinear alternatives — only be
used with great caution.
2.4.2 Three-way Fixed Effects
The simulations in this section correspond to our preferred empirical specification for
the extensive margin of international trade, in which we not only take into account
the theoretically motivated it- and jt-fixed effects, but additionally allow for bilateral
unobserved heterogeneity. In this three-way error structure environment, we generate
data according to
yijt = 1[βyyijt−1 + βxxijt + λit + ψjt + µij ≥ ijt] ,
yij0 = 1[βxxij0 + λi0 + ψj0 + µij ≥ ij0] ,
where i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , N , t = 1, . . . , T , βy = 0.5, βx = 1, λit ∼ iid. N (0, 1/24),
ψjt ∼ iid. N (0, 1/24), µij ∼ iid. N (0, 1/24), and ijt ∼ iid. N (0, 1).18 The exogenous
regressor is modeled as an AR-1 process, xijt = 0.5xijt−1 + λit + ψjt + µij + νijt, where
νijt ∼ iid. N (0, 0.5) and xij0 ∼ iid. N (0, 1). Again, we consider different sample sizes,
specifically N ∈ {50, 100, 150} and T ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40, 50} and generate 1, 000 data sets
for each.
Tables B.13 – B.12 in Appendix B.3.2 summarize the extensive simulation results for both
18We again follow Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2016) and incorporate the information that {λit}IT ,
{ψjt}JT , and {µij}IJ are independent sequences, and λit, ψjt, and µij are independent for all it, jt, ij in
the covariance estimator for the APEs. The explicit expression is provided in Appendix B.2.3.
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regressors. For ABC and LPM we report two different choices of the bandwidth parameter,
L = 1 and L = 2. Here, we again focus on the biases and coverage probabilities for
N ∈ {50, 150} which are shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5.
We start by considering the different estimators for the structural parameters. For
both kinds of regressors, MLE exhibits a severe bias that decreases with increasing T .
However, even with T = 50, the estimator shows a distortion of 11 percent in the case of
the predetermined regressor and 5 percent in the case of the exogenous regressor. We
also find that the inference is not valid, since the CPs are zero or close to zero. The bias
corrections bring a substantial improvement. First, they reduce the bias considerably.
For example, the MLE estimator of the predetermined regressor shows a distortion of
63 percent for T = 10 and N = 150. ABC reduces the bias to 8 percent and SPJ to
20 percent. In the case of the exogenous regressor, MLE exhibits a bias of 23 percent,
whereas ABC has a bias of 1 percent and SPJ of 7 percent. Irrespective of the type of the
regressor, both bias-corrected estimators also converge quickly to the true parameter
value with growing T . Second, the bias corrections improve the CPs. For the exogenous
regressor the CPs of ABC are close to the desired level of 95 percent for all T , whereas
SPJ remains far away from 95 percent even at T = 50. In the case of the predetermined
regressor, the CPs of both corrections approach the nominal level when T rises. This
happens faster for ABC.
We again proceed with the APEs, where we also consider LPM as an alternative estimator.
Overall, we obtain similar findings as for the structural parameters. MLE is distorted over
all settings, but the bias decreases as T increases. The distortion is especially severe in
the case of the predetermined regressor. Even at T = 50, MLE suffers a bias of 15 percent.
The bias corrections bring a substantial reduction in this case. Whereas ABC shows only
a small distortion of 1 percent in the case of the exogenous regressor at T = 10, SPJ is
even more heavily distorted than MLE. However, with increasing T , both SPJ and ABC
quickly converge to the true APE. Furthermore, unlike ABC, SPJ needs a sufficiently
large number of time periods to get its CPs close to 95 percent. For the predetermined
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Figure 2.4: Dynamic: Three-way Fixed Effects — Predetermined Regressor
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Figure 2.5: Dynamic: Three-way Fixed Effects – Exogenous Regressor
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regressor, these convergence processes last longer for both bias corrections. Looking
at LPM in the case of the exogenous regressors, it produces almost unbiased estimates
irrespective of T , but its CPs fall dramatically with increasing T . Moreover, in the case
of the predetermined regressor, we observe an increase in the bias up to 14 percent with
increasing T .19 These results illustrate the superiority of ABC and SPJ over LPM.
Overall, our three-way fixed effects simulation results confirm the conjecture of Ferna´ndez-
Val and Weidner (2018) about the general form and lend support to our conjecture
for the specific structure of the bias terms in the three-way fixed effects specification.
First, we find that the bias corrections indeed substantially mitigate the bias. Second, as
already found in other studies, analytical bias corrections clearly outperform split-panel
jackknife bias corrections (see among others Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2016), and
Czarnowske and Stammann (2019)). For samples with shorter time horizons, ABC is
often less distorted and its dispersion is generally lower. This is also reflected by better
CPs. Further, our three-way fixed effects simulation results suggest that estimates based
on MLE or LPM should be treated with great caution. Generally, in the three-way fixed
effects setting, a sufficiently large number of time periods appears to be crucial to obtain
reliable results, even for the bias-corrected estimators.
2.5 Determinants of the Extensive Margin of Trade
Having described the estimation and bias correction procedures, we now turn to the
estimation of the determinants of the extensive margin of international trade outlined in
Section 2.2.
19A similar behaviour of LPM has been observed by Czarnowske and Stammann (2019) in the context
of a dynamic probit model with individual and time fixed effects. To ensure that the bias correction
presented in Appendix B.2.4 in our three-way fixed effects specification is implemented correctly we have
tested it in a data generation process for classical linear models, i.e. without binary dependent variables,
and found that it works as intended. The undesirable behavior in our simulation design for the probit
model is driven by the fact that, because of the autoregressive process of x, the predicted probabilities
of LPM exceed the boundaries of the unit interval more and more frequently as T increases. This is
particularly reflected in the APEs for binary regressors, since they are based on differences of predicted
probabilities.
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Recall equation (2.3) that relates the incidence of nonzero aggregate trade flows to
exporter-time and importer-time specific characteristics, as well as trade in the previous
period, next to fixed and variable trade costs:
yijt =

1 if κ+ λit + ψjt + βyyij(t−1) + x′ijtβx ≥ ζijt,
0 else .
This yields the following probit model:
Pr(yijt = 1|xijt, yij(t−1), λit, ψjt) = F
(
x′ijtβx + βyyij(t−1) + λit + ψjt
)
, (2.10)
in case we assume to capture bilateral variables and fixed trade costs entirely with
observables, or:
yijt =

1 if κ+ λit + ψjt + βyyij(t−1) + x′ijtβx + µij ≥ ζijt,
0 else
and:
Pr(yijt = 1|xijt, yij(t−1), λit, ψjt, µij) = F
(
x′ijtβx + βyyij(t−1) + λit + ψjt + µij
)
, (2.11)
in case we include a time-invariant bilateral fixed effect to capture unobservable country
pair characteristics. yij(t−1) is the lagged dependent variable, x is a vector of observable
bilateral variables, βy and βx are the corresponding parameters. We largely follow
Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) and the wider literature on the determinants
of the intensive margin of trade (compare Head and Mayer, 2014) in the choice of these
variables: distance, a common land border, the same origin of the legal system, common
language, previous colonial ties, a joint currency, an existing free trade agreement,
or joint membership in the WTO. In terms of data, we turn to the comprehensive
gravity dataset provided alongside Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010), which encompasses
information on trade flows and these variables of interest from 1948 – 2006.
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Table 2.2: Probit Estimation: Coefficients
Dependent variable: yijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged DV - - 1.664∗∗∗ - 1.140∗∗∗
[-] [-] [1.719] [-] [1.057]
(-) (-) (0.004) (-) (0.005)
log(Distance) - -0.800∗∗∗ -0.528∗∗∗ - -
[-0.656∗∗∗] [-0.821] [-0.546] [-] [-]
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (-) (-)
Land border - 0.207∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ - -
[0.260∗∗∗] [0.214] [0.124] [-] [-]
(0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (-) (-)
Legal - 0.137∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ - -
[0.090∗∗∗] [0.141] [0.093] [-] [-]
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (-) (-)
Language - 0.426∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ - -
[0.380∗∗∗] [0.436] [0.289] [-] [-]
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (-) (-)
Colonial ties - 0.657∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ - -
[0.190∗∗∗] [0.702] [0.542] [-] [-]
(0.02) (0.031) (0.036) (-) (-)
Currency union - 0.631∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗
[0.381∗∗∗] [0.649] [0.443] [0.335] [0.255]
(0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.032) (0.034)
FTA - 0.543∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.073∗ 0.038
[0.508∗∗∗] [0.552] [0.364] [0.072] [0.033]
(0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.038) (0.04)
WTO - 0.152∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗
[0.286∗∗∗] [0.154] [0.104] [0.058] [0.048]
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017)
Fixed effects i, j, t it, jt it, jt it, jt, ij it, jt, ij
Sample size 1204671 1204671 1171794 1204671 1171794
- perf. class. 12298 147760 141537 370617 374067
Deviance 8.891×105 7.019×105 5.183×105 4.76×105 4.189×105
Notes: Uncorrected coefficients in square brackets. Standard errors in parenthesis.
We report the bias-corrected coefficients in Table 2.2 and the corresponding average
partial effects in Table 2.3.20 For each uncorrected and (analytically) bias-corrected
coefficients and average partial effects we also report the uncorrected one in square
brackets, as well as the standard error in parenthesis below. In column (1) we first
20While the error term distribution assumed in Section 2.2 suggests a probit estimator, we also estimate
equations 2.10 and 2.11 with a logit estimator and show the corresponding results in Tables B.22 and
B.23 in Appendix B.5. The coefficients and average partial effects are similar to those estimated with the
probit model.
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Table 2.3: Probit Estimation: Average Partial Effects
Dependent variable: yijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged DV - - 0.346∗∗∗ - 0.179∗∗∗
[-] [-] [0.344] [-] [0.138]
(-) (-) (0.003) (-) (0.052)
log(Distance) - -0.135∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ - -
[-0.136∗∗∗] [-0.135] [-0.066] [-] [-]
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (-) (-)
Land border - 0.035∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ - -
[0.054∗∗∗] [0.035] [0.015] [-] [-]
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (-) (-)
Legal - 0.023∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ - -
[0.019∗∗∗] [0.023] [0.011] [-] [-]
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (-) (-)
Language - 0.071∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ - -
[0.078∗∗∗] [0.071] [0.035] [-] [-]
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (-) (-)
Colonial ties - 0.107∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ - -
[0.039∗∗∗] [0.111] [0.066] [-] [-]
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (-) (-)
Currency union - 0.103∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
[0.078∗∗∗] [0.103] [0.054] [0.037] [0.025]
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009)
FTA - 0.090∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.009 0.004
[0.103∗∗∗] [0.088] [0.044] [0.008] [0.003]
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006)
WTO - 0.026∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.004
[0.061∗∗∗] [0.026] [0.013] [0.006] [0.005]
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Fixed effects i, j, t it, jt it, jt it, jt, ij it, jt, ij
Sample size 1204671 1204671 1171794 1204671 1171794
- perf. class. 12298 147760 141537 370617 374067
Deviance 8.891×105 7.019×105 5.183×105 4.76×105 4.189×105
Notes: Uncorrected average partial effects in square brackets. Standard errors in
parenthesis.
mimic the specification estimated by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008).21 Their
specification includes exporter, importer and time fixed effects.22 All coefficients have
21Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) use a dataset that ranges from 1970 to 1997. They also
include dummy variables for whether both countries are landlocked or islands, or follow the same religion.
Hence our coefficients deviate somewhat from theirs, while remaining qualitatively similar.
22Note that following Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2018) the incidental bias problem is small enough
to ignore in this setting with i, j and t fixed effects, since the order of the bias is 1/IT + 1/JT + 1/IJ ,
which in our case becomes negligible small since I, J and T are large.
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the expected sign, i.e. a negative impact of distance on the probability to trade, while
all other variables are estimated to have a positive impact. Note the strong and highly
significant impact of a common currency, free trade agreement or joint membership
of the WTO. Ceteris paribus, each is estimated to increase the probability of nonzero
flows by between 6 and 10 percentage points. Column (2) introduces a stricter set of
fixed effects, namely at the exporter-time and importer-time level. Most coefficients and
average partial effects are similar to those in column (1). This changes in column (3),
which keeps the same fixed effects, but adds a lagged dependent variable. Assuming no
unobservable bilateral heterogeneity, as in equation (2.10), this specification correctly
estimates the model set up in Section 2.2. The first thing to note is the highly significant
coefficient for the lagged dependent variable, which reflects the strong impact of previous
nonzero trade flows on current ones. Ceteris paribus, the average partial effect shows a
34 percentage points higher probability of nonzero trade, given the two countries were
also engaged in trade in the previous year. The second observation is that essentially
all coefficients are remarkably smaller than those in column (2), and average partial
effects are reduced by about 50 percent across the board. This result underlines the
need to explicitly take persistence into account. Note, however, that the APEs of the two
specifications are not directly comparable, because the static model forces immediate
effects and long-run dynamic adjustments into a single estimate.
Column (4) then takes one step back and one forward. While not including the lagged
dependent variable in the estimation, it introduces a bilateral fixed effect that controls
for bilateral unobserved heterogeneity. This follows the important insight by Baier and
Bergstrand (2007), who show that controlling for unobserved bilateral heterogeneity
produces a considerably different estimated impact of free trade agreements, among
other variables, on the intensive margin of trade. While now an identification of
many of the variables of interest is no longer possible anymore because of their time
invariance, this specification reveals a much reduced estimated impact of the time-
varying variables. The impact of a common currency on the probability of exporting is
reduced to 3.8 percentage points, while those of a common free trade agreement and
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WTO are decreased to less than 1 percentage point. This result highlights the importance
of controlling for unobserved country pair heterogeneity and possible endogeneity.
Finally, in column (5) we present our preferred specification, estimating equation (2.11).
The estimation now includes the “full set” of fixed effects, i.e. exporter-time, importer-
time and bilateral fixed effect, in addition to the lagged dependent variable.23 Again, the
coefficient on the latter is highly significant, entailing an average partial effect of about
18 percentage points. Importantly, the only remaining statistically significant average
partial effect is estimated for a common currency at 2.4 percentage points. The impact
of a free trade agreement or joint membership of the WTO are statistically insignificant.
Contrasting the results from column (5) to those of column (1), which currently con-
stitutes the de-facto standard of estimating the determinants of the extensive margin
of trade, underlines the importance of (i) appropriate exporter-time and importer-time
fixed effects that capture all country-time specific variation; (ii) country pair fixed effects
that capture all unobserved bilateral heterogeneity and address endogeneity concerns,
analogous to Baier and Bergstrand (2007) on the intensive margin; (iii) dynamics, in
that country pairs that have previously traded are significantly more likely to do so than
otherwise comparable country pairs. This corroborates the stylized facts from Section
2.1, which showed country pairs that had previously engaged in trade to be likely to do
so again in the next year. Failing to observe any of these three insights produces widely
different estimates.
Another important insight is that the magnitude of the incidental parameter problem —
at least in this specific setting — is not as severe as one might have feared. The most
significant impact is observed on the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable, which
in Table 2.2 column (5) differs by about 10 percent, and even almost 24 percent in the
respective average partial effect reported in Table 2.3 column (5). However, this does
not carry through to other variables, in particular for average partial effects. As shown
in simulations in Section 2.4, this may not come as a big surprise. In this application we
23Note that in the analytical bias correction we set the bandwidth parameter to L = 2. We report results
for L ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} in Tables B.24 to B.29 in Appendix B.5. The results remain robust with L = 1− 4.
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Table 2.4: Probit vs. OLS Estimation: Average Partial Effects with Three-way Fixed Effects
Dependent variable: yijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lagged DV - - 0.444∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(-) (-) (0.001) (0.001) (0.052)
Currency Union 0.009∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009)
FTA -0.121∗∗∗ 0.009 -0.065∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
WTO 0.017∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Estimator OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit
bias corrected - true false true true
Sample size 1204671 1204671 1171794 1171794 1171794
Notes: All columns include Origin × Year, Destination × Year and Origin ×
Destination fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis.
consider a panel that covers 57 years, meaning the relatively large T inhibits a strong
bias (e.g. compare Figure 2.5). As shown in the simulations, the bias is more severe in
settings with fewer time periods and should be handled appropriately.
To show the superiority of using suitable binary choice estimators with high-dimensional
fixed effects we also contrast the results to estimating equations (2.10) and (2.11) with
a linear probability model. Table 2.4 shows that OLS with the same set of three-way
fixed effects produces estimates that are far off the probit ones.24 Columns (1) and
(2) compare estimates without, columns (3) to (5) those with a lagged dependent
variable.25 Figure B.3 underlines this impression: the LPM produces up to 28 percent of
fitted probabilities < 0 or > 1. This result highlights that binary choice estimators with
high-dimensional fixed effects cannot easily be mimicked by an OLS estimator.
24As for the probit estimates, we also report the bias-corrected LPM estimates with different bandwidth
parameters in Table B.29. All in all, the results remain robust with L = 1− 4. We also report estimates for
two-way fixed effects in Table B.28 in Appendix B.5.
25In column (3) we ignore and in column (4) we apply the appropriate bias correction for the LPM with
endogenous regressor, as detailed in Appendix B.2.4.
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2.6 Conclusions
In this paper we reexamine the determinants of the extensive margin of international
trade. We set up a model that exhibits a dynamic component and allows for time-
invariant unobserved bilateral trade cost factors, generating persistence — a feature
in the data that has so far been given little attention. We estimate the model using a
probit estimator with high-dimensional fixed effects. As fixed effects create an incidental
parameter problem in binary choice settings, we characterize and implement bias
corrections for estimations with appropriate two- and three-way fixed effects. Finally,
we show that our estimates of the determinants of the extensive margin of trade
differ significantly from previous ones. This highlights the importance of true state
dependence and unobserved heterogeneity and therefore strongly supports the use of
our bias-corrected dynamic fixed effects estimator.
The extensive margin of trade obviously extends beyond the aggregate level, warranting
further research at lower levels of aggregation, in particular in the context of firms.
While our model’s prediction and its empirical specification rely on some abstractions, it
provides a very tractable and flexible framework that can be estimated with recently
established estimation procedures, when combined with the bias correction technique
we introduce.
3Carbon Tariffs: An Analysis of the
Trade, Welfare, and Emission Effects1
3.1 Introduction
The struggle against anthropogenic climate change is one of the most urgent tasks of
humankind in the 21st century. A large strand of economic literature has evolved around
the question of how to reduce global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in an efficient
way. It is obvious that a first-best solution would involve the participation of all countries,
including developing nations (see for example Branstetter and Pizer, 2014). But the past
United Nations climate conferences have shown the difficulties associated with agreeing
on an effective and binding global agreement. Instead, national and regional initiatives
have prevailed. The lack of global coordination has raised questions concerning the
1This chapter is joint work with Mario Larch. It has been published under the same title in the Journal
of International Economics, 2017, 109, 195–213. Funding from the DFG under project 592405 is gratefully
acknowledged. We thank Rahel Aichele, Gabriel Felbermayr, Carol McAusland, Sergey Nigai, Alejandro
Rian˜o, Joa˜o Santos Silva, Yoto Yotov, two anonymous referees, the handling editor Giovanni Maggi and
the participants at the European Trade Study Group 2013, the Goettinger Workshop “Internationale
Wirtschaftsbeziehungen” 2014, the GEP Postgraduate Conference 2014, the Congress of the European
Economic Association 2014, the Conference of the European Association of Environmental and Resource
Economists 2015, the FIW Research Conference “International Economics” 2015, and the EAERE FEEM
VIU European Summer School 2017, as well as the seminar participants at the University of Bayreuth for
their helpful comments. All remaining errors are our own.
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relationship of national (or regional) climate policies and international trade. Unilateral
emission reductions can for example be partly offset by resulting increases in other
countries, i.e. emissions can be shifted via international trade, a phenomenon known as
carbon leakage (see Felder and Rutherford, 1993).
One possible measure against carbon leakage is the introduction of carbon tariffs. With
carbon tariffs, countries that have a stricter climate policy would impose an import
tariff on goods from countries with a laxer regulation (or lower carbon prices), based
on the amount of carbon emissions embodied in the good. Carbon tariffs are very
prominently discussed in the environmental policy debate. For example, the House
of Representatives in the USA released the American Clean Energy and Security Act
(H.R.2454) in 2009 that enables the introduction of carbon tariffs from 2020 onwards in
some carbon intensive sectors. In Europe, French politicians have repeatedly called for
carbon tariffs by the European Union, most prominently the former President Nicolas
Sarkozy in 2009.2 Claims for carbon tariffs also received prominent academic support.
Nobel laureate Paul Krugman (2009a,b) argues for carbon tariffs in his New York Times
column by highlighting the fact that trade policy may indeed be a good tool in the case of
non-economic objectives such as carbon emissions that do not respect national borders.
This policy measure is the object of investigation of this work.
As carbon tariffs have a strong international perspective, we analyze the effects in a
trade model typically used to evaluate trade policies. We therefore use as a starting
point an empirically very successful structural empirical trade model, which explains
trade flows by country sizes, distances and multilateral resistance terms, where the latter
capture the embedding of a country into the world economy. These models are known
as structural gravity models (see for example Eaton and Kortum, 2002, and Anderson
and van Wincoop, 2003, as well as the survey by Head and Mayer, 2014). We want to
investigate the effects of carbon tariffs on trade, welfare, and emissions and therefore
have to adopt existing structural trade models to incorporate important aspects related
2See http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/097002465.html (accessed on September 13th, 2017).
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to carbon emissions. First, we add a production structure that uses energy as an input.
Second, we allow for emissions as a side output of production related to the amount of
energy employed. Third, we allow for multiple sectors to distinguish between varying
sectoral emission intensities. Fourth, we introduce revenue-generating carbon tariffs.
With the resulting structural model it is possible to evaluate ex ante the effects of the
introduction of carbon tariffs. Importantly, our model structure allows a decomposition
of the emission effects into scale, composition, and technique effects as first proposed
by Grossman and Krueger (1993) and formalized by Copeland and Taylor (1994). The
decomposition helps to understand the cross-country differences of the effects as well as
the effects on the world as a whole.
There are already some studies quantifying the carbon emission effects of carbon tariffs
based on Computational General Equilibrium (CGE) models (for a discussion, see Section
3.2). However, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider carbon tariffs
and empirically implement the decomposition as in Copeland and Taylor (2003) based
on a structural multi-sector, multi-country gravity framework. Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-
Clare (2014) see the following main advantages of structural gravity models: i) they
are better micro-founded than other quantitative work, like many CGE models, ii) they
provide a close link between the theory and the data by estimating the parameters from
the same model and data as are used for the counterfactual analysis, and iii) they are
still small enough to understand the driving mechanisms and do not hide important
mechanisms behind a very large number of equations. What we see as the major strength
of our framework is related to the third point raised by Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-Clare
(2014): it allows the analytical and quantitative decomposition of emission changes into
scale, composition, and technique effects.
We use our estimable structural model to conduct different counterfactual analyses.
First, we find that the introduction of pure carbon tariffs, which equalize energy tax
differentials across countries, reduces trade flows and welfare for most countries, most
strongly for developing countries. Concerning carbon emissions, we indeed see a partial
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shift of carbon emissions from low carbon tax countries to high carbon tax countries.
Hence, carbon tariffs reduce carbon leakage. Our analysis further reveals that world
carbon emissions would decrease by 0.50 percent if carbon tariffs were introduced. The
bootstrapped 95% confidence interval of [-0.58, -0.44] for this counterfactual calculation
shows that the decrease is statistically significant. About one third of this reduction can
be attributed to a decrease in world production (-0.17 percent with bootstrapped 95%
confidence interval [-0.19, -0.16]), while the other two thirds result from changes in
the composition of production across countries (-0.33 percent with bootstrapped 95%
confidence interval [-0.40, -0.28]).
Second, we investigate the effects of the pledges made by the Annex I countries in the
Copenhagen Accord. We first consider the emission targets only and then compare the
findings to a scenario in which the targets are combined with carbon tariffs. If the
committed emission targets are fully met, we predict a world carbon emission decrease
of 8.4 percent (with bootstrapped 95% confidence interval [-8.6, -8.1]). The costs
of the world carbon emission reduction is reflected in a quite substantial decrease of
welfare in the committing countries, ranging up to -4.7 percent. The non-committing
countries see an increase in welfare due to reduced global carbon emissions and in-
creased competitiveness in pollution-intensive sectors. If countries introduce carbon
tariffs as an accompanying policy, world carbon emissions decrease by 9.3 percent (with
bootstrapped 95% confidence interval [-9.3, -9.2]). This larger reduction stems from a
lower leakage rate (i.e. a lower percentage part of domestic emission reductions that is
offset by foreign increases) of 4.1 percent (with bootstrapped 95% confidence interval
of [3.3, 4.9]) rather than 13.4 percent (with bootstrapped 95% confidence interval of
[11.5, 15.8]) in the scenario without carbon tariffs. This additional reduction undoes a
large part of the welfare gains for the non-committing countries.
The rest of this work proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 introduces carbon leakage and the
concept of carbon tariffs in some more detail, also giving a short overview of other work
in the area. In Section 3.3, we develop a structural gravity model in the vein of Anderson
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and van Wincoop (2003), incorporating a sectoral structure, a multi-factor production
function, and non-resource consuming, revenue-generating tariffs. We also introduce
the decomposition of the emission effects in this framework. Further, we present a
model extension incorporating a production structure for energy. In Section 3.4, we
describe the estimation of the gravity equation and explain how the remaining model
parameters are obtained. Section 3.5 presents the data sources and some descriptive
statistics. In Section 3.6, first, we provide a short discussion of the model validation
before proceeding to discuss the results obtained for the counterfactuals. Section 3.7
concludes.
3.2 Carbon Leakage and Carbon Tariffs
The relationship between carbon policy and international trade has been of major
interest in the last years. One phenomenon that has been discussed in this context is
carbon leakage. Carbon leakage arises if stricter climate policy and a resulting reduction
of emissions in one country (or region, such as e.g. the European Union) leads to an
increase of carbon emissions elsewhere. This can mainly occur due to two reasons (see
Felder and Rutherford, 1993). First, a higher carbon price (via a carbon tax, tradable
certificates or simply stricter regulation) makes goods from the country implementing
the policy relatively more expensive. This can lead to a shift of carbon emission-intensive
production to countries with laxer regulation or lower carbon prices and hence increase
emissions in these countries. Secondly, a higher carbon price can lead to a lower demand
for energy in the countries imposing the regulation. This could lead to falling world
market prices for energy and hence lead to a more emission-intensive production in
other countries. This mechanism is called energy-market leakage (see for example
McAusland and Najjar, 2015). We will focus on the former type of carbon leakage in
the base model. The model extension in Section 3.3.5 will additionally incorporate
energy-market leakage effects.
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Several empirical studies have investigated the extent of carbon leakage. For example,
Aichele and Felbermayr (2012, 2015) conduct ex post analyses of the Kyoto Protocol’s
ability to reduce world carbon emissions. They find strong evidence that the Kyoto
Protocol led to carbon leakage. In fact, the reductions in the committing countries may
have been completely offset (or possibly even overcompensated) by increases in other
countries. On the other hand, Chan, Li, and Zhang (2013) investigate the effects of the
European Union emission trading scheme and find little evidence for carbon leakage.
A second approach in the literature is the use of computable general equilibrium (CGE)
models (see Burniaux and Oliveira Martins, 2012, for a good overview). Estimated
leakage rates in these models range between two and 20 percent in most cases, but can
also go up as high as 100 percent (see for example Babiker, 2005).
Another approach that, just as CGE models, allows ex ante investigations of policy
scenarios in an international trade context is the use of structural gravity models.
Aichele (2013) explicitly investigates carbon leakage in a one-sector Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003)-type framework which she augments with a multi-factor production
structure. She investigates several counterfactual scenarios, finding for example a
leakage rate of 10 percent for an increase of the EU emission allowance price by 15 US-$.
Besides Aichele (2013), Egger and Nigai (2012, 2015) use structural gravity models in
a similar context. In both cases, these authors employ an Eaton and Kortum (2002)-
type framework. Egger and Nigai (2012) analyze the implications of the Copenhagen
Accord. Based on the pledges countries made in the Accord, required carbon prices are
calculated and used in different counterfactual scenarios. Their quantification shows
that welfare losses from stricter climate policies are substantially reduced for individual
countries if implemented in an internationally cooperative way. Egger and Nigai (2015)
include an energy sector in their model and compare different policy measures meant
to reduce a country’s energy demand. Shapiro (2016) introduces CO2 emissions from
both production and shipping into a structural gravity model and investigates the
effects of carbon taxes on transportation. He finds that such carbon taxes lead to an
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increase in global welfare and lower world emissions, but reduce real income in poor,
non-participating countries. Shapiro and Walker (2015) develop a Melitz (2003)-type
structural model with endogenous pollution abatement. They use their framework to
identify the main drivers of past pollution reductions in U.S. manufacturing, finding
environmental regulation to be the most important factor.
Even though its extent remains a matter of scientific debate, carbon leakage is likely to
at least reduce the effectiveness of unilateral climate policies. One measure that could
be taken in order to reduce carbon leakage is the introduction of carbon tariffs. Leaving
the question of legal and practical feasibility aside3, questions arise of how these tariffs
would influence trade flows, welfare, and carbon emissions.
Theoretically, the potential of tariffs to internalize international externalities is for
example discussed by Markusen (1975). Hoel (1996) specifically investigates the
theoretical properties of tariffs in the carbon emission context demonstrating their ability
to mitigate leakage. He´mous (2016) extends the theoretical consideration of carbon
tariffs to a dynamic framework featuring directed technical change. He shows that
a combination of clean research subsidies and trade taxes is the optimal unilateral
policy to ensure environmentally sustainable growth. He also calibrates his two-sector,
two-country model and provides simulation evidence.
Besides these primarily theoretical contributions, carbon tariffs are mainly investigated
within the framework of CGE models. For example, Elliott, Foster, Kortum, Munson,
Pe´rez Cervantes, and Weisbach (2010) find that accompanying a higher carbon tax in
some countries with full border tax adjustment (i.e. a combination of import tariffs
and export subsidies) eliminates carbon leakage but has no noteworthy effect on world
carbon emissions. Elliott, Foster, Kortum, Khun Jush, Munson, and Weisbach (2013)
investigate a similar scenario without export subsidies and find that carbon tariffs reduce
world carbon emissions. Bo¨hringer, Carbone, and Rutherford (2018) also find that
3For short treatments of the legal issues in the WTO context and practical implementation issues, see
Branstetter and Pizer (2014, pp. 26–27 and pp. 34–35, respectively).
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carbon tariffs shift emissions back from developing to developed countries, i.e. reduce
carbon leakage, but without reducing world emissions. They argue that the main effect
of introducing carbon tariffs is to shift the welfare costs of climate policy to developing
countries. Babiker and Rutherford (2005) compare different accompanying measures for
the Kyoto Coalition countries’ abatement policies. They also find that carbon tariffs partly
push the abatement costs to non-coalition countries, minimizing the coalition’s welfare
costs, and therefore are more attractive than alternative measures such as voluntary
export restraints. Bo¨hringer, Mu¨ller, and Schneider (2015) focus on the competitiveness
effects of carbon tariffs on energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries. They show
that these industries are not necessarily made better off in the countries imposing carbon
tariffs. The effect rather depends on the specific industry structure as carbon tariffs
would e.g. also make these industries’ imported intermediate goods more expensive.
In the gravity framework, one of the policy measures investigated by Egger and Nigai
(2015) are import tariffs. They investigate tariffs as a mean to reduce domestic emissions
by imposing a tariff on imported energy inputs, but do not consider carbon tariffs that
are specifically based on the products’ carbon contents. Hence, to the best of our
knowledge, carbon tariffs have not yet been analyzed within a structural gravity model.
Besides closely linking theory and data, this has the additional advantage of allowing a
decomposition of the emission changes induced by carbon tariffs into scale, composition,
and technique effects.
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3.3 A Multi-Sector, Multi-Factor Gravity Model
with Tariffs
3.3.1 Trade Flows
In this section, we develop a gravity model in the vein of Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003). Their model aggregates over all sectors. As the aim of this work is to investigate
the effects of a policy measure that will influence sectors differently according to their
carbon intensities, this level of aggregation is inappropriate in the given context. We
therefore allow for a sectoral structure including multiple tradable sectors and one
non-tradable sector in the model, following Anderson and Yotov (2010), Caliendo and
Parro (2015) and most closely the approach of Egger, Larch, and Staub (2012), who
introduce a sectoral structure into a Krugman (1980)-type gravity model.4
Let us assume there is one non-tradable sector S and a set L containing L tradable
goods sectors (l) in each of N countries. Following Armington (1969), goods within
each tradable sector are differentiated by country of origin and each country produces
one variety per sector. The utility of the representative consumer from consumption in
a specific tradable sector is given by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility
function:
U jl =
 N∑
i=1
(βil )
1−σl
σl (qijl )
σl−1
σl

σl
σl−1
, (3.1)
where βil is a positive, country- and sector-specific distribution parameter (which can
for example be interpreted as representing quality differences), qijl is the amount of
goods from country i in tradable sector l that the representative consumer in country
4Following this literature, we stick to a static framework. This implies an interpretation of our results
as a long-run steady-state comparison. More recent developments, as the ones by Eaton, Kortum, Neiman,
and Romalis (2016) and Anderson, Larch, and Yotov (2015), extend the gravity framework to allow
for dynamic channels. Adding for example capital accumulation would lead to additional adjustments
of countries, which would potentially magnify the trade, welfare and emission effects. In a dynamic
framework, one would also want to consider endogenous technological change, e.g. along the lines of
He´mous (2016). We view the extension to allow for a dynamic channel as an important area for future
research.
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j buys, and σl is the elasticity of substitution in sector l. CES utility functions have
the desirable property of accounting for a “love of variety” of the consumers, i.e. for a
given consumption level, a higher utility level is achieved if more different varieties are
consumed. In addition, we assume a homogenous non-tradable goods sector S with
utility U jS given by the quantity consumed in country j, q
j
S.
The total utility of the representative consumer is given by a Cobb-Douglas function over
the consumption in the different sectors combined with multiplicative damages from
CO2 pollution following Shapiro and Walker (2015):
U j =
(
U jS
)γjS ∏
l∈L
(U jl )γ
j
l

 1
1 +
(
1
µj
∑N
i=1E
i
)2
 , (3.2)
where γjS +
∑
l∈L γ
j
l = 1, and the second bracket captures disutility from carbon emis-
sions.5 The country-specific parameter µj translates pollution into social costs, and Ei
are CO2 emissions in country i. As in Shapiro and Walker (2015), it is assumed that
pollution is a pure externality and the representative consumer therefore ignores the
last term from equation (3.2) in making expenditure choices.
The representative consumer in each country earns income from energy E with energy
price e, and from unskilled and skilled labor, capital, land, and natural resources, which
are summarized in the set F . Total income of the representative consumer in country j
is therefore given by:
Y j = ejEjS +
∑
l∈L
ejEjl +
∑
f∈F
vjfV
j
Sf +
∑
l∈L
∑
f∈F
vjfV
j
lf +
∑
l∈L
N∑
i=1
(τ ijl − 1)X ijl , (3.3)
where EjS and E
j
l are the amounts of energy used in country j in the non-tradable
5This disutility term captures all damages from CO2 pollution, such as reduced agricultural output,
lower labor productivity, polar bear extinction, or mortality increases (see Dell, Jones, and Olken, 2014, for
an overview of the manifold effects of climate change on economic, social, and environmental outcomes).
An alternative approach, taken in integrated assessment modeling, allows climate change to directly
affect the production function (see Metcalf and Stock, 2017, for a recent survey). As in our framework
technology as well as capital stocks are exogenous, including these additional channels is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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sector S and tradable sectors l, respectively, ej is the energy price in country j, V jSf and
V jlf are the sectoral usages of factor f ∈ F with corresponding factor prices of factor
f in country j denoted by vjf in the non-tradable sector S and the tradable sectors l,
respectively. The last term are tariff revenues distributed to the consumers of country
j, where τ ijl is one plus the ad valorem tariff rate and X
ij
l is the value of exports from
country i to country j in sector l. The representative consumer in j hence maximizes U j
subject to Y j = pjSq
j
S +
∑
l∈L
∑N
i=1 p
ij
l q
ij
l , where Y
j is given by (3.3), pjS is the price for
the non-tradable good in country j, qjS denotes the quantity of the non-tradable goods
consumed, pijl is the price in country j for goods from sector l from country i, and q
ij
l is
the quantity of goods from sector l from country i consumed in country j.6
Denoting total expenditure of country j by Xj, expenditure in tradable sector l in
country j can be written as Xjl = γ
j
lX
j = ∑Ni=1 pijl qijl , and expenditure in the non-tradable
sector S is given by XjS = γ
j
SX
j = pjSq
j
S. The balanced trade assumption then implies
Y j = Xj = XjS +
∑
l∈LX
j
l .
In the non-tradable sector, demand in country j is given by qjS = X
j
S/p
j
S. Demand in
country j for goods from tradable sector l from country i is given by:
qijl =
(
βilp
ij
l
P jl
)−σl(βilXjl
P jl
)
, (3.4)
where P jl is the sectoral price index, given by
P jl =
 N∑
i=1
(βilp
ij
l )1−σl
 11−σl . (3.5)
Assuming (sector-specific) iceberg transport costs (T ijl ≥ 1), the price consumers in j
pay for imports from i can be restated as pijl = T
ij
l τ
ij
l p
i
l, where p
i
l is the factory-gate price
of products from country i in sector l. We assume frictionless intra-national trade flows
(T iil = 1) and trade costs are, in contrast to tariffs, additionally assumed to be symmetric,
6We assume multilaterally balanced trade at the country level. This implies that total expenditure
equals total income in each country.
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i.e. T ijl = T
ji
l . The value of exports from i to j can then be expressed as
X ijl = pilq
ij
l T
ij
l =
(
τ ijl
)−σl (βilpilT ijl
P jl
)1−σl
Xjl . (3.6)
Goods market clearing ensures that the sectoral production of a country is equal to the
world-wide demand for its good Y il =
∑N
j=1X
ij
l . Replacing X
ij
l by the expression given
in equation (3.6), rearranging to solve for (βilpil)1−σl, replacing (βilpil)1−σl in equation
(3.6) by the resulting expression, defining Y W ≡ ∑Nj=1 Y j, θj ≡ Y j/Y W , θil ≡ Y il /Y W ,
and using Xjl = γ
j
lX
j = γjl Y j gives an expression that strongly resembles the well-known
expression obtained by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Anderson and Yotov
(2010), accounting for tariffs and the sectoral structure:
X ijl =
γjl Y
jY il
Y W
(
T ijl
ΠilP
j
l
)1−σl (
τ ijl
)−σl
, (3.7)
with
Πil =
 N∑
j=1
(
T ijl
P jl
)1−σl (
τ ijl
)−σl
γjl θ
j
 11−σl (3.8)
and
P jl =
 N∑
i=1
(
T ijl τ
ij
l
Πil
)1−σl
θil
 11−σl . (3.9)
Πil and P
j
l represent so-called outward and inward multilateral resistance terms, respec-
tively, indicating that bilateral trade flows depend on relative trade costs. The multilateral
resistance terms were introduced by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and capture
any third-country effects resulting from changes between two countries, such as trade
diversion effects due to the relative trade cost changes. Any theory-consistent gravity
estimation takes into account these terms and doing so is a key feature of structural
gravity (see Head and Mayer, 2014, for a good survey on gravity estimation).
A country’s total income is given by the sum of its sectoral production values and its
tariff revenues:
Y j = Y jS +
∑
l∈L
Y jl +
∑
l∈L
N∑
i=1
(τ ijl − 1)X ijl . (3.10)
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3.3.2 Introducing a Multiple-Factor Production Function
The Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) framework relies on the assumption of an
endowment economy. Without a production structure as in an endowment economy,
there is no convincing way to include for example energy as an input factor or emissions
as a side output into the model. As such features are of great interest in the carbon
leakage context, we follow an approach as in Aichele (2013) and Caliendo and Parro
(2015) to incorporate a production function that allows for multiple input factors. As the
use of energy is highly correlated with the emission of CO2 (see for example Egger and
Nigai, 2015), we include energy into the production function and treat the emissions as
a proportional side output. Sectoral production in country i is modeled by the following
Cobb-Douglas production functions:
qil = Ail(Eil )α
i
lE
∏
f∈F
(V ilf )α
i
lf , (3.11)
qiS = AiS(EiS)α
i
SE
∏
f∈F
(V iSf )α
i
Sf , (3.12)
where Ail is a sector- and country-specific productivity parameter, α
i
lE is the country- and
sector-specific cost share of energy, and αilf are the cost shares of the F other factors
(unskilled and skilled labor, capital, land, and natural resources), and accordingly
for the non-tradable sector S. We assume constant returns to scale, implying that
αilE +
∑
f∈F αilf = 1 and αiSE +
∑
f∈F αiSf = 1.
All factors are assumed to be perfectly mobile between sectors but internationally
immobile. For all factors except energy, factor endowments are given and constant
for all countries and factor prices adjust endogenously. Energy is treated differently:
for countries without binding emission targets, we take energy prices as given and
there is an endogenous, completely elastic, supply of energy at the given price.7 For
7An energy price that is held constant may in fact be quite plausible given the important role of the oil
market and OPEC’s role as a dominant producer therein. OPEC may have incentives to adjust the amount
of oil in order to keep the oil price stable. This role of OPEC and its influence on energy-market leakage is
analyzed in detail by Bo¨hringer, Rosendahl, and Schneider (2013).
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countries with binding emission targets as e.g. in our Copenhagen scenarios, the amount
of energy used is exogenously given by these targets and national energy prices adjust
endogenously in such a way that the factor market clearing condition holds.8
With this production structure, one can derive expressions for the equilibrium amount
or price of energy and all other factor rewards, which we use in deriving counterfactual
expressions.9
3.3.3 Counterfactuals
An important feature of structural gravity models is that they allow ex ante evaluations
of policies by counterfactual analyses. For the model derived in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2,
this means that for example the effects of climate policy (associated with a change in
ei/P i), of trade policy (such as the reduction of trade costs via regional trade agreements)
or of the introduction of carbon tariffs (a combined climate and trade policy instrument,
so to say) on trade flows, welfare and carbon emissions can be investigated. In this
section, we will show how to solve the model for counterfactual sectoral production
values, income, and prices from which expressions for the counterfactual values of the
other variables of interest can be obtained.
Let the additional subscripts b and c denote the benchmark and the counterfactual
cases, respectively. Let us start by rewriting the market clearing condition for each
tradable sector Y il =
∑N
j=1X
ij
l for the benchmark case, defining scaled equilibrium prices
ψil,b ≡ (βilpil,b)1−σl,10 inserting the price index (3.5), and using equation (3.6) as well as
Xjl,b = γ
j
l Y
j
b :
Y il,b = ψil,b
N∑
j=1
(T ijl,b)1−σl(τ
ij
l,b)−σl∑N
k=1 ψ
k
l,b(T
kj
l,b τ
kj
l,b )1−σl
γjl Y
j
b . (3.13)
8Note that this model structure rules out energy-market leakage effects. In order to be able to capture
such effects, we develop a model extension incorporating a more elaborate energy market model in
Section 3.3.5.
9For further details on these derivations, see Appendix C.1.2.
10Prices are scaled by the positive, country- and sector-specific distribution parameter βil and trans-
formed with the elasticity of substitution because this highlights that there is no need to identify βil and
the transformation eases notation.
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Given data for the sectoral values of production in country i in the benchmark scenario,
Y il,b, and for the total value of production in country i in the benchmark scenario, Y
i
b ,
and values for γjl , σl, T
ij
l,b and τ
ij
l,b, the LN equations represented by (3.13) can be solved
for the LN values of the scaled equilibrium prices in the benchmark scenario, ψil,b.
11
The most fundamental counterfactual variable is the sectoral value of production, Y il,c.
Restating expression (3.13) for the counterfactual case therefore is a good starting point:
Y il,c = ψil,c
N∑
j=1
(T ijl,c)1−σl(τ
ij
l,c)−σl∑N
k=1 ψ
k
l,c(T
kj
l,c τ
kj
l,c )1−σl
γjl Y
j
c . (3.14)
As there are L tradable sectors, this leads to a system of LN equations. Whereas we
only had to solve for the scaled equilibrium prices in the benchmark, we also have to
account for sectoral and overall production value changes in the counterfactual. Hence,
there are (2L+ 1)N unknowns (Y il,c, ψil,c and Y ic ), and we need additional equations to
solve for these variables. We use the factor-market clearing conditions as well as our
production structure to obtain the additional equations.
Note that spending for the non-tradable sector, XiS,c, is equal to production, i.e. X
i
S,c =
Y iS,c, and can be expressed as a constant share γ
i
S of Y
i
c . Using this in combination with
our expression for total nominal income (equation (3.10)), the price index (equation
(3.5)), and the expression for the value of exports (equation (3.6)), the following
additional expression can be obtained for a country’s counterfactual total income:
Y ic = γiSY ic +
∑
l∈L
Y il,c + N∑
j=1
(τ jil,c − 1)
ψjl,c(T
ji
l,c)1−σl(τ
ji
l,c)−σl∑N
k=1 ψ
k
l,c(T kil,cτ kil,c)1−σl
γilY
i
c
 . (3.15)
This adds N equations to the system. Using the production structure of our model given
by equation (3.11), we can find an expression for the counterfactual change in sectoral
equilibrium prices for each tradable sector, which adds another LN equations with the
11Note that the system of equations is only defined up to a normalization for each sector (see e.g.
Anderson and Yotov, 2016). We put sectoral scaled equilibrium prices in Albania to one. The choice of
normalization does not affect any of our reported results.
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N further unknowns eic (see Appendix C.1.3 for details of the derivation):
(
ψil,c
ψil,b
) 1
σl−1
=
(
eib
eic
)αilE ∏
f∈F
(
αiSfγ
i
SY
i
b +
∑
m∈L αimfY
i
m,b
αiSfγ
i
SY
i
c +
∑
m∈L αimfY im,c
)αilf
. (3.16)
An additional equation can be derived using factor market clearing for energy. As noted
above, we distinguish two cases. For countries without binding emission reduction
targets, we keep real energy prices between the baseline and any counterfactual scenario
constant, i.e. eic/P
i
c = eib/P ib , hence ensuring that our calculated changes are independent
of the choice of the nume´raire. In this case, counterfactual nominal energy prices can be
solved by:
eic = eib
P ic
P ib
= eib
∏
l∈L
(
P il,c
P il,b
)γil (piS,c
piS,b
)γiS
, (3.17)
with P il,c = [
∑N
j=1(T
ji
l,cτ
ji
l,c)1−σlψ
j
l,c]1/(1−σl) and piS,c/piS,b = (eic/eib)α
i
SE
∏
f∈F [(αiSf
Y iS,c +
∑
l∈L αilfY
i
l,c)/(αiSfY iS,b +
∑
l∈L αilfY
i
l,b)]α
i
Sf .12
For countries with binding emission reduction targets, real energy prices are endogenous
and are calculated as follows:
eic =
αiSEγ
i
SY
i
c +
∑
l∈L αilEY
i
l,c
Eic
, (3.18)
with the amount of counterfactual emissions Eic now exogenously given.
Equations (3.14) to (3.17) (for countries with endogenous emissions) or (3.14) to (3.16)
and (3.18) (for countries with binding emission targets) represent systems of (2L+ 2)N
equations in (2L+ 2)N unknowns. There are data or exogenously set values for Y ib , Y il,b,
σl, γil , γ
i
S, α
i
lf , α
i
lE, α
i
Sf , and e
i
b or E
i
b, estimates or exogenously set values for T
ij
l,c and τ
ij
l,c,
and values for ψil,b can be obtained by solving (3.13). Hence, the system is solvable for
N values of Y ic and e
i
c, as well as LN values of Y
i
l,c and ψ
i
l,c, each.
13
12See Appendix C.1.3 for a detailed derivation.
13Note that in our counterfactual scenario for carbon tariffs, we do not change the estimated trade costs,
i.e. T ijl,b = T
ij
l,c. We nonetheless stick to the general notation above to show that counterfactual analyses
involving exogenous changes in this variable could just as well be conducted in the given framework.
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The aim of counterfactual analyses in this modeling framework is to evaluate policy
scenarios (such as the introduction of carbon tariffs) in terms of their impact on trade
flows, welfare, and carbon emissions. Given the solved values for counterfactual nominal
sectoral production values, nominal total income, scaled equilibrium prices, and nominal
energy prices, these impacts can be calculated.14
3.3.4 Decomposing the Emission Effects
Since the contributions by Grossman and Krueger (1993) and Copeland and Taylor
(1994), decompositions of emissions changes into scale, composition, and techniques
effects have become an import part of the toolbox in the trade and environment litera-
ture.15 In this section, we show how such a quantifiable decomposition can be derived
in our model framework.
We start off with an expression for total emissions from production in multiple tradable
and one non-tradable sectors: Ei = (αiSEY iS +
∑
l∈L αilEY
i
l ) /ei. Defining total nominal
income without tariff revenues Y˜ i ≡ Y iS+
∑
l∈L Y il , sectoral production shares κ
i
S = Y iS/Y˜i
and κil = Y il /Y˜i, and a country’s production-share-weighted average energy cost share
α¯iE ≡ αiSEκiS +
∑
l∈L αilEκ
i
l, we can rewrite total emissions in terms of this energy cost
term (capturing sectoral composition), the real value of production and the real energy
price as:
Ei = α¯iE
Y˜ i
P i
(
ei
P i
)−1
. (3.19)
Following Copeland and Taylor (1994, 2003), taking the total differential yields the
following decomposition:
dEi = ∂E
i
∂(Y˜ i/P i)
d(Y˜ i/P i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
scale effect
+ ∂E
i
∂α¯iE
dα¯iE︸ ︷︷ ︸
composition effect
+ ∂E
i
∂(ei/P i)d(e
i/P i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
technique effect
. (3.20)
14See Appendix C.1.4 for the derivations.
15See Cherniwchan, Copeland, and Taylor (2017) for a recent survey as well as an extension to a
firm-level decomposition.
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Scale effect. The effect of a ceteris paribus increase of a country’s production on its
emissions is positive and directly proportional to the rise in production:
∂Ei
∂(Y˜ i/P i)
= α¯
i
E
ei/P i
> 0 and ∂E
i
∂(Y˜ i/P i)
(Y˜ i/P i)
Ei
= 1. (3.21)
Composition effect. The effect of an increase of the average energy cost share on
emissions is always positive and directly proportional to the increase in the energy share:
∂Ei
∂α¯iE
= Y˜
i
ei
> 0 and ∂E
i
∂α¯iE
α¯iE
Ei
= 1. (3.22)
Technique effect. The effect of an increase of the real energy price on emissions is
always negative and inversely proportional to the increase in the real energy price:
∂Ei
∂(ei/P i) = −
α¯iEY˜
i/P i
(ei/P i)2 < 0 and
∂Ei
∂(ei/P i)
(ei/P i)
Ei
= −1. (3.23)
Note that capturing the sectoral composition via the average energy cost share in our
framework is equivalent to considering changes in the dirty production share if there are
only two sectors as in Copeland and Taylor (2003). We demonstrate this equivalence in
Appendix C.1.5.
Further note that in our base model, the real energy price is constant and we do not
change it in our counterfactual scenario for countries without an emission target. Hence,
there is no technique effect for those countries in our baseline results. This changes in
the extended model considered in Section 3.3.5.
To obtain an index of the relative importance of the three channels, we in some cases also
report the shares of the absolute values of the three effects in the overall emission change,
i.e. scale share = |scale effect|/(|scale effect|+ |composition effect|+ |technique effect|),
and accordingly for the composition and technique shares.
We also report world scale, composition, and technique effects which are obtained by
summing each of the three components of equation (3.20) over all countries.
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So far, we have introduced a decomposition of the emission effects that relies on total
differentials and is therefore a linear approximation around the baseline values. While
this will work well for small changes, the approximation error may be substantial for
large counterfactual scenarios (such as our Copenhagen Accord scenarios).
Given the multiplicative structure of the expression for emissions in equation (3.19),
we therefore additionally propose an alternative log-change decomposition similar to
Copeland and Taylor (2003) and Cherniwchan, Copeland, and Taylor (2017). Denoting
changes from the baseline to the counterfactual by hats (xˆ ≡ xc/xb), we can write:
Eˆi =
ˆ¯αiÊ˜Y i/P i
êi/P i
. (3.24)
We next take the log and divide by the log emission change:
1 =
ln
(
̂˜Y i/P i
)
ln Eˆi︸ ︷︷ ︸
log scale effect
+ln
ˆ¯αiE
ln Eˆi︸ ︷︷ ︸
log composition effect
−
ln
(
êi/P i
)
ln Eˆi︸ ︷︷ ︸
log technique effect
. (3.25)
The corresponding world effect can be calculated as:
1 =
∑
i ln ˆ¯αiE∑
i ln Eˆi
+
∑
i ln
(
̂˜Y i/P i
)
∑
i ln Eˆi
−
∑
i ln
(
êi/P i
)
∑
i ln Eˆi
. (3.26)
As for the approximate decomposition, we again also calculate the shares of the absolute
values of the three effects, i.e. log scale share = |log scale effect|
/(|log scale effect| + |log composition effect| + |log technique effect|), and accordingly
for the composition and technique shares.16
In our results, we make use of both decompositions. While the approximate decom-
positions based on the total differentials are easier to interpret than the log-change
decomposition, the latter are exact even for large changes.
16As the shares based on the approximative total differential decomposition and the log shares are
almost perfectly correlated in cases where the approximation works well, we are confident that the
log-decomposition shares are also informative about the relative importance of the different effects in
cases when our approximation is off.
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3.3.5 Extension: Incorporating Energy Production
The model developed above did not allow for energy-market leakage effects. But the
introduction of carbon tariffs influences energy demand around the world. Therefore,
it would be a desirable feature of the model if the national energy prices were not
exogenous but would also be influenced by the price of internationally tradable energy
resources, such as oil.
We therefore extend the model by specifying a production function of the following
form: Ei = EiS +
∑
l∈LEil = AiE(Ri)ξ
i
R
∏
f∈F(V iEf )ξ
i
f , where R is a freely internationally
tradable input resource as in Egger and Nigai (2015) and the E subscript denotes the
energy sector which is neither part of the l ∈ L tradable sectors nor of the non-tradable
sector S. Further, we assume ξiR +
∑
f∈F ξif = 1, which implies constant returns to scale
in the production of energy. The international character of the resource factor implies
that factor income associated with production in a certain country no longer incurs only
in that country. We take this fact into account when defining total national income. For
further details on the model extension, please refer to Appendix C.1.6.17
3.4 Estimation Method
3.4.1 Gravity Estimation
Trade costs T ijl are not observable and therefore have to be approximated. The standard
procedure is to approximate them as an exponential function of K observable variables
zij = (zij1 , zij2 , . . . , zijK)′: T
ij
l = exp((z
ij
l )′bl), where bl is a (K × 1) parameter vector.
Adding a stochastic expression to equation (3.7) and pooling all exporter- or importer-
17In fact, climate policies may also influence the extraction path of fossil fuels which would additionally
influence the amount of carbon leakage. As the incorporation of this effect would require a dynamic
model structure, we leave this extension of our empirical framework for future research. For a theoretical
treatment in a general equilibrium framework, see Eichner and Pethig (2011).
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specific components, the following stochastic expression for the value of exports is
obtained:
X ijl =
1
Y W
exp((zijl )′βl)(τ
ij
l )−σlnilm
j
lu
ij
l , (3.27)
where nil ≡ Y il (Πil)σl−1, mjl ≡ γjl Y j
(
P jl
)σl−1
, βl = bl(1− σl), and uijl is a random error
which is mean independent of all right-hand side variables with conditional expectation
equal to one. As carbon tariffs are not yet implemented in any country, tariffs are zero
in the benchmark case, in which T ijl is estimated (i.e. τ
ij
l = 1).
Equation (3.27) represents a multiplicative constant-elasticity model. As has been
pointed out by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), OLS estimation of a log-linearized
version of this gravity equation is generally inconsistent due to heteroskedasticity and
zero trade flows. They suggest to consistently estimate (3.27) in its multiplicative
form using the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) estimator. Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2006, 2011) further demonstrate that the PPML estimator is generally
well behaved in the context of constant elasticity models by conducting Monte Carlo
simulations. Additionally, Fally (2015) highlights that using PPML with exporter and
importer fixed effects ensures that the equilibrium constraints imposed by our model are
satisfied. We therefore follow this by now standard approach and will base the empirical
investigation on sector-wise PPML estimation of (3.27). As it is common practice, we
will also estimate the model with OLS and use the resulting estimates as a robustness
check.
Estimation of equation (3.27) with PPML yields (alongside the fixed effects) the param-
eter vector estimate βˆl with corresponding variance-covariance matrix Ωˆl.18 Based on
this, the estimated trade costs can be obtained as
Tˆ ijl = exp
( 1
1− σl
((
zijl
)′
βˆl
))
. (3.28)
18The regression results are given in Table C.4 in Appendix C.3.1.
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3.4.2 Determination of Remaining Model Parameters
We will now show how the carbon tariffs for the first counterfactual scenarios are
calculated. Let λi denote the implicit carbon tax in country i (calculated as i’s producers’
energy tax expenses over i’s carbon emissions). Then, carbon tariffs τ ijl,c that equalize
carbon tax differentials between countries can be obtained as follows:
τ ijl,c =

1 + E
j
l
Y j
l
(λj − λi) if λj > λi,
1 if λj ≤ λi,
(3.29)
where Ejl /Y
j
l is the carbon intensity of production in sector l in the importing country.
Of course, it is also possible to use the carbon intensities of the exporting country instead.
This would be a production-based rather than a product-based calculation of the carbon
tariff rates. In our main counterfactual carbon tariff scenario, we will follow equation
(3.29) and hence work with product-based carbon tariffs, because they can possibly
be regarded as being comparable to VAT border tax adjustments which are legitimate
under WTO law (see Metcalf and Weisbach, 2009, p. 546 f.). However, to investigate
the differences between product- and production-based carbon tariffs, we also consider
the latter. Note that we treat tariffs as exogenous. Hence, we do not model the strategic
policy interaction of countries, neither in terms of tariffs (as done when calculating Nash
tariffs, see e.g. Bagwell and Staiger, 2002), nor in terms of other policies, such as carbon
taxes (see e.g. Bo¨hringer, Carbone, and Rutherford, 2016).
The expenditure share for sector l in country i, γil is calculated from the data as γ
i
l =
Xil/X
i. For the sectoral elasticity of substitution, we use estimates provided in our main
data source (see Section 3.5).
As was mentioned in Section 3.3, we treat energy and emissions as if there was a
perfectly linear relationship. This allows us to infer the energy price of country i as
ei = ECi/Ei, where ECi are total energy costs in country i and Ei are total emissions
in country i.19 Treating energy and emissions as perfectly correlated further makes it
19Note that the energy price is given per unit of carbon emissions, rather than per a typical energy unit
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possible to calculate the sectoral energy cost shares in country i as αilE = ECil/TCil ,
where TCil are the total costs in the corresponding sector. The remaining factor cost
shares can be calculated as αilf = (1− αilE)V Cilf/
∑
g∈F V Cilg, where V C
i
lf are the costs
for factor f in sector l in country i. The factor cost shares in the non-tradable sector can
be obtained accordingly.
For the model extension, we have to calculate additional parameters. First, a country’s
resource endowment share is obtained by dividing a country’s resource costs RCi by the
world expenditure for natural resources, i.e. ωi = RCi/∑j RCj. Second, the resource
cost share in energy production is calculated as ξiR = RCi/TCiE, where TCiE denote the
total costs in energy production. Accordingly, the other factor cost shares are given by
ξif = V CiEf/TCiE.
3.5 Data
3.5.1 Data Sources
For most of the data in this work, we use the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 8
database (see Narayanan, Aguiar, and McDougall, 2012). This database comprises data
for 128 regions covering all countries in the world.20 The data are given for 57 sectors,
which we aggregate to one non-tradable and 14 tradable sectors.21 All further data
taken from the GTAP 8 database were then aggregated to this sectoral structure. These
are the bilateral trade flows used for the estimation of the gravity equation, sectoral
production and expenditure values22, sectoral total costs, energy expenses (and the tax
such as kilowatt-hour. This is unproblematic due to the linear relationship of energy and emissions.
20Most of these regions are identical with countries, but some countries are pooled together as one
region. For a list of the regions please refer to Appendix C.2.1.
21For a list of the industries and their grouping to the 15 sectors see Appendix C.2.2.
22For an explanation of the calculation of the sectoral expenditures from the GTAP raw data, see
Appendix C.2.3.
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part thereof)23, other factor costs, and national carbon emissions.24 The GTAP 8 data
base uses 2007 as its most recent reference year. We therefore construct the whole data
set as a cross-section for this year.
Bilateral data on regional trade agreement (RTA) memberships are taken from Mario
Larch’s Regional Trade Agreements Database from Egger and Larch (2008).25 All
geographic variables for the estimation of the gravity equation stem from the Centre
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) data set constructed by
Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010).
For the calibration of the social cost of carbon to our welfare function, we follow Shapiro
and Walker (2015) and use two additional data sources. For the overall costs per ton of
CO2, we linearly extrapolate the estimates provided by the Interagency Working Group
on the Social Cost of Carbon (2013) for the years 2010 (32 US-$) and 2015 (37 US-$)
to the year 2007 to obtain a social cost of carbon of 29 US-$ per ton of CO2. The relative
distribution of these costs across different world regions is obtained using estimates
from Nordhaus and Boyer (2000).26 Additionally, we use national real income data from
the Penn World Tables 9.0.27
For the model extension, we additionally use data on the resource cost share in energy
production and the resource revenues across countries from the GTAP 8 database. For
this flow variable to be a valid measure, both the law of one price and a common
23For expenditure on the factor energy in our model, we use data on intermediate input expenditure for
the following GTAP energy industries: “coal”, “oil”, “gas”, “petroleum, coal products”, “electricity”, and
“gas manufacture, distribution”.
24As our framework does not distinguish between emissions from the production and the consumption
of a good, we add those values up.
25The RTA data can be downloaded from Mario Larch’s website at http://www.ewf.uni-
bayreuth.de/en/research/index.html (accessed on September 13th, 2017).
26Note that Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) obtain climate change damage estimates for a scenario in which
the world heats up by 2.5 degrees. We therefore only rely on the relative costs of climate change across
regions from this source (i.e. the share of the world costs that a specific region has to bear), combining
them with a recent estimate of the social costs of carbon in our calibration of the welfare function. See
Appendix C.1.1 for details.
27The data is available for download at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/pwt-9.0 (ac-
cessed on September 13th, 2017). Specifically, we use expenditure-side real GDP at current PPPs (in
mil. 2011US$) converted to 2007 values using the price level of real consumption of households and
government, at current PPPs in order to be comparable with the rest of our data.
Data 97
extraction rate across countries need to hold. In a robustness check, we therefore base
the calculation of the national resource shares on stock data on fossil fuel endowments
from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) instead.28
In our analyzes of the Copenhagen Accord, we make use of the country-specific emission
reduction pledges specified in Appendix I of the Copenhagen Accord.29 Some countries
give a range in which their reduction is targeted to be. In these cases, we use the
center of the respective intervals for our calculations. As the national reduction targets
are given for different base years, we convert the corresponding pledges to our model
base year 2007 using national emission time series provided in the World Development
Indicators. For some countries, this procedure leads to a negative emission reduction
target because they already strongly lowered their emissions before 2007. For these
countries, we assume that they commit to not increasing their emissions.
To investigate the sensitivity of our results with respect to the implicit carbon taxes
(λi), we use an additional data source rather than only relying on our own calculations
based on energy taxation data from GTAP. Specifically, we employ effective carbon prices
provided by the OECD (2016, pp. 146f.).30
3.5.2 Descriptive Statistics
In this subsection, we briefly describe the most important summary statistics of the data
involved. Tables 3.1 to 3.3 show descriptive statistics for all model parameters and
variables in the baseline.31 Table 3.1 depicts the country-level variables and parameters.
28The data are available to download at http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject (accessed on September
13th, 2017). Specifically, for each country we multiply total recoverable coal reserves, proved reserves
of dry natural gas, and proved reserves of crude oil by their respective energy contents, sum them up
to obtain a country’s overall fossil fuel reserves in BTU and divide this sum by the global sum of these
reserves to obtain national fossil fuel endowment shares.
29The respective documents specifying the national targets are available at
http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen dec 2009/items/5264.php (accessed on September 13th,
2017).
30Details on and descriptive statistics of the implicit carbon taxes are given in Appendix C.2.5.
31Descriptive statistics of the gravity variables used for the trade cost estimation are given in Table C.1
in Appendix C.2.4.
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The total value of production in one country is 839 billion US-$ on average, ranging
Table 3.1: Model Variables and Parameters, Country-Level
Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Production (Y , in billion US-$) 839 2,617 3 25,167
Emissions (E, in mT of CO2) 207 698 0 5,583
Energy price (e, inUS-$/t CO2) 327 166 81 1,148
Carbon tax (λ, in US-$/t CO2) 26 32 -13 138
Resource share (GTAP, ω) 0.0078 0.018 0 0.100
Resource share (EIA, ω) 0.0078 0.024 0 0.168
Resource cost share (ξR) 0.137 0.137 0 0.473
Notes: All values in this table are either taken directly or calculated from the GTAP 8 data. The parame-
ters in the separated bottom part of the table are only relevant for the extended model.
from three billion up to 25 trillion. This production is associated with an average 207
million tons of carbon emissions, varying between almost none and close to 5.6 billion
tons. Energy prices also show huge variation, from 81 US-$ per ton of CO2 up to 1,148
US-$/ton of CO2. The tax component of this price (i.e. the implicit carbon tax) is even
negative in a few cases, implying that some countries subsidize the use of energy. Implicit
carbon taxes therefore range from -13 to 138 US-$ per ton of CO2. The summaries for
the two additionally required model parameters for the model extension are also shown.
National shares of the tradable energy resource (from GTAP data) vary from zero to 10
percent. The alternative calculation of national resource shares using data from the EIA
gives a very similar pattern, with a correlation coefficient between the two measures of
0.84. The resource cost share in energy production ranges from zero to 47.3 percent
with an average value of 13.7 percent.
Table 3.2 shows the sectoral production and emission values as well as the sectoral
energy cost and expenditure shares. Both production and expenditure shares indicate
that the non-tradable sector is the largest one (accounting for almost one quarter on
average). The mineral sector accounts for the largest part of the emissions and is also
characterized by the highest energy cost share (51 percent on average).
Table 3.3 shows the sectoral carbon tariffs (based on either the importing or the exporting
country’s carbon intensities), trade costs, and elasticities of substitution. It is evident
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Table 3.2: Model Variables and Parameters, Sector-Level (I)
Production (Y ) Emissions (E) Energy cost Expenditure
(billion US-$) (mT of CO2) share (α) share (γ)
Non-tradables 218,448 32.97 0.07 0.24
(804,791) (113.75) (0.06) (0.07)
Agriculture 25,498 4.62 0.04 0.08
(67,654) (15.61) (0.04) (0.06)
Apparel 8,381 0.40 0.02 0.01
(27,683) (1.87) (0.03) (0.01)
Chemical 37,829 18.46 0.21 0.04
(112,164) (63.71) (0.24) (0.02)
Equipment 31,296 1.01 0.03 0.03
(102,585) (4.29) (0.10) (0.02)
Food 38,695 3.07 0.02 0.07
(94,316) (9.91) (0.03) (0.04)
Machinery 61,382 2.84 0.05 0.06
(203,526) (11.89) (0.11) (0.03)
Metal 35,953 12.61 0.12 0.04
(109,750) (62.98) (0.12) (0.02)
Mineral 32,605 73.55 0.51 0.05
(86,679) (258.70) (0.23) (0.02)
Mining 22,397 3.94 0.09 0.03
(49,379) (15.81) (0.14) (0.04)
Other 7,750 0.53 0.12 0.01
(22,407) (1.22) (0.22) (0.01)
Paper 14,678 2.59 0.09 0.01
(47,936) (9.14) (0.16) (0.01)
Service 288,220 48.79 0.09 0.29
(976,964) (159.90) (0.06) (0.08)
Textile 8,515 1.27 0.03 0.01
(32,248) (7.98) (0.03) (0.01)
Wood 7,419 0.54 0.04 0.01
(28,600) (2.33) (0.10) (0.00)
Notes: Values without parentheses give the means of the variables and parameters, while values in
parentheses are the respective standard deviations. All values in this table are either taken directly or
calculated from the GTAP 8 data.
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Table 3.3: Model Variables and Parameters, Sector-Level (II)
Carbon Tariffs (τ) Carbon Tariffs (τ) Trade Costs Elasticity of
(product-based) (production-based) (t1−σ) Substitution (σ)
Agriculture 0.002 0.002 0.011 4.76
(0.004) (0.008) (0.032)
Apparel 0.001 0.002 0.023 7.64
(0.001) (0.007) (0.041)
Chemical 0.007 0.016 0.029 6.60
(0.020) (0.052) (0.049)
Equipment 0.001 0.003 0.042 6.26
(0.004) (0.032) (0.063)
Food 0.001 0.002 0.015 5.01
(0.001) (0.009) (0.038)
Machinery 0.001 0.005 0.048 8.36
(0.005) (0.033) (0.058)
Metal 0.004 0.009 0.023 7.28
(0.008) (0.026) (0.047)
Mineral 0.019 0.034 0.011 4.51
(0.032) (0.072) (0.033)
Mining 0.004 0.005 0.008 11.88
(0.011) (0.017) (0.027)
Other 0.003 0.011 0.040 7.50
(0.011) (0.049) (0.047)
Paper 0.003 0.009 0.016 5.90
(0.006) (0.041) (0.041)
Service 0.003 0.006 0.166 3.80
(0.006) (0.016) (0.077)
Textile 0.001 0.002 0.017 7.50
(0.003) (0.007) (0.038)
Wood 0.001 0.003 0.018 6.80
(0.003) (0.018) (0.046)
Notes: Values without brackets give the means of the variables and parameters, while values in brackets are the
respective standard deviations. The values of t are obtained by estimating the gravity equation. The values of the
carbon tariffs (τ) refer to the scenarios in which carbon tariffs are given exogenously in such a way as to equalize
carbon tax differentials between countries (see equation (3.29)).
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that carbon tariffs are low on average (partly due to the fact that for each country-
pair, only one country will impose a tariff) and tend to be considerably higher in the
production-based case than in the product-based case. This implies that countries with
low carbon taxes have higher emission intensities on average. The mineral sector has
the highest tariffs, with an average rate of 1.9 percent if the calculation is based on the
importer’s carbon intensity and 3.4 percent if the exporter’s emission intensity is used.
Estimated international trade costs vary strongly across sectors, with services being most
easily traded internationally. Sectoral elasticities of substitution lie between 3.8 for the
service sector and 11.9 for the mining sector.
Table 3.4 gives a list of the committing countries of the Copenhagen Accord (not
considering the voluntary additional pledges made by other countries in Appendix II of
the Accord) along with their respective reduction targets.32
Table 3.4: National Pledges Made in the Copenhagen Accord (Appendix I)
Australia 23.0% Austria 37.9% Belarus 0.0% Belgium 22.9%
Bulgaria 0.0% Canada 16.7% Croatia 48.4% Cyprus 57.4%
Czech Rep. 15.7% Denmark 10.1% Estonia 8.5% Finland 39.3%
France 24.9% Germany 10.7% Greece 43.3% Hungary 6.8%
Ireland 47.6% Italy 32.3% Japan 34.4% Kazakhs. 0.0%
Latvia 0.0% Lithuania 0.0% Luxemb. 31.9% Malta 40.0%
Netherl. 30.7% New Zeal. 40.2% Norway 54.8% Poland 12.1%
Portugal 48.0% R. o. EFTA 25.0% Romania 0.0% Russia 0.1%
Slovakia 9.9% Slovenia 42.4% Spain 54.2% Sweden 18.9%
Switzerl. 15.9% Ukraine 0.0% UK 21.1% USA 17.0%
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Model Validation
Before we proceed with our counterfactual analysis, we discuss how our model fits
the data and the world economy’s response to shocks. In any structural gravity model,
32A similar table for the pledges made in Appendix II of the Copenhagen Accord that we will additionally
discuss briefly is given in Appendix C.2.6.
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output values are fitted perfectly. This also holds in our framework, even at the sectoral
level. Due to our focus on carbon tariffs and their implications specifically for emissions,
we construct our model in such a way that national emission data are also perfectly
replicated in our baseline equilibrium. As sectoral emissions are obtained based on
sectoral energy expenditure, they are not perfectly replicated. However, our model-
predicted sectoral emission data are highly correlated with the observed sectoral emission
data (with an average sectoral correlation coefficient of 0.96).
We follow a large strand of the structural gravity literature and obtain model consistent
trade flows based on estimated trade costs (see Head and Mayer, 2014, for an overview).
The generally good fit of gravity models, even at the sectoral level, is confirmed in our
estimations as indicated by the high Pseudo-R2 reported in Table C.4 in Appendix C.3.1.
While our framework relies on a workhorse model to evaluate the effects of trade policies
for trade flows and welfare, it is far less common to use a structural gravity framework
to evaluate environmental policies. We therefore use our framework to evaluate the
same scenario which is compared by Bo¨hringer, Balistreri, and Rutherford (2012) for a
number of computable general equilibrium models. Specifically, the scenario consists of
all countries of Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol33 (including the United States of America
and excluding the Russian Federation) jointly lowering their emissions by 20 percent
while all other countries have no emission target and therefore endogenously adjust
their emissions. The necessary national policies are implemented once with and once
without carbon tariffs. The resulting leakage rates from our model are 3.6 percent
(with a bootstrapped 95% confidence interval of [2.8, 4.3]) and 12.5 percent (with
a bootstrapped 95% confidence interval of [10.7, 14.8]), and hence lie well within
the range of leakage rates in the CGE models surveyed by Bo¨hringer, Balistreri, and
Rutherford (2012) of 2 to 12 percent and 5 to 19 percent, respectively.34
33See http://unfccc.int/parties and observers/parties/annex i/items/2774.php (accessed on September
13th, 2017).
34In fact, the leakage rates for the tariff scenario in Bo¨hringer, Balistreri, and Rutherford (2012) are
obtained with full carbon border tax adjustment (i.e. a combination of import tariffs and export subsidies).
However, Bo¨hringer, Balistreri, and Rutherford (2012) mention on page S104 that considering full carbon
border tax adjustment or only border tariffs, as we do, has very similar impacts in the models they survey.
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3.6.2 Counterfactual Scenarios
As was stated above, structural gravity models allow the investigation of counterfactual
scenarios, taking into account general equilibrium effects. The model developed in
Section 3.3 can be used to conduct scenarios for exogenous changes in trade costs,
energy/carbon prices or carbon tariffs. We first analyze the latter case. Afterwards, we
consider the effects of the Copenhagen Accord.
To obtain information about the precision of our counterfactual results, we bootstrap
500 times from our parameter estimates reported in columns (1) to (14) of Table C.4 in
Appendix C.3.1 along with the corresponding variance-covariance matrix obtained in
the estimation, i.e. we draw 500 sets of vectors from the sector-specific K-dimensional
multivariate normal distributionsNK(βˆl, Ωˆl). We then solve the model in the benchmark
case and the counterfactual for each of the 500 bootstraps. We report the obtained
standard errors in parentheses below the corresponding point estimates in tables C.6 to
C.15 in Appendix C.3.2. All confidence intervals reported for counterfactual values are
also obtained using this bootstrapping procedure.
Pure Carbon Tariffs: Base Model
In our first counterfactual scenario, we introduce carbon tariffs that equalize the differ-
ences in the levels of the implicit carbon taxes and are obtained as described in Section
3.4.2.35 Then the model is solved for the scaled equilibrium prices, sectoral productions,
total national incomes, and nominal energy prices (using the scaled equilibrium price
in the agricultural sector in Albania as the nume´raire36) and the percentage changes in
normalized trade flows (X ijl /Y
i), welfare, and carbon emissions are calculated. In this
section, we will (mostly graphically) present the results for the latter three variables. Ad-
ditionally, in Appendix C.3.2, the exact numerical results are given as well as numerical
35Denoting our first scenarios as “pure” carbon tariff scenarios refers to the fact that the only coun-
terfactual policy change in these cases is the introduction of carbon tariffs. This is in contrast to other
scenarios, where we additionally introduce national emission targets.
36As already stated above, none of our reported results depend on the choice of nume´raire.
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and graphical representations of the percentage change in real income.
The way in which the carbon tariffs are calculated implies that for each country-pair the
country with the higher implicit carbon tax imposes a tariff on imported goods from
the other country. In order to give an overview which countries are imposing tariffs
in most cases and which countries more often have to pay them, Figure 3.1 presents
the national implicit carbon taxes in all 128 countries.37 The larger the difference
Figure 3.1: Implicit Carbon Taxes
Notes: This figure shows national implicit carbon taxes (λi) around the world. The values range between
-13 US-$ in Malaysia and 138 US-$ in Norway and Sweden. Red represents low carbon taxes, while green
represents high values of λi. Values below zero are due to implicit carbon subsidies in a few Arabic and
Asian countries.
between two countries’ carbon taxes, the higher is the carbon tariff imposed by the
high-price country. Additionally, the percentage carbon tariff is higher in sectors with
a higher carbon intensity. The implicit national carbon taxes (λi) vary between -13
US-$ in Malaysia (i.e. an implicit carbon subsidy) and 138 US-$ in Norway and Sweden.
Generally, carbon taxes tend to be very high in European countries and very low for
large parts of Africa, Asia and Oceania. It follows that European countries most often
impose tariffs, while African, Asian, and Oceanic countries in many cases have to pay
tariffs. Further, many North and South American countries have to pay tariffs when
exporting to Europe and impose tariffs in most other cases.
Figures 3.2 to 3.4 show the most important results of the counterfactual introduction of
37For the exact values of the carbon prices, see Table C.6 in Appendix C.3.2.
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carbon tariffs. As carbon tariffs are a (climate-policy related) trade-policy instrument,
Figure 3.2: Percentage Changes in Normalized Trade Flows
Notes: This figure shows the percentage changes in trade flows due to the counterfactual introduction of
carbon tariffs. Darker shades of reds represent stronger reductions in a country’s international trade flows.
The values range between -5.9 percent for Azerbaijan and -0.66 percent for Sweden. The corresponding
change in world trade flows is a 1.9 percent decrease.
Figure 3.3: Percentage Changes in Welfare
Notes: This figure shows the percentage changes in welfare due to the counterfactual introduction of
carbon tariffs. Green represents an increase in a country’s welfare, while red represents a reduction. The
values range between -1.5 percent for Bahrain and 0.30 percent for Norway.
a plausible starting point for the evaluation of its effects is to look at the changes
in trade flows. The changes in normalized international trade flows are given in
Figure 3.2. It is apparent that trade flows are reduced for all countries, but there
are considerable differences in the effects for different countries. The reductions vary
between 5.9 percent for Azerbaijan and 0.66 percent for Sweden. Comparing the figure
with the representation of the carbon taxes given by Figure 3.1, one can state a distinct
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Figure 3.4: Percentage Changes in Carbon Emissions
Notes: This figure shows the percentage changes in carbon emissions due to the counterfactual introduc-
tion of carbon tariffs. Red represents an increase in a country’s emission level, while green represents
a reduction. The values range between -7.0 percent for Bulgaria and 2.1 percent for Norway. The
corresponding change in world carbon emissions is a 0.50 percent decrease.
relation between a country’s carbon tax and the trade effects of carbon tariffs: those
countries with low carbon taxes (which hence have to pay most and highest carbon
tariffs) undergo the strongest negative effects in the counterfactual scenario. While
most European countries (except a few Eastern European ones with low carbon taxes)
experience only a mild decrease in their trade flows and most American countries face
moderate effects, many African and Asian countries with very low carbon taxes are
subject to a comparatively strong reduction of their trade flows. Overall, aggregate
world trade flows decrease by 1.9 percent.
Figure 3.3 shows the percentage changes in welfare. First of all, welfare effects are
negative for the majority of countries (79 percent), the largest being a -1.5 percent effect
for Bahrain. While there are also countries with positive effects, these welfare gains are
comparatively small (the largest being a 0.30 percent increase for Norway). Overall,
the relative picture of the different effects for different countries given by Figure 3.3 is
strongly linked to the respective image obtained for the trade flows: those countries
which experience strong reductions in trade flows also tend to experience strong welfare
losses. As most of these countries are developing countries in Africa and Asia, the
counterfactual scenario would mostly decrease the welfare of already relatively poor
countries.
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Besides welfare changes, we also calculate the percentage changes in real income (i.e.
welfare effects net of the environmental effects).38 For the pure carbon tariff scenario,
the welfare and real income effects are almost identical. This is due to the comparably
small overall reduction of emissions. This close similarity breaks if the world emission
reduction is stronger and/or the social costs of carbon used to calibrate our utility
parameter µj are substantially larger. We will consider a case with higher social costs of
carbon as a sensitivity check in one of our Copenhagen Accord scenarios.
Figure 3.4 shows the percentage changes of carbon emissions around the world. The
introduction of carbon tariffs leads to significant changes in national carbon emissions.
”Clean“ industrialized countries with comparatively high carbon taxes tend to experience
an increase or only a slight reduction in their carbon emissions. In contrast, most of
the ”dirtier“ developing countries (especially in Africa and parts of Asia) strongly reduce
their emissions after the tariff introduction. The changes range between -7.0 percent
for Bulgaria and 2.1 percent for Norway. The corresponding change in world carbon
emissions is a 0.50 percent decrease, with a bootstrapped 95% confidence interval of
[-0.58, -0.44].
Comparing Figure 3.4 to Figure 3.1, one can see that emissions are shifted from countries
with low carbon taxes to countries with high carbon taxes. If we see carbon tax
differences as a cause for carbon leakage, carbon tariffs are able to reduce this effect.
The pattern in Figure 3.4 is mainly driven by the composition effect. On average, it
accounts for 67 percent of the change in national carbon emissions. It ranges from
-5.6 percent for Bulgaria to 2.4 percent for Norway and is negative for 80 percent of
the countries (see Table C.6 in Appendix C.3.2 for further details). The scale effect
is negative for all countries, less strong (between -1.6 percent for Bahrain and -0.02
percent for Japan) and positively correlated with the composition effect. The latter
implies that countries that experience lower emissions due to a shift of production
towards cleaner sectors at the same time also reduce their overall production more
38The corresponding Figure C.1 is given in Appendix C.3.2.
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strongly, which further lowers their emissions.39
The relative importance of the scale and composition effect is similar on the aggregate
level. 34 percent of the world emission reduction are due to the world scale effect (-0.17
percent with bootstrapped 95% confidence interval [-0.19, -0.16]) and 66 percent are
due to the world composition effect (-0.33 percent with bootstrapped 95% confidence
interval [-0.40, -0.28]).
Naturally, the numerical results of our counterfactual scenario depend on the specific
level of tariffs implemented. As we have shown in equation (3.29), the level of carbon
tariffs depends on the national implicit carbon taxes as well as on the carbon intensities.
As we have already mentioned, we will investigate the sensitivity of our results with
respect to using importer’s or exporter’s carbon intensities by distinguishing between
product- and production-based tariffs. Additionally, we employ alternative data from
the OECD (2016) for implicit carbon taxes. With these, we run the same counterfactual
analysis as discussed above. Overall, the qualitative results are identical and the
quantitative results are very similar but effects tend to be somewhat smaller using OECD
data. This is due to the generally lower level of carbon taxes reported by the OECD. For
example, the world carbon emissions go down by only 0.38 percent (with a bootstrapped
95% confidence interval of [-0.44, -0.34]) as compared to the 0.50 percent using GTAP
data. Again, two thirds of this reduction are explained by composition.40
So far, we considered product-based carbon tariffs. Production-based carbon tariffs
lead to overall stronger effects on carbon emissions. The largest reductions occur for
Bulgaria with -13.6 percent, whereas Norway experiences a 3.2 percent increase in
emissions. World carbon emissions are reduced by 1.4 percent, with a bootstrapped
95% confidence interval of [-1.6, -1.3]. The overall larger effects are driven by two
39Note that our emission decomposition also relates to the national welfare effects. While the real
income part is by definition almost entirely driven by the scale effect (not perfectly due to tariff income),
emission changes and hence the emission part of welfare changes is mainly driven by the composition
effect, as just described.
40Detailed results for this scenario (as for all counterfactual scenarios considered in this section) can be
found in Appendix C.3.2.
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factors: First, the average level of production-based tariffs is higher than the average
level of product-based tariffs. Secondly, production-based tariffs target more specifically
emission-intensive industries in the country of production. These two effects are also
reflected in our decomposition: First, both the scale and composition effects become
stronger compared to the product-based scenario. Secondly, the relative importance of
the composition effect increases. National scale effects now vary between -4.1 percent
and -0.04 percent, while the composition effects range from -10.9 percent to 3.8 percent.
Again, 82 percent of countries have a negative composition effect. The average share of
the country-level changes explained by the composition effect increases to 72 percent.
At the aggregate level, 71 percent of the world emission reduction are due to the world
composition effect (-1.0 percent with bootstrapped 95% confidence interval [-1.2, -0.9]),
magnifying the importance of the composition effect as compared to the product-based
scenario.
To sum up, the decomposition of the emission helps to understand “both common and
divergent effects on the economy” (Copeland and Taylor, 2003, p. 46) of different types
of policies, like the production- and product-based carbon tariffs investigated here.
Pure Carbon Tariffs: Extended Model
We conduct the same counterfactual experiment as described in the first part of this
section in the extended framework. Again, world carbon emissions decrease. The effect
is less strong: -0.25 percent (with bootstrapped 95% confidence interval [-0.30, -0.21])
compared to -0.50 percent in the base model. This result is driven by the technique effect
which is no longer zero in the extended model. The overall lower energy demand drives
down the international energy resource price. This makes a more energy-intensive
production worthwhile, leading to higher world emissions due to a positive world
technique effect of 0.18 percent (with bootstrapped 95% confidence interval [0.17,
0.20]). This partly counterbalances the negative world scale and composition effects of
-0.11 percent (with bootstrapped 95% confidence interval [-0.12, -0.11]) and -0.31
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percent (with bootstrapped 95% confidence interval [-0.37, -0.26]), respectively, re-
ducing the decrease in world carbon emissions compared to the scenario with purely
country-specific energy prices. Using our alternative measure for the national resource
shares, we obtain almost identical results for all variables of interest (see Table C.10 in
Appendix C.3.2 for details).
When considering production-based instead of product-based carbon tariffs, we again
see stronger effects on carbon emissions. World carbon emissions are reduced by 0.76
percent, with a bootstrapped 95% confidence interval of [-0.88, -0.67]. As before, this
stronger reduction is due to the larger average level and the more pinpoint character of
the production-based tariffs. The world emission reduction of 0.76 percent decomposes
into a positive world technique effect of 0.44 percent (with bootstrapped 95% confidence
interval [0.40, 0.48]), a negative world scale effect of -0.24 percent (with bootstrapped
95% confidence interval [-0.26, -0.23]), and an also negative world composition effect
of -0.96 percent (with bootstrapped 95% confidence interval [-1.09, -0.84]). As in the
base model, the composition effect again gains in importance, explaining 58 percent of
the overall world emission change compared to 51 percent for the product-based tariffs.
Figure 3.5: Comparison of Decompositions
Figure 3.5 compares the decompositions of the world emission effects of our baseline and
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extended model for both product- and production-based carbon tariffs. Several features
discussed above are evident: First, composition is more important than scale in all
scenarios. Second, compositional effects become more influential with production-based
tariffs. Third, our model extension introduces a counteracting technique effect that
lowers the overall effectiveness of carbon tariffs as an emission reduction policy.
At first sight, our large composition effects seem to be at odds with Levinson (2009)
and Shapiro and Walker (2015), who decompose the change in U.S. manufacturing
pollution over the last decades. They both find a small composition effect and rather
identify pollution intensities/technology (related to our technique effect) as the most
important driver of pollution reductions. While Levinson (2009) and Shapiro and Walker
(2015) undertake an ex post decomposition of actual U.S. manufacturing emissions, we
analyze the ex ante effects of counterfactual carbon tariffs. As these have never been
implemented, a decomposition of the actual, historically realized, emission changes
can not be informative about the decomposition of carbon tariff emission effects. As
carbon tariffs specifically target the composition of production, the comparably stronger
composition effect in our decomposition compared to Levinson (2009) and Shapiro and
Walker (2015) is in fact plausible and does not contradict the findings based on historical
emission developments. Policy-wise, this finding suggests that if a government wants to
achieve compositional changes, carbon tariffs may be a suitable instrument. As carbon
tariffs tend to shift dirty production to countries with a more ambitious climate policy,
an additional advantage might arise in a model with directed technical change as in
He´mous (2016): the scope of any unilateral climate policy, such as green R&D subsidies,
to reduce CO2 emissions becomes larger due to the higher average emission intensity in
countries undertaking the policies. This may also induce more positive welfare effects of
carbon tariffs.
Copenhagen Accord
At the fifteenth session of The Conference of the Parties (COP), the international com-
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munity took note of the Copenhagen Accord in an attempt to come up with a follow-up
agreement for the Kyoto Protocol.41 In the Accord, one subset of countries (the Annex I
countries of the Kyoto Protocol) were requested to formulate binding national emission
targets in an appendix (Appendix I) to the Accord. Different than in the Kyoto Protocol,
a second subset of (mainly developing and emerging) countries specified voluntary
emission reduction targets, specified in Appendix II of the Accord.
Our framework is well suited to study the trade, welfare, and emission effects of a
scenario in which all countries with emission targets fulfill these targets while other
countries do not take climate policy actions of their own. In our main analysis, we focus
on the pledges made by the Annex I countries in Appendix I, because the commitments
made in Appendix II – different than the Appendix I pledges – are not “[...] measured,
reported and verified in accordance with existing and any further guidelines adopted by
the Conference of the Parties”42. We will shortly discuss how the results change if these
Appendix II pledges are also considered to be binding at the end of this subsection.43
As is well understood and discussed in Section 3.2, the Copenhagen Accord will – just
as any type of sub-global climate policy – potentially suffer from substantial carbon
leakage. Therefore, we will additionally report the percentage leakage rate (LR) of the
41For details and the text of the Copenhagen Accord, see http://unfccc.int/meetings/ copen-
hagen dec 2009/items/5262.php (accessed on September 13th, 2017).
42See p. 6 in the legal text of the Accord available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf (accessed on September 13th, 2017).
43On November 4th, 2016, the more recent Paris Agreement entered into force (see
http://unfccc.int/paris agreement/items/9485.php). In this agreement, all parties agreed
to individually provide Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) (see
http://unfccc.int/focus/indc portal/items/8766.php, accessed on September 13th, 2017). We
focus on the Copenhagen Accord rather than on the Paris Agreement mainly for two reasons: first, as all
countries are required to formulate national emission targets in the Paris Agreement, carbon leakage
would not be a problem in this context (at least assuming that all countries ratify the Agreement and
actually fulfill their targets). This would eliminate one important effect of carbon tariffs, that we are
interested in and want to investigate in our counterfactual analysis. (Of course, carbon tariffs would still
influence trade patterns and the distribution of the welfare effects associated with the implementation of
the Paris Agreement as national emission targets will differ in their stringency. Further, carbon leakage
will again arise if some countries do not adhere to their commitments. We are therefore convinced that a
better understanding of the effects of carbon tariffs keeps its policy relevance even in the light of the Paris
Agreement.) Secondly, existing literature on the Copenhagen Accord allows us to compare our results for
scenarios without carbon tariffs to previous findings.
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implementation of the Copenhagen Accord, calculated as follows:
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where E¯ic are the emission levels to which the Copenhagen Accord countries, which
constitute the set cop, committed. Note that
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amount of emissions that would result without carbon leakage, i.e. if non-committing
countries would have constant emissions, and
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are the actually realized
emissions. Hence, the leakage rate gives the share of the emission reduction that is lost
due to leakage.
Figure 3.6 shows the percentage changes in carbon emissions in our Copenhagen
scenario. For all countries that committed to a specific emission reduction (the Annex I
countries listed in Appendix I), we plot this target, which is equal to the actual emission
reduction in our counterfactual. Some countries only commit to holding their emissions
constant, whereas others commit to large emission reductions, like Cyprus with a
reduction target of 57.4 percent.
Further, we see quite strong endogenous emission increases for many non-committing
countries, specifically in Latin America, Africa and parts of Asia ranging up to 12.6
percent. This leads to a substantial leakage rate of 13.4 percent (with bootstrapped 95%
confidence interval of [11.5, 15.8]) and an overall carbon emission reduction of 8.4
percent (with bootstrapped 95% confidence interval of [-8.6, -8.1]). Egger and Nigai
(2012) obtain a reduction of world carbon emissions of 17 percent in a multi-sector
Ricardian-model of trade. This larger reduction is partly explained by the near absence
of carbon leakage in their model of 33 OECD countries and a Rest of the World, their
consideration of not only Appendix I but also Appendix II countries (such as Brazil,
China, and India), and partly due to the different model structure and calibration. Note
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that Egger and Nigai (2012) do not investigate carbon tariffs in their framework, which
we will do below.
For the non-committing countries, our total differential decomposition remains a very
good approximation. It turns out that the emission changes are overwhelmingly due
to the composition effect which accounts for 88.7 percent on average. The remaining
part is explained by the scale effect, as we do not consider the energy market leakage
channel and keep real energy prices for these countries constant. For the countries with
emission targets, our decomposition leads to partly substantial approximation errors
due to very ambitious emission goals. In the following, we therefore use the exact
log-decomposition. Two things are noteworthy: First, for the committing countries we
have a substantial technique effect amounting to 77.7 percent of the national changes
on average.44 The reason is that introducing an exogenous emission target leads to a
large endogenous adjustment of the real energy price. Second, also for the committing
countries we find a larger average national share for composition (18.8 percent) than for
scale (3.5 percent). The absolute world emission effect decomposes into 83.4 percent
technique effect, 14.3 percent composition effect, and 2.3 percent scale effect. The
corresponding world log technique, composition, and scale effects are 1.17, -0.20, and
0.03, respectively. Hence, the composition effect works in the opposite direction of
the technique and scale effects and actually increases world emissions due to carbon
leakage. The increase in the importance of the technique effect at the world level is
explained by the fact that country-level technique effects are all negative and hence sum
up, while national composition and scale effects partially cancel each other.
In Figure 3.7, we plot the welfare effects of our Copenhagen scenario. It basically gives
the inverse picture of Figure 3.6. Hence, the committing countries bear the costs of
the global emission reduction due to the higher energy price, whereas non-committing
countries gain twofold: first, there is the direct welfare increase due to the decrease of
44For the countries with an emission target of no change, we use our total differential decomposition
for the calculation of the shares, as the log of zero is not defined and the approximation works well due to
the fact that emissions do not change.
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Figure 3.6: Percentage Changes in Carbon Emissions (Copenhagen Scenario)
Notes: This figure shows the percentage changes in carbon emissions due to the counterfactual imple-
mentation of the Copenhagen Accord. Red represents an increase in a country’s emission level, while
green represents a reduction. The values range between -57.4 percent for Cyprus and 12.6 percent for
Rest of North Africa. The corresponding change in world carbon emissions is a 8.4 percent decrease.
emissions. Second, those countries gain comparative advantage in the emission-intensive
industries, and can now serve the committing countries’ markets with those products.
The welfare effects range from -4.7 percent for Greece to 2.2 percent for Bahrain.
Figure 3.7: Percentage Changes in Welfare (Copenhagen Scenario)
Notes: This figure shows the percentage changes in welfare due to the counterfactual implementation
of the Copenhagen Accord. Green represents an increase in a country’s welfare, while red represents a
reduction. The values range between -4.7 percent for Greece and 2.2 percent for Bahrain.
Comparing the welfare effects with the real income effects, we see that the difference
of these two measures is non-negative for all countries. On average, the percentage
change in welfare is 0.12 percentage points higher than the percentage change in real
income. While this seems small, looking for example at the largest absolute difference of
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0.25 percentage points for India implies more than a doubling of the gains experienced
by India (turning the 0.20 percent gain in real income into a 0.45 percent increase in
welfare). This noticeable difference between the two measures not seen in the pure tariff
scenario is due to the considerably stronger world emission reduction in the Copenhagen
scenario. The extend to which welfare and real income differ depends strongly on the
social cost of carbon assumed in the calibration of our welfare function. In addition
to our base calibration of the social costs of carbon of 29 US-$ per metric ton of CO2,
we follow Shapiro and Walker (2015) and use a more extreme value of 200 US-$ as
a sensitivity check. Note that changing the social costs of carbon does only affect our
welfare results. The welfare effects then range between -3.8 percent for Greece and 2.8
percent for Bahrain. The difference between welfare and real income increases to 0.89
percentage points on average. The real income as well as welfare effects for social costs
of carbon of either 29 US-$ or 200 US-$ are illustrated in Figure 3.8.
Figure 3.8: Comparison of Real Income and Welfare Effects (Copenhagen Scenario)
Other studies of the effects of the Copenhagen Accord also consider real income changes.
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Our finding that committing countries bear income losses for the reduction of world
emissions is consistent with previous findings in the literature (see e.g. Saveyn, Van
Regemorter, and Ciscar, 2011; Egger and Nigai, 2012; Ciscar, Saveyn, Soria, Szabo, Van
Regemorter, and Van Ierland, 2013). While Saveyn, Van Regemorter, and Ciscar (2011)
and Ciscar, Saveyn, Soria, Szabo, Van Regemorter, and Van Ierland (2013) find more
moderate real income losses than we obtain (ranging up to -1.9 percent and -3.0 percent,
respectively), Egger and Nigai (2012) obtain stronger real income losses (ranging up to
-15.7 percent).
As discussed above, the Copenhagen scenario leads to a substantial leakage rate of 13.4
percent. One of the main reasons to consider carbon tariffs is exactly their ability to
mitigate leakage. We therefore additionally consider to accompany the emission targets
with the introduction of carbon tariffs. While the tariffs considered in the first two
parts of this section were meant to compensate for differences in the level of carbon
taxation, we will now introduce carbon tariffs that equalize the increase in committing
countries’ real energy price vis-a`-vis non-committing countries as carbon tariffs are now
an accompanying measure to the national commitments. We implement this by the
following formula for the carbon tariffs τ ijl,c:
τ ijl,c =

1 + E
j
l,c
Y j
l,c
/P jc
(
ejc
P jc
− e
j
b
P j
b
)
if i /∈ cop ∧ j ∈ cop,
1 if i ∈ cop ∨ j /∈ cop,
(3.31)
which we jointly endogenously solve with our other model equations.45
Figure 3.9 plots the percentage changes in carbon emissions of the Copenhagen scenario
with tariffs. As before, for the committing countries we plot the committed targets
corresponding to the actual emission reductions. For the non-committing countries,
we see that the adjustment is substantially mitigated if the emission targets are accom-
panied by carbon tariffs, ranging now only up to a 2.4 percent increase in emissions.
45Note that we now calculate the emission intensity using the real production value as we compensate
for changes in the real energy price, different from equation (3.29) where we compensated for nominal
carbon tax differentials.
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Figure 3.9: Percentage Changes in Carbon Emissions (Copenhagen Scenario with Tariffs)
Notes: This figure shows the percentage changes in carbon emissions due to the counterfactual implemen-
tation of the Copenhagen Accord with carbon tariffs. Red represents an increase in a country’s emission
level, while green represents a reduction. The values range between -57.4 percent for Cyprus and 2.4
percent for Cote d’Ivoire. The corresponding change in world carbon emissions is a 9.3 percent decrease.
Carbon tariffs hence strongly reduce carbon leakage from 13.4 percent to 4.1 percent
(with bootstrapped 95% confidence interval of [3.3, 4.9]). This leads to a stronger
world carbon emission reduction of 9.3 percent (with bootstrapped 95% confidence
interval of [-9.3, -9.2]) compared to 8.4 percent in the scenario without carbon tariffs.
To understand the driving forces of this increase, one needs to consider the altered
composition effect in the non-committing countries. As discussed above, the changes in
composition lead to an average increase in emissions in these countries by 3.4 percent
in the Copenhagen scenario without tariffs. Carbon tariffs reduce this increase to 1.0
percent on average. Due to this reduction, the composition effects of committing and
non-committing countries cancel each other out almost exactly, leading to a decompo-
sition of the absolute world emission effects into 94.8 percent technique, 4.0 percent
scale, and only 1.2 percent composition.
In terms of welfare, we find that the additional introduction of carbon tariffs destroys
most of the welfare gains of the non-committing countries (see Figure 3.10). While
the non-committing countries initially profit from the commitments due to reduced
carbon emissions and increased comparative advantage in dirty goods production, the
carbon tariffs load the burden of the additional world carbon emission reduction on the
non-committing countries due to the tariff expenses and the (partial) reversion of the
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comparative advantage effect. Welfare effects for the committing countries remain very
similar, tending to be a little less negative due to tariff revenues, re-gained comparative
advantages, and the additional world carbon emission reduction.
Figure 3.10: Percentage Changes in Welfare (Copenhagen Scenario with Tariffs)
Notes: This figure shows the percentage changes in welfare due to the counterfactual implementation of
the Copenhagen Accord with carbon tariffs. Green represents an increase in a country’s welfare, while red
represents a reduction. The values range between -4.6 percent for Greece and 0.40 percent for Belarus.
As previously stated, we take our policy (i.e., the targets and the decision whether to
use carbon tariffs or not) as exogenous and therefore do not allow countries to change
any of their policies in reaction to carbon tariff changes. Bo¨hringer, Carbone, and
Rutherford (2016) investigate strategic reactions to the threat of carbon tariffs by a
climate coalition (similar to the set of committed countries in the Copenhagen Accord).
They consider three policy options for the non-committed countries, namely no reaction,
tariff retaliation, and cooperation (i.e., the introduction of own reduction targets). Their
main finding is that China and Russia would choose the cooperative solution. Applied
to our framework, allowing for endogenous policy reactions may hence even increase
the effectiveness of carbon tariffs by incentivizing pollution-intensive countries to take
climate policy actions of their own. However, Bo¨hringer, Carbone, and Rutherford
(2016) do not allow high-pollution countries to lower their carbon taxes in reaction
to carbon tariffs. In principle, countries could use this channel to restore international
competitiveness of energy-intensive industries (unless carbon tariffs are defined to react
to any carbon tax changes), re-intensifying carbon leakage effects.
120 Chapter 3: Carbon Tariffs
The results presented so far for the Copenhagen scenarios only considered the pledges
made in Appendix I of the Accord. We also conducted the same counterfactual ex-
periments additionally taking into account the voluntary emission targets of further
countries according to Appendix II of the Accord (see Table C.3 in Appendix C.2.6 for
the specific countries and their pledges).
Assuming that the partly very ambitious goals of both Appendix I and Appendix II of the
Copenhagen Accord are actually met, world emissions go down by 19.0 percent (with
bootstrapped 95% confidence interval [-19.2, -18.9]) in a scenario without carbon tariffs.
This magnification of the reduction is explained by two factors: first, additional main
polluters such as China, Brazil, and India now also reduce their emissions keeping up
with their voluntary targets. Second, the overall larger number of committing countries
reduces the scope for carbon leakage. This is confirmed by the new leakage rate that
we find in this scenario of 6.0 percent (with bootstrapped 95% confidence interval
[5.3, 6.9]). Comparing the leakage rates we obtain in our two Copenhagen scenarios
without carbon tariffs with the results of Peterson, Schleich, and Duscha (2011) who
also investigate a number of Copenhagen Accord scenarios with differently strict pledges,
our 6.0 and 13.4 percent leakage rates are similar to their obtained range of 4.3 to 13.1
percent.
Again, carbon tariffs can substantially reduce the leakage rate. If all committing countries
in the larger scenario accompany their national climate policies with the introduction
of carbon tariffs, the leakage rate goes down to 1.4 percent (with bootstrapped 95%
confidence interval [1.0, 1.8]), leading to an even stronger reduction of global emissions
amounting to 20.0 percent (with bootstrapped 95% confidence interval [-20.1, -19.9]).
Note that also taking into account the pledges of the Appendix II, our overall world
emission reductions are now much closer to the predictions of Egger and Nigai (2012).
Table 3.5 summarizes the world emission effects and their decomposition for all coun-
terfactual scenarios considered in this section.
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Table 3.5: World Emission Effects Across Scenarios
Pure Carbon Tariff Scenarios
∆WE WPSE WPCE WPTE
Base model, product-based -0.50 -0.17 -0.33 0
(0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
Base model, product-based -0.38 -0.13 -0.26 0
(OECD data) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Base model, production-based -1.41 -0.41 -1.02 0
(0.08) (0.02) (0.07)
Extended model, product-based -0.25 -0.11 -0.31 0.18
(0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
Extended model, product-based -0.24 -0.11 -0.31 0.18
(EIA data) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
Extended model, production-based -0.76 -0.24 -0.96 0.44
(0.05) (0.01) (0.07) (0.02)
Copenhagen Accord Scenarios
∆WE WLSE WLCE WLTE LR
Appendix I, no tariffs -8.37 0.03 -0.20 1.17 13.40
(0.11) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (1.15)
Appendix I, with tariffs -9.27 0.07 0.00 0.93 4.14
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.43)
Appendix I and II, no tariffs -19.05 0.03 -0.31 1.28 6.01
(0.08) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.41)
Appendix I and II, with tariffs -19.98 0.08 -0.02 0.95 1.41
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.23)
Notes: ∆WE denotes the percentage changes in world carbon emissions, WPSE the world percentage scale effects,
WPCE the world percentage composition effects, WPTE the world percentage technique effects, WLSE the world log
scale effects, WLCE the world log composition effects, WLTE the world log technique effects, and LR the leakage
rates. Note that WPSE + WPCE + WPTE = ∆WE (up to the approximation and rounding errors), while
WLSE + WLCE + WLTE = 1 (up to rounding errors). The numbers in parentheses below the reported values
give the corresponding bootstrapped standard errors.
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3.7 Conclusions
The effectiveness of unilateral or at least sub-global climate policies is undermined by
carbon leakage. One policy measure that may tackle this problem and that is widely
discussed in this context is the introduction of carbon tariffs.
Using a multi-sector, multi-factor Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)-type structural
gravity model, we first counterfactually introduce carbon tariffs to investigate their
trade, welfare, and emission effects. We find that trade decreases, welfare is reduced in
most countries (and most strongly in the developing world), carbon emissions are partly
shifted from countries with low carbon taxes to countries with high carbon taxes (i.e.
carbon leakage is reduced), and world carbon emissions decrease by 0.50 percent, driven
primarily by composition effects. Hence, based on our model, we find that carbon tariffs
have some desirable effects: a reduction of carbon leakage and a decrease of world
emission. But these effects have welfare costs which are mainly borne by developing
countries. Qualitatively similar but stronger effects are obtained when considering
production-based instead of product-based carbon tariffs. Allowing for energy market
leakage reduces the effectiveness of carbon tariffs due to a counteracting technique
effect.
We additional apply our framework to analyze the effects of one of the latest attempts
to obtain binding emission reduction commitments at an international level, namely
the Copenhagen Accord. We find that the effectiveness of such a sub-global climate
agreement is hampered by carbon leakage. Specifically, 13.4 percent of the potential
emission reduction are lost. Accompanying the emission targets with carbon tariffs
towards non-committing countries significantly reduces the leakage rate to 4.1 percent.
The 8.4 percent reduction of world emissions (mainly driven by the technique effect) in
the scenario without tariffs is payed for with high welfare losses in committing countries,
while non-committing countries tend to strongly gain in this case. The welfare costs of
the further reduction of an additional 0.9 percentage points in the scenario with tariffs,
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however, is mainly borne by the non-committing countries.
There are several issues in the given model framework which ask for further research.
For example, there are no dynamic effects, technology is fixed (in the sense that the
parameters of the production function do not change), climate change impacts on
countries’ productivities are not directly taken into account, and policies are exogenous.
Nevertheless, this paper contributes to the literature by providing a framework with
a sectoral structure in which counterfactual analyses of exogenous changes in trade
costs, national emission targets, and carbon tariffs can be conducted and the resulting
emission changes can be decomposed into scale, composition, and technique effects.

4The Consequences of Unilateral
Withdrawals from the Paris
Agreement1
4.1 Introduction
The coming into force of [the] Paris Agreement has ushered in a new
dawn for global cooperation on climate change.
(UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, November 15th, 2016)
[I]n order to fulfill my solemn duty to protect America and its citizens,
the United States will withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord.
(US President Donald Trump, June 1st, 2017)
In December 2015, the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) reached a joint agreement to combat climate change. With its 195
signing countries, the Paris Agreement constitutes a truly global consensus to take
1This chapter is joint work with Mario Larch. We thank participants at the TRISTAN workshop 2018 in
Bayreuth, ETSG 2018 in Warsaw, FIW Research Conference “International Economics” 2018 in Vienna,
Midwest International Economics Group Meeting 2019 in Bloomington, as well as at research seminars in
Innsbruck, Nottingham, St. Catharines (Brock University), Penn State, Philadelphia (Drexel University),
and Paris (CEPII).
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appropriate measures to keep global warming well below two degrees Celsius. One
centerpiece of the agreement are the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in
which every country specifies an individual greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction
target. Figure 4.1 shows the different national reduction targets, standardized to
reductions compared to a business as usual (BAU) scenario in 2030, to make the targets
comparable.
Figure 4.1: Emission Reduction Targets in the Paris Agreement
Notes: This figure shows the emission reduction targets specified in the individual countries’ NDCs (or,
where no NDCs are available, the Intended NDCs). To make the targets comparable, all are given as
reductions below the business as usual emission path in 2030. National targets aggregate to a 14.7%
global reduction compared to a BAU emission path. For details on the targets and their standardization,
see Section 4.3.
The large heterogeneity in ambition of the targets becomes evident at first sight. While
some Asian and African countries merely commit to not increase their emissions beyond
the BAU path and some have very mild targets (like the 5.0% of China), large parts
of Europe and the Americas formulate strong targets that in some cases lower their
emission by more than half. What is more crucial though and most likely explains at least
part of the enthusiasm expressed for example in the first opening quote by the former UN
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, is the fact that every country has a target. The subglobal
coverage of the Paris Agreement’s most prominent predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol, has
severely harmed its effectiveness due to leakage effects (see e.g. Aichele and Felbermayr,
2012, 2015). Carbon leakage refers to the phenomenon that climate policies undertaken
in some countries can actually lead to increased emissions in other places where no such
policies are undertaken due to (i) production shifts of emission-intensive goods towards
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the un- (or less) regulated countries and (ii) falling fossil fuel prices on the world market
that incentivize a more fossil fuel-intensive production (see e.g. Felder and Rutherford,
1993). The underlying free-riding problem of international climate policy is analyzed by
Nordhaus (2015).
As the second opening quote by US President Donald Trump clearly shows, the hope
of actually achieving the world emission reduction that would result from adding up
all national targets appears overly optimistic. The United States have announced their
withdrawal, other signing countries of the agreement (such as e.g. Iran, Russia, and
Turkey) have not yet moved on to ratification. Countries that decide not to commit to
their emission targets harm the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement in two ways. First
and most obviously, the sum of the national targets is lowered if some countries drop
their target. Second and potentially just as importantly, withdrawals can induce carbon
leakage that lowers the actually achieved world reduction below the remaining sum
of national targets. The first effect can easily be calculated by combining the national
targets shown in Figure 4.1 with data on the national emission levels and is shown in
Figure 4.2 and (for the five countries with the strongest effects) in Table 4.1.
Figure 4.2: World Reduction Lost by Withdrawn Commitments (Direct Effect Only)
Notes: This figure shows for every country in turn, which share of the world emission reduction due
to the Paris Agreement would be lost if the respective country withdraws from the agreement and its
target specified in the NDC is hence no longer part of the global reduction. Endogenous adjustments of
withdrawing country to other countries’ climate policies with potentially resulting emission increases in
the withdrawing country beyond the BAU path are not taken into account at this point.
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Table 4.1: Top Five Direct Reduction Losses
Withdrawing country USA CHN BRA CAN JPN
World reduction lost (direct effect) 25.7% 8.2% 5.8% 5.5% 5.1%
China (7241 Mt CO2)2 and the United States (5108 Mt CO2) are by far the largest
emitters. Unsurprisingly, their withdrawals would directly lower the world emission
reduction comparatively strongly. Even though the US comes second in terms of emis-
sions, its combination of large emissions with a rather ambitious NDC reduction target
(21%) makes the direct effect of a US withdrawal the by far strongest of all countries:
more than a quarter of the global reduction would be lost due to the absence of the
US target. China (8.2% world reduction loss) comes in second, while Brazil (5.8%)
has the third strongest effect. These two countries’ strong effects come about in very
different ways: very large emissions and a mild target in one case (China) and much
lower emissions (about 5% of the Chinese level) and a very ambitious target (65%) in
the other case (Brazil). Besides these three countries, a group of European countries,
as well as a few more large developed countries (Canada, Japan, and South Korea)
combine high emission levels and strong targets to notable direct reduction losses in
case of withdrawal of three to five percent. All African and most Asian countries have
either sufficiently low emissions or very small targets (or both), so that the loss of their
target would not alter the achieved world reduction conceivably.
Two prominent examples illustrate the limitations of considering only the direct effect of
removing a withdrawing country’s target particularly well: India and Russia. Both these
countries have targets that imply only a commitment to not increase emissions above
the BAU path. Obviously, removing such a “zero target” does not change the sum of
targets and hence, these countries’ withdrawals are depicted with a zero effect in Figure
4.2. But indeed, an Indian or Russian decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement
and to not take any climate policy measures may induce carbon leakage and therefore
harm the achieved global emission reduction indirectly. Such leakage effects will not
2The emission data used here refer to the year 2011 and capture only carbon and no other GHG
emissions. For details, see Section 4.3.
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only introduce effects for countries with zero targets, but it will also amplify the effects
of all other countries’ withdrawals.
Different from the direct effects, leakage effects (and hence the total effects) of unilateral
withdrawals cannot be simply calculated, but have to be solved using a multi-country
general equilibrium framework. The most common approach to investigate the global
effects of different trade and climate policies is the use of computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models (see e.g. Bo¨hringer, Balistreri, and Rutherford, 2012, for an overview of
various prominent CGE models). A recent strand of literature (Egger and Nigai, 2015;
Larch and Wanner, 2017; Larch, Lo¨ning, and Wanner, 2018; Shapiro, 2016; Shapiro and
Walker, 2018) incorporates environmental components into structural gravity models
as an alternative approach.3 Gravity models are the workhorse models in the empirical
international trade literature. Just as CGE models, they can be used to conduct ex ante
analyzes of different policy scenarios. Compared to typical CGE models, they tend to
sacrifice some detail in the model structure in favor of higher analytical tractability and
direct estimation of key model parameters.
Given gravity’s great success in predicting trade flows (see e.g. Head and Mayer, 2014;
Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 2014, for surveys on gravity models and their perfor-
mance), it is likely to capture well leakage that occurs via production shifts and inter-
national trade. In fact, the main model of Larch and Wanner (2017), as well as the
models by Shapiro (2016) and Shapiro and Walker (2018) exclusively focus on this
leakage channel. In this paper, we extend the model of Larch and Wanner (2017) by
considering fossil fuel resources that are internationally traded and supplied according
to a constant elasticity of fossil fuel supply function as proposed in the CGE context by
Boeters and Bollen (2012). The resulting extended gravity model will capture leakage
effects via international trade and via the international fossil fuel market and hence
allow a quantification of the total emission reduction losses associated with unilateral
withdrawals from the Paris Agreement. At the same time, the model structure remains
3Pothen and Hu¨bler (2018) develop a hybrid model, combining an Eaton and Kortum (2002)-type
gravity trade structure with a CGE model production structure.
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tractable enough to allow an analytical and quantitative decomposition of the national
emission changes into scale, composition, and technique effects as is often done in the
theoretical and empirical literature on trade and the environment (see e.g. Grossman
and Krueger, 1993; Copeland and Taylor, 1994, 2003). Such a decomposition can
generate important insights on the channels via which international climate policies are
effective.
Our analysis of the effects of unilateral withdrawals complements other studies that
investigate the Paris Agreement and its implications. For example, Rogelj, den Elzen,
Ho¨hne, Fransen, Fekete, Winkler, Schaeffer, Sha, Riahi, and Meinshausen (2016) analyze
whether the individual national targets are sufficient to jointly achieve the two (or even
1.5) degree Celsius target. Aldy and Pizer (2016), Aldy, Pizer, and Akimoto (2017), and
Iyer, Calvin, Clarke, Edmonds, Hultman, Hartin, McJeon, Aldy, and Pizer (2018) aim to
make the different NDCs comparable in their implied required mitigation efforts of the
different countries. Rose, Wei, Miller, Vandyck, and Flachsland (2018) investigate one
particular way for actually achieving the reduction pledges in an efficient way, namely by
linking different emissions trading schemes. Nong and Siriwardana (2018) analyze the
consequences of a US withdrawal on the US economy, finding besides others a significant
drop in energy prices. Bo¨hringer and Rutherford (2017) and Winchester (2018) show
that the introduction of carbon tariffs is not a credible threat towards the US in order
to try to keep them in the agreement. Kemp (2017) considers measures that can be
taken in order to reduce the harm done to the effectiveness of the agreement due to
a US withdrawal, e.g. by incorporating cooperation with US states. We contribute to
the literature by quantifying the harm done by countries withdrawing from the Paris
Agreement taking into account both direct effects and emission shifts (leakage) resulting
from general equilibrium adjustments of supply and demand of goods and fossil fuels.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 develops our extended structural
gravity model, shows how counterfactual analyzes can be performed in this framework,
and derives the emission change decomposition. In Section 4.3, the data sources and
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descriptive statistics are presented, as well as the gravity estimation procedure. We
discuss the results of simulating the unilateral withdrawal for every country in Section
4.4. In Section 4.5, we derive a model extension with multiple fossil fuels of varying
carbon intensities, demonstrate how this extension leads to a fourth, substitution,
effect on emissions, and rerun the simulations using the extended model. Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 Model
In this section, we develop an extended structural gravity model including a non-tradable
and multiple tradable sectors, a multi-factor production function including an energy
input, energy production including an internationally tradable fossil fuel resource, a
constant elasticity of fossil fuel supply (CEFS) function following Boeters and Bollen
(2012), as well as emissions associated to the fossil fuel usage. The model builds on the
framework by Larch and Wanner (2017), but importantly deviates by (i) modeling the
energy-market leakage channel using a CEFS function4, (ii) linking emissions directly to
fossil fuel use rather than to general energy use, and (iii) explicitly including a carbon
tax which countries can use to achieve emission reduction targets.
Demand
Consumers in country j ∈ N (where N denotes the set of all countries in the world)
obtain utility according to the following utility function:
U j = (U jS)γ
j
S
∏
l∈L
(U jl )γ
j
l

 1
1 +
(
1
µj
∑
i∈N Ri
)2
 , (4.1)
4The base model of Larch and Wanner (2017) only features the trade leakage channel, while the small
model extension presented in their work relies on an energy resource in fixed supply.
132 Chapter 4: Unilateral Withdrawals from the Paris Agreement
with
U jl =
[∑
i∈N
(βil )
1−σl
σl (qijl )
σl−1
σl
] σl
σl−1
, (4.2)
where subscript S denotes the non-tradable sector, l ∈ L is one of the tradable sectors
(with L being the set of all tradable sectors), γjl represents the expenditure share of sector
l in country j, µj is a parameter that captures j’s disutility from global carbon emissions,
Ri is country i’s fossil fuel use which is proportional to its emissions, βil represents
the utility parameter for tradable goods, qijl is the amount of good l from country i
consumed in country j, and σl stands for the sectoral elasticity of substitution. Equations
(4.1) and (4.2) hence combine linear utility from non-tradable good consumption and
CES utility from tradable goods consumption in an upper-tier Cobb-Douglas utility
function (implying constant sectoral expenditure shares), as well as disutility from
global emissions in the functional form chosen by Shapiro (2016) in order to ensure
almost constant social costs of carbon around the baseline emission level.
Carbon emissions are treated as a pure externality (and are therefore not taken into
account in the consumption decisions). Demand for non-tradable goods is then simply
given by the corresponding expenditure XjS divided by the non-tradable good price(
qjS = X
j
S/p
j
S
)
. Demand for tradable goods l from i in j follows from CES utility as:
qijl =
(
βilp
ij
l
P jl
)−σl (
βilX
j
l
P jl
)
, (4.3)
where pijl is the price including trade costs from i to j and P
j
l is the sectoral price index
in j, given by:
P jl =
[∑
i∈N
(βilp
ij
l )1−σl
] 1
1−σl
. (4.4)
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Supply
Each country produces a non-tradable good S, as well as a differentiated variety of each
of l ∈ L tradable goods according to the following Cobb-Douglas production functions:
qiS = AiS(EiS)α
i
SE
∏
f∈F
(V iSf )α
i
Sf , (4.5)
qil = Ail(Eil )α
i
lE
∏
f∈F
(V ilf )α
i
lf , (4.6)
where AiS and A
i
l are sector- and country-specific productivity parameters, α
i
SE, α
i
lE,
αiSf , and α
i
lf denote production cost shares, and V
i
Sf and V
i
lf the usages of a production
factor f ∈ F . Countries are endowed with a fixed factor supply V if and factors are
mobile across sectors, but internationally immobile. EiS and E
i
l denote the energy
inputs in producing non-tradable and tradable goods, respectively. Different from the
other production factors, countries are not endowed with a fixed energy supply, but the
energy inputs have to be produced themselves according to the following Cobb-Douglas
production function:
Ei = AiE(Ri)ξ
i
R
∏
f∈F
(V iEf )ξ
i
f , (4.7)
where ξiR and ξ
i
f denote the input cost shares andR
i is the usage of a freely internationally
tradable fossil fuel resource. National factor markets are assumed to clear, i.e. V if =
V iSf +
∑
l∈L V ilf + V iEf , determining the factor prices vif . Countries can charge a national
carbon tax λi on the use of fossil fuels in order to fulfill specific emission reduction
targets and the fossil fuel price r is determined on the world market by global market
clearing:
r = 1
RW
∑
i∈N
( 1
1 + λi
)
ξiR
αiSEY iS +∑
l∈L
αilEY
i
l
 , (4.8)
where Y iS = qiSpiS and Y il = qilpil are the sectoral values of production. Following Boeters
and Bollen (2012), a change in the fossil fuel price is translated into a change in the
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global supply of the fossil fuel with a constant elasticity of fossil fuel supply function:
R̂W = (r̂)η , (4.9)
where η denotes the supply elasticity and the hat notation (introduced into the structural
gravity literature by Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum, 2007, 2008) indicates the change
of the respective variables, i.e. R̂W = RW ′
RW
and r̂ = r′
r
, where the prime indicates a
counterfactual value in response to a policy shock and values without a prime correspond
to the baseline equilibrium. The total fossil fuel supply RW stems from the different
countries according to their varying fossil fuel endowment shares ωi (with
∑
i∈N ωi = 1).
A change in the fossil fuel world market price further leads to an adjusted national
energy price:
êi =
(
̂(1 + λi)r̂
)ξiR ∏
f∈F
[
(αiSf + ξifαiSE)Y i′S +
∑
l∈L(αilf + ξifαilE)Y i′l
(αiSf + ξifαiSE)Y iS +
∑
l∈L(αilf + ξifαilE)Y il
]ξif
. (4.10)
Note that the adjustment of the energy price in response to a policy shock further
depends on the endogenously adjusted, counterfactual production values. Subsection
4.2.1 will lay out the full system of equations that can—for a given counterfactual policy
shock—be solved for the values of a sufficient set of endogenous variables from which
all variables of interest can then be obtained.
Income
Countries generate income from (i) the expenditure on their national production factors,
(ii) their share of the global supply of the fossil fuel, and (iii) the carbon tax charged on
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its fossil fuel use:
Y i =
∑
f∈F
(αiSf + ξifαiSE)Y iS +∑
l∈L
(αilf + ξifαilE)Y il

+ ωi
∑
j∈N
( 1
1 + λj
)
ξjR
αjSEY jS +∑
l∈L
αjlEY
j
l
+ ( λi1 + λi
)
ξiR
αiSEY iS +∑
l∈L
αilEY
i
l
 .
(4.11)
Trade Flows
Introducing iceberg trade costs T ijl (with T
ij
l = T
ji
l ≥ 1 and T iil = 1) and defining
sectoral scaled equilibrium prices as ψil ≡ (βilpil)1−σl , the exports of country i to country
j in sector l can be obtained from the bilateral demand given in Equation (4.3) as:
X ijl =
(
ψilT
ij
l
P jl
)1−σl
Xjl . (4.12)
This gravity equation links bilateral trade flows to bilateral trade costs, the importer’s
market size and overall openness (captured by the price index which is equivalent to
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)’s inward multilateral resistance), as well as the
overall exporting capability of country j (summarized by ψil which implicitly captures
the exporter’s size in terms of production and its outward multilateral resistance).
Assuming balanced trade and market clearing, as well as using the sectoral price index
given by Equation (4.4), from Equation (4.12) we can obtain an expression which links
the sectoral production to the international trade cost matrix:
Y il = ψil
N∑
j=1
(T ijl )1−σl∑N
k=1 ψ
k
l (T
kj
l )1−σl
γjl Y
j. (4.13)
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4.2.1 Comparative Statics
Equation (4.8) for the world market price of fossil fuels, Equation (4.9) depicting the
constant elasticity of fossil fuel supply function, Equation (4.10) that captures the
response in energy prices, Equation (4.11) which describes total national income, and
Equation (4.13) linking sectoral production values and scaled equilibrium prices to the
trade cost matrix (or the counterfactual equilibrium counterparts of these equations)
describe a system of equations that can almost be solved for a given policy shock. Cost
minimization in production allows to derive the second last necessary equation which
captures the change in factory-gate prices (or equivalently in scaled equilibrium prices):
(
ψ̂il
) 1
σl−1 =
(
êi
)αilE ∏
f∈F
(
(αiSf + ξifαiSE)Y iS +
∑
m∈L(αimf + ξifαimE)Y im
(αiSf + ξifαiSE)Y i′S +
∑
m∈L(αimf + ξifαimE)Y i′m
)αilf
. (4.14)
The last equation needed to solve the model for the counterfactual equilibrium stems
from the specific policy scenario under investigation. We will run different scenarios in
all of which all countries around the world will fulfill the emission reduction targets
specified in their NDCs, except for one country that decides to withdraw from the
agreement. We can link this scenario to the choice of the carbon tax λi in the model.
Denoting the set of committed (or cooperating) countries by cop, the country that is not
part of the agreement chooses a zero carbon tax, while all other countries choose their
carbon tax exactly at the required level to ensure that their realized emissions are equal
to their targeted emission level (denoted by Ri′):
λi =

0 if i /∈ cop,
ξiR(αiSEY i′S +
∑
l∈L α
i
lEY
i′
l )
Ri′r′
− 1 if i ∈ cop.
(4.15)
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4.2.2 Decomposition of Emission Changes
As emissions are proportional to a country’s fossil fuel use, emissions in country i can be
written as:
Ri = ξ
i
R (αiSEY iS +
∑
l∈L αilEY
i
l )
(1 + λi)r = ξ
i
Rα¯
i
E
Y˜ i
P i
(
ri
P i
)−1
, (4.16)
where Y˜ i ≡ Y iS +
∑
l∈L Y il denotes total production, α¯
i
E ≡ αiSE Y
i
S
Y˜ i
+ ∑l∈L αilE Y ilY˜ i is the
production-share-weighted average energy cost share, and ri ≡ (1 + λi)r is the national
price for fossil fuels (including the carbon tax). Intuitively, the level of emissions in a
country depends on (i) how much is spend for energy inputs in production, (ii) which
share of the energy input expenditure is paid for fossil fuel inputs in energy production,
and (iii) how expensive fossil fuels are (both in terms of the world market price and the
national carbon tax).
Following Grossman and Krueger (1993) and Copeland and Taylor (1994) (as well as
Larch and Wanner, 2017, in a structural gravity context), the change in emissions can
then be decomposed into three parts:
dRi = ∂R
i
∂(Y˜ i/P i)
d(Y˜ i/P i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
scale effect
+ ∂R
i
∂α¯iE
dα¯iE︸ ︷︷ ︸
composition effect
+ ∂R
i
∂(ri/P i)d(r
i/P i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
technique effect
.
Scale Effect. A country’s fossil fuel use (and hence emissions) increases proportionally
with the size of the economy (measured as the real value of production):
∂Ri
∂(Y˜ i/P i)
= ξ
i
Rα¯
i
E
(1 + λi)r/P i > 0 and
∂Ri
∂(Y˜ i/P i)
(Y˜ i/P i)
Ri
= 1.
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Composition Effect. An increase in the average energy intensity of production in a
country (measured by the weighted average energy cost share) proportionately increases
the country’s carbon emissions:
∂Ri
∂α¯iE
= ξ
i
RY˜
i
(1 + λi)r > 0 and
∂Ri
∂α¯iE
α¯iE
Ri
= 1.
Technique Effect. An increase in the fossil fuel resource price—either due to a higher
world market price or due to a higher national carbon tax—proportionately lowers a
country’s carbon emissions:
∂Ri
∂(ri/P i) = −
ξiRα¯
i
EY˜
i/P i
(r/P i)2 < 0 and
∂Ri
∂(ri/P i)
ri/P i
Ri
= −1.
4.3 Data and Estimation
4.3.1 Data Sources
Our main data source is the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 9 database (Aguiar,
Narayanan, and McDougall, 2016). From GTAP, we take the data on carbon emissions,
sectoral production, trade flows, factor expenditures, and expenditure for and income
from fossil fuels.5 GTAP also provides estimates for the sectoral elasticities of substitution
of which we make use. Unfortunately, no estimate is available for the fossil fuel supply
elasticity. For our main model, we therefore choose the simple average of the values
reported by Boeters and Bollen (2012) for the three different specific fossil fuels oil, gas,
and coal, namely η = 2.6
The GTAP 9 data is given for the base year 2011. We hence construct our whole data
set for this year. It captures 139 countries (some of which are in fact aggregates of
5See Appendix D.2 for details on the parametrization of the model.
6In our model extension presented in Section 4.5 we can directly use Boeters and Bollen (2012)’s
values, specifically ηoil = ηgas = 1, ηcoal = 4.
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several countries) covering the whole world. We aggregate the sectoral structure to one
non-tradable and 14 tradable sectors.7
For the gravity estimation of bilateral trade costs, we rely on a set of standard gravity
variables from the CEPII dataset by Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010), namely bilateral dis-
tance (DIST ), an indicator variable for whether two countries share a common border
(BRDR), and a second indicator variable for a common official language (LANG). We
complement these variables by an indicator variable for joint regional trade agreement
(RTA) membership taken from Mario Larch’s RTA database (Egger and Larch, 2008).
The (I)NDCs of the signatory states of the Paris Agreement are collected and made
available online at the United Nations NDC Registry and summarized by the World
Resources Institute.8 In order to translate the different emission targets into 2030 BAU
reduction targets, we additionally use GDP and carbon emission projections by the US
Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) International Energy Outlook 2016.
The gravity and emission target data are aggregated to the regional structure of the
GTAP data base.
4.3.2 Standardization of Reduction Targets
The reduction targets depicted in Figure 4.1 are percentage reductions of carbon emis-
sions below the 2030 business as usual emission level.9 They hence relate to the counter-
factual emission level enforced in the counterfactual scenarios by targeti = 1−Ri′/Ri.
Note that while we calculate the reduction targets for the 2030 time frame, we will
refrain from projecting all model variables and parameters to 2030 and therefore im-
7The 14 tradable sectors are agriculture, apparel, chemical, equipment, food, machinery, metal, mineral,
mining, other, paper, service, textile, and wood. See Larch and Wanner (2017) for the concordance to the
57 original GTAP sectors.
8See https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx (accessed on August 16th, 2019) and
https://cait.wri.org/indc/ (accessed on August 16th, 2019).
9Note that strictly speaking the targets refer to CO2 equivalents of all greenhouse gas emissions. Due
to better data availability, we use carbon emission paths for the projections to 2030.
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plement all scenarios as changes from the 2011 baseline equilibrium (implying that Ri
refers to national emissions in 2011).
Different countries’ (I)NDCs are specified in different ways, e.g. in terms of emission
levels or intensities and compared to varying base years or to a BAU projection. In the
simplest case, a country specifies a reduction target relative to BAU (target = targetNDCBAU ,
suppressing the country superscript for ease of notation).
Some countries specify a specific targeted reduction of the level of emissions in 2030
compared to a reference (ref) year (targetNDClevel ), as was e.g. the case for all targets in
the Kyoto Protocol, which translates into our business as usual target as follows:
target = 1−
(
1− targetNDClevel
) CO2,ref
COproj2,2030
, (4.17)
where COproj2,2030 are projected BAU emissions in 2030.
The final type of target is an emission intensity target. In this case, a country specifies the
reduction of emissions per (value) unit of GDP it aims to achieve compared to a reference
year intensity (targetNDCint ). This corresponds to a 2030 BAU target as follows:
10
target = 1− (1− targetNDCint )
CO2,ref/GDPref
COproj2,2030/GDP
proj
2030
. (4.18)
Whenever countries reported a range for their targeted reduction, we chose the center
of this range. We did not take into account additional, higher reduction promises that
are conditional on other parties’ behavior (e.g. financial support).11 Neither did we
incorporate any other components of the NDCs beyond the greenhouse gas reduction
commitments (such as additionally targeted renewable energy shares). In a few cases the
combination of NDCs and GDP and emission projections imply a target that represents
an increase over the BAU emission path. For these Paris member countries, we assume
10Israel reported an intensity target per capita rather than per unit of GDP. In this case, simply substitute
the GDP values by observed and projected population sizes.
11In some cases, countries did not specify which part of the target is conditional. We treated these
commitments as entirely conditional.
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in the counterfactual scenarios that they commit to not emit more CO2 than in the BAU
case (i.e. target = 0). For both level and intensity targets, some countries deviated
from the 2030 target year and reported for instance targets for 2025. We treated these
targets as if they were specified for 2030. Finally, some countries reported only certain
mitigation actions rather than reduction targets or targets for specific sectors only. We
treated these countries as committing to the BAU scenario (i.e. target = 0). Table D.2 in
Appendix D.2 reports the targets that result from this procedure and which are used in
our counterfactual analyses.
4.3.3 Selected Descriptive Statistics
Given the critical role of initial emission levels for the importance of the different
national reduction targets (and, as will turn out, for the leakage potential), Figure 4.3
displays the national levels of carbon emissions. China and the US stand out as the
strongest emitters, followed by other large developed or emerging economies, such as
India, Russia, Japan, Germany, and Canada.
Figure 4.3: National Carbon Emissions in 2011
Table 4.2 additionally summarizes the gravity variables used in the trade cost estimation:
country pairs are on average 7600 km apart, 2% share a common border, 11% share a
common official language, and 23% are joint members of a regional trade agreement.
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Table 4.2: Gravity Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Distance (in km) 19,321 7568.75 4334.84 8.45 19781.39
Contiguity 19,321 0.02 0.14 0 1
Common Language 19,321 0.11 0.31 0 1
RTA 19,321 0.23 0.42 0 1
4.3.4 Gravity Estimation
Estimates of bilateral trade costs can be obtained based on the gravity Equation (4.12)
derived above. Approximating trade costs by a function of observable bilateral charac-
teristics (captured by the vector zij), collecting all (partly unobservable) importer- and
exporter-specific terms and introducing an error term yields the following regression
equation:
X ijl = exp(piil + χ
j
l + z′ijβl)× εijl . (4.19)
Following the suggestions by Feenstra (2004) and Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006),
respectively, we capture piil and χ
j
l by the inclusion of exporter and importer fixed
effects and estimate the model in its multiplicative form (avoiding problems due to
heteroskedasticity and zero trade flows) with the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
(PPML) estimator. The estimation results for all sectors are shown in Table D.1 in
Appendix D.1. Based on these coefficient estimates, we can construct an estimated trade
cost matrix.
4.3.5 Model Validation
In this subsection, we briefly discuss how our model fits the data from the baseline
equilibrium, as well as how its global emission reactions to a policy shock compare to
other models in the literature.
As structural gravity models always do, our model perfectly replicates the national
(sectoral) production values. Unsurprisingly, the workhorse model in international trade
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also fits the sectoral bilateral trade flows very well, indicated by an average Pseudo-
R2 from the gravity regressions of 0.83. Importantly, national carbon emissions are
also perfectly fitted in our framework. The sectoral distribution of a country’s carbon
emissions is closely proxied by the perfectly replicated distribution of sectoral energy
expenditures.
In order to investigate whether the model predicts credible reactions to policy shocks
(not only in terms of trade effects that are well established in the trade literature, but
also in terms of emission changes), we simulate a counterfactual scenario in which all
Annex I countries of the Kyoto Protocol reduce their emissions by 20% while all other
countries undertake no climate policy and calculate the resulting leakage rate. This
type of scenario has been investigated intensively in the literature and therefore can be
compared nicely. Using 2011 baseline data, we find a leakage rate of 24.6%. Bo¨hringer,
Balistreri, and Rutherford (2012) implement the same scenario in a number of CGE
models using data for 2004 and find a range of leakage rates from 5 to 19%. Larch and
Wanner (2017) obtain a leakage rate of 12.5% for the base year 2007. Elliott, Foster,
Kortum, Munson, Pe´rez Cervantes, and Weisbach (2010) consider the introduction of
specific carbon tax rates rather than explicit reduction targets and—also using 2004
data—find leakage rates in the range of 15 to 25%, which increase in the level of the
carbon tax. The prediction of our model hence are at the high end of a typical range of
results. However, in comparing the models’ predictions one should keep in mind that
the Annex I countries covered a larger share of global emissions in 2004 than in 2011.
Given the implied smaller coalition size in our case, leakage is expectedly somewhat
higher in our simulation.12
12We re-calibrated our model to 2004 data and ran the same simulation, obtaining—as expected—a
somewhat lower leakage rate of 21.3%.
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4.4 Counterfactual Analysis: Unilateral Withdrawals
from the Paris Agreement
We use the model framework developed in Section 4.2 to investigate the effects of
unilateral withdrawals from the Paris Agreement. We consider each of the 139 countries
in our data set in turn, i.e. we run 139 different model simulations in all of which all
countries but one fulfill the targets specified in their NDCs while one country does not
undertake any policies towards its reduction aim and instead endogenously adjusts
to the policies undertaken by the committed countries. We start this section off by
discussing the results for two particularly important and illustrative examples, the US
and China, before comparing results across the world.
4.4.1 The US Withdrawal
As discussed in the introduction, the mere erasure of the US target would cut the overall
emission reduction of the Paris Agreement by one fourth. But the calculation of this
direct effect did not allow for an endogenous adjustment of the US to the climate policies
of the Paris member countries, as the US were assumed to follow a BAU emission path
rather than fulfill their NDC target. Simulating a US withdrawal as a counterfactual
scenario in which all countries introduce carbon taxes that are sufficient to fulfill their
reduction targets while the US introduces no carbon tax at all, we find that the US
emissions increase by 5.7%. This implies a leakage rate of 9.4%, i.e. almost every tenth
ton of CO2 saved in the committed countries is offset by increased emissions in the
US. Putting together the loss of the US target and the partial offset of the remaining
countries’ targets via leakage, we find that a US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
lowers the achieved global emission reduction by a third (32.7%). As shown in Section
4.2.2, we can decompose the US emission increase into three components. It could stem
from an overall increase in production (scale effect), a shift towards the production of
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more energy-intensive goods (composition effect), or the use of more fossil fuel intensive
production techniques for a given scale and composition of the economy (technique
effect). We find a zero scale effect, a very small composition effect (0.3%) and a very
strong technique effect (5.1%).13 As explained above, the technique effect can occur
either due to a carbon tax or due to changes in the world fossil fuel price. As the
withdrawing country does not introduce a carbon tax, we can fully attribute the strong
positive technique effect to a decline in the fossil fuel price in response to lower fossil
fuel demand in the committed countries. US producers make use of this fall in the price
to switch towards a more fossil fuel intensive production technique. These findings
indicates that the leakage of carbon emissions into the US is almost entirely driven by
the energy-market leakage channel. This insight relates to a strand of literature that
stresses the role of the supply side in climate policies (cf. e.g. Sinn, 2008; Harstad, 2012;
Jensen, Mohlin, Pittel, and Sterner, 2015). If achieving the reduction targets in the rest
of the world via carbon taxes (i.e. a demand-side climate policy) induces strong leakage
towards the US, climate policies that try to directly limit the supply of fossil fuels might
be offset to a smaller extent.
4.4.2 A Potential Chinese Withdrawal
China has ratified the Paris Agreement and—different than the US—has not expressed
an intention to withdraw. The scenario of a Chinese withdrawal is therefore a much
more hypothetical one. Given China’s role as the world’s largest emitter and its very
different economic structure compared to highly developed countries (as the US), we
think it is nevertheless an illustrative example that is worth a closer look before moving
on to comparing results across the world.
Given China’s mild reduction target, we showed in the introduction that the direct
13Note that the decomposition relies on a total differential and therefore is a linear approximation
around the baseline equilibrium. The three effects hence do not necessarily (and typically) exactly add up
to the overall emission change.
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effect of removing the Chinese NDC had a far less detrimental effect on the global
emission reduction (8.2%) than the US case. But again, this number was based on
China following its BAU emission path. In fact, we find that Chinese emissions increase
by 6.8% in response to the other countries’ carbon taxes if China does not introduce
a climate policy of its own. Due to the very high level of Chinese emissions, this is
equivalent to a 12.1% leakage rate, i.e. an even higher share of the rest of the world’s
emission reductions is offset than in the US withdrawal case. Putting the direct loss and
the leakage effect together results in a total global emission reduction loss of 19.4% for
a Chinese withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Taking into account an endogenous
reaction to the other countries’ policies hence more than doubles the overall harm done
to the effectiveness of the agreement in this case. As in the US case, the increase in
Chinese emissions is almost entirely driven by the fall in the international price for fossil
fuels (6.4%, compared to 0.1% scale and a 0.2% composition effect).
4.4.3 Results Across the World
We now turn to comparing the effects of unilateral withdrawals of all countries in
our data set. Figure 4.4 shows the emission changes in every country if the rest of
the world fulfills its targets and the respective country takes no climate policy action.
Unsurprisingly, all countries endogenously react by increasing their emissions. As it
turns out, the two examples considered so far (China and the US) are the countries with
the smallest percentage emission increases. All other countries experience higher carbon
emission increases in the range of 8.0 to almost 11.6%. Comparing the pattern to Figures
4.1 and 4.3, countries with a high overall level of emissions and/or very ambitious
reduction targets appear to have lower increases of their emission levels. The reason is
that countries with a high overall level of emissions and/or very ambitious reduction
targets lead to larger reactions of world prices if they stick to their commitments and
therefore reactions for other countries not sticking to their commitments will be larger.
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Figure 4.4: National Emission Effects
Notes: This figure shows the emission change in each country if the respective country withdraws from
the Paris Agreement while the rest of the world fulfills its emission reduction targets. Emissions go up by
9.2% on average, ranging from 5.7% in the US to 11.6% in Trinidad and Tobago.
To dig a little deeper into the differences in national emission effects, we can again make
use of the decomposition. Two characteristics of our exemplary considerations hold up
as global patterns: the almost complete absence of a scale effect (0.01% on average)
and the predominant role of the technique effect (accounting for 89% of the emission
increase on average). Different from the Chinese and US cases, the composition effects
are non-negligible for many other countries (0.9% on average, ranging up to 2.8%).
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 depict the technique and composition effects in the withdrawing
countries, respectively.
Just as for the overall emission effect, the technique effect is smallest in the US and
China. If one of these major emitters of carbon emissions is absent from the Paris
Agreement, the fall in the demand for fossil fuels is strongly attenuated. This implies
less pressure on the international fossil fuel price and hence a smaller incentive to shift
towards more fossil fuel intensive production techniques. On the other hand, if a small
country with a mild reduction target drops out of the agreement, almost the complete
sum of national targets is still in place. Therefore, the fossil fuel price goes down by
almost the full extent by which it would have been lowered in the case of full global
compliance with the Paris Agreement and therefore the withdrawing country faces a
very strong incentive towards “dirtier” production techniques induced by the lower fossil
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fuel price.
Figure 4.5: Technique Effects
Notes: This figure shows the technique effect in each country if the respective country withdraws from
the Paris Agreement while the rest of the world fulfills its emission reduction targets. The technique
effect increases the withdrawing country’s emissions by 7.6% on average, ranging from 5.1% in the US to
slightly more than 7.7% for many countries.
More fossil fuel intensive production techniques for all goods are one reason why
emissions in the withdrawing country can go up, another one is the possibility to
specialize in the supply of goods from particularly emission-intensive sectors. This source
of higher emissions is captured by the composition effect. While we found almost no
compositional changes in China and the US in case of their withdrawals, it is evident
from Figure 4.6 that the same is not true for many other countries. Even though the
composition effects are not as strong as the technique effects, most countries make use
to a noticeable extent of the possibility to shift production towards emission intensive
sectors and then export these products to Paris Agreement member countries who partly
pulled out of these sectors in order to achieve their emission reduction targets.
After this closer look on how the national emission increases of withdrawing countries
come about, let us focus on the implications of these endogenous adjustments for
the global emissions. As illustrated above for the Chinese and US case, the emission
increase in the withdrawing country partly offsets the global emission reduction from the
remaining reduction targets, a phenomenon that is captured by the leakage rate. Figure
4.7 displays the different leakage rates that occur in the 139 withdrawal scenarios. Even
though the US and China experience the lowest percentage emission increase, their
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Figure 4.6: Composition Effects
Notes: This figure shows the composition effect in each country if the respective country withdraws from
the Paris Agreement while the rest of the world fulfills its emission reduction targets. The composition
effect increases the withdrawing country’s emissions by 0.9% on average, ranging from 0.03% in Namibia
to 2.8% in Trinidad and Tobago.
very high levels of carbon emissions translates these comparatively small increases into
the by far highest leakage rates. Already the withdrawals from the group of countries
with the highest leakage rates after those two leading emitters (India, Russia, Japan,
and Germany) offsets far lower shares of the world emission reduction (3.5, 3.1, 2.2,
and 1.8%, respectively). As was illustrated by the consideration of the technique and
composition effects above, leakage appears to be primarily driven by the energy market
leakage channel, while leakage via the production shift and international trade channel
plays a second-order role. For most countries, leakage is very small as their emissions
make up only a small fraction of global emissions (the median leakage rate is 0.07%).
Figure 4.8 summarizes the relationship between countries’ direct reduction losses and
leakage highlighting the role of their national emission levels as well as their target
reduction rates. It illustrates that while for leakage national emissions are the main
driver, the direct reduction losses depend on both, national emission levels and the
target. Starting from a vertical line of countries without a target, countries move in a
clockwise direction when increasing their target reduction rate.
Putting together the direct emission reduction losses from removing a withdrawing coun-
try’s reduction target and the additional leakage losses due to endogenous adjustment
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Figure 4.7: Leakage Rates
Notes: This figure shows the leakage rates that occur in the 139 different unilateral withdrawal scenarios
from the Paris Agreement. On average, 0.4% of the rest of the world’s emission reduction is offset by
emission increases in the withdrawing country. The leakage rates range between 0.0% for a number of
very small countries and 12.1% for China.
Figure 4.8: Direct Reduction Losses and Leakage
Notes: This figure shows the relationship between the leakage rate (in %)
and the direct reduction losses (in %). Countries are depicted in different
shapes and colors depending on their CO2 emission levels and reduction
targets, respectively. To be able to restrict the scale of the scatter plot, we
leave out the US and China.
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towards higher emissions in the withdrawing country, we can obtain the total loss in
the global emission reduction of the Paris Agreement induced by unilateral withdrawals.
These total reduction losses are shown in Figure 4.9 and (for the five countries with
the strongest effects) in Table 4.3. The announced US withdrawal has by far the worst
impact on the Paris Agreement’s effectiveness to lower global emissions, followed by the
also previously discussed Chinese case. All other unilateral withdrawals are significantly
less harmful to the agreement’s capacity to lower world emissions. Nevertheless, a group
of countries including e.g. several European countries (Germany, Italy, France, Spain,
the United Kingdom, and Poland), other large developed countries (Japan, Canada,
and South Korea), as well as three of the four remaining BRICS states (Brazil, Russia,
and India) would still perceptibly lower the overall reduction (all in the range of 3 to
7.2%). Two particularly noteworthy cases are India (3.5%) and Russia (3.1%) for both
of which the zero target (i.e. the target to not do worse than the BAU path) implied a
zero direct effect. Taking into account their endogenous adjustment, it becomes evident
that a Russian or Indian withdrawal would indeed harm the effectiveness of the Paris
Agreement significantly. For all African countries, as well as for smaller and/or poorer
European, Asian, or South American countries, even the total effect remains rather small,
pulling down the average across all countries to a 1.1% reduction loss.
Figure 4.9: Total Emission Reductions Lost
Notes: This figure shows the shares of the global emission reduction due to the Paris Agreement that is
lost due to a unilateral withdrawal in the 139 different scenarios. On average, 1.1% of the global emission
reduction are forgone. The loss shares range from 0.0% for a number of very small countries to 32.7% for
the US.
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Table 4.3: Top Five Total Reduction Losses
Withdrawing country USA CHN JPN CAN BRA
World reduction lost (total effect) 32.7% 19.4% 7.2% 6.6% 6.5%
Table 4.4 summarizes the results for all major variables of interest across the 139
different withdrawal scenarios that have been graphically shown above.
Table 4.4: Unilateral Withdrawal Results
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Direct global reduction loss (in %) 139 0.72 2.51 0 25.75
Total global reduction loss (in %) 139 1.10 3.45 0.00 32.72
Leakage rate (in %) 139 0.41 1.36 0.00 12.13
Emission effect* (in %) 139 9.20 0.72 5.68 11.56
Scale effect* (in %) 139 0.01 0.05 -0.09 0.17
Composition effect* (in %) 139 0.91 0.54 0.03 2.84
Technique effect* (in %) 139 7.59 0.28 5.08 7.75
Notes: For the variables marked by an asterisk, the national values of the withdrawing countries are
shown.
4.4.4 Sensitivity: Varying the Fossil Fuel Supply Elasticity
One crucial model parameter for which we need to rely on values from the literature
is the fossil fuel supply elasticity. In this subsection, we investigate the sensitivity of
our results with respect to the choice of η by considering the upper and lower bound of
the range of elasticities used by Boeters and Bollen (2012) for their different fossil fuel
types.
When increasing the fossil fuel supply elasticity from 2 to 4, the average global emission
reduction loss decreases from 1.1% to 0.9%. The reduction loss induced by the US
withdrawal still amounts to 29.5%. These somewhat lower effects are driven by lower
leakage rates, which are cut in half on average (0.2% instead of 0.4%). Intuitively,
the reason for the lower leakage and overall smaller emission reduction losses is that
fossil fuel suppliers react more strongly to the falling prices by lowering the extracted
quantities. This implies that the price in our new counterfactual equilibrium will decrease
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less, lowering the withdrawing country’s incentive to shift to a more emission intensive
production technique. Note that as a larger part of the reduction loss for China is due to
leakage, a higher fossil fuel supply elasticity affects the Chinese withdrawal scenario
specifically strongly: the reduction loss decreases from 19.4% to 14.2%.
When lowering the fossil fuel supply elasticity instead from 2 to 1, the average global
emission reduction loss increases from 1.1% to 1.5%. In this case, a US withdrawal
would eliminate 38.5% of the world emission reduction and a Chinese withdrawal
would induce a 28.2% reduction loss. These larger effects are driven by relatively
weaker quantity adjustments by fossil fuel suppliers in response to the falling fossil fuel
price, inducing stronger leakage. Specifically, the average leakage rate almost doubles
compared to the benchmark η = 2 case to 0.79%, with the maximum in the case of a
Chinese withdrawal as high as 21.8%. Further details on the results for the different
values of η are presented in Appendix D.3.
4.5 Model Extension: Multiple Fossil Fuels
The model developed in Section 4.2 incorporated one single fossil fuel resource used in
energy production and assumed emissions to be proportional to the fossil fuel usage.
In this section, we allow for multiple fossil fuels with varying carbon intensities and
potentially different supply elasticities.
4.5.1 Model
Fossil fuels used in country i are now treated as a composite of different types of fossil
fuels (specifically oil, gas, and coal):
Ei = AiE
(∏
v∈V
(Riv)ρ
i
v
)ξiR ∏
f∈F
(V iEf )ξ
i
f , (4.20)
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with
∑
v∈V ρiv = 1. For each type of fossil fuel, supply is modeled with a separate CEFS
function:
R̂Wv = (r̂v)
ηv , (4.21)
with
∑
i∈N Riv = RWv . Fossil fuel types differ in their carbon intensity (κv). Hence,
emissions are no longer simply proportional to Ri, but rather given by:
EM i =
∑
v∈V
κvR
i
v. (4.22)
Countries implement carbon taxes that are equal per ton of CO2 across fossil fuel
types. Therefore, the percentage tax is no longer simply given by λi, but by κvλi/rv.
Additionally using the Cobb-Douglas structure, the national aggregate fossil fuel price is
then given by:
ri =
∏
v∈V
(1 + κvλirv )rv
ρiv
ρiv . (4.23)
Market clearing for each fossil fuel type pins down their respective world market prices:
rv =
1
RWv
∑
i∈N
 1
1 + κvλi
rv
 ρivξiR
αiSEY iS +∑
l∈L
αilEY
i
l
 . (4.24)
In order to achieve its emission target, country i sets the carbon tax according to:
EM i =
∑
v∈V
κv
ρivξ
i
R (αiSEY iS +
∑
l∈L αilEY
i
l )
(1 + κvλi
rv
)rv
. (4.25)
In the absence of a target, there is no carbon tax levied (i.e. λi = 0). As there are
multiple fossil fuels and countries can have different endowment shares for oil, gas, and
coal (and the percentage tax rates vary across fossil fuel types), we also need to update
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the expression for a country’s total income:
Y i =
∑
f∈F
(αiSf + ξifαiSE)Y iS +∑
l∈L
(αilf + ξifαilE)Y il

+
∑
v∈V
ωiv
∑
j∈N
 1
1 + κvλj
rv
 ρjvξjR
αjSEY jS +∑
l∈L
αjlEY
j
l

+
∑
v∈V
 κvλirv
1 + κvλi
rv
 ρivξiR
αiSEY iS +∑
l∈L
αilEY
i
l
 .
(4.26)
Further, the aggregate fossil fuel price is now country-specific (due to compositional
differences) and already includes the tax, leading to the following new expression for
the adjustment of the national energy price:
êi = (r̂i)ξ
i
R
∏
f∈F
[
(αiSf + ξifαiSE)Y i′S +
∑
l∈L(αilf + ξifαilE)Y i′l
(αiSf + ξifαiSE)Y iS +
∑
l∈L(αilf + ξifαilE)Y il
]ξif
. (4.27)
As in the base model, we again can decompose the emission changes into scale, technique,
and composition effect. Additionally, there is a substitution effect resulting from the
change in the fossil fuel mix. See Appendices D.4.1 and D.4.2 for details on the
decomposition and parametrization of the extended model, respectively.
4.5.2 Results
Figure 4.10 summarizes the most important results of the simulation of unilateral
withdrawals from the Paris Agreement in our extended model framework, namely the
total percentage loss for the world emission reduction (i.e. it reproduces Figure 4.9 from
the main model results). Reassuringly, the overall pattern bears striking resemblance to
our previous results. The US withdrawal still has by far the strongest effect, followed by
China and then a group of countries with relatively similar effects including e.g. Japan,
Canada, Brazil, and South Korea. On average, the incurred loss is slightly higher when
additionally allowing for substitution between different fossil fuel sources. The largest
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differences occurs for Russia, whose withdrawal is associated with a 1.4 percentage
points higher reduction loss, and China, whose withdrawal has a 1.4 percentage points
weaker effect in the extended model.
Figure 4.10: Total Emission Reductions Lost (Model Extension)
Notes: This figure shows the shares of the global emission reduction due to the Paris Agreement that is
lost due to a unilateral withdrawal in the 139 different scenarios (in the extended model). On average,
1.1% of the global emission reduction are forgone. The loss shares range from 0.0% for a number of very
small countries to 34.0% for the US.
In order to gain a better insight into the differences in outcomes for the base and
extended model, Figure 4.11 displays the decomposition of the withdrawing countries
emission changes into scale, composition, technique, and substitution effect. As in
the base model, the overall emission increases are primarily driven by the technique
effects, i.e. generally more energy-intensive production. The new substitution effect in
most cases additionally contributes to higher emissions in the non-committing countries.
Hence, withdrawing countries shift within their fossil fuel mix from relatively cleaner
gas and oil to the most emission intensive coal. This is because the price decrease on the
international coal market is particularly strong as coal is the most heavily taxed fossil
fuel in the committed countries. However, there are a few notable exceptions, like China,
India, and Poland, where the substitution effect actually counteracts the overall emission
increase. This only occurs in countries with a high coal-share in the initial fossil fuel
mix. For example, if China does not participate in the Paris Agreement, there is a smaller
price decrease on fossil fuels compared to a scenario in which all countries fulfill their
targets due to a smaller drop in the fossil fuel demand. As China has a coal-intensive
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energy mix, this drop is smallest for coal. Hence, China substitutes away from coal to oil
and gas, leading to a negative substitution effect. This relationship between the coal
share and the substitution effect is illustrated in Figure 4.12.
Figure 4.11: Decomposition of Emission Changes (Model Extension)
Notes: This figure plots the decomposition of the emission
changes into scale, composition, technique, and substitution
effect for the 22 countries with the biggest reduction effect on
world emissions and a rest of the world composite.
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Figure 4.12: Scatter Plot of Substitution Effect against Coal Share
Notes: This figure plots the percentage substitution effect
against the coal cost share in fossil fuel production for the 22
countries with the biggest reduction effect on world emissions.
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4.6 Conclusions
In spite of potential problems of enforceability and an overall lack of ambition in the
NDCs, the Paris Agreement has an important strength: its global coverage. This strength
is currently at stake as not all signatory states have moved forward to ratification of the
agreement and one major party—namely the US—has ratified, but already announced
its withdrawal. In this paper, we analyze the consequences of unilateral withdrawals
from the Paris Agreement on the achieved global emission reduction. To be able to
account for both the direct effect of removing the withdrawing country’s reduction
target and the indirect effect of additional emission reductions due to carbon leakage,
we develop an extended multi-sector structural gravity model featuring emissions from
fossil fuel use, carbon taxes, and a constant elasticity fossil fuel supply function.
We find that single countries leaving the Paris Agreement can severely hurt the effec-
tiveness of the treaty, the worst case being a US withdrawal which would eliminate
one third of the overall emission reduction. Taking into account the endogenous emis-
sion adjustments beyond the mere absence of an emission target turns out to be of
major importance, most notably in the Chinese case, in which the reduction loss more
than doubles if carbon leakage is added to the direct effect. Using a decomposition of
emission changes into scale, composition, and technique effects, we find that emission in-
creases in withdrawing countries are mainly driven by a shift towards emission-intensive
production techniques in response to a fall in the international fossil fuel price.
Both the overall magnitude of the reduction losses and the relative importance of the
different leakage channels have significant policy implications. Most importantly, our
findings imply that the global coverage is indeed crucial for the overall mitigation
success of the agreement and therefore strong political efforts should be made to keep
all large emitters on board. Further, if the global coverage breaks down, our findings
on the strong energy market leakage channel suggest to consider new climate policy
instruments that specifically tackle the fossil fuel supply.

Conclusions
The gravity model of international trade has become an integral part of empirical and
quantitative trade economists’ toolkit. It is used to estimate which factors determine
bilateral trade flows and to quantify the effects of policy scenarios. Both types of gravity
application rely on a solid theoretical foundation, either in informing the empirical
specification or in enabling the computation of the counterfactual equilibrium.
This thesis contributes to both mentioned strands of the gravity literature. The first two
chapters deal with econometric challenges arising in the estimation of in- and extensive
margin gravity models. Specifically, they are concerned with nonlinear estimators in
the presence of high-dimensional fixed effects, both with respect to the computational
feasibility and the potential emergence of an incidental parameter problem. Crucially,
the econometric advances turn out to matter decisively for the empirical results. The
applications covered in the first two chapters can therefore be considered as cautionary
tales concerning the temptation to circumvent some of the methodological difficulties
by relying on linear estimators or less general sets of fixed effects. Interesting prospects
for future research arise from incorporating aspects of the second chapter into the
estimation of the intensive margin of trade. For instance, dynamics as introduced for
the extensive margin in Chapter 2 may also be a relevant factor for intensive margin
estimation. Furthermore, incidental parameter bias corrections are not unique to the
extensive margin. While the specific large-sample PPML specification considered in
Chapter 1 can be estimated without asymptotic bias, other specifications or estimators,
such as Gamma PML, are not free from incidental parameter bias and require suitable
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corrections. An additional avenue for future research relating to the first two chapters
of this dissertation is the transfer of the discussed methods to firm-level data sets and
applications because they allow a much more fine-grained analysis of the functioning of
trade policies.
The last two chapters of this thesis contribute to the role of gravity as a tool for general
equilibrium policy analysis. More precisely, they incorporate environmental aspects
into a gravity model. Gravity inherently focuses on international interconnectedness.
This international perspective is crucial in the climate policy debate due to the threat of
carbon leakage. The third chapter focuses on leakage due to production shifts, implying
compositional changes in the sectoral structure, and on how carbon tariffs can be used
to counteract this leakage tendency. The fourth chapter additionally considers carbon
leakage via the international energy market in greater detail. In the context of the Paris
Agreement, this leakage channel turns out to matter critically as countries that do not
commit to emission reduction targets have a strong incentive to make use of falling
fossil fuel prices and shift to carbon intensive production techniques in response to other
countries’ mitigation efforts. There is a plenitude of interesting directions for future
research concerning the interplay of climate policy and international trade. To name
just a few possible extensions of the model frameworks considered in Chapters 3 and
4, one could (i) incorporate trade in intermediate goods to capture more details of the
international input-output linkages, (ii) include damages from global warming into the
production function to link the model more closely to the science of climate change, and
(iii) develop a dynamic model which could generate insights on the roles of directed
technical change, trade induced growth effects, and optimal resource extraction paths
of fossil fuel owners in the international efforts against climate change.
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This Appendix elaborates on several important considerations such as how to obtain
multi-way clustered standard errors and how to verify before estimation that valid
estimates do indeed exist. It is in part intended to serve as additional technical docu-
mentation for interested readers seeking to work with or extend the machinery used
in ppml panel sg or implement the proposed procedure in other software packages
such as Matlab or R.1 All procedures described here can be verified to reproduce results
produced by other widely-used routines. See the supporting material included with
Zylkin (2017) for examples. Further, we provide some additional results and robustness
checks.
A.1 Iteratively Re-weighted Least Squares Algorithm
The IRLS version of the algorithm is analogous to typical IRLS estimation in that it
repeatedly utilizes weighted least squares estimation (of a particular form specific to the
estimator being used), which is continuously updated as new estimates are produced,
until both weights and estimates eventually converge. An IRLS approach is thus easily
embedded within the broad approach described in the paper.
For IRLS estimation of a PPML model, it is necessary to first define an adjusted dependent
variable—call it X˜ijt—which is given by:
X˜ijt =
Xijt − X̂ijt
X̂ijt
+ b̂′wijt.
For PPML, the relevant weighting matrix for the estimation is simply given by the
conditional mean X̂ijt. Thus, given X̂ijt and X˜ijt, an updated value for b̂ can be simply
1We use Stata because it is the most widely used software by trade economists running gravity
regressions. However, the procedure described here can be easily implemented in other software packages
as well.
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computed as:
b̂ =
[
W′X̂W
]−1
W′X̂X˜,
where X̂ is a diagonal weighting matrix with elements X̂ijt on its main diagonal and
W is the matrix of main covariates wijt. As in a more-typical IRLS loop, the weighting
matrix is updated repeatedly as each new iteration of b̂ implies a new conditional
mean.2 What must be added here are the intermediate steps needed to compute Ψ, Φ,
and D, which follow from (1.5b)-(1.5d). Iterating repeatedly on these objects, along
with b̂, will eventually converge to the correct conditional mean, weighting matrix, and
PPML estimates for b̂. Since the algorithm requires repeated iteration anyway, the IRLS
method is always the most efficient approach versus solving the first-order condition for
b̂ exactly each time through the loop.3
A.2 Three-way Within Transformation
A useful prior for the rest of these notes is the notion of a three-way “within-transformation”,
generalizing the two-way procedures of Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002) and
Guimara˜es and Portugal (2010) and as may be applied via the hdfe algorithm of Correia
(2016b).
Let each of the “main” (non-fixed effect) regressors of the vector wijt on the right hand
side be denoted by wkijt, with superscript k indexing the kth regressor. The idea is to
(iteratively) regress each wkijt on the complete set of fixed effects. Doing so results in a
new set of “partialed-out” (or “within-transformed”) versions of wkijt, which have been
removed of any partial correlation with the set of fixed effects. For the current three-way
2For clarity, X˜ijt is derived from a first-order Taylor approximation of the PPML FOC for b̂ around
b̂0, where b̂0 denotes the current guess for b̂. The use of X̂ as a weighting matrix also follows from this
approximation. For a reference, see Nelder and Wedderburn (1972).
3The adoption of IRLS in ppml panel sg was inspired by the use of a similar principle—albeit in an
altogether very different procedure—in the latest version of Guimaraes2016, by Guimara˜es (2016).
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HDFE context—with it, jt, and ij fixed effects—the needed within-transformation for
each wkijt is given by the following system of equations:
∑
j
(
wkijt − λ˜kit − ψ˜kjt − µ˜kij
)
= 0 ∀i, t, (A.1a)
∑
i
(
wkijt − λ˜kit − ψ˜kjt − µ˜kij
)
= 0 ∀j, t, (A.1b)
∑
t
(
wkijt − λ˜kit − ψ˜kjt − µ˜kij
)
= 0 ∀i, j, (A.1c)
where (A.1a)-(A.1c) are derived from the first-order conditions from an OLS regression
of wk on a set of fixed effects {λ˜kit, ψ˜kit, µ˜kij}. Either by using “zig-zag” iteration methods
or via the more sophisticated algorithm of Correia (2016b), this system is easily solved
even for a large number of fixed effects. The resulting, now-transformed regressors,
which we will denote as w˜k, are given by:
w˜kijt = wkijt − λ˜kit − ψ˜kjt − µ˜kij.
Variations of this within-transformation procedure will come into play in the discussion
that follows of how we construct standard errors as well as how we implement the
“check for existence” recommended by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010b). Thus, these
basic mechanics will be helpful to keep in mind.
A.3 Standard Errors
The construction of standard errors largely follows the exposition in the Appendix of
Figueiredo, Guimara˜es, and Woodward (2015), which we extend to the case of three-
way HDFEs with multi-way clustering. Let
∑
i,j,t denote a sum over all observations and
let xijt denote the vector of all covariates associated with observation ijt, including all
0/1 dummy variables associated with each fixed effect. The estimated “robust” variance-
covariance (VCV) matrix for our PPML estimates that we need to construct is given
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by
V̂rob =
∑
i,j,t
X̂ijtxijtx′ijt
−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
V̂
×
∑
i,j,t
(
Xijt − X̂ijt
)2
xijtx′ijt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
×
∑
i,j,t
X̂ijtxijtx′ijt
−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
V̂
, (A.2)
where V̂ is proportional to the usual (uncorrected) Poisson MLE VCV matrix and
X̂ijt is the conditional mean from our regression. The middle term, M, provides a
heteroscedasticity correction.
While we can compute the matrix
∑
i,j,t X̂ijtxijtx′ijt, inversion of this matrix is potentially
infeasible due to the large dimension of xijt. The problem is simplified, however,
by recognizing we are only interested in the submatrix of V̂ that pertains to b̂, the
coefficients for our non-fixed effect regressors. Call this submatrix V̂∗. To obtain V̂∗, we
make use of the following two “tricks”: (i) the V̂ that appears in (A.2) is proportional
to the VCV matrix that would be produced by any weighted least squares regression
using xijt as covariates and
√
X̂ijt as weights; (ii) By the Frish-Waugh-Lovell theorem,
the dimensionality of an HDFE linear regression can be easily reduced by first applying
a within-transformation (a weighted one in this case).
We thus proceed in two steps. First, using a weighted version of our within-transformation
procedure, we regress each weighted regressor
√
X̂ijtw
k
ijt on a set of exporter-time,
importer-time, and exporter-importer fixed effects, which themselves must also be
weighted by
√
X̂ijt. The system of equations associated with this operation may be
written as
∑
j
X̂ijt
(
wkijt − λ˜k∗it − ψ˜k∗jt − µ˜k∗ij
)
= 0 ∀i, t, (A.3a)
∑
i
X̂ijt
(
wkijt − λ˜k∗it − ψ˜k∗jt − µ˜k∗ij
)
= 0 ∀j, t, (A.3b)
∑
t
X̂ijt
(
wkijt − λ˜k∗it − ψ˜k∗jt − µ˜k∗ij
)
= 0 ∀i, j, (A.3c)
where {λ˜k∗it , ψ˜k∗it , µ˜k∗ij } are the fixed effects terms we now need to solve for. Despite
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the presence of X̂ijt in (A.3a)-(A.3c), the basic principles and methods to solve are no
different than with (A.1a)-(A.1c).
The transformed regressors we need for our auxiliary regression—call these w˜k∗i —are
given by
w˜k∗ijt =
√
X̂ijt
(
wkijt − λ˜k∗it − ψ˜k∗jt − µ˜k∗ij
)
.
With these residuals in hand, the second step is to now perform the following OLS
regression:
Xijt =
∑
k
akw˜
k∗
ijt + ui. (A.4)
The estimates obtained from this regression are irrelevant. The main point is that, after
employing the two “tricks” mentioned above, the VCV matrix from (A.4) will be equal
to s2 × V̂∗, where s2 is the usual mean squared error from the linear regression.
Finally, now that we have V̂∗, the full, heteroscedasticity-robust VCV matrix for our
main regressors can be computed as
V̂∗rob = V̂∗ ×M∗ × V̂∗,
where the middle term,
M∗ =
∑
i,j,t
(
Xijt − X̂ijt
)2
X̂ijt
w˜∗ijtw˜∗′ijt
 ,
must be adjusted to take into account the fact that each w˜k∗ijt is weighted by
√
X̂ijt.
Multi-way clustering. The multi-way clustered VCV matrix takes the form
V̂∗clus = V̂∗M∗clusV̂∗,
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where V̂∗ is calculated in the exact same way as described above. For the matrix M∗clus,
we follow Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011), taking into account that we are still
dealing only with a submatrix of the overall matrix V̂, and calculate it as follows:
M∗clus =
∑
||r||=k,r∈R
(−1)k+1M˜∗r,
with
M˜∗r =
∑
l
∑
m
(
Xl − X̂l
)
√
X̂l
(
Xm − X̂m
)
√
X̂m
w˜∗l w˜∗′mIr(l,m) r ∈ R,
where the set R ≡ {r : rd ∈ {0, 1}, d = 1, 2, ..., D, r 6= 0}, where D is the number of
dimensions of clustering and the elements of R index whether two observations are joint
members of at least one cluster. l and m denote specific ijt-observations. Ir(l,m) takes
the value one if observations l and m are both members of all clusters for which rd = 1.
||r|| denotes the `1-norm of the vector r.
A.4 Check for Existence
As illuminated in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010b), depending on the configuration
of the data, estimates from Poisson regressions may not actually exist. Specifically, if
two or more regressors are perfectly collinear over the subsample where the dependent
variable is non-zero, researchers are advised to carefully investigate each “implicated”
regressor to see if it can be included in their model. Otherwise, estimation routines may
result in spurious estimates, or even no estimates at all.4
With multiple high-dimensional fixed effects, implementing the checks favoured by
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010b) may seem a daunting task, since collinearity checks
4Note this is a different issue altogether than the standard issue of “perfect collinearity” and can be
significantly more difficult to detect. See Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010b) for a simple example of a
model with non-collinear regressors that does not have a solution.
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across all the different fixed effects to determine whether one or more are “implicated”
may be computationally expensive and/or conceptually difficult, especially when there
are more than two HDFEs. In addition, it is also necessary to check whether each
individual regressor is collinear over Xijt > 0 with the complete set of fixed effects, as
well as whether any subset of fixed effect and non-fixed effect regressors are collinear
over Xijt > 0.
Fortunately, however, it turns out these issues are quickly and easily resolved by (i)
applying the within-transformation technique described above and (ii) recognizing that
fixed effects themselves only present an issue under easily-identifiable circumstances.
To see this, let “w˜kijt|X>0” denote the within-transformed version of each non-fixed effect
regressor wk after performing a within-transformation (only this time restricted to the
subsample Xijt > 0). After applying the within-transformation, these w˜kijt|X>0’s now only
contain the residual variation in each wkijt over Xijt > 0 that is uncorrelated with the set
of fixed effects. Thus, any individual w˜kijt|X>0 that is uniformly zero should be considered
“implicated”, since this only occurs if wkijt is perfectly collinear with the set of fixed effects
over Xijt > 0. Furthermore, it is now a simple matter to apply a standard collinearity
check among the remaining w˜kijt|X>0 to test for joint collinearity over Xijt > 0, taking
into account all possible correlations with the set of fixed effects.
That still leaves the matter of collinearity among the potentially very many fixed effects,
which may seem the most difficult step of all. However, Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2010b) also clarify that it should always be possible to include any regressor that has
“reasonable overlap” in the values that it takes over both the Xijt > 0 and Xijt = 0
samples. While there is no hard-and-fast rule that may be applied to determine how
much overlap is “reasonable”, the condition they include with their ppml command is to
check whether the mean value of each wkijt over Xijt > 0 lies between the maximum and
minimum values it takes over Xijt = 0. Setting aside the more general (and comparably
benign) issue of collinearity over all Xijt, the only situation where any of our fixed
effects would fail this condition would be if a country did not engage in exporting or
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importing in a given year or if a pair of countries never trades during the sample.5 Thus,
ppml panel sg drops all observations for pairs of countries who never trade, exporters
who do not export anything in a given year, and importers who do not import anything
in the given year.6
A.5 Time Trends
For time trends, let αij be the time trend coefficient and let t = 0, 1, 2, 3... be the time
trend itself. The estimating equation is now given by:
Xijt = exp (λit + ψjt + µij + αijt+ b′wijt) + νijt. (A.5)
The PPML first-order condition for αij is
∑
t
(
Xijt − X̂ijt
)
t = 0,
which again amounts to a summation of actual and fitted flows, only this time multiplied
by the trend at time t (which we are here taking to be one and the same).
Now suppose we have an initial guess value α0ij for the time trend and we want to obtain
the next value in a converging sequence α1ij. To obtain α
1
ij we may write:
∑
t
(
Xijt − X̂0ijtedαijt
)
t = 0, (A.6)
5When multiple fixed effects are collinear over the whole sample (as is always the case in this context),
these manifest as redundant FOC’s that do not affect the existence or uniqueness of a solution for b̂. Thus,
even though one might construct examples where one or more of the fixed effect dummies do not take
on both 0 and 1 over each subsample, these scenarios can always be resolved by accounting for general
collinearity.
6Ultimately, whether or not these observations are dropped or kept does not affect much. What
standard Stata commands will do is try to force the conditional mean for these observations to zero,
by (wrongly) estimating large, negative values for their associated fixed effects. Stata users should be
reassured that, despite this oddity, other estimates are usually fine so long as the main set of non-fixed
effect regressors meets the conditions described above.
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where dαij = α1ij − α0ij is the change in αij from one iteration to another and X̂0ijt are
current fitted values. The idea is that when the αij ’s converge, dαij = 0 implies that the
first-order condition is satisfied. We want to obtain a new value for dαij based on (A.6)
that will allow us to update α1ij = α0ij + dαij, but unfortunately (A.6) is nonlinear in dαij
and cannot be solved analytically. Thus, we instead derive a first-order Taylor Series
expansion around dαij = 0:
∑
t
(
Xijt − X̂0ijt
)
t− dαij
∑
t
X̂0ijtt
2 = 0, (A.7)
since f ′(0) in this case is −∑ X̂0ijtt2. We then solve (A.7) to obtain dαij, update α1ij =
α0ij + dαij, iterate on all other first-order conditions, and repeat until convergence. The
system of equations we now need to solve to obtain standard errors is:
∑
j
X̂ijt
(
wkijt − λ˜k∗it − ψ˜k∗jt − µ˜k∗ij − α˜k∗ij t
)
= 0 ∀i, t, (A.8a)
∑
i
X̂ijt
(
wkijt − λ˜k∗it − ψ˜k∗jt − µ˜k∗ij − α˜k∗ij t
)
= 0 ∀j, t, (A.8b)
∑
t
X̂ijt
(
wkijt − λ˜k∗it − ψ˜k∗jt − µ˜k∗ij − α˜k∗ij t
)
= 0 ∀i, j, (A.8c)
∑
t
X̂ijt
(
wkijt − λ˜k∗it − ψ˜k∗jt − µ˜k∗ij − α˜k∗ij t
)
t = 0 ∀i, j, (A.8d)
which is again our weighted within-transformation exercise from before only with the
last set of equations representing the first-order conditions from a linear time trend.
A.6 Computation Times
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A.7 Further OLS Estimation Results
Table A.2: OLS Estimation of Different Subsamples
1948-2013 1985-2013 1995-2013 1948-2005 1985-2005 1995-2005
All countries
EMU 0.429 0.444 0.476 0.172 0.176 0.177
(0.021)∗∗∗ (0.022)∗∗∗ (0.028)∗∗∗ (0.032)∗∗∗ (0.030)∗∗∗ (0.037)∗∗∗
{0.149}∗∗∗ {0.135}∗∗∗ {0.121}∗∗∗ {0.158} {0.140} {0.120}
All Non-EMU CUs 0.298 0.235 0.301 0.290 0.076 0.167
(0.025)∗∗∗ (0.088)∗∗∗ (0.132)∗∗ (0.026)∗∗∗ (0.107) (0.167)
{0.097}∗∗∗ {0.183} {0.224} {0.091}∗∗∗ {0.170} {0.209}
Industrial countries plus present/future EU
EMU -0.010 -0.052 0.043 -0.088 -0.158 -0.074
(0.021) (0.022)∗∗ (0.025)∗ (0.032)∗∗∗ (0.031)∗∗∗ (0.036)∗∗
{0.098} {0.074} {0.042} {0.107} {0.095} {0.068}
All Non-EMU CUs 0.537 -0.151 -0.444 0.532 0.300 0.059
(0.049)∗∗∗ (0.250) (0.329) (0.049)∗∗∗ (0.275) (0.302)
{0.196}∗∗∗ {0.732} {0.460} {0.181}∗∗∗ {0.644} {0.440}
Upper income (GDP p/c ≥ $ 12,736)
EMU 0.107 0.138 0.163 -0.017 -0.007 -0.085
(0.026)∗∗∗ (0.027)∗∗∗ (0.033)∗∗∗ (0.037) (0.035) (0.041)∗∗
{0.103} {0.094} {0.099} {0.123} {0.104} {0.108}
All Non-EMU CUs 0.456 0.378
(0.138)∗∗∗ (0.123)∗∗∗
{0.350} {0.277}
Rich Big (GDP≥$ 10bn, GDP p/c≥$ 10k)
EMU 0.109 0.098 0.094 0.051 0.016 -0.066
(0.023)∗∗∗ (0.024)∗∗∗ (0.029)∗∗∗ (0.032) (0.030) (0.032)∗∗
{0.093} {0.078} {0.081} {0.117} {0.088} {0.090}
All Non-EMU CUs 1.041 0.990
(0.100)∗∗∗ (0.093)∗∗∗
{0.263}∗∗∗ {0.239}∗∗∗
OECD
EMU 0.058 -0.001 -0.027 0.035 -0.038 -0.077
(0.017)∗∗∗ (0.015) (0.019) (0.023) (0.018)∗∗ (0.018)∗∗∗
{0.093} {0.053} {0.032} {0.086} {0.048} {0.039}∗
All Non-EMU CUs 0.991 0.947
(0.129)∗∗∗ (0.120)∗∗∗
{0.664} {0.615}
Present/future EU
EMU -0.267 -0.217 -0.037 -0.312 -0.289 -0.099
(0.024)∗∗∗ (0.023)∗∗∗ (0.024) (0.036)∗∗∗ (0.032)∗∗∗ (0.029)∗∗∗
{0.112}∗∗ {0.096}∗∗ {0.046} {0.123}∗∗ {0.125}∗∗ {0.078}
All Non-EMU CUs 0.814 0.736
(0.065)∗∗∗ (0.065)∗∗∗
{0.417}∗ {0.407}∗
Notes: This table reports estimates obtained from linear specifications that correspond to the PPML
estimates from Table 1.3 of the main text. RTAs and CurCol are included in the regressions, but their
coefficient estimates are not shown for brevity. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors
clustered by exporter, importer, and year in curly brackets. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. See text
for further details.
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Table A.3: OLS with Time Trends, Leads, and Lags
Intervals Trends Lags Leads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EMU 0.431 0.361 0.225 0.055
(0.042)∗∗∗ (0.047)∗∗∗ (0.057)∗∗∗ (0.073)
{0.169}∗∗ {0.128}∗∗ {0.148} {0.141}
All Non-EMU CUs 0.348 0.076 0.238 0.275
(0.051)∗∗∗ (0.065) (0.081)∗∗∗ (0.073)∗∗∗
{0.106}∗∗∗ {0.116} {0.087}∗∗ {0.098}∗∗
RTAs 0.414 0.053 0.207 0.325
(0.019)∗∗∗ (0.022)∗∗ (0.025)∗∗∗ (0.028)∗∗∗
{0.084}∗∗∗ {0.067} {0.109}∗ {0.115}∗∗
CurCol 0.321 -0.015 -0.076 0.341
(0.069)∗∗∗ (0.074) (0.101) (0.103)∗∗∗
{0.154}∗ {0.135} {0.132} {0.111}∗∗∗
EMUt−4 0.141
(0.068)∗∗
{0.105}
All Non-EMU CUst−4 0.075
(0.073)
{0.124}
RTAst−4 0.358
(0.027)∗∗∗
{0.103}∗∗∗
CurColt−4 0.358
(0.089)∗∗∗
{0.119}∗∗∗
EMUt+4 0.280
(0.063)∗∗∗
{0.137}∗
All Non-EMU CUst+4 0.127
(0.082)
{0.114}
RTAst+4 0.183
(0.026)∗∗∗
{0.084}∗∗
CurColt+4 -0.136
(0.117)
{0.080}
N 221,170 221,170 217,462 196,559
# of Clusters
Exporters 212 212 212 211
Importers 212 212 212 211
Years 17 17 16 16
R2 0.864 0.914 0.865 0.866
Notes: Column (1) of this table reproduces the results of column (2) of Table
1.1 but using the data in four year intervals. In addition, we add bilateral linear
time trend in column (2) and lags and leads in columns (3) and (4), respectively.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by exporter,
importer, and year in curly brackets. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. See
text for further details.
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B.1 Stylized Facts
Figure B.1: Determinants of the Extensive margin of Trade — Gravity and Persistence (1990–1991).
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Figure B.2: Determinants of the Extensive Margin of Trade — Gravity and Persistence (1997–2006).
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B.2 Computational and Econometric Details
B.2.1 Computational Details
In this section we briefly demonstrate how the method of alternating projections (MAP)
works in the context of logit and probit models with a two- or three-way error component,
and how it can be efficiently embedded into a standard Newton-Raphson optimization
routine (see Stammann, 2018, for further details).
First, note that Mv is essentially a weighted within transformation, where v is an
arbitrary n × 1 vector, and M = In − P = In − D(D′ΩD)−1D′Ω. The computation
of M is problematic even in moderately large data sets, and since M is non-sparse,
there is also no general scalar expression to compute Mv. Thus Stammann (2018)
proposes to calculate Mv using a simple iterative approach based on the MAP tracing
back to Von Neumann (1950) and Halperin (1962).1 Let Dk, denote the dummy
variables corresponding to the k-th group, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Further, let MDk v, with
MDk = In − Dk(D′kΩDk)−1D′kΩ. The corresponding scalar expressions of MDk v are
summarized in table (B.1).
Table B.1: Scalar Transformations
group MDk v
importer-time (k = 1) vijt −
∑J
j=1 ωijtvijt∑J
j=1 ωijt
exporter-time (k = 2) vijt −
∑I
i=1 ωijtvijt∑I
i=1 ωijt
dyadic (k = 3) vijt −
∑T
t=1 ωijtvijt∑T
t=1 ωijt
The MAP can be summarized by algorithm 1, where K = 2 in the case of two-way fixed
effects and K = 3 in the case of three-way fixed effects. Thus, the MAP only requires
1The MAP has been introduced to econometrics by Guimara˜es and Portugal (2010) and Gaure (2013)
in the context of linear models with multi-way fixed effects.
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to repeatedly apply weighted one-way within transformations (see Stammann, 2018)).
The entire optimization routine is sketched by algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 MAP: Neumann-Halperin
1: Initialize Mv = v.
2: repeat
3: for k = 1, . . . , K do
4: Compute MDkMv and update Mv such that Mv = MDkMv
5: until convergence.
Algorithm 2 Efficient Newton-Raphson using the MAP
1: Initialize β0, η0, and r = 0.
2: repeat
3: Set r = r + 1.
4: Given ηˆr−1 compute νˆ and Ω̂.
5: Given νˆ and Ω̂ compute M̂νˆ and M̂X using the MAP
6: Compute βr − βr−1 =
(
(M̂X)′Ω̂(M̂X)
)−1
(M̂X)′Ω̂(M̂νˆ)
7: Compute ηˆr = ηˆr−1 + νˆ − M̂νˆ + M̂X(βr − βr−1)
8: until convergence.
B.2.2 Neyman-Scott Variance Example
In this section we study two variants of the classical Neyman and Scott (1948) variance
example to support the form of the bias terms, and to illustrate the functionality of the
bias corrections. To the best of our knowledge, the variance example of Neyman and
Scott (1948) has not been investigated for our specific error components. We start with
the more general three-way fixed effects case which nests the two-way error structure.
Three-way Fixed Effects
Let i = 1, . . . , I, j = 1, . . . , J and t = 1, . . . , T . Consider the following linear three-way
fixed effects model:
yijt = x′ijtβ + λit + ψjt + µij + uijt . (B.1)
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According to Balazsi, Matyas, and Wansbeek (2018), the appropriate within transforma-
tion corresponding to equation (B.1) is given by
zijt − z¯ij· − z¯·jt − z¯i·t + z¯··t + z¯·j· + z¯i·· − z¯··· ,
where z¯ij· = 1T
∑T
t=1 zijt, z¯·jt = 1I
∑I
i=1 zijt, z¯i·t = 1J
∑J
j=1 zijt, z¯··t = 1IJ
∑I
i=1
∑J
j=1 zijt,
z¯·j· = 1IT
∑I
i=1
∑T
t=1 zijt, z¯i·· = 1JT
∑J
j=1
∑T
t=1 zijt, and z¯··· = 1IJT
∑I
i=1
∑J
j=1
∑T
t=1 zijt.
This result is helpful to study the following variant of the Neyman and Scott (1948)
variance example
yijt|λ,ψ,µ ∼ N (λit + ψjt + µij, β) ,
where we can now easily form the uncorrected variance estimator
βˆI,J,T =
1
IJT
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
(yijt − y¯ij· − y¯·jt − y¯i·t + y¯··t + y¯·j· + y¯i·· − y¯···)2 (B.2)
and the (degrees-of-freedom)-corrected counterpart
βˆcorI,J,T =
IJT
(I − 1)(J − 1)(T − 1) βˆI,J,T .
Taking the expectation of (B.2) (conditional on the fixed effects) yields
β¯I,J,T = Eα[βˆI,J,T ] = β0
(
(I − 1)(J − 1)(T − 1)
IJT
)
(B.3)
= β0
(
1− 1
I
− 1
J
− 1
T
+ 1
IT
+ 1
JT
+ 1
IJ
− 1
IJT
)
,
where β0 is the true variance parameter. Thus, the three leading bias terms, which drive
the main part of the asymptotic bias, are Bβ1,∞ = −β0, Bβ2,∞ = −β0, and Bβ3,∞ = −β0.
Analytical Bias Correction. Using equation (B.3), we can form the analytically bias-
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corrected estimator
β˜aI,J,T = βˆI,J,T −
B̂β1,I,J,T
I
− B̂
β
2,I,J,T
J
− B̂
β
3,I,J,T
T
, (B.4)
where we set B̂β1,I,J,T = −βˆI,J,T , B̂β2,I,J,T = −βˆI,J,T , and B̂β3,I,J,T = −βˆI,J,T to reduce
the order of the bias in equation (B.3) at costs of introducing higher order terms (see
equation (B.6)). Thus, we can rewrite the analytically bias-corrected estimator (B.4)
β˜aI,J,T = βˆI,J,T
(
1 + 1
I
+ 1
J
+ 1
T
)
. (B.5)
Taking the expectation of (B.5) yields
β¯aI,J,T = Eα[β˜aI,J,T ] = β0
(
1− 1
I
− 1
J
− 1
T
+ 1
IT
+ 1
JT
+ 1
IJ
− 1
IJT
)(
1 + 1
I
+ 1
J
+ 1
T
)
(B.6)
= β0
(
1− 1
IT
− 1
JT
− 1
T 2
− 3
IJ
+ 1
I3
+ 1
J3
+ 4
IJT
+ 1
IT 2
+ 1
JT 2
− 1
I3T
− 1
J3T
− 1
IJT 2
)
.
Split-Panel Jackknife. As an alternative to equation (B.5) we can also form the follow-
ing SPJ estimator
βˆspjI,J,T = 4βˆI,J,T − βˆI/2,J,T − βˆI,J/2,T − βˆI,J,T/2 ,
where βˆI/2,J,T denotes the half panel estimator based on splitting the panel by exporters.
This estimator also reduces the order of the bias in equation (B.3) as we see from its
expected value
β¯spjI,J,T = Eφ[βˆ
spj
I,J,T ] = 4β¯I,J,T − β¯I/2,J,T − β¯I,J/2,T − β¯I,J,T/2 (B.7)
= β0
(
1− 1
IT
− 1
JT
− 1
IJ
+ 2
IJT
)
.
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Numerical Results. Table B.2 shows numerical results for the uncorrected and the
bias-corrected estimators in finite samples, where we assume symmetry, i.e. I = J = N .
The results demonstrate that the bias corrections are effective in reducing the bias.
Table B.2: Bias - Three-way Fixed Effects
N T (β¯I,J,T − β0)/β0 (β¯aI,J,T − β0)/β0 (β¯spjI,J,T − β0)/β0
10 10 -0.271 -0.052 -0.028
25 10 -0.171 -0.021 -0.009
25 25 -0.115 -0.009 -0.005
50 10 -0.136 -0.015 -0.004
50 25 -0.078 -0.004 -0.002
50 50 -0.059 -0.002 -0.001
Two-way Fixed Effects
In the following we briefly review the example with two-way fixed effects:
yijt|λ,ψ ∼ N (λit + ψjt, β) .
Since it is a subcase of three-way fixed effects example, all previous results simplify by
dropping the terms that exhibit T .
The uncorrected variance estimator is2
βˆI,J,T =
1
IJT
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
(yijt − y¯·jt − y¯i·t + y¯··t)2
and the (degrees-of-freedom)-corrected variance estimator is
βˆcorI,J,T =
IJ
(I − 1)(J − 1) βˆI,J,T .
2We draw on the appropriate demeaning formula for the two-way fixed effects model yijt = x′ijtβ +
λit + ψjt + uijt, which is given by zijt − z¯·jt − z¯i·t + z¯··t.
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Taking the expected value yields
β¯I,J,T = Eα[βˆI,J,T ] = β0
(
(I − 1)2
IJ
)
(B.8)
= β0
(
1− 1
I
− 1
J
+ 1
IJ
)
.
Analytical Bias Correction. Based on equation (B.8) we can form the following analyt-
ically bias-corrected estimator
β˜aI,J,T = βˆI,J,T
(
1 + 1
I
+ 1
J
)
,
which has the expected value
β¯aI,J,T = Eα[β˜aI,J,T ] = β0
(
1− 3
IJ
+ 1
I3
+ 1
J3
)
.
Split-Panel Jackknife. A suitable split-panel jackknife estimator is
βˆspjI,J,T = 4βˆI,J,T − βˆI/2,J,T − βˆI,J/2,T ,
which has the expected value
β¯spjI,J,T = Eα[βˆ
spj
I,J,T ] = 3β¯I,J,T − β¯I/2,J,T − β¯I,J/2,T
= β0
(
1− 1
IJ
)
.
Numerical Results. The numerical results in table B.3 demonstrate that the bias
corrections work.
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Table B.3: Bias - Two-way Fixed Effects
N (β¯I,J,T − β0)/β0 (β¯aI,J,T − β0)/β0 (β¯spjI,J,T − β0)/β0
10 -0.190 -0.028 -0.010
25 -0.078 -0.005 -0.002
50 -0.040 -0.001 -0.000
100 -0.020 -0.000 -0.000
B.2.3 Asymptotic Bias Corrections
For the following expressions we draw on the results of Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner
(2016), who have already derived the asymptotic distributions of the MLE estimators
for structural parameters and APEs in classical two-way fixed effects models based
on it-panels. As outlined in Cruz-Gonzalez, Ferna´ndez-Val, and Weidner (2017) the
bias corrections of Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2016) can easily be adjusted to two-
way fixed effects models based on pseudo-panels with an ij-structure (i corresponds to
importer and j to exporter), and importer and exporter fixed effects. We give an intuitive
explanation. Since only J observations are informative per exporter fixed effects, we get
a bias of order J for including exporter fixed effects, and vice versa a bias of order I for
including importer fixed effects. Further, since there are no predetermined regressors in
an ij-structure, we get two symmetric bias terms
B1,∞ = plimI,J→∞
 1
2J
J∑
j=1
∑I
i=1 Eα[Hij∂η2Fij(MX)ij]∑I
i=1 Eα[ωij]
 , (B.9)
B2,∞ = plimI,J→∞
[
1
2I
I∑
i=1
∑J
j=1 Eα[Hij∂η2Fij(MX)ij]∑J
j=1 Eα[ωij]
]
, (B.10)
where ωij is the ij-th diagonal entry of Ω, and M = IIJ − D(D′ΩD)−1D′Ω. ∂ι2g(·)
denotes the second order partial derivative of an arbitrary function g(·) with respect to
some parameter ι. The explicit expressions of Hijt and ∂η2Fijt are reported in table 2.1.
Equations (B.9) and (B.10) are essentially D∞ from Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2016)
with adjusted indices. The same adjustment can be transferred to the APEs.
In the following we apply the same logic to derive the asymptotic bias terms in our two-
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and three-way error structure.
Two-way Fixed Effects
We get a bias of order J for including exporter-time fixed effects, since J observations are
informative per exporter-time fixed effect. In the same way we get a bias of order I for
including importer-time fixed effects. As in the case of the ij-structure of Cruz-Gonzalez,
Ferna´ndez-Val, and Weidner (2017) there are no predetermined regressors, leading to
two symmetric bias terms in the distributions of the structural parameters and the APEs,
respectively.
Asymptotic distribution of βˆ:
√
IJ(β̂I,J,T − β0)→d W−1∞N (κB1,∞ + κ−1B2,∞,W∞), with (B.11)
B1,∞ = plimI,J→∞
 1
2J
T∑
t=1
J∑
j=1
∑I
i=1 Eα[Hijt∂η2Fijt(MX)ijt]∑I
i=1 Eα[ωijt]
 ,
B2,∞ = plimI,J→∞
[
1
2I
T∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
∑J
j=1 Eα[Hijt∂η2Fijt(MX)ijt]∑J
j=1 Eα[ωijt]
]
,
W∞ = plimI,J→∞
− 1
IJ
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
Eα[ωijt(MX)ijt(MX)′ijt]
 ,
where
√
J/I → κ as I, J →∞.
Asymptotic distribution of δˆ:
r(δˆ − δ − I−1Bδ1,∞ − J−1Bδ2,∞)→d N (0,V∞), with (B.12)
Bδ1,∞ = plimI,J→∞
 1
2JT
T∑
t=1
J∑
j=1
∑I
i=1−Eα[Hijt∂η2Fijt]Eα (PΨ)ijt + Eα[∂η2∆ijt]∑I
i=1 Eα[ωijt]
 ,
Bδ2,∞ = plimI,J→∞
 1
2IT
T∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
∑J
j=1−Eα[Hijt∂η2Fijt]Eα (PΨ)ijt + Eα[∂η2∆ijt]∑J
j=1 Eα[ωijt]
 ,
Vδ∞ = plimI,J→∞
r2
I2J2T 2
Eα
 I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
∆¯ijt
 I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
∆¯ijt
′ + I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
ΓijtΓ′ijt
 ,
where ∆¯ijt = ∆ijt−δ, ∆ijt = [∆1ijt, . . . ,∆mijt]′, δ = [δ1, . . . , δm]′, δk = 1IJT
∑I
i=1
∑J
j=1
∑T
t=1 ∆kijt,
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Ψijt = ∂η∆ijt/ωijt, and
Γijt =
 I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
∂β∆ijt − (PX)ijt ∂η∆ijt
′W−1 (MX)ijt ωijtνijt − (PΨ)ijt ∂η`ijt .
r is a convergence rate. ∂ιg(·) denotes the first order partial derivative of an arbitrary
function g(·) with respect to some parameter ι. The expression Vδ∞ can be modified
by assuming that {λit}IT and {ψjt}JT are independent sequences, and λit and ψjt are
independent for all it, jt:
Vδ∞ = plimI,J→∞
r2
I2J2T 2
Eα
 I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
J∑
j=1
J∑
r=1
∆¯ijt∆¯
′
irt +
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
I∑
i 6=p
∆¯ijt∆¯
′
pjt
+
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
ΓijtΓ′ijt
 .
Three-way Fixed Effects
With the inclusion of pair fixed effects, we introduce an additional bias of order T , since
only T observations are informative per pair fixed effect. Another difference that occurs
in contrast to the two-way fixed effects case is that predetermined regressors are now
possible. To deal with this issue we adapt the asymptotic bias terms B∞ and B
δ
∞ of
Ferna´ndez-Val and Weidner (2016) to the new structure.
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Conjectured asymptotic distribution of βˆ:
√
IJT (β̂I,J,T − β0)→d W−1∞N (κ1B1,∞ + κ2B2,∞ + κ3B3,∞,W∞), with
B1,∞ = plimI,J,T→∞
 1
2JT
T∑
t=1
J∑
j=1
∑I
i=1 Eα[Hijt∂η2Fijt(MX)ijt]∑I
i=1 Eα[ωijt]
 ,
B2,∞ = plimI,J,T→∞
[
1
2IT
T∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
∑J
j=1 Eα[Hijt∂η2Fijt(MX)ijt]∑J
j=1 Eα[ωijt]
]
,
B3,∞ = plimI,J,T→∞
 1
2IJ
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
(
T∑
t=1
Eα[ωijt]
)−1 ( T∑
t=1
Eα[Hijt∂η2Fijt(MX)ijt]
+2
T∑
τ=t+1
Eα[Hijt(Yijt − Fijt)ωijt(MX)ijt]
)]
,
W∞ = plimI,J,T→∞
− 1
IJT
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
Eα[ωijt(MX)ijt(MX)′ijt]
 .
where
√
(JT )/I → κ1,
√
(IT )/J → κ2, and
√
(IJ)/T → κ3 as I, J, T →∞. The second
term in the numerator of B3,∞ is dropped if all regressors are assumed to be strictly
exogenous.
Conjectured asymptotic distribution of δˆ:
r(δˆ − δ − I−1Bδ1,∞ − J−1Bδ2,∞ − T−1Bδ3,∞)→d N (0,Vδ∞), with
Bδ1,∞ = plimI,J,T→∞
 1
2JT
T∑
t=1
J∑
j=1
∑I
i=1−Eα[Hijt∂η2Fijt]Eα (PΨ)ijt + Eα[∂η2∆ijt]∑I
i=1 Eα[ωijt]
 ,
Bδ2,∞ = plimI,J,T→∞
 1
2IT
T∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
∑J
j=1−Eα[Hijt∂η2Fijt]Eα (PΨ)ijt + Eα[∂η2∆ijt]∑J
j=1 Eα[ωijt]
 ,
Bδ3,∞ = plimI,J,T→∞
 1
2IJ
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
(
T∑
t=1
Eα[ωijt]
)−1 ( T∑
t=1
−Eα[Hijt∂η2Fijt]Eα[(PΨ)ijt]
+Eα[∂η2∆ijt] + 2
T∑
τ=t+1
Eα[∂η`ijt−lωijt (MΨ)ijt]
)]
.
Vδ∞ = plimI,J,T→∞
r2
I2J2T 2
Eα
 I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
∆¯ijt
 I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
∆¯ijt
′
+
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
ΓijtΓ′ijt + 2
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
s>t
∆¯ijtΓ′ijs
 ,
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r is a convergence rate. The second term in the numerator of B3,∞ and the last
term in Vδ∞ are dropped if all regressors are assumed to be strictly exogenous. The
expression Vδ∞ can be further modified by assuming that {λit}IT , {ψjt}JT and {µij}IJ
are independent sequences, and λit, ψjt and µij are independent for all it, jt, ij:
V̂δ = plimI,J,T→∞
r2
I2J2T 2
Eα
 I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
J∑
j=1
J∑
r=1
∆¯ijt∆¯
′
irt +
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
I∑
i 6=p
∆¯ijt∆¯
′
pjt
+
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
s 6=t
∆¯ijt∆¯
′
ijs +
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
ΓijtΓ′ijt + 2
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
s>t
∆¯ijtΓ′ijs
 ,
B.2.4 Bias-corrected Ordinary Least Squares
Consider the three-way fixed effects linear probability model
yijt = λit + ψjt + µij + x′ijtβ + ijt ,
which can also be rewritten in matrix notation:
y = Dα+ Xβ +  . (B.13)
We first deal with the computational burden. Applying the three-way fixed effects resid-
ual projection M = IIJT −D(D′D)−1D′ to (B.13), leads to the following concentrated
regression:
My = MXβ +  . (B.14)
The demeaning can be efficiently carried out by using the method of alternating projec-
tions (see Gaure, 2013).
Hahn and Moon (2006) have derived the bias of dynamic linear models with individual
and time fixed effects. They show that there is only a bias of order 1/T stemming
from the inclusion of individual effects in combination with predetermined regressors.
Transferring their result to our problem with the three-way error component suggests
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that the inclusion of pair fixed effects in combination with predetermined regressors
leads to the same order of the bias. Thus, the linear probability model needs only to be
bias-corrected if not all regressors are strictly exogenous. This is, for example, the case
in a dynamic model, where we include yt−1 to our set of regressors.
An estimator of the bias is given by
B̂ =
 1
IJT
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
(MX)ijt(MX)′ijt
−1− I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
L∑
l=1
1
T − l
T∑
t=l+1
Xijtˆijt−l
 ,
where ˆ is the residual of (B.14) and L is a bandwidth parameter.3 This yields the
bias-corrected estimator
βˆ − B̂
IJT
, (B.15)
where βˆ = ((MX)′(MX))−1 (MX)′My.
3The residuals of equation (B.13) and equation (B.14) are identical (see Gaure, 2013).
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B.3 Monte Carlo Results — Dynamic Model
B.3.1 Two-way Fixed Effects
Table B.4: Dynamic: Two-way FEs — x, N = 50
Coefficients APE
Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95 Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95
N = 50; T = 10
MLE 5 2 5 0.95 0.14 0 1 1 0.97 0.95
ABC -0 2 2 0.99 0.95 -0 1 1 0.98 0.95
SPJ -1 2 2 0.96 0.90 -0 1 1 0.96 0.95
LPM -0 1 1 0.89 0.91
N = 50; T = 20
MLE 5 1 5 0.97 0.00 0 1 1 0.97 0.95
ABC -0 1 1 1.01 0.95 -0 1 1 0.98 0.95
SPJ -1 1 1 0.97 0.88 -0 1 1 0.96 0.94
LPM -0 1 1 0.88 0.92
N = 50; T = 30
MLE 5 1 5 0.93 0.00 0 1 1 0.97 0.94
ABC -0 1 1 0.97 0.94 -0 1 1 0.98 0.95
SPJ -1 1 1 0.93 0.86 -0 1 1 0.96 0.94
LPM -0 1 1 0.90 0.92
N = 50; T = 40
MLE 5 1 5 0.98 0.00 0 1 1 1.00 0.96
ABC -0 1 1 1.03 0.95 -0 1 1 1.01 0.96
SPJ -1 1 1 0.98 0.83 -0 1 1 0.98 0.94
LPM -0 1 1 0.92 0.92
N = 50; T = 50
MLE 5 1 5 0.92 0.00 0 1 1 0.95 0.93
ABC -0 1 1 0.96 0.94 -0 1 1 0.95 0.94
SPJ -1 1 1 0.94 0.80 -0 1 1 0.93 0.92
LPM -0 1 1 0.86 0.90
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Table B.5: Dynamic: Two-way FEs — x, N = 100
Coefficients APE
Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95 Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95
N = 100; T = 10
MLE 2 1 3 0.97 0.12 0 1 1 0.95 0.94
ABC -0 1 1 0.99 0.94 -0 1 1 0.95 0.94
SPJ -0 1 1 0.97 0.94 -0 1 1 0.94 0.93
LPM -0 1 1 0.79 0.87
N = 100; T = 20
MLE 2 1 2 0.96 0.01 0 1 1 0.90 0.92
ABC -0 1 1 0.98 0.94 -0 1 1 0.90 0.92
SPJ -0 1 1 0.96 0.93 -0 1 1 0.89 0.91
LPM -0 1 1 0.73 0.82
N = 100; T = 30
MLE 2 0 2 0.97 0.00 0 0 0 0.92 0.93
ABC -0 0 0 0.99 0.95 -0 0 0 0.92 0.93
SPJ -0 0 0 0.98 0.93 -0 0 0 0.91 0.92
LPM -0 0 1 0.75 0.83
N = 100; T = 40
MLE 2 0 2 0.97 0.00 0 0 0 0.89 0.92
ABC -0 0 0 0.99 0.95 -0 0 0 0.89 0.92
SPJ -0 0 0 0.99 0.92 -0 0 0 0.88 0.92
LPM -0 0 0 0.73 0.81
N = 100; T = 50
MLE 2 0 2 0.99 0.00 0 0 0 0.92 0.93
ABC -0 0 0 1.00 0.95 -0 0 0 0.92 0.94
SPJ -0 0 0 0.99 0.93 -0 0 0 0.91 0.93
LPM -0 0 0 0.74 0.83
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Table B.6: Dynamic: Two-way FEs — x, N = 150
Coefficients APE
Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95 Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95
N = 150; T = 10
MLE 2 1 2 0.98 0.12 -0 1 1 0.91 0.92
ABC -0 1 1 0.99 0.95 -0 1 1 0.91 0.93
SPJ -0 1 1 0.99 0.94 -0 1 1 0.91 0.93
LPM -0 1 1 0.67 0.80
N = 150; T = 20
MLE 2 0 2 0.99 0.01 0 0 0 0.91 0.92
ABC -0 0 0 1.00 0.95 -0 0 0 0.90 0.93
SPJ -0 0 0 0.98 0.93 -0 0 0 0.90 0.92
LPM -0 0 0 0.67 0.76
N = 150; T = 30
MLE 2 0 2 1.01 0.00 0 0 0 0.86 0.91
ABC -0 0 0 1.02 0.95 -0 0 0 0.86 0.90
SPJ -0 0 0 1.01 0.95 -0 0 0 0.86 0.91
LPM -0 0 0 0.63 0.73
N = 150; T = 40
MLE 2 0 2 0.99 0.00 0 0 0 0.88 0.91
ABC 0 0 0 1.00 0.95 0 0 0 0.88 0.91
SPJ -0 0 0 0.98 0.94 0 0 0 0.88 0.91
LPM -0 0 0 0.66 0.75
N = 150; T = 50
MLE 2 0 2 1.02 0.00 0 0 0 0.90 0.93
ABC -0 0 0 1.03 0.96 -0 0 0 0.90 0.93
SPJ -0 0 0 1.02 0.95 -0 0 0 0.90 0.93
LPM -0 0 0 0.67 0.73
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Table B.7: Dynamic: Two-way FEs — yt−1, N = 50
Coefficients APE
Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95 Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95
N = 50; T = 10
MLE 5 4 7 0.99 0.81 0 4 4 0.99 0.95
ABC -0 4 4 1.03 0.95 -0 4 4 1.01 0.95
SPJ -1 4 4 1.00 0.94 -0 4 4 0.98 0.94
LPM 5 4 7 0.97 0.76
N = 50; T = 20
MLE 5 3 6 0.96 0.65 -0 3 3 0.96 0.94
ABC -0 3 3 1.00 0.95 -0 3 3 0.97 0.95
SPJ -1 3 3 0.97 0.93 -0 3 3 0.94 0.94
LPM 5 3 6 0.96 0.56
N = 50; T = 30
MLE 5 3 6 0.95 0.48 0 3 3 0.94 0.92
ABC 0 3 3 0.99 0.95 0 3 3 0.96 0.93
SPJ -1 3 3 0.97 0.93 0 3 3 0.94 0.93
LPM 6 3 6 0.94 0.40
N = 50; T = 40
MLE 5 2 5 0.98 0.38 0 2 2 0.99 0.95
ABC -0 2 2 1.02 0.95 -0 2 2 1.01 0.95
SPJ -1 2 2 1.01 0.94 -0 2 2 0.99 0.95
LPM 6 2 6 0.97 0.27
N = 50; T = 50
MLE 5 2 5 0.92 0.31 0 2 2 0.93 0.93
ABC -0 2 2 0.96 0.94 -0 2 2 0.95 0.93
SPJ -1 2 2 0.94 0.92 -0 2 2 0.92 0.93
LPM 6 2 6 0.93 0.21
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Table B.8: Dynamic: Two-way FEs — yt−1, N = 100
Coefficients APE
Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95 Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95
N = 100; T = 10
MLE 2 2 3 0.96 0.80 0 2 2 0.94 0.94
ABC 0 2 2 0.98 0.94 0 2 2 0.95 0.94
SPJ -0 2 2 0.97 0.94 0 2 2 0.95 0.94
LPM 5 2 6 0.91 0.30
N = 100; T = 20
MLE 2 2 3 0.99 0.63 0 2 2 0.99 0.94
ABC -0 1 1 1.01 0.95 -0 2 2 1.00 0.94
SPJ -0 2 2 0.99 0.94 -0 2 2 0.98 0.94
LPM 6 2 6 0.96 0.06
N = 100; T = 30
MLE 2 1 3 0.97 0.52 0 1 1 0.97 0.94
ABC -0 1 1 0.99 0.94 -0 1 1 0.98 0.94
SPJ -0 1 1 0.96 0.94 -0 1 1 0.96 0.93
LPM 6 1 6 0.94 0.01
N = 100; T = 40
MLE 2 1 3 0.99 0.42 0 1 1 0.97 0.94
ABC -0 1 1 1.01 0.95 -0 1 1 0.98 0.94
SPJ -0 1 1 0.99 0.94 -0 1 1 0.96 0.94
LPM 6 1 6 0.94 0.00
N = 100; T = 50
MLE 2 1 3 0.94 0.31 0 1 1 0.92 0.93
ABC -0 1 1 0.96 0.93 -0 1 1 0.92 0.93
SPJ -0 1 1 0.95 0.93 -0 1 1 0.91 0.92
LPM 6 1 6 0.90 0.00
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Table B.9: Dynamic: Two-way FEs — yt−1, N = 150
Coefficients APE
Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95 Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95
N = 150; T = 10
MLE 2 1 2 0.98 0.79 0 2 2 0.96 0.94
ABC 0 1 1 0.99 0.95 0 2 2 0.97 0.94
SPJ -0 1 1 0.98 0.95 0 2 2 0.95 0.94
LPM 6 2 6 0.92 0.04
N = 150; T = 20
MLE 2 1 2 0.98 0.66 -0 1 1 1.00 0.95
ABC -0 1 1 1.00 0.95 -0 1 1 1.00 0.95
SPJ -0 1 1 0.99 0.95 -0 1 1 0.99 0.95
LPM 5 1 6 0.96 0.00
N = 150; T = 30
MLE 2 1 2 0.98 0.53 0 1 1 0.99 0.95
ABC 0 1 1 1.00 0.95 0 1 1 0.99 0.95
SPJ -0 1 1 0.98 0.95 0 1 1 0.98 0.95
LPM 6 1 6 0.94 0.00
N = 150; T = 40
MLE 2 1 2 0.96 0.42 -0 1 1 0.96 0.94
ABC -0 1 1 0.97 0.94 -0 1 1 0.96 0.94
SPJ -0 1 1 0.96 0.94 -0 1 1 0.95 0.94
LPM 6 1 6 0.91 0.00
N = 150; T = 50
MLE 2 1 2 0.94 0.34 -0 1 1 0.93 0.93
ABC -0 1 1 0.95 0.94 -0 1 1 0.94 0.94
SPJ -0 1 1 0.94 0.94 -0 1 1 0.93 0.94
LPM 6 1 6 0.90 0.00
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B.3.2 Three-way Fixed Effects
Table B.10: Dynamic: Three-way FEs — x, N = 50
Coefficients APE
Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95 Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95
N = 50; T = 10
MLE 29 3 29 0.82 0.00 4 2 4 1.01 0.33
ABC (1) -1 2 2 1.02 0.94 -1 2 2 1.09 0.94
ABC (2) -1 2 2 1.01 0.93 -1 2 2 1.08 0.93
SPJ -14 3 14 0.62 0.00 4 2 5 0.87 0.32
LPM (1) 0 2 2 0.94 0.93
LPM (2) -0 2 2 0.94 0.93
N = 50; T = 20
MLE 16 1 16 0.87 0.00 3 1 3 0.97 0.36
ABC (1) -0 1 1 0.98 0.94 -0 1 1 1.00 0.95
ABC (2) -0 1 1 0.97 0.93 -0 1 1 0.99 0.95
SPJ -5 1 5 0.86 0.04 1 1 1 0.91 0.89
LPM (1) -0 1 1 0.90 0.93
LPM (2) -0 1 1 0.90 0.92
N = 50; T = 30
MLE 12 1 12 0.92 0.00 2 1 2 1.00 0.48
ABC (1) -0 1 1 1.01 0.95 -0 1 1 1.01 0.95
ABC (2) -0 1 1 1.01 0.95 -0 1 1 1.01 0.94
SPJ -3 1 3 0.93 0.15 -0 1 1 0.96 0.95
LPM (1) -0 1 1 0.89 0.92
LPM (2) -0 1 1 0.89 0.90
N = 50; T = 40
MLE 10 1 10 0.89 0.00 1 1 2 0.97 0.53
ABC (1) -0 1 1 0.97 0.94 -0 1 1 0.98 0.93
ABC (2) -0 1 1 0.97 0.94 -0 1 1 0.97 0.93
SPJ -2 1 2 0.88 0.27 -0 1 1 0.91 0.91
LPM (1) -0 1 1 0.84 0.89
LPM (2) -0 1 1 0.84 0.86
N = 50; T = 50
MLE 9 1 9 0.90 0.00 1 1 1 1.01 0.61
ABC (1) -0 1 1 0.97 0.94 -0 1 1 1.01 0.96
ABC (2) -0 1 1 0.97 0.93 -0 1 1 1.01 0.96
SPJ -2 1 2 0.90 0.33 -0 1 1 0.94 0.94
LPM (1) -0 1 1 0.86 0.88
LPM (2) -0 1 1 0.86 0.87
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Table B.11: Dynamic: Three-way FEs — x, N = 100
Coefficients APE
Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95 Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95
N = 100; T = 10
MLE 24 1 24 0.89 0.00 4 1 4 1.04 0.02
ABC (1) 0 1 1 1.05 0.95 -0 1 1 1.08 0.94
ABC (2) 0 1 1 1.05 0.96 -1 1 1 1.08 0.91
SPJ -9 1 9 0.70 0.00 6 1 6 0.89 0.00
LPM (1) 0 1 1 0.88 0.91
LPM (2) -0 1 1 0.87 0.91
N = 100; T = 20
MLE 13 1 13 0.89 0.00 2 1 2 0.96 0.02
ABC (1) 0 1 1 0.98 0.93 0 1 1 0.98 0.95
ABC (2) 0 1 1 0.98 0.94 -0 1 1 0.97 0.94
SPJ -3 1 3 0.86 0.01 1 1 1 0.89 0.54
LPM (1) -0 1 1 0.85 0.89
LPM (2) -0 1 1 0.85 0.87
N = 100; T = 30
MLE 9 1 9 0.91 0.00 2 0 2 0.96 0.05
ABC (1) 0 0 0 0.97 0.95 0 0 0 0.96 0.94
ABC (2) -0 0 0 0.97 0.94 -0 0 0 0.96 0.94
SPJ -1 1 2 0.91 0.14 0 0 1 0.93 0.86
LPM (1) -0 0 1 0.82 0.86
LPM (2) -0 0 1 0.82 0.81
N = 100; T = 40
MLE 7 0 7 0.91 0.00 1 0 1 0.94 0.12
ABC (1) 0 0 0 0.96 0.94 0 0 0 0.94 0.93
ABC (2) -0 0 0 0.96 0.94 -0 0 0 0.94 0.92
SPJ -1 0 1 0.92 0.32 0 0 0 0.91 0.91
LPM (1) -0 0 1 0.79 0.81
LPM (2) -0 0 1 0.79 0.73
N = 100; T = 50
MLE 6 0 6 0.94 0.00 1 0 1 1.00 0.17
ABC (1) 0 0 0 0.99 0.94 0 0 0 1.00 0.95
ABC (2) -0 0 0 0.98 0.94 -0 0 0 1.00 0.95
SPJ -1 0 1 0.95 0.48 0 0 0 0.96 0.94
LPM (1) -0 0 0 0.80 0.76
LPM (2) -0 0 1 0.80 0.69
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Table B.12: Dynamic: Three-way FEs — x, N = 150
Coefficients APE
Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95 Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95
N = 150; T = 10
MLE 23 1 23 0.86 0.00 3 1 4 1.06 0.00
ABC (1) 1 1 1 1.01 0.82 -0 1 1 1.09 0.94
ABC (2) 0 1 1 1.00 0.88 -0 1 1 1.07 0.90
SPJ -7 1 7 0.67 0.00 6 1 6 0.89 0.00
LPM (1) 0 1 1 0.84 0.88
LPM (2) -0 1 1 0.83 0.90
N = 150; T = 20
MLE 11 0 11 0.94 0.00 2 0 2 0.97 0.00
ABC (1) 0 0 0 1.02 0.89 0 0 0 0.97 0.94
ABC (2) 0 0 0 1.01 0.93 -0 0 0 0.97 0.94
SPJ -2 0 2 0.89 0.00 1 0 1 0.90 0.16
LPM (1) -0 0 0 0.81 0.88
LPM (2) -0 0 0 0.81 0.81
N = 150; T = 30
MLE 8 0 8 0.92 0.00 2 0 2 0.96 0.00
ABC (1) 0 0 0 0.98 0.91 0 0 0 0.97 0.93
ABC (2) 0 0 0 0.98 0.95 -0 0 0 0.97 0.95
SPJ -1 0 1 0.91 0.06 0 0 1 0.92 0.73
LPM (1) -0 0 0 0.79 0.80
LPM (2) -0 0 0 0.79 0.66
N = 150; T = 40
MLE 6 0 6 0.95 0.00 1 0 1 0.95 0.01
ABC (1) 0 0 0 1.00 0.94 0 0 0 0.95 0.92
ABC (2) -0 0 0 1.00 0.95 -0 0 0 0.95 0.94
SPJ -1 0 1 0.94 0.22 0 0 0 0.92 0.87
LPM (1) -0 0 0 0.75 0.68
LPM (2) -0 0 0 0.75 0.54
N = 150; T = 50
MLE 5 0 5 0.95 0.00 1 0 1 0.97 0.02
ABC (1) 0 0 0 0.99 0.93 0 0 0 0.97 0.93
ABC (2) -0 0 0 0.99 0.94 -0 0 0 0.97 0.94
SPJ -1 0 1 0.95 0.38 0 0 0 0.95 0.91
LPM (1) -0 0 0 0.76 0.61
LPM (2) -0 0 0 0.76 0.45
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Table B.13: Dynamic: Three-way FEs — yt−1, N = 50
Coefficients APE
Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95 Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95
N = 50; T = 10
MLE -62 5 62 0.95 0.00 -70 4 71 1.02 0.00
ABC (1) -6 4 7 1.14 0.81 -7 5 8 1.11 0.76
ABC (2) -7 5 9 1.05 0.68 -8 5 10 1.02 0.62
SPJ 24 6 25 0.77 0.01 -11 6 12 0.94 0.48
LPM (1) 2 5 5 1.02 0.95
LPM (2) 3 5 6 0.94 0.89
N = 50; T = 20
MLE -27 4 27 0.94 0.00 -36 3 37 0.95 0.00
ABC (1) -3 3 4 1.05 0.87 -3 3 5 1.00 0.85
ABC (2) -1 3 3 1.00 0.94 -1 3 4 0.96 0.93
SPJ 5 4 6 0.89 0.69 -2 4 4 0.89 0.89
LPM (1) 8 3 9 0.95 0.28
LPM (2) 11 4 12 0.91 0.09
N = 50; T = 30
MLE -16 3 16 0.97 0.00 -25 3 25 0.97 0.00
ABC (1) -2 3 3 1.06 0.88 -2 3 3 1.01 0.87
ABC (2) -0 3 3 1.03 0.95 -0 3 3 0.98 0.95
SPJ 2 3 3 0.95 0.88 -1 3 3 0.92 0.93
LPM (1) 10 3 11 0.96 0.03
LPM (2) 13 3 13 0.94 0.00
N = 50; T = 40
MLE -11 2 11 0.96 0.01 -19 2 19 0.95 0.00
ABC (1) -2 2 3 1.03 0.86 -2 2 3 0.99 0.85
ABC (2) -0 2 2 1.01 0.95 -0 2 2 0.97 0.95
SPJ 1 2 3 0.93 0.92 -0 3 3 0.90 0.92
LPM (1) 11 2 12 0.95 0.01
LPM (2) 13 2 13 0.93 0.00
N = 50; T = 50
MLE -7 2 8 0.94 0.07 -15 2 15 0.92 0.00
ABC (1) -2 2 3 1.01 0.89 -2 2 3 0.95 0.87
ABC (2) -0 2 2 0.99 0.95 -0 2 2 0.93 0.93
SPJ 0 2 2 0.92 0.92 -0 2 2 0.87 0.90
LPM (1) 12 2 12 0.92 0.00
LPM (2) 14 2 14 0.91 0.00
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Table B.14: Dynamic: Three-way FEs — yt−1, N = 100
Coefficients APE
Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95 Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95
N = 100; T = 10
MLE -63 3 63 0.98 0.00 -70 2 70 1.04 0.00
ABC (1) -6 2 7 1.13 0.22 -8 2 8 1.10 0.09
ABC (2) -8 2 8 1.04 0.08 -9 2 10 1.01 0.03
SPJ 21 3 21 0.80 0.00 -11 3 11 0.94 0.02
LPM (1) 2 2 3 1.00 0.84
LPM (2) 4 3 4 0.92 0.66
N = 100; T = 20
MLE -29 2 29 0.96 0.00 -37 2 37 0.96 0.00
ABC (1) -3 2 4 1.03 0.42 -4 2 4 0.99 0.37
ABC (2) -1 2 2 0.99 0.86 -2 2 2 0.95 0.83
SPJ 4 2 5 0.91 0.26 -2 2 3 0.90 0.80
LPM (1) 8 2 9 0.95 0.00
LPM (2) 11 2 11 0.91 0.00
N = 100; T = 30
MLE -18 1 18 0.97 0.00 -25 1 25 0.96 0.00
ABC (1) -3 1 3 1.03 0.50 -3 1 3 0.98 0.49
ABC (2) -1 1 1 1.00 0.93 -1 1 2 0.95 0.92
SPJ 2 1 2 0.94 0.72 -1 1 2 0.90 0.90
LPM (1) 10 1 10 0.95 0.00
LPM (2) 13 1 13 0.92 0.00
N = 100; T = 40
MLE -13 1 13 1.01 0.00 -19 1 19 1.01 0.00
ABC (1) -2 1 2 1.06 0.57 -2 1 2 1.04 0.56
ABC (2) -0 1 1 1.04 0.94 -0 1 1 1.02 0.94
SPJ 1 1 2 0.98 0.86 -0 1 1 0.96 0.93
LPM (1) 11 1 11 0.98 0.00
LPM (2) 13 1 13 0.96 0.00
N = 100; T = 50
MLE -10 1 10 0.98 0.00 -15 1 15 0.97 0.00
ABC (1) -2 1 2 1.03 0.61 -2 1 2 0.99 0.62
ABC (2) -0 1 1 1.01 0.95 -0 1 1 0.98 0.94
SPJ 1 1 1 0.98 0.91 -0 1 1 0.95 0.93
LPM (1) 12 1 12 0.94 0.00
LPM (2) 14 1 14 0.93 0.00
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Table B.15: Dynamic: Three-way FEs — yt−1, N = 150
Coefficients APE
Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95 Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95
N = 150; T = 10
MLE -63 2 64 0.95 0.00 -70 1 70 1.02 0.00
ABC (1) -7 1 7 1.09 0.01 -8 2 9 1.08 0.00
ABC (2) -8 2 9 1.01 0.00 -10 2 10 1.00 0.00
SPJ 20 2 20 0.78 0.00 -11 2 11 0.92 0.00
LPM (1) 2 2 3 0.98 0.71
LPM (2) 3 2 4 0.90 0.42
N = 150; T = 20
MLE -30 1 30 0.99 0.00 -37 1 37 1.00 0.00
ABC (1) -4 1 4 1.07 0.05 -4 1 4 1.03 0.03
ABC (2) -2 1 2 1.02 0.69 -2 1 2 0.99 0.61
SPJ 4 1 4 0.92 0.05 -2 1 2 0.90 0.61
LPM (1) 8 1 8 0.96 0.00
LPM (2) 11 1 11 0.92 0.00
N = 150; T = 30
MLE -19 1 19 0.98 0.00 -25 1 25 0.97 0.00
ABC (1) -3 1 3 1.04 0.15 -3 1 3 0.99 0.13
ABC (2) -1 1 1 1.01 0.89 -1 1 1 0.97 0.87
SPJ 2 1 2 0.96 0.47 -0 1 1 0.92 0.90
LPM (1) 10 1 10 0.93 0.00
LPM (2) 13 1 13 0.91 0.00
N = 150; T = 40
MLE -14 1 14 1.01 0.00 -19 1 19 0.99 0.00
ABC (1) -2 1 2 1.06 0.20 -2 1 2 1.01 0.19
ABC (2) -0 1 1 1.03 0.92 -0 1 1 0.99 0.90
SPJ 1 1 1 0.96 0.76 -0 1 1 0.93 0.92
LPM (1) 11 1 11 0.96 0.00
LPM (2) 13 1 13 0.94 0.00
N = 150; T = 50
MLE -11 1 11 0.97 0.00 -15 1 15 0.95 0.00
ABC (1) -2 1 2 1.01 0.30 -2 1 2 0.97 0.30
ABC (2) -0 1 1 0.99 0.92 -0 1 1 0.95 0.91
SPJ 1 1 1 0.96 0.84 -0 1 1 0.92 0.92
LPM (1) 12 1 12 0.92 0.00
LPM (2) 14 1 14 0.90 0.00
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B.4 Further Monte Carlo Results — Static Model
Although the main focus of our article is on the dynamic two- and three-way fixed
effects model, the static counterparts are also highly relevant for applied work. For this
reason, we study the finite sample properties of MLE, ABC, SPJ and LPM for these model
specifications, too. In the following we briefly sketch the designs. Let i = 1, . . . , N ,
j = 1, . . . , N , t = 1, . . . , T , βy = 0.5, β = 1.
Design — Two-way Fixed Effects.
yijt = 1[βxijt + λit + ψjt ≥ ijt] ,
where λit ∼ iid. N (0, 1/16), ψjt ∼ iid. N (0, 1/16), and ijt ∼ iid. N (0, 1). Further,
xijt = 0.5xijt−1 + λit + ψjt + νijt, where νijt ∼ iid. N (0, 0.5), xij0 ∼ iid. N (0, 1).
Design — Three-way Fixed Effects.
yijt = 1[βxijt + λit + ψjt + µij ≥ ijt] ,
where λit ∼ iid. N (0, 1/24), ψjt ∼ iid. N (0, 1/24), µij ∼ iid. N (0, 1/24), and ijt ∼
iid. N (0, 1). Further, xijt = 0.5xijt−1 + λit + ψjt + µij + νijt, where νijt ∼ iid. N (0, 0.5),
xij0 ∼ iid. N (0, 1).
Note that, unlike in the dynamic three-way fixed effects model, the OLS estimator of the
linear probability model (LPM) does not require a bias correction for the specifications
considered in this section.
We now review the key results of the simulation experiments.
Results — Two-way Fixed Effects. Static (see Tables B.16, B.17, B.18): although MLE
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shows a distortion in the structural parameter estimates, the bias does not carry over
to the estimates of APEs. The bias corrections ABC and SPJ work well. They reduce
the biases of the structural parameters and APEs to 1 or zero percent, and bring the
CPs close to the nominal level. Overall, ABC, SPJ and MLE work similarly well if APEs
are of interest. In terms of structural parameters, ABC exhibits a lower bias and better
CPs than SPJ in samples with smaller N . LPM shows no distortion of the APEs in all
settings, but we observe that with increasing N , the standard errors are underestimated,
resulting in too low CPs.
Note that MLE is consistent under fixed T asymptotics. This is also evident from the
simulation results, where the properties of the estimator do not change with T .
Results — Three-way Fixed Effects. Static (see Tables B.19, B.20, B.21): we find
a considerable distortion in the MLE estimates of the structural parameters, which
decreases with rising T , but is not negligibly small even at T = 50. ABC and SPJ both
reduce this bias considerably, but ABC works better in samples with smaller T . While
the CPs of ABC quickly converge to the nominal level, the CPs of SPJ are still far away
from 95 percent even at T = 50. If we look at the APEs, we see that all estimators have
either a very small bias of 1 percent or none at all. With increasing T , their CPs are also
getting closer to 95 percent.
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Table B.16: Static: Two-way FEs — x, N = 50
Coefficients APE
Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95 Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95
N = 50; T = 10
MLE 5 2 5 0.97 0.10 0 1 1 0.98 0.94
ABC -0 1 1 1.01 0.94 -0 1 1 0.99 0.94
SPJ -1 1 2 0.98 0.93 -0 1 1 0.96 0.93
LPM 0 1 1 0.96 0.93
N = 50; T = 20
MLE 5 1 5 0.99 0.01 0 1 1 1.06 0.96
ABC -0 1 1 1.03 0.96 -0 1 1 1.07 0.97
SPJ -1 1 1 0.98 0.91 -0 1 1 1.04 0.95
LPM -0 1 1 1.05 0.96
N = 50; T = 30
MLE 5 1 5 0.98 0.00 0 1 1 1.01 0.95
ABC -0 1 1 1.02 0.95 -0 1 1 1.03 0.95
SPJ -1 1 1 1.00 0.89 -0 1 1 1.00 0.95
LPM 0 1 1 0.99 0.94
N = 50; T = 40
MLE 5 1 5 0.94 0.00 0 1 1 0.98 0.95
ABC -0 1 1 0.97 0.94 -0 1 1 0.99 0.95
SPJ -1 1 1 0.95 0.84 -0 1 1 0.97 0.94
LPM -0 1 1 0.97 0.94
N = 50; T = 50
MLE 5 1 5 0.97 0.00 0 1 1 1.02 0.95
ABC -0 1 1 1.01 0.96 -0 1 1 1.04 0.96
SPJ -1 1 1 0.98 0.83 -0 1 1 1.00 0.95
LPM 0 1 1 1.00 0.95
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Table B.17: Static: Two-way FEs — x, N = 100
Coefficients APE
Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95 Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95
N = 100; T = 10
MLE 2 1 2 0.95 0.13 0 1 1 0.96 0.94
ABC -0 1 1 0.97 0.94 -0 1 1 0.96 0.93
SPJ -0 1 1 0.95 0.93 -0 1 1 0.95 0.93
LPM 0 1 1 0.85 0.90
N = 100; T = 20
MLE 2 1 2 0.98 0.00 0 0 0 0.99 0.96
ABC -0 1 1 1.00 0.95 -0 0 0 1.00 0.95
SPJ -0 1 1 0.99 0.94 -0 0 0 0.99 0.95
LPM -0 0 0 0.89 0.92
N = 100; T = 30
MLE 2 0 2 1.00 0.00 0 0 0 1.03 0.95
ABC 0 0 0 1.02 0.96 -0 0 0 1.03 0.95
SPJ -0 0 0 1.00 0.95 -0 0 0 1.03 0.96
LPM 0 0 0 0.92 0.93
N = 100; T = 40
MLE 2 0 2 0.98 0.00 0 0 0 0.97 0.94
ABC -0 0 0 1.00 0.94 -0 0 0 0.97 0.94
SPJ -0 0 0 0.98 0.93 -0 0 0 0.96 0.94
LPM -0 0 0 0.87 0.91
N = 100; T = 50
MLE 2 0 2 1.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.99 0.95
ABC -0 0 0 1.02 0.96 -0 0 0 0.99 0.95
SPJ -0 0 0 1.02 0.94 -0 0 0 0.99 0.95
LPM -0 0 0 0.88 0.92
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Table B.18: Static: Two-way FEs — x, N = 150
Coefficients APE
Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95 Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95
N = 150; T = 10
MLE 1 0 2 0.99 0.12 0 0 0 1.02 0.96
ABC -0 0 0 1.01 0.96 -0 0 0 1.02 0.96
SPJ -0 0 0 1.00 0.95 -0 0 0 1.01 0.95
LPM -0 0 0 0.84 0.90
N = 150; T = 20
MLE 1 0 2 0.95 0.01 0 0 0 0.95 0.94
ABC 0 0 0 0.96 0.94 0 0 0 0.95 0.94
SPJ -0 0 0 0.95 0.93 0 0 0 0.95 0.94
LPM 0 0 0 0.79 0.86
N = 150; T = 30
MLE 1 0 2 1.01 0.00 0 0 0 0.96 0.95
ABC -0 0 0 1.03 0.95 -0 0 0 0.97 0.94
SPJ -0 0 0 1.02 0.94 -0 0 0 0.96 0.95
LPM -0 0 0 0.79 0.88
N = 150; T = 40
MLE 1 0 2 0.99 0.00 0 0 0 0.97 0.94
ABC -0 0 0 1.00 0.95 -0 0 0 0.97 0.94
SPJ -0 0 0 0.99 0.94 -0 0 0 0.96 0.94
LPM -0 0 0 0.80 0.88
N = 150; T = 50
MLE 1 0 2 0.99 0.00 0 0 0 0.95 0.94
ABC -0 0 0 1.00 0.94 -0 0 0 0.95 0.94
SPJ -0 0 0 0.99 0.94 -0 0 0 0.95 0.94
LPM 0 0 0 0.78 0.88
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Table B.19: Static: Three-way FEs — x, N = 50
Coefficients APE
Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95 Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95
N = 50; T = 10
MLE 22 2 22 0.85 0.00 1 1 2 1.00 0.89
ABC -1 2 2 1.03 0.88 -1 1 2 1.07 0.86
SPJ -12 2 12 0.72 0.00 -0 2 2 0.88 0.91
LPM 0 1 1 1.04 0.96
N = 50; T = 20
MLE 12 1 12 0.92 0.00 0 1 1 1.00 0.94
ABC -1 1 1 1.02 0.92 -0 1 1 1.03 0.93
SPJ -4 1 4 0.88 0.08 -1 1 1 0.92 0.89
LPM -0 1 1 1.04 0.96
N = 50; T = 30
MLE 10 1 10 0.94 0.00 0 1 1 1.02 0.94
ABC -0 1 1 1.02 0.94 -0 1 1 1.04 0.94
SPJ -2 1 2 0.93 0.28 -0 1 1 0.96 0.89
LPM 0 1 1 1.01 0.95
N = 50; T = 40
MLE 8 1 8 0.93 0.00 0 1 1 1.02 0.95
ABC -0 1 1 0.99 0.92 -0 1 1 1.03 0.94
SPJ -2 1 2 0.94 0.40 -0 1 1 0.99 0.90
LPM -0 1 1 0.98 0.94
N = 50; T = 50
MLE 8 1 8 0.96 0.00 0 1 1 1.04 0.94
ABC -0 1 1 1.03 0.93 -0 1 1 1.06 0.95
SPJ -1 1 2 0.95 0.46 -0 1 1 0.99 0.91
LPM 0 1 1 0.99 0.94
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Table B.20: Static: Three-way FEs — x, N = 100
Coefficients APE
Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95 Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95
N = 100; T = 10
MLE 18 1 18 0.89 0.00 1 1 1 1.05 0.90
ABC -1 1 1 1.05 0.80 -1 1 1 1.09 0.70
SPJ -8 1 8 0.74 0.00 0 1 1 0.89 0.87
LPM -0 1 1 1.04 0.96
N = 100; T = 20
MLE 9 1 9 0.93 0.00 0 0 1 1.01 0.92
ABC -0 1 1 1.00 0.92 -0 0 1 1.03 0.92
SPJ -2 1 2 0.94 0.01 -0 1 1 0.96 0.91
LPM 0 0 0 0.96 0.93
N = 100; T = 30
MLE 7 0 7 0.95 0.00 0 0 0 1.05 0.95
ABC -0 0 0 1.01 0.93 -0 0 0 1.06 0.95
SPJ -1 0 1 0.93 0.21 -0 0 0 0.98 0.92
LPM -0 0 0 0.97 0.95
N = 100; T = 40
MLE 6 0 6 0.96 0.00 0 0 0 1.00 0.94
ABC -0 0 0 1.00 0.94 -0 0 0 1.01 0.94
SPJ -1 0 1 0.95 0.44 -0 0 0 0.95 0.92
LPM -0 0 0 0.93 0.93
N = 100; T = 50
MLE 5 0 5 0.94 0.00 0 0 0 0.99 0.94
ABC -0 0 0 0.98 0.94 -0 0 0 1.00 0.94
SPJ -1 0 1 0.94 0.57 -0 0 0 0.97 0.92
LPM -0 0 0 0.91 0.93
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Table B.21: Static: Three-way FEs — x, N = 150
Coefficients APE
Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95 Bias SD RMSE SE/SD CP .95
N = 150; T = 10
MLE 16 1 16 0.87 0.00 0 0 1 1.04 0.87
ABC -1 1 1 1.02 0.77 -1 0 1 1.07 0.51
SPJ -7 1 7 0.76 0.00 1 1 1 0.91 0.73
LPM -0 0 0 0.95 0.94
N = 150; T = 20
MLE 8 0 8 0.92 0.00 0 0 0 1.00 0.91
ABC -0 0 0 0.99 0.91 -0 0 0 1.01 0.89
SPJ -2 0 2 0.89 0.00 -0 0 0 0.93 0.91
LPM -0 0 0 0.93 0.93
N = 150; T = 30
MLE 6 0 6 0.93 0.00 0 0 0 0.97 0.93
ABC -0 0 0 0.97 0.93 -0 0 0 0.98 0.92
SPJ -1 0 1 0.93 0.08 -0 0 0 0.92 0.90
LPM -0 0 0 0.88 0.92
N = 150; T = 40
MLE 5 0 5 0.95 0.00 0 0 0 1.01 0.93
ABC -0 0 0 0.99 0.94 -0 0 0 1.02 0.94
SPJ -1 0 1 0.93 0.33 -0 0 0 0.98 0.93
LPM -0 0 0 0.90 0.93
N = 150; T = 50
MLE 4 0 4 0.98 0.00 0 0 0 1.05 0.95
ABC -0 0 0 1.01 0.94 -0 0 0 1.05 0.95
SPJ -0 0 0 0.97 0.51 -0 0 0 1.00 0.94
LPM -0 0 0 0.92 0.92
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B.5 Application
Table B.22: Logit Estimation: Coefficients
Dependent variable: yijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged DV - - 2.869∗∗∗ - 1.929∗∗∗
[-] [-] [2.985] [-] [1.798]
(-) (-) (0.008) (-) (0.009)
log(Distance) - -1.454∗∗∗ -0.980∗∗∗ - -
[-1.181∗∗∗] [-1.494] [-1.012] [-] [-]
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (-) (-)
Land border - 0.621∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ - -
[0.660∗∗∗] [0.643] [0.244] [-] [-]
(0.026) (0.029) (0.033) (-) (-)
Legal - 0.262∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ - -
[0.172∗∗∗] [0.269] [0.176] [-] [-]
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (-) (-)
Language - 0.737∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ - -
[0.663∗∗∗] [0.757] [0.529] [-] [-]
(0.009) (0.01) (0.012) (-) (-)
Colonial ties - 1.345∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗ - -
[0.342∗∗∗] [1.443] [1.102] [-] [-]
(0.036) (0.061) (0.07) (-) (-)
Currency union - 1.137∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗
[0.660∗∗∗] [1.173] [0.807] [0.64] [0.497]
(0.021) (0.027) (0.031) (0.06) (0.064)
FTA - 1.059∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗ 0.130∗ 0.072
[0.955∗∗∗] [1.077] [0.674] [0.123] [0.054]
(0.031) (0.036) (0.04) (0.07) (0.075)
WTO - 0.228∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
[0.462∗∗∗] [0.232] [0.191] [0.105] [0.102]
(0.009) (0.014) (0.016) (0.028) (0.031)
Fixed effects i, j, t it, jt it, jt it, jt, ij it, jt, ij
Sample size 1204671 1204671 1171794 1204671 1171794
- perf. class. 12298 147760 141537 370617 374067
Deviance 8.857×105 6.976×105 5.2×105 4.728×105 4.184×105
Notes: Uncorrected coefficients in square brackets. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table B.23: Logit Estimation: APEs
Dependent variable: yijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged DV - - 0.331∗∗∗ - 0.168∗∗∗
[-] [-] [0.332] [-] [0.13]
(-) (-) (0.002) (-) (0.049)
log(Distance) - -0.138∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ - -
[-0.140∗∗∗] [-0.137] [-0.067] [-] [-]
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (-) (-)
Land border - 0.058∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ - -
[0.077∗∗∗] [0.059] [0.016] [-] [-]
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (-) (-)
Legal - 0.025∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ - -
[0.020∗∗∗] [0.025] [0.012] [-] [-]
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (-) (-)
Language - 0.069∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ - -
[0.078∗∗∗] [0.069] [0.035] [-] [-]
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (-) (-)
Colonial ties - 0.122∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ - -
[0.040∗∗∗] [0.127] [0.074] [-] [-]
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (-) (-)
Currency union - 0.104∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
[0.077∗∗∗] [0.104] [0.054] [0.04] [0.028]
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.009)
FTA - 0.098∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.009 0.004
[0.110∗∗∗] [0.097] [0.045] [0.008] [0.003]
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
WTO - 0.022∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.005∗
[0.056∗∗∗] [0.021] [0.013] [0.006] [0.006]
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Fixed effects i, j, t it, jt it, jt it, jt, ij it, jt, ij
Sample size 1204671 1204671 1171794 1204671 1171794
- perf. class. 12298 147760 141537 370617 374067
Deviance 8.857×105 6.976×105 5.2×105 4.728×105 4.184×105
Notes: Uncorrected average partial effects in square brackets. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table B.24: Probit Estimation with Different Bandwidths: Coefficients
Dependent variable: yijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged DV 0.961∗∗∗ 1.112∗∗∗ 1.140∗∗∗ 1.154∗∗∗ 1.161∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.04) (0.04)
Currency union 0.228∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047)
FTA 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.042 0.043
(0.056) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
WTO 0.041 0.039 0.039 0.040 0.042∗
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Trim L = 0 L = 1 L = 2 L = 3 L = 4
Notes: All columns include Origin × Year, Destination × Year and Origin × Destina-
tion fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table B.25: Probit Estimation with Different Bandwidths: Average Partial Effects
Dependent variable: yijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged DV 0.144∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Currency union 0.026∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
FTA 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
WTO 0.005∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trim L = 0 L = 1 L = 2 L = 3 L = 4
Notes: All columns include Origin × Year, Destination × Year and Origin × Destina-
tion fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table B.26: Logit Estimation with Different Bandwidths: Coefficients
Dependent variable: yijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lagged DV 1.606∗∗∗ 1.879∗∗∗ 1.929∗∗∗ 1.953∗∗∗ 1.965∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.04) (0.04)
Currency Union 0.448∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053)
FTA 0.065 0.069 0.072 0.077 0.080
(0.063) (0.061) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
WTO 0.091∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Trim L = 0 L = 1 L = 2 L = 3 L = 4
Notes: All columns include Origin × Year, Destination × Year and Origin × Destina-
tion fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table B.27: Logit Estimation with Different Bandwidths: Average Partial Effects
Dependent variable: yijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lagged DV 0.133∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Currency Union 0.028∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
FTA 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
WTO 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trim L = 0 L = 1 L = 2 L = 3 L = 4
Notes: All columns include Origin × Year, Destination × Year and Origin × Destina-
tion fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table B.28: Probit vs. OLS estimation: Average Partial Effects with Two-way Fixed Effects
Dependent variable: yijt
(1) (2) (3) (5)
Lagged DV - - 0.599∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗
(-) (-) (0.001) (0.003)
log(Distance) -0.133∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0) (0.001)
Land border 0.014∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Legal 0.008∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Language 0.098∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Colonial ties 0.021∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005)
Currency union 0.107∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
FTA -0.155∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
WTO -0.010∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Estimator OLS Probit OLS Probit
bias corrected - true - true
Sample size 1204671 1204671 1171794 1171794
Notes: All columns include Origin × Year, Destination × Year and Origin
× Destination fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table B.29: LPM Estimation with Different Bandwidths: Average Partial Effects
Dependent variable: yijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged DV 0.444∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Currency union 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
FTA -0.065∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
WTO 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trim L = 0 L = 1 L = 2 L = 3 L = 4
Notes: All columns include Origin × Year, Destination × Year and Origin × Destina-
tion fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Figure B.3: Fitted Probabilities
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C.1 Detailed Model Derivations
This part of the Appendix gives some further details on the derivations of our model.
The calibration of the utility function is described and additional explanations on the
production structure, the implementation of counterfactual scenarios, the calculation
of the changes in variables of interest, the emission decomposition, and the model
extension are provided.
C.1.1 Calibration of µj
In order to calibrate µj, we exactly follow the procedure used and described by Shapiro
and Walker (2015). Specifically, we take the derivative of the direct utility function with
respect to world emissions and equalize this marginal utility of an additional unit of
world emissions to the part of total social costs in the world accruing to the country
(which we denote by SCCj):
∂
Y jP j
 1
1+
(
1
µj
∑N
i=1 E
i
)2


∂
(∑N
i=1E
i
) = SCCj, (C.1)
where we used the fact that
(
U jS
)γjS [∏
l∈L(U jl )γ
j
l
]
= Y j/P j. Calculating the derivative on
the left-hand side leads to:
− Y
j
P j
2
(µj)2
∑N
i=1E
i[
1 +
(
1
µj
∑N
i=1 E
i
)2]2 = scW sc
jY j/P j∑
i scjY i/P i
, (C.2)
where scW denotes the world social costs, which we take from the Interagency Working
Group on the Social Cost of Carbon (2013), and scj captures the distribution across
countries according to Boyer and Nordhaus (2000), as in Shapiro and Walker (2015).
We take national real income values from the Penn World Table 9.0.
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C.1.2 Production Structure
With the production structure given by equation (3.11), the cost function can be derived
as
cil(ei,vi, qil) =
1
Ail
∏
f∈F
(
vif
αilf
)αilf( ei
αilE
)αilE
q,il . (C.3)
where vi is a vector that collects all factor prices of country i. Under the assumption of
perfect competition, the price in country i equals minimal unit costs and, rearranging
slightly, is hence given by
pil =
1
Ail
(
ei
αilE
)αilE ∏
f∈F
(
vif
αilf
)αilf
. (C.4)
According to Shepard’s lemma, the conditional demand for the input factor energy in
tradable sector l, xilE, is given by the partial derivative of the cost function (C.3):
xilE(ei,vi, qil) =
∂c(ei,vi, qil)
∂ei
= α
i
lE
ei
pilq
i
l =
αilE
ei
Y il . (C.5)
Analogous expressions hold for the non-tradable sector S. Additionally, factor market
clearing ensures that the following expression holds:
Ei = xiSE +
∑
l∈L
xilE. (C.6)
From equations (C.5) and (C.6), the equilibrium amount of energy can be derived:
Ei = α
i
SEY
i
S +
∑
l∈L αilEY
i
l
ei
. (C.7)
For all other factors, the amount is given and the price is flexible and hence an expression
for the equilibrium factor price vif is of interest. Following the same procedure as for
energy, but solving for the factor price vif instead of the factor endowments V
i
f , yields
vif =
αiSfY
i
S +
∑
l∈L αilfY
i
l
V if
. (C.8)
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C.1.3 Calculating Counterfactual Changes
Using the production structure given by equation (3.11), inserting Eil = αilEY il /ei into
(3.11) and adding the counterfactual subscript, we obtain the following expression for
sectoral GDP:
Y il,c = pil,cAil
(
αilEY
i
l,c
eic
)αilE ∏
f∈F
(V ilf,c)α
i
lf . (C.9)
This again represents a system of LN equations, but at the same time adds the (1+F )LN
unknown variables pil,c and V
i
lf,c and the LN unknown parameters A
i
l.
In order to obtain different expressions for V ilf,c, we make use of the fact that the equation
for the factor prices given by (C.8) also has to hold on the sectoral level:
vif =
αilfY
i
l
V ilf
. (C.10)
Solving for V ilf and substituting equation (C.8) for v
i
f gives
V ilf =
αilfY
i
l V
i
f
αiSfY
i
S +
∑
m∈L αimfY im
. (C.11)
Now the expression for (counterfactual) sectoral GDP can be restated as
Y il,c = pil,cAil
(
αilEY
i
l,c
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)αilE ∏
f∈F
(
αilfY
i
l,cV
i
f
αiSfY
i
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∑
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)αilf
. (C.12)
Following Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007, 2008), rewriting (C.12) as the counterfactual
change in sectoral GDP will turn out to be of use:
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Y il,b
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)(
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i
b
Y il,be
i
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i
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. (C.13)
This equation can be restated using scaled equilibrium prices:
Y il,c
Y il,b
=
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ψil,c
ψil,b
) 1
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b
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, (C.14)
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which simplifies to equation (3.16) in the main text.
To derive equation (3.17), we start off with the constant real energy price condition,
eic/P
i
c = eib/P ib , and therefore require an expression for the change of a country’s overall
price index:
P ic
P ib
=
(
piS,c
)γiS ∏
l∈L(P il,c)γ
i
l(
piS,b
)γiS ∏
l∈L(P il,b)γ
i
l
. (C.15)
We hence need the counterfactual sectoral price indexes to obtain counterfactual nominal
energy price. These are given by equation (3.5) and can be reformulated as:
P il,c =
 N∑
j=1
(T jil,cτ
ji
l,c)1−σlψ
j
l,c
 11−σl . (C.16)
Further, counterfactual prices in the non-tradable sector are given by:
piS,c =
1
AiS
(
eic
αiSE
)αiSE ∏
f∈F
(
vif,c
αiSf
)αiSf
. (C.17)
To solve for the overall price change, we in fact only need the ratio of piS,c/p
i
S,b, which is
given by:
piS,c
piS,b
=
(
eic
eib
)αiSE ∏
f∈F
(
αiSfY
i
S,c +
∑
l∈L αilfY
i
l,c
αiSfY
i
S,b +
∑
l∈L αilfY
i
l,b
)αiSf
, (C.18)
where we substituted vif,c and v
i
f,b using equation (C.8) into the non-tradable counterpart
of (C.4).
C.1.4 Counterfactual Percentage Changes
The effect of counterfactual scenarios on trade flows could in general be investigated
on a sectoral and bilateral level. As this would imply the depiction of LN2 numbers,
we instead only present the effect on a country’s aggregate trade flows. Due to the
balanced trade assumption, it does not make any difference if the percentage change in
total imports or total exports is analyzed and the counterfactual percentage changes in a
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country’s normalized international trade flows can hence be obtained as
∆X i ≡
∑l∈L∑j 6=iX ijl,c/Y ic∑
l∈L
∑
j 6=iX
ij
l,b/Y
i
b
− 1
× 100, (C.19)
where the values of sectoral, bilateral exports between countries i and j in the baseline
(X ijl,b) and counterfactual (X
ij
l,c) can be obtained using equations (3.7) to (3.9) for the
benchmark and counterfactual case, respectively.
As emissions are proportional to energy use, the counterfactual percentage change in a
country’s level of carbon emissions is equal to the percentage change in energy use and
hence given by
∆Ei ≡
[
Eic
Eib
− 1
]
× 100 =
eib
(
αiSEY
i
S,c +
∑
l∈L αilEY
i
l,c
)
eic
(
αiSEY
i
S,b +
∑
l∈L αilEY
i
l,b
) − 1
× 100, (C.20)
using the factor market clearing condition for energy, i.e. Ei = (αiSEY iS +
∑
l∈L αilEY
i
l )/ei.
Real income is defined as total income divided by the consumer price index, i.e.
Ri = Y
i
P i
= Y
i
(piS)
γiS
∏
l∈L(P il )γ
i
l
. (C.21)
The percentage change of real income is then given by
∆Ri ≡
(
Y ic /P
i
c
Y ib /P
i
b
− 1
)
× 100 =
Y ic ∏l∈L(P il,b)γil
Y ib
∏
l∈L(P il,c)γ
i
l
(
piS,c
piS,b
)−γiS
− 1
× 100. (C.22)
Additionally accounting for the social costs of carbon, the change in welfare can be
calculated using the total utility function (3.2):
∆U i =

(
U iS,c
U iS,b
)γiS ∏
l∈L
(
U il,c
U il,b
)γil
1 +
(
1
µi
∑N
j=1E
j
b
)2
1 +
(
1
µi
∑N
j=1E
j
c
)2
− 1
× 100.
Noting that the dual representation for the first part is the change in real income, and
utilizing for the second part the factor market clearing condition for energy, we can
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write the change in welfare as:
∆U i =
Y
i
c
∏
l∈L(P il,b)γ
i
l
Y ib
∏
l∈L(P il,c)γ
i
l
(
piS,c
piS,b
)−γiS
×

1 +
(
1
µi
∑N
j=1
αjSEY
j
S,b
+
∑
l∈L α
j
lE
Y j
l,b
ej
b
)2
1 +
(
1
µi
∑N
j=1
αjSEY
j
S,c+
∑
l∈L α
j
lE
Y j
l,c
ejc
)2
− 1
× 100. (C.23)
C.1.5 Two-Sector Decomposition
In this subsection, we show a decomposition of the emission effects in scale, composition
and technique effects for the case of two (tradable) sectors in order to follow closely
the theoretical decomposition of Copeland and Taylor (2003). We call the these sectors
clean (C) and dirty (D) subsequently, i.e. γiS = 0 for all i and L = {C,D}.
Starting from Ei = ∑l∈{C,D} αilEY il /ei, a country’s carbon emissions can be re-expressed
in terms of the dirty production share, real value of production and the real energy price
as follows:
Ei =
{
αiCE(1− κiD) + αiDEκiD
} Y˜ i
P i
(
ei
P i
)−1
, (C.24)
where Y˜ i ≡ ∑l∈{C,D} Y il is the total nominal income without tariff revenues and κiD ≡
Y iD/Y˜
i denotes the dirty production share. Note that the expression in curly brackets
exactly equals the definition of the production-share-weighted average energy cost share
α¯iE in the main text. We could hence apply our multi-sectoral decomposition here. But
given that the sectoral energy cost shares do not change in our model and the sectoral
composition is fully captured by one parameter (κiD) in the two sector case, we can
equivalently follow Copeland and Taylor (2003) and capture the composition effect via
changes in the dirty production share:
dEi = ∂E
i
∂(Y˜ i/P i)
d(Y˜ i/P i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
scale effect
+ ∂E
i
∂κiD
dκiD︸ ︷︷ ︸
composition effect
+ ∂E
i
∂(ei/P i)d(e
i/P i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
technique effect
. (C.25)
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Scale effect. The effect of a ceteris paribus increase of a country’s production on its
emissions is positive and directly proportional to the rise in production:
∂Ei
∂(Y˜ i/P i)
=
(
αiCE(1− κiD) + αiDEκiD
)( ei
P i
)−1
> 0
and
∂Ei
∂(Y˜ i/P i)
(Y˜ i/P i)
Ei
= 1. (C.26)
Composition effect. The effect of an increase of the dirty production share on emissions
is always positive:
∂Ei
∂κiD
=
(
Y˜ i
ei
)(
αiDE − αiCE
)
> 0 if αiDE > αiCE ∀ i. (C.27)
Technique effect. The effect of an increase of the real energy price on emissions is
always negative and inversely proportional to the rise of the real energy price:
∂Ei
∂(ei/P i) = −
(
αiCE(1− κiD) + αiDEκiD
) Y˜ i/P i
(ei/P i)2 < 0
and
∂Ei
∂(ei/P i)
(ei/P i)
Ei
= −1. (C.28)
C.1.6 Incorporating Energy Production
The general production functions stay the same in the extended model:
qil = Ail(Eil )α
i
lE
∏
f∈F
(V ilf )α
i
lf , (C.29)
qiS = AiS(EiS)α
i
SE
∏
f∈F
(V iSf )α
i
Sf . (C.30)
As before, factor market clearing for energy holds and ensures that the following
expression holds:
Ei = α
i
SEY
i
S +
∑
l∈L αilEY
i
l
ei
. (C.31)
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What is new in the extended framework is a production function for energy:
Ei = EiS +
∑
l∈L
Eil = AiE(Ri)ξ
i
R
∏
f∈F
(V iEf )ξ
i
f , (C.32)
where R is a freely internationally tradable input resource and the E subscript denotes
the energy sector which is neither part of the l ∈ L tradable sectors nor of the non-
tradable sector S. It follows from the Cobb-Douglas production structure that ξiR is the
resource cost share in energy production.
The extended production structure changes the factor market clearing conditions to:
V if = V iEf + V iSf +
∑
l∈L
V ilf . (C.33)
It also leads to a new expression for the equilibrium factor prices:
vif =
αiSfY
i
S +
∑
l∈L αilfY
i
l + ξifEiei
V if
=
(
αiSf + ξifαiSE
)
Y iS +
∑
l∈L(αilf + ξifαilE)Y il
V if
. (C.34)
We can furthermore add an international resource factor market clearing condition:
N∑
i=1
Ri = RW , (C.35)
assuming the world resource endowment RW and the use of it to be constant.
The expression for the energy price that is implied by the general production function
(C.29) stays the same as in the benchmark model:
ei = α
i
SEY
i
S +
∑
l∈L αilEY
i
l
Ei
. (C.36)
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From (C.32), we can then derive a country’s resource use as follows:
Ri = ξ
i
R
r
eiEi = ξ
i
R
r
αiSEY iS +∑
l∈L
αilEY
i
l
 , (C.37)
where r denotes the international resource price. Summing both sides over all countries
and solving for r yields:
r = 1
RW
N∑
i=1
ξiR
αiSEY iS +∑
l∈L
αilEY
i
l
 . (C.38)
The benchmark resource price rb can hence be calculated from the data. The inter-
national character of the resource factor implies that factor income associated with
production in a certain country no longer incurs only in that country. Hence, total
national income is defined in terms of factor incomes and tariff revenues as follows:
Y i =
∑
f∈F
vifV
i
f + ωirRW +
N∑
j=1
∑
l∈L
(τ jil − 1)Xjil , (C.39)
where ωi is the ressource endowment share of country i (and hence
∑N
i=1 ω
i = 1).
Using (C.34) and (C.38), (C.39) can be rewritten as
Y i =
∑
f∈F
(αiSf + ξifαiSE)Y iS +∑
l∈L
(αilf + ξifαilE)Y il

+ωi
N∑
j=1
ξjR
αjSEY jS +∑
l∈L
αjlEY
j
l
+ N∑
j=1
∑
l∈L
(τ jil − 1)Xjil , (C.40)
where
Xjil =
ψjl (T
ji
l )1−σl(τ
ji
l )−σl∑N
k=1 ψ
k
l (T kil τ kil )1−σl
γilY
i.
Using this new expression for total income, (3.13) can again be solved for scaled
equilibrium prices in the benchmark scenario.
In the system of equations (3.14) to (3.17) that needs to be solved to conduct counter-
factual analyses in the base model, (3.14) stays the same and (3.15) is substituted by
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the counterfactual equivalent of (C.40) in the extended model:
Y ic =
∑
f∈F
(αiSf + ξifαiSE) γiSY ic +∑
l∈L
(αilf + ξifαilE)Y il,c

+ωi
N∑
j=1
ξjR
αjSEγjSY jc +∑
l∈L
αjlEY
j
l,c
+ N∑
j=1
∑
l∈L
(τ jil,c − 1)Xjil,c. (C.41)
Additionally, we need a new analogue for equation (3.16). It evolves from the expression
for sectoral GDP:
Y il = pilAil
(
αilEY
i
l
ei
)αilE ∏
f∈F
(V ilf )α
i
lf . (C.42)
We again need an expression for the sectoral use of factors, V ilf . It still has to hold that
vif =
αilfY
i
l
V ilf
. (C.43)
Solving for V ilf and substituting (C.34) for v
i
f gives
V ilf =
αilfY
i
l V
i
f(
αiSf + ξifαiSE
)
Y iS +
∑
l∈L(αilf + ξifαilE)Y il
. (C.44)
Using this expression in equation (C.42) and – as in the base model – considering the
counterfactual change in sectoral GDP yields:
(
ψil,c
ψil,b
) 1
σl−1
=
(
eib
eic
)αilE
× ∏
f∈F

(
αiSf + ξifαiSE
)
γiSY
i
b +
∑
m∈L(αimf + ξifαimE)Y im,b(
αiSf + ξifαiSE
)
γiSY
i
c +
∑
m∈L(αimf + ξifαimE)Y im,c
α
i
lf
. (C.45)
Equations (3.14), (C.41), and (C.45) hence correspond to equations (3.14) to (3.16) in
the base model. We additionally need an equivalent for equation (3.17) to solve for eic.
1
We can derive an expression for the energy price by cost minimization using the produc-
tion function given in (C.32). Specifically, we minimize the costs for producing energy,
1Also, additional parameters (ξiR, ξ
i
f and ω
i) have to be obtained from the data, as described in Section
3.4.2.
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rRi + ∑f∈F vifV iEf , under the constraint of the factor usage for producing one unit of
energy, i.e. 1 = AiE(Ri)ξ
i
R
∏
f∈F(V iEf )ξ
i
f :
ei = 1
AiE
(
r
ξiR
)ξiR ∏
f∈F
(
vif
ξif
)ξi
, (C.46)
where the right-hand side are marginal costs of energy production.
Considering the change of the energy price and additionally using (C.34), we can obtain
the following expression for the energy price in the counterfactual scenario:
eic =
∏
f∈F

(
αiSf + ξifαiSE
)
γiSY
i
c +
∑
l∈L(αilf + ξifαilE)Y il,c(
αiSf + ξifαiSE
)
γiSY
i
b +
∑
l∈L(αilf + ξifαilE)Y il,b
ξ
i
f (
rc
rb
)ξiR
eib, (C.47)
with
rc =
1
RW
N∑
i=1
ξiR
αiSEγiSY ic +∑
l∈L
αilEY
i
l,c
 . (C.48)
We can then jointly solve equations (3.14), (C.41), (C.45), (C.47), and (C.48), for Y ic ,
Y il,c, ψ
i
l,c, rc, and e
i
c.
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C.2 Data
This part of the Appendix gives some further details on the data used in this paper.
First, the 128 regions and the countries which are aggregated to one region are given.
Afterwards, the grouping of the industries of the GTAP 8 database into the fifteen
sectors used in this work is presented and the computation of sectoral expenditure
is displayed. Then, we show descriptive statistics for the gravity variables followed
by a short description of our additional data source for implicit carbon taxes (OECD,
2016). We also compare these tax values to the ones we obtain based on the GTAP data.
Finally, the voluntary national emission reduction pledges made in Appendix II of the
Copenhagen Accord are shown.
C.2.1 Regions
The 128 regions are:2
Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cana-
da, Caribbean (Aruba, Anguilla, Netherland Antilles, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas,
Barbados, Cuba, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Ja-
maica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Montserrat, Puerto Rico, Turks and Caicos
Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Virgin Islands British,
Virgin Islands U.S.), Central Africa (Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial
Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Chad), Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote
d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala,
Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia,
2In parentheses, we indicate which countries are aggregated to give the respective region. The
aggregated countries and regions finally used in the analysis are written in bold.
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Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mex-
ico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rest of Central America (Belize), Rest of East Asia (Macao,
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), Rest of Eastern Africa (Burundi, Comoros,
Djibouti, Eritrea, Mayotte, Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Seychelles), Rest of Eastern
Europe (Moldova), Rest of EFTA (Iceland, Lichtenstein), Rest of Europe (Andorra,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Faroe Islands, Gibraltar, Monaco, Macedonia, San Marino, Ser-
bia, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Montenegro, Vatican), Rest of Former Soviet Union
(Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), Rest of North Africa (Algeria, Lybia, Western Sa-
hara), Rest of North America (Bermuda, Greenland, Saint Pierre and Miquelon), Rest
of Oceania (American Samoa, Cook Islands, Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Guam,
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Northern Mariana Islands, New Caledonia, Niue, Nauru, Palau,
Papua New Guinea, French Polynesia, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanu-
atu, Wallis and Futuna, Samoa, Pitcairn, United States Minor Outlying Islands), Rest of
South African Customs Union (Lesotho, Swaziland), Rest of South America (Falkland
Islands, French Guiana, Guyana, Suriname, South Georgia and the South Sandwich
Islands), Rest of Southeast Asia (Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, Timor Leste), Rest of
South Asia (Afghanistan, Bhutan, Maldives), Rest of Western Africa (Benin, Burkina
Faso, Cape Verde, Guinea, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Saint Helena, Sierra Leone, Togo), Rest of Western Asia (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pales-
tine, Syria, Yemen), Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Africa, South Central Africa (Angola, Congo Democratic Republic),
South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand,
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United
States of America, Uruguay, Vietnam, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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C.2.2 Sectors
The 15 sectors comprise the following GTAP 8 industries:
Agriculture: pdr (Paddy rice), wht (Wheat), gro (Cereal grains nec), v f (Vegetables,
fruit, nuts), osd (Oil seeds), c b (Sugar cane, sugar beet), pfb (Plant-based fibers), ocr
(Crops nec), ctl (Cattle, sheep, goats, horses), oap (Animal products nec), rmk (Raw
milk), wol (Wool, silk-worn cocoons), frs (Forestry), fsh (Fishing).
Apparel: wap (Wearing apparel), lea (Leather products).
Chemical: crp (Chemical, rubber, plastic prods).
Equipment: mvh (Motor vehicles and parts), otn (Transport equipment nec).
Food: cmt (Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse), omt (Meat products nec), vol (Vegetable
oils and fats), mil (Dairy products), pcr (Processed rice), sgr (Sugar), ofd (Food products
nec), b t (Beverages and tobacco products).
Machinery: ele (Electronic equipment), ome (Machinery and equipment nec).
Metal: i s (Ferrous metals), nfm (Metals nec), fmp (Metal products).
Mineral: p c (Petroleum, coal products), nmm (Mineral products nec).
Mining: coa (Coal), oil (Oil), gas (Gas), omn (Minerals nec).
Non-Tradables: ely (Electricity), gdt (Gas manufacture, distribution), wtr (Water), cns
(Construction), osg (PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat), dwe (Dwellings).
Other: omf (Manufactures nec).
Paper: ppp (Paper products, publishing).
Service: trd (Trade), otp (Transport nec), wtp (Sea transport), atp (Air transport), cmn
(Communication), ofi (Financial Services nec), isr (Insurance), obs (Business services
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nec), ros (Recreation and other services).
Textile: tex (Textiles).
Wood: lum (Wood products).
C.2.3 Calculation of Sectoral Expenditures
In GTAP notation, r and s refer to regions and i to sectors. Then, sectoral expenditures
can be calculated as follows:3
Xjl = Xri
=
∑
s
V XMD(i, s, r) + V DPM(r, i) + V DGM(r, i) + V DFM(r, i),
where V XMD(i, s, r) denotes the value of exports of commodity i from source s to
destination r, V DPM(r, i) is the value of private household’s purchases of domestic
commodity i in region r, V DGM(r, i) denotes the value of government’s expenditure on
domestic commodity i in region r, and V DFM(r, i) is the value of purchases of domestic
commodity i in region r.
C.2.4 Descriptive Statistics of Gravity Variables
Table C.1 shows the descriptive statistics for all gravity variables. As both the RTA and
the CEPII data are given on a country level, we aggregated them to the GTAP 8 regional
level. For the distance variable, the mean distance was used for aggregation. All of the
other variables are binary. For these variables, we again took the mean when aggregating
the countries and then rounded these variables to zero or one.
22 percent of the country-pairs in the data set had signed some kind of common RTA
3For a good introduction to the GTAP model and database and the included variables, see Hertel
(1997).
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Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics for Gravity Variables
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
WTO
RTA 0.22 0.41 0 1
CEPII
DIST 7,585 4,346 132 19,781
CONTIG 0.02 0.15 0 1
COLONY 0.01 0.12 0 1
COMCOL 0.07 0.26 0 1
COMLANG 0.13 0.33 0 1
GTAP
X ijagriculture 21.89 186.21 0 8,074
X ijapparel 24.13 388.84 0 39,618
X ijchemicals 107.21 871.50 0 33,201
X ijequipment 95.63 1,184.58 0 75,321
X ijfood 40.51 289.15 0 12,659
X ijmachinery 206.03 2,125.12 0 144,059
X ijmetal 75.60 560.13 0 31,767
X ijmineral 44.06 330.14 0 14,025
X ijmining 93.67 1,037.74 0 51,876
X ijother 16.39 295.58 0 31,932
X ijpaper 15.92 176.90 0 15,277
X ijservice 143.65 867.00 0 32,857
X ijtextile 20.11 183.81 0 13,135
X ijwood 15.18 224.30 0 18,745
Notes: We have information for 128 countries, leading to 128 × 127 = 16, 256 obser-
vations (excluding intra-trade flows). Distances are given in kilometers and trade flows
in million US-$.
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in 2007. The average weighted distance between two countries is 7,585 km, ranging
from 132 to 19,781 km. Only two percent have a common land border. One percent
had a direct colonial link and seven percent a common colonizer at some point in the
past. 13 percent share a common language.4 Average bilateral sectoral trade flows range
between 15.2 million US-$ in the wood sector and 206 million US-$ for machinery. In
all sectors, there are country-pairs that do not trade at all. As explained in Section 3.4.1
of the main manuscript, these zero trade flows are unproblematic for the estimation
with our preferred PPML estimator.
C.2.5 Implicit Carbon Taxes
The OECD (2016) provides data on the effective carbon rates for 41 OECD and G20
countries. The rates are distinguished between non-road and road emissions. We calcu-
late one national number from this by weighting the two values with the corresponding
national emission shares.
The effective carbon prices in OECD (2016) are given in 2012 Euros. We make them
compatible with the rest of our data by converting them to 2012 US-$ using the exchange
rate obtained from the OECD (0.778 US-$/Euro) and to 2007 US-$ using US inflation
data also obtained from the OECD (with an average inflation rate from 2007 to 2012 of
2.2 percent).
For the calculation of the carbon tariffs, we make use of the implicit carbon tax differ-
entials between all country-pairs. We therefore need carbon tax data for all countries.
We use the average of the non-OECD countries for which the OECD (2016) provides
data as the value for all other non-OECD countries in our data set. The resulting implicit
carbon tax data are highly correlated with the measure we obtain from GTAP (with a
correlation coefficient of 0.78), though somewhat lower on average. Table C.2 shows
4We construct the variable for common language (COMLANG) to be one if either the two countries
share an official language or if one language is spoken by at least nine percent of the population in both
countries.
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descriptive statistics for both sources.
Table C.2: Implicit Carbon Taxes
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
GTAP 128 25.6 31.8 -13.1 138.4
OECD 128 19.3 23.0 0 104.4
Notes: The values are given in US-$/t CO2.
C.2.6 Appendix II of the Copenhagen Accord
Table C.3 shows the voluntary emission reduction pledges made in Appendix II of the
Copenhagen Accord, adjusted to the base year of our model (2007).
Table C.3: National Pledges Made in the Copenhagen Accord (Appendix II)
Brazil 27.8% Chile 26.7% China 37.1%
Costa Rica 53.4% India 19.5% Indonesia 13.9%
Israel 22.7% Kyrgyzstan 18.8% Mexico 33.2%
Singapore 6.1% South Afr. 43.8% South Korea 27.2%
Thailand 9.2%
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C.3 Detailed Results
This section of the Appendix gives some further detailed results for the regressions
and counterfactual scenarios. Tables C.4 and C.5 give the PPML and OLS estimation
results, respectively. Figure C.1 illustrates the real income effects for all countries in
our first counterfactual scenario (pure product-based carbon tariffs in our base model).
Tables C.6 to C.15 give the exact results for all countries in the counterfactual scenarios
discussed in Section 3.6.2 of the main paper. Specifically, the implicit carbon taxes (λi),
the percentage changes in trade flows (∆X i), real income (∆Ri), welfare (∆U i), and
emissions (∆Ei), as well as the percentage scale, composition, and technique effects
(PSE, PCE, and PTE, respectively) are shown. For our Copenhagen Accord scenarios,
we additionally show our exact log decomposition, i.e. the log scale, composition, and
technique effects (LSE, LCE, and LTE, respectively). In all results tables, bootstrapped
standard errors are given in parentheses.
In the tables, country codes are given rather than country names. We therefore provide
an alphabetical list of all the country codes here: ALB (Albania), ARE (United Arab
Emirates), ARG (Argentina), ARM (Armenia), AUS (Australia), AUT (Austria), AZE
(Azerbaijan), BEL (Belgium), BGD (Bangladesh), BGR (Bulgaria), BHR (Bahrain), BLR
(Belarus), BOL (Bolivia), BRA (Brazil), BWA (Botswana), CAN (Canada), CHE (Switzer-
land), CHL (Chile), CHN (China), CIV (Cote d’Ivoire), CMR (Cameroon), COL (Colom-
bia), CRI (Costa Rica), CYP (Cyprus), CZE (Czech Republic), DEU (Germany), DNK
(Denmark), ECU (Ecuador), EGY (Egypt), ESP (Spain), EST (Estonia), ETH (Ethiopia),
FIN (Finland), FRA (France), GBR (United Kingdom), GEO (Georgia), GHA (Ghana),
GRC (Greece), GTM (Guatemala), HKG (Hong Kong), HND (Honduras), HRV (Croatia),
HUN (Hungary), IDN (Indonesia), IND (India), IRL (Ireland), IRN (Iran), ISR (Israel),
ITA (Italy), JPN (Japan), KAZ (Kazakhstan), KEN (Kenya), KGZ (Kyrgyzstan), KHM
(Cambodia), KOR (South Korea), KWT (Kuwait), LAO (Laos), LKA (Sri Lanka), LTU
(Lithuania), LUX (Luxembourg), LVA (Latvia), MAR (Morocco), MDG (Madagascar),
MEX (Mexico), MLT (Malta), MNG (Mongolia), MOZ (Mozambique), MUS (Mauritius),
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MWI (Malawi), MYS (Malaysia), NAM (Namibia), NGA (Nigeria), NIC (Nicaragua),
NLD (Netherlands), NOR (Norway), NPL (Nepal), NZL (New Zealand), OMN (Oman),
PAK (Pakistan), PAN (Panama), PER (Peru), PHL (Philippines), POL (Po-land), PRT
(Portugal), PRY (Paraguay), QAT (Qatar), ROU (Romania), RUS (Russia), SAU (Saudi
Arabia), SEN (Senegal), SGP (Singapore), SLV (El Salvador), SVK (Slovakia), SVN
(Slovenia), SWE (Sweden), THA (Thailand), TUN (Tunisia), TUR (Turkey), TWN (Tai-
wan), TZA (Tanzania), UGA (Uganda), UKR (Ukraine), URY (Uruguay), USA (U.S.A.),
VEN (Venezuela), VNM (Vietnam), XAC (South Central Africa), XCA (Rest of Central
America), XCB (Caribbean), XCF (Central Africa), XEA (Rest of East Asia), XEC (Rest of
Eastern Africa), XEE (Rest of Eastern Europe), XEF (Rest of EFTA), XER (Rest of Europe),
XNA (Rest of North America), XNF (Rest of North Africa), XOC (Rest of Oceania), XSA
(Rest of South Asia), XSC (Rest of South African Customs Union), XSE (Rest of Southeast
Asia), XSM (Rest of South America), XSU (Rest of Former Soviet Union), XWF (Rest of
Western Africa), XWS (Rest of Western Asia), ZAF (South Africa), ZMB (Zambia), ZWE
(Zimbabwe).
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C.3.1 Regression Results
As was described in Section 3.4, the gravity equation resulting from the model developed
in Section 4.2 is estimated both with OLS and PPML. The PPML results are given in
Table C.4 and are in line with the usual findings. Distance significantly reduces bilateral
trade flows in all sectors. Regional trade agreements, contiguity, and common language
have the expected positive effects on trade. However, the magnitude and significance
vary strongly across sectors. The two variables for colonial links do not show a robust
effect across sectors, but also tend to be positive. Table C.5 shows the results obtained
by OLS estimation of the log-linearized gravity equation.
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C.3.2 Counterfactual Analyses
Figure C.1: Percentage Changes in Real Income (Pure Carbon Tariffs)
Notes: This figure shows the percentage changes in real income due to the counterfactual introduction of
product-based carbon tariffs in our base model. Green represents an increase in a country’s real income,
while red represents a reduction. The values range between -1.6 percent for Bahrain and 0.29 percent for
Norway.
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Table C.6: Pure Carbon Tariffs (Product-Based)
Country λi ∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE
ALB 70.41 -1.52 -0.01 0.00 -0.76 -0.61 -0.14
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
ARE -0.17 -3.34 -0.44 -0.43 -2.87 -0.44 -2.44
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.10)
ARG 28.84 -1.17 0.04 0.05 0.38 -0.11 0.49
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.00) (0.07)
ARM 58.38 -1.89 -0.09 -0.09 -1.34 -0.79 -0.55
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
AUS 0.58 -1.63 -0.14 -0.14 -0.40 -0.14 -0.27
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.07)
AUT 99.13 -0.83 0.13 0.14 0.53 -0.21 0.74
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02)
AZE -0.09 -5.85 -1.33 -1.32 -5.79 -1.33 -4.52
(0.16) (0.06) (0.06) (0.30) (0.06) (0.25)
BEL 88.87 -0.83 0.11 0.12 0.49 -0.06 0.55
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.10)
BGD 5.71 -1.55 -0.18 -0.17 -1.23 -0.21 -1.03
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
BGR 4.14 -4.63 -1.41 -1.41 -6.97 -1.43 -5.62
(0.14) (0.03) (0.03) (0.17) (0.03) (0.14)
BHR -0.09 -4.52 -1.55 -1.55 -5.12 -1.55 -3.62
(0.18) (0.07) (0.07) (0.26) (0.07) (0.19)
BLR 21.56 -2.47 -0.79 -0.78 -3.41 -0.86 -2.58
(0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.16) (0.04) (0.13)
BOL 31.25 -1.57 0.00 0.01 -0.15 -0.42 0.27
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) (0.06)
BRA 22.06 -0.92 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
BWA 1.03 -2.87 -0.22 -0.20 -0.38 -0.22 -0.16
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
CAN 30.51 -1.02 0.03 0.03 0.29 -0.08 0.36
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06)
CHE 75.84 -0.85 0.01 0.02 -0.33 -0.09 -0.25
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
CHL 35.00 -1.20 0.06 0.06 0.55 -0.14 0.69
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CHN 4.35 -1.22 -0.06 -0.06 -0.36 -0.07 -0.29
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04)
CIV 2.59 -2.54 -0.69 -0.68 -5.05 -0.69 -4.39
(0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.32) (0.04) (0.29)
CMR 15.50 -1.48 -0.21 -0.20 -1.71 -0.26 -1.46
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) (0.14)
COL 31.26 -1.03 0.03 0.04 0.49 -0.09 0.58
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
CRI 18.50 -0.95 -0.07 -0.06 -0.44 -0.13 -0.31
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04)
CYP 64.69 -1.73 -0.01 0.00 -0.76 -0.74 -0.02
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Continued on next page
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Table C.6 – Continued from previous page
Country λi ∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE
CZE 18.57 -2.45 -0.39 -0.39 -3.34 -0.44 -2.91
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.11)
DEU 61.59 -1.07 0.01 0.01 -0.23 -0.11 -0.12
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03)
DNK 84.76 -1.05 0.09 0.10 0.08 -0.27 0.35
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
ECU 11.48 -1.40 -0.21 -0.20 -1.35 -0.25 -1.11
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.02) (0.14)
EGY -0.02 -3.49 -0.81 -0.80 -4.24 -0.81 -3.46
(0.16) (0.05) (0.05) (0.30) (0.05) (0.25)
ESP 54.66 -1.14 0.00 0.01 -0.24 -0.13 -0.12
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
EST 29.12 -1.80 -0.13 -0.13 -0.62 -0.33 -0.29
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
ETH 5.92 -1.56 -0.16 -0.15 -0.52 -0.18 -0.34
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
FIN 52.58 -1.35 -0.06 -0.05 -0.71 -0.19 -0.51
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06)
FRA 113.02 -0.78 0.17 0.18 1.12 -0.08 1.20
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08)
GBR 92.31 -0.95 0.14 0.15 0.71 -0.10 0.81
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.00) (0.07)
GEO 18.46 -1.90 -0.16 -0.15 -0.52 -0.28 -0.24
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GHA 1.55 -1.99 -0.38 -0.36 -3.20 -0.38 -2.82
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.11)
GRC 62.69 -2.42 0.07 0.08 -0.22 -0.67 0.46
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.08)
GTM 27.86 -0.87 -0.01 0.00 -0.16 -0.18 0.02
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
HKG -2.05 -1.88 -0.24 -0.24 -0.32 -0.24 -0.08
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
HND 8.58 -1.29 -0.13 -0.12 -0.41 -0.16 -0.25
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
HRV 46.45 -2.26 -0.31 -0.31 -1.63 -0.48 -1.16
(0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06)
HUN 57.83 -1.26 -0.03 -0.03 -0.60 -0.27 -0.33
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
IDN 1.88 -1.64 -0.11 -0.11 -0.35 -0.14 -0.21
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.10)
IND 16.81 -1.50 -0.01 0.00 -0.13 -0.11 -0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
IRL 51.95 -1.70 -0.09 -0.08 -1.01 -0.23 -0.78
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.00) (0.10)
IRN 6.43 -2.74 -0.41 -0.41 -1.46 -0.50 -0.97
(0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.18) (0.04) (0.14)
ISR 27.57 -1.80 -0.11 -0.11 -0.88 -0.27 -0.61
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.24) (0.02) (0.22)
Continued on next page
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Table C.6 – Continued from previous page
Country λi ∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE
ITA 124.51 -1.13 0.22 0.23 1.34 -0.09 1.44
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.13)
JPN 41.75 -0.81 0.05 0.05 0.30 -0.02 0.33
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
KAZ 0.18 -2.95 -0.48 -0.47 -2.36 -0.48 -1.88
(0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.20) (0.03) (0.18)
KEN 3.71 -1.55 -0.24 -0.22 -2.23 -0.25 -1.99
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.18) (0.01) (0.16)
KGZ 11.83 -2.08 -0.27 -0.27 -0.81 -0.51 -0.30
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
KHM 15.97 -0.72 -0.02 -0.01 -0.14 -0.12 -0.02
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
KOR 17.34 -0.95 -0.06 -0.05 -0.37 -0.10 -0.27
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
KWT 0.03 -4.61 -1.32 -1.31 -5.87 -1.32 -4.61
(0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.18) (0.04) (0.15)
LAO 12.33 -0.80 -0.08 -0.07 -0.76 -0.13 -0.63
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04)
LKA -0.86 -2.21 -0.38 -0.37 -1.88 -0.39 -1.50
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.02) (0.13)
LTU 29.15 -2.47 -0.53 -0.53 -3.55 -0.60 -2.97
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.02) (0.13)
LUX 84.77 -0.81 0.07 0.07 -0.30 -0.27 -0.03
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
LVA 40.98 -1.29 -0.05 -0.05 -0.32 -0.23 -0.09
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
MAR 0.03 -3.24 -0.56 -0.55 -4.87 -0.56 -4.33
(0.11) (0.04) (0.03) (0.39) (0.04) (0.36)
MDG 1.64 -2.10 -0.20 -0.18 -1.52 -0.20 -1.32
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.07)
MEX -0.15 -1.57 -0.19 -0.18 -1.01 -0.19 -0.82
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.23) (0.02) (0.21)
MLT 63.22 -1.16 -0.03 -0.02 -0.42 -0.47 0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
MNG 5.06 -1.92 -0.24 -0.23 -0.64 -0.37 -0.26
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
MOZ 5.28 -1.87 -0.23 -0.21 -0.77 -0.23 -0.54
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
MUS 7.40 -1.66 -0.17 -0.16 -0.72 -0.22 -0.50
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
MWI 4.51 -1.82 -0.24 -0.23 -1.19 -0.26 -0.93
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
MYS -13.12 -2.94 -0.58 -0.57 -3.70 -0.58 -3.13
(0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.38) (0.04) (0.34)
NAM 2.58 -2.17 -0.21 -0.20 -0.27 -0.21 -0.05
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NGA 12.96 -2.58 -0.13 -0.12 0.00 -0.23 0.22
(0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.21) (0.01) (0.20)
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NIC 44.39 -1.47 -0.04 -0.03 -0.57 -0.75 0.18
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02) (0.07)
NLD 107.53 -0.79 0.23 0.24 1.36 -0.07 1.42
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05)
NOR 138.42 -1.34 0.29 0.30 2.13 -0.31 2.45
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
NPL 3.94 -1.69 -0.19 -0.18 -0.74 -0.20 -0.54
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
NZL 0.77 -1.53 -0.16 -0.16 -0.66 -0.16 -0.50
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.13)
OMN 0.98 -4.03 -0.46 -0.46 -2.23 -0.48 -1.76
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.09)
PAK 35.01 -2.07 0.06 0.07 -0.03 -0.49 0.47
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.03) (0.09)
PAN 3.35 -1.47 -0.16 -0.15 -0.35 -0.17 -0.18
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
PER 19.54 -1.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.48 -0.10 -0.38
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
PHL 11.75 -1.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.34 -0.12 -0.22
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.08)
POL 24.58 -2.14 -0.27 -0.27 -2.23 -0.37 -1.86
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.02) (0.14)
PRT 79.44 -1.08 0.11 0.12 0.33 -0.19 0.52
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
PRY 29.02 -0.78 -0.02 -0.02 -0.18 -0.16 -0.02
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
QAT -0.05 -3.59 -0.44 -0.44 -3.46 -0.45 -3.03
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.11)
ROU 4.61 -3.25 -0.66 -0.66 -4.94 -0.67 -4.29
(0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.23) (0.03) (0.20)
RUS 22.00 -1.73 -0.14 -0.14 -0.71 -0.23 -0.47
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
SAU -0.03 -3.74 -0.60 -0.59 -2.48 -0.60 -1.90
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.18) (0.03) (0.15)
SEN 10.09 -2.05 -0.39 -0.37 -2.44 -0.42 -2.02
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.02) (0.14)
SGP 5.14 -1.52 -0.28 -0.28 -1.74 -0.33 -1.42
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.14) (0.02) (0.13)
SLV 22.96 -0.92 -0.05 -0.04 -0.32 -0.20 -0.11
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05)
SVK 42.45 -1.68 -0.21 -0.21 -2.08 -0.34 -1.75
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07)
SVN 52.40 -1.49 -0.07 -0.06 -0.53 -0.25 -0.28
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
SWE 138.13 -0.66 0.23 0.24 1.75 -0.07 1.83
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.00) (0.07)
THA 13.03 -1.13 -0.05 -0.04 -0.26 -0.13 -0.13
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
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TUN 0.97 -3.50 -0.58 -0.57 -3.66 -0.59 -3.09
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.13) (0.02) (0.12)
TUR 89.49 -2.10 0.26 0.27 1.08 -0.36 1.45
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
TWN 12.80 -1.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.30 -0.10 -0.19
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05)
TZA 1.73 -1.83 -0.19 -0.18 -0.61 -0.20 -0.41
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
UGA 29.73 -1.14 -0.05 -0.03 -0.33 -0.19 -0.14
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
UKR 15.14 -2.69 -0.60 -0.59 -2.12 -0.73 -1.40
(0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.07)
URY 30.50 -0.82 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.09 0.12
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
USA 13.92 -0.92 -0.03 -0.03 -0.17 -0.04 -0.13
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
VEN 6.43 -2.04 -0.45 -0.44 -3.59 -0.46 -3.15
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.10)
VNM -4.19 -2.19 -0.24 -0.23 -0.87 -0.26 -0.61
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04)
XAC 2.05 -3.66 -0.30 -0.29 -1.88 -0.31 -1.58
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.26) (0.01) (0.24)
XCA 19.15 -0.99 -0.10 -0.10 -0.81 -0.16 -0.65
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04)
XCB 14.15 -1.27 -0.15 -0.14 -0.97 -0.17 -0.80
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05)
XCF 3.16 -3.07 -0.30 -0.29 -2.35 -0.30 -2.05
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.21) (0.01) (0.20)
XEA 1.39 -1.78 -0.28 -0.28 -1.31 -0.30 -1.02
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
XEC 1.46 -2.53 -0.33 -0.32 -1.71 -0.34 -1.38
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.14) (0.02) (0.12)
XEE 10.09 -2.33 -0.28 -0.28 -0.55 -0.34 -0.21
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
XEF 20.62 -1.80 -0.20 -0.19 -1.33 -0.25 -1.08
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
XER 30.38 -2.23 -0.27 -0.26 -1.71 -0.49 -1.22
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (0.09)
XNA 46.67 -1.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.84 -0.19 -0.64
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
XNF 0.03 -4.31 -0.84 -0.83 -5.77 -0.84 -4.97
(0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.36) (0.04) (0.32)
XOC 9.26 -1.43 -0.15 -0.14 -0.77 -0.17 -0.60
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.11)
XSA 19.74 -1.22 -0.10 -0.10 -0.97 -0.19 -0.79
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04)
XSC 4.32 -1.77 -0.21 -0.19 -1.39 -0.21 -1.18
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04)
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XSE 17.86 -1.34 -0.06 -0.06 -0.28 -0.32 0.04
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.10)
XSM 23.04 -1.23 -0.11 -0.11 -1.23 -0.14 -1.09
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06)
XSU 1.73 -3.40 -0.77 -0.77 -2.07 -0.81 -1.27
(0.15) (0.04) (0.04) (0.14) (0.05) (0.09)
XWF 2.00 -2.59 -0.26 -0.25 -1.27 -0.27 -1.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.10)
XWS 1.43 -3.51 -0.67 -0.66 -2.21 -0.69 -1.52
(0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.19) (0.04) (0.15)
ZAF 8.35 -1.66 -0.13 -0.11 -0.54 -0.16 -0.37
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.10)
ZMB 2.63 -2.20 -0.29 -0.27 -1.23 -0.29 -0.94
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
ZWE 0.23 -2.73 -0.41 -0.39 -1.19 -0.42 -0.77
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04)
Notes: λi denotes the implicit carbon taxes, ∆Xi denotes the percentage changes in trade flows,
∆Ri the percentage changes in real income, ∆U i the percentage changes in welfare, ∆Ei the
percentage changes in carbon emissions, PSE the percentage scale effects, and PCE the percentage
composition effects. The numbers in parentheses below the reported values give the corresponding
bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table C.7: Pure Carbon Tariffs (Product-Based, with OECD carbon tax data)
Country λi ∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE
ALB 8.53 -2.17 -0.43 -0.42 -2.42 -0.45 -1.98
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04)
ARE 8.53 -1.42 -0.15 -0.14 -0.97 -0.17 -0.81
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03)
ARG 32.96 -1.41 0.16 0.17 1.26 -0.11 1.37
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.00) (0.15)
ARM 8.53 -1.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.51 -0.14 -0.38
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
AUS 21.18 -0.79 0.02 0.02 0.53 -0.04 0.57
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03)
AUT 56.24 -0.52 0.06 0.07 0.25 -0.08 0.32
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
AZE 8.53 -2.48 -0.44 -0.44 -1.97 -0.51 -1.47
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.07)
BEL 40.64 -1.43 -0.21 -0.20 -2.25 -0.26 -1.99
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06)
BGD 8.53 -0.75 -0.06 -0.05 -0.37 -0.10 -0.26
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02)
BGR 8.53 -2.80 -0.83 -0.82 -4.19 -0.85 -3.37
(0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (0.09)
BHR 8.53 -2.14 -0.60 -0.59 -2.01 -0.62 -1.40
(0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.05)
BLR 8.53 -2.32 -0.86 -0.86 -3.68 -0.89 -2.81
(0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.16) (0.04) (0.13)
BOL 8.53 -1.20 -0.24 -0.23 -1.14 -0.29 -0.84
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.02) (0.09)
BRA 3.83 -1.00 -0.08 -0.08 -0.48 -0.08 -0.39
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07)
BWA 8.53 -1.45 -0.09 -0.08 -0.20 -0.11 -0.09
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
CAN 10.73 -0.73 -0.04 -0.04 -0.19 -0.07 -0.12
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
CHE 104.36 -0.45 0.10 0.11 0.59 -0.17 0.76
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05)
CHL 12.47 -1.01 -0.07 -0.06 -0.16 -0.12 -0.04
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07)
CHN 3.98 -0.84 -0.05 -0.05 -0.31 -0.05 -0.26
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
CIV 8.53 -1.32 -0.31 -0.30 -2.32 -0.32 -2.01
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.14) (0.02) (0.13)
CMR 8.53 -1.14 -0.20 -0.19 -1.73 -0.21 -1.52
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.09)
COL 8.53 -0.80 -0.07 -0.07 -0.57 -0.09 -0.48
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.04)
CRI 8.53 -0.69 -0.07 -0.06 -0.39 -0.09 -0.30
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
CYP 8.53 -1.56 -0.19 -0.19 -0.60 -0.22 -0.38
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
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CZE 33.20 -1.26 -0.11 -0.11 -1.15 -0.25 -0.90
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
DEU 58.67 -0.63 0.08 0.09 0.50 -0.04 0.54
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04)
DNK 80.28 -0.81 0.12 0.13 0.41 -0.28 0.69
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
ECU 8.53 -0.85 -0.11 -0.10 -0.64 -0.14 -0.50
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06)
EGY 8.53 -2.14 -0.45 -0.44 -2.52 -0.48 -2.05
(0.12) (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) (0.03) (0.14)
ESP 43.36 -0.75 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.08 0.07
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
EST 29.09 -1.30 -0.07 -0.06 -0.50 -0.34 -0.15
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
ETH 8.53 -0.90 -0.08 -0.07 -0.27 -0.11 -0.16
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FIN 48.75 -0.81 0.04 0.05 0.12 -0.11 0.23
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
FRA 65.84 -0.44 0.09 0.10 0.55 -0.03 0.58
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05)
GBR 75.53 -0.73 0.14 0.14 0.80 -0.07 0.88
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06)
GEO 8.53 -1.31 -0.13 -0.12 -0.36 -0.17 -0.19
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
GHA 8.53 -0.97 -0.14 -0.13 -1.13 -0.17 -0.97
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.08)
GRC 60.44 -2.08 0.17 0.18 0.14 -0.66 0.81
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.02) (0.05)
GTM 8.53 -0.66 -0.05 -0.04 -0.15 -0.08 -0.07
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
HKG 8.53 -0.78 -0.07 -0.07 -0.10 -0.09 -0.02
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HND 8.53 -0.67 -0.06 -0.05 -0.18 -0.09 -0.09
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
HRV 8.53 -2.82 -0.67 -0.67 -3.04 -0.68 -2.38
(0.11) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (0.09)
HUN 35.41 -0.99 -0.08 -0.08 -0.87 -0.21 -0.66
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
IDN 2.37 -1.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.58 -0.12 -0.46
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.10)
IND 2.93 -1.10 -0.16 -0.14 -0.80 -0.16 -0.64
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
IRL 71.87 -0.55 0.10 0.11 0.36 -0.18 0.53
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
IRN 8.53 -1.58 -0.22 -0.22 -0.83 -0.29 -0.54
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.06)
ISR 79.60 -1.67 0.31 0.31 3.08 -0.36 3.45
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.32) (0.04) (0.29)
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ITA 60.42 -0.50 0.09 0.09 0.49 -0.02 0.52
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05)
JPN 34.77 -0.58 0.04 0.04 0.23 -0.02 0.25
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
KAZ 8.53 -1.43 -0.12 -0.11 -0.55 -0.21 -0.34
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06)
KEN 8.53 -0.81 -0.11 -0.10 -1.06 -0.13 -0.93
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.08)
KGZ 8.53 -1.21 -0.15 -0.14 -0.40 -0.25 -0.15
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
KHM 8.53 -0.51 -0.04 -0.03 -0.13 -0.06 -0.07
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
KOR 28.41 -0.73 0.05 0.05 0.23 -0.05 0.27
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
KWT 8.53 -2.23 -0.53 -0.53 -2.39 -0.54 -1.86
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06)
LAO 8.53 -0.54 -0.06 -0.05 -0.62 -0.08 -0.53
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
LKA 8.53 -0.86 -0.10 -0.09 -0.50 -0.14 -0.36
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04)
LTU 8.53 -2.68 -0.76 -0.76 -4.93 -0.77 -4.19
(0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.17) (0.03) (0.15)
LUX 95.30 -0.75 0.10 0.10 -0.56 -0.47 -0.09
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
LVA 8.53 -1.45 -0.15 -0.14 -0.35 -0.16 -0.19
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
MAR 8.53 -1.76 -0.29 -0.28 -2.62 -0.30 -2.33
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.20) (0.02) (0.18)
MDG 8.53 -0.99 -0.08 -0.07 -0.66 -0.10 -0.56
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
MEX 2.68 -0.87 -0.09 -0.09 -0.48 -0.09 -0.39
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.09)
MLT 8.53 -1.32 -0.17 -0.16 -0.38 -0.19 -0.19
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
MNG 8.53 -1.60 -0.19 -0.18 -0.81 -0.56 -0.25
(0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
MOZ 8.53 -1.08 -0.11 -0.10 -0.34 -0.12 -0.22
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
MUS 8.53 -1.00 -0.09 -0.09 -0.44 -0.13 -0.31
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
MWI 8.53 -1.00 -0.12 -0.11 -0.61 -0.14 -0.47
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02)
MYS 8.53 -0.68 -0.06 -0.06 -0.36 -0.10 -0.26
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
NAM 8.53 -1.19 -0.10 -0.09 -0.16 -0.11 -0.05
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NGA 8.53 -1.88 -0.12 -0.11 -0.50 -0.16 -0.34
(0.08) (0.01) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) (0.09)
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Country λi ∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE
NIC 8.53 -0.73 -0.12 -0.11 -0.51 -0.17 -0.34
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
NLD 88.67 -0.73 0.21 0.21 1.22 -0.09 1.31
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
NOR 92.96 -0.90 0.21 0.22 1.55 -0.19 1.74
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
NPL 8.53 -0.75 -0.06 -0.05 -0.25 -0.10 -0.15
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
NZL 30.53 -0.69 0.06 0.06 0.80 -0.05 0.85
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
OMN 8.53 -1.88 -0.18 -0.18 -0.89 -0.23 -0.66
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
PAK 8.53 -0.96 -0.10 -0.09 -0.48 -0.17 -0.31
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
PAN 8.53 -0.79 -0.06 -0.05 -0.20 -0.12 -0.08
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PER 8.53 -0.82 -0.08 -0.07 -0.61 -0.09 -0.52
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06)
PHL 8.53 -0.67 -0.06 -0.05 -0.46 -0.09 -0.38
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06)
POL 28.61 -1.52 -0.12 -0.12 -1.13 -0.29 -0.85
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.11)
PRT 48.43 -0.73 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.12 0.15
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
PRY 8.53 -0.94 -0.09 -0.09 -0.13 -0.11 -0.02
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
QAT 8.53 -1.58 -0.16 -0.16 -1.23 -0.18 -1.05
(0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04)
ROU 8.53 -1.95 -0.38 -0.38 -2.93 -0.39 -2.54
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.14) (0.02) (0.12)
RUS 0.00 -1.97 -0.41 -0.41 -1.85 -0.41 -1.45
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.07)
SAU 8.53 -1.85 -0.24 -0.24 -1.03 -0.27 -0.77
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05)
SEN 8.53 -1.35 -0.25 -0.24 -1.63 -0.27 -1.36
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.08)
SGP 8.53 -0.78 -0.13 -0.13 -0.81 -0.14 -0.66
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05)
SLV 8.53 -0.66 -0.07 -0.07 -0.39 -0.10 -0.29
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04)
SVK 39.97 -0.90 -0.04 -0.04 -0.54 -0.16 -0.38
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05)
SVN 67.84 -0.60 0.07 0.07 -0.18 -0.30 0.12
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
SWE 69.34 -0.35 0.11 0.12 0.76 0.00 0.76
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05)
THA 8.53 -0.70 -0.08 -0.07 -0.41 -0.10 -0.31
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
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TUN 8.53 -1.91 -0.30 -0.29 -2.03 -0.32 -1.72
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06)
TUR 39.23 -1.17 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.17 0.22
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
TWN 8.53 -0.77 -0.08 -0.07 -0.52 -0.10 -0.42
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
TZA 8.53 -0.87 -0.07 -0.06 -0.22 -0.10 -0.13
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
UGA 8.53 -1.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.51 -0.11 -0.40
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
UKR 8.53 -1.91 -0.45 -0.45 -1.58 -0.53 -1.06
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06)
URY 8.53 -1.40 -0.26 -0.26 -2.43 -0.27 -2.16
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.15)
USA 5.69 -0.73 -0.03 -0.03 -0.18 -0.03 -0.15
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
VEN 8.53 -1.01 -0.16 -0.16 -1.25 -0.18 -1.07
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
VNM 8.53 -0.84 -0.04 -0.04 -0.24 -0.15 -0.08
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
XAC 8.53 -1.92 -0.14 -0.13 -0.81 -0.15 -0.66
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.01) (0.11)
XCA 8.53 -0.77 -0.10 -0.10 -0.74 -0.12 -0.62
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05)
XCB 8.53 -0.93 -0.12 -0.11 -0.76 -0.13 -0.63
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04)
XCF 8.53 -1.67 -0.14 -0.13 -1.08 -0.15 -0.93
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.10)
XEA 8.53 -1.23 -0.17 -0.16 -1.05 -0.29 -0.76
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
XEC 8.53 -1.23 -0.14 -0.13 -0.77 -0.15 -0.62
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05)
XEE 8.53 -1.43 -0.17 -0.17 -0.35 -0.21 -0.14
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
XEF 8.53 -1.55 -0.20 -0.19 -1.21 -0.21 -1.00
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
XER 8.53 -1.87 -0.36 -0.36 -1.99 -0.39 -1.61
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.08)
XNA 8.53 -1.30 -0.27 -0.26 -2.46 -0.28 -2.19
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
XNF 8.53 -2.36 -0.43 -0.42 -3.02 -0.44 -2.59
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.17) (0.02) (0.15)
XOC 8.53 -1.00 -0.11 -0.11 -0.71 -0.13 -0.59
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.08)
XSA 8.53 -0.99 -0.12 -0.12 -1.06 -0.15 -0.92
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
XSC 8.53 -1.10 -0.12 -0.11 -0.93 -0.13 -0.81
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03)
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XSE 8.53 -1.00 -0.11 -0.10 -0.58 -0.17 -0.41
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05)
XSM 8.53 -1.19 -0.16 -0.15 -1.69 -0.16 -1.53
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06)
XSU 8.53 -1.81 -0.30 -0.29 -0.89 -0.46 -0.43
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04)
XWF 8.53 -1.33 -0.12 -0.11 -0.56 -0.13 -0.43
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05)
XWS 8.53 -2.08 -0.38 -0.37 -1.32 -0.42 -0.90
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.07)
ZAF 13.67 -1.13 -0.03 -0.02 0.08 -0.11 0.19
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
ZMB 8.53 -1.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.53 -0.13 -0.40
(0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
ZWE 8.53 -1.32 -0.17 -0.16 -0.61 -0.27 -0.35
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Notes: λi denotes the implicit carbon taxes (obtained from the OECD (2016) data), ∆Xi denotes
the percentage changes in trade flows, ∆Ri the percentage changes in real income, ∆U i the per-
centage changes in welfare, ∆Ei the percentage changes in carbon emissions, PSE the percentage
scale effects, and PCE the percentage composition effects. The numbers in parentheses below the
reported values give the corresponding bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table C.8: Pure Carbon Tariffs (Production-Based)
Country ∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE
ALB -2.38 -0.11 -0.09 -1.07 -0.74 -0.33
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
ARE -3.53 -0.65 -0.63 -4.86 -0.65 -4.24
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.21) (0.02) (0.19)
ARG -2.09 -0.11 -0.09 -0.41 -0.23 -0.19
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04)
ARM -2.93 -0.31 -0.28 -2.64 -0.76 -1.89
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
AUS -1.92 -0.17 -0.17 -0.91 -0.18 -0.73
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) (0.14)
AUT -1.43 0.25 0.27 1.21 -0.40 1.62
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
AZE -4.87 -2.00 -1.97 -9.44 -2.00 -7.60
(0.14) (0.06) (0.06) (0.33) (0.06) (0.28)
BEL -1.24 0.30 0.32 1.60 -0.11 1.72
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.19) (0.01) (0.18)
BGD -2.46 -0.41 -0.38 -3.82 -0.43 -3.41
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.13)
BGR -9.62 -2.98 -2.97 -13.57 -2.99 -10.90
(0.19) (0.07) (0.07) (0.34) (0.07) (0.29)
BHR -5.21 -2.07 -2.05 -6.76 -2.07 -4.79
(0.23) (0.09) (0.09) (0.33) (0.09) (0.25)
BLR -5.46 -1.84 -1.83 -7.67 -1.92 -5.87
(0.15) (0.08) (0.08) (0.33) (0.08) (0.26)
BOL -3.08 -0.24 -0.22 -0.56 -0.52 -0.03
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.03) (0.09)
BRA -0.93 0.01 0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
BWA -5.44 -0.51 -0.48 -1.56 -0.52 -1.05
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
CAN -1.56 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.13 0.18
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
CHE -0.96 0.17 0.19 -0.11 -0.16 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
CHL -1.80 0.02 0.04 0.50 -0.21 0.71
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04)
CHN -3.41 -0.19 -0.19 -0.96 -0.19 -0.76
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.09)
CIV -1.83 -0.53 -0.50 -4.79 -0.54 -4.27
(0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.28) (0.03) (0.26)
CMR -1.39 -0.28 -0.24 -3.52 -0.37 -3.17
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.20) (0.01) (0.19)
COL -1.65 0.05 0.06 0.76 -0.14 0.90
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
CRI -1.29 -0.05 -0.03 -0.35 -0.17 -0.18
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04)
CYP -3.21 -0.25 -0.23 -1.26 -0.97 -0.29
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
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CZE -4.80 -0.72 -0.71 -5.25 -0.77 -4.51
(0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.18) (0.02) (0.16)
DEU -1.59 0.11 0.14 0.24 -0.13 0.37
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.06)
DNK -1.49 0.15 0.18 0.43 -0.32 0.76
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
ECU -2.41 -0.40 -0.38 -2.37 -0.44 -1.94
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.24) (0.03) (0.22)
EGY -8.64 -1.97 -1.94 -9.19 -1.97 -7.36
(0.21) (0.10) (0.10) (0.60) (0.10) (0.51)
ESP -1.69 0.09 0.12 0.24 -0.14 0.38
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05)
EST -5.55 -0.68 -0.67 -1.98 -0.84 -1.15
(0.11) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03)
ETH -4.32 -0.55 -0.51 -3.02 -0.58 -2.45
(0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.04)
FIN -2.06 0.09 0.12 0.16 -0.24 0.40
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
FRA -1.72 0.31 0.34 1.94 -0.23 2.17
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) (0.15)
GBR -1.62 0.25 0.27 1.19 -0.19 1.38
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.13)
GEO -4.96 -0.66 -0.63 -2.31 -0.78 -1.54
(0.10) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04)
GHA -3.77 -0.74 -0.71 -6.15 -0.75 -5.44
(0.08) (0.03) (0.02) (0.34) (0.03) (0.32)
GRC -4.28 -0.19 -0.16 -0.39 -0.67 0.28
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.03) (0.10)
GTM -1.93 -0.09 -0.07 -0.56 -0.33 -0.23
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
HKG -2.15 -0.20 -0.20 -0.25 -0.20 -0.05
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
HND -3.26 -0.41 -0.39 -1.91 -0.45 -1.46
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
HRV -2.80 -0.03 -0.02 -0.14 -0.35 0.22
(0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
HUN -1.91 0.01 0.02 -0.43 -0.37 -0.07
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07)
IDN -3.61 -0.31 -0.29 -1.23 -0.33 -0.90
(0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.25) (0.03) (0.22)
IND -3.38 -0.28 -0.23 -1.07 -0.34 -0.73
(0.07) (0.02) (0.01) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06)
IRL -1.43 0.07 0.09 -1.66 -0.18 -1.49
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.00) (0.13)
IRN -8.51 -1.84 -1.82 -6.28 -1.88 -4.49
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.45) (0.11) (0.35)
ISR -2.38 -0.21 -0.21 -2.94 -0.44 -2.51
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.40) (0.03) (0.37)
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ITA -2.30 0.37 0.40 2.25 -0.26 2.52
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.23) (0.01) (0.23)
JPN -1.33 0.12 0.13 0.62 -0.04 0.67
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06)
KAZ -8.47 -1.57 -1.56 -6.93 -1.58 -5.44
(0.14) (0.06) (0.06) (0.47) (0.06) (0.42)
KEN -2.66 -0.39 -0.36 -3.56 -0.41 -3.16
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.26) (0.02) (0.25)
KGZ -8.83 -1.43 -1.41 -2.67 -1.58 -1.11
(0.12) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
KHM -1.96 -0.17 -0.14 -1.22 -0.38 -0.84
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02)
KOR -1.28 -0.01 0.01 -0.22 -0.10 -0.12
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
KWT -3.10 -1.42 -1.41 -6.93 -1.43 -5.58
(0.12) (0.05) (0.04) (0.23) (0.05) (0.19)
LAO -0.91 -0.04 -0.02 -1.07 -0.15 -0.92
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06)
LKA -4.01 -0.64 -0.62 -2.79 -0.65 -2.15
(0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.02) (0.13)
LTU -2.77 -0.45 -0.45 -3.78 -0.63 -3.17
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.02) (0.14)
LUX -1.22 0.14 0.16 -0.43 -0.33 -0.11
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
LVA -2.69 -0.21 -0.20 -1.39 -0.46 -0.93
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
MAR -4.81 -0.91 -0.87 -8.38 -0.91 -7.54
(0.17) (0.06) (0.06) (0.63) (0.06) (0.58)
MDG -2.08 -0.23 -0.20 -3.73 -0.24 -3.50
(0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.17) (0.01) (0.17)
MEX -1.68 -0.20 -0.19 -1.38 -0.21 -1.17
(0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.30) (0.03) (0.27)
MLT -2.38 -0.27 -0.25 -1.46 -0.80 -0.67
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
MNG -13.08 -2.51 -2.48 -6.72 -2.53 -4.29
(0.45) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07)
MOZ -2.97 -0.75 -0.71 -5.45 -0.77 -4.71
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.02) (0.11)
MUS -3.54 -0.52 -0.48 -2.73 -0.57 -2.17
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07)
MWI -1.90 -0.27 -0.23 -1.25 -0.29 -0.95
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05)
MYS -4.09 -0.81 -0.79 -5.18 -0.81 -4.41
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.47) (0.05) (0.43)
NAM -2.84 -0.32 -0.28 -1.42 -0.33 -1.09
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02)
NGA -3.77 -0.47 -0.43 -3.47 -0.53 -2.95
(0.13) (0.02) (0.02) (0.47) (0.02) (0.45)
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NIC -2.00 -0.09 -0.07 -0.44 -0.67 0.23
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.03) (0.09)
NLD -1.39 0.39 0.41 2.07 -0.19 2.27
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.00) (0.12)
NOR -2.10 0.37 0.39 3.18 -0.59 3.79
(0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) (0.10)
NPL -3.18 -0.40 -0.38 -2.31 -0.41 -1.90
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
NZL -1.35 -0.11 -0.11 -0.79 -0.11 -0.68
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.15)
OMN -6.34 -1.09 -1.07 -5.36 -1.10 -4.30
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.20) (0.03) (0.18)
PAK -3.68 -0.23 -0.21 -1.19 -0.63 -0.56
(0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.04) (0.11)
PAN -9.00 -1.55 -1.54 -5.10 -1.56 -3.60
(0.11) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.06)
PER -1.20 -0.03 -0.02 -0.43 -0.12 -0.31
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
PHL -1.92 -0.17 -0.15 -1.22 -0.24 -0.99
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.18) (0.02) (0.16)
POL -5.13 -0.75 -0.75 -5.03 -0.84 -4.22
(0.13) (0.04) (0.04) (0.33) (0.04) (0.29)
PRT -1.70 0.22 0.24 1.15 -0.25 1.40
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.07)
PRY -1.76 -0.13 -0.12 -1.32 -0.31 -1.01
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
QAT -3.90 -0.85 -0.83 -7.97 -0.85 -7.18
(0.12) (0.03) (0.03) (0.31) (0.03) (0.28)
ROU -5.21 -1.01 -1.00 -7.24 -1.02 -6.29
(0.13) (0.04) (0.04) (0.33) (0.04) (0.29)
RUS -4.14 -0.72 -0.72 -3.16 -0.80 -2.38
(0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.03) (0.09)
SAU -3.77 -1.06 -1.05 -5.13 -1.07 -4.11
(0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.28) (0.05) (0.23)
SEN -3.44 -0.63 -0.59 -3.69 -0.68 -3.03
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.21) (0.02) (0.19)
SGP -0.87 -0.08 -0.08 -1.11 -0.14 -0.97
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.09)
SLV -1.49 -0.07 -0.05 -0.34 -0.24 -0.10
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.07)
SVK -2.21 -0.11 -0.11 -1.76 -0.37 -1.39
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.08)
SVN -2.70 -0.12 -0.11 -0.54 -0.37 -0.17
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
SWE -2.20 0.40 0.43 3.08 -0.59 3.69
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08)
THA -2.48 -0.22 -0.20 -0.97 -0.31 -0.67
(0.06) (0.02) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02) (0.08)
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TUN -5.87 -1.09 -1.05 -6.97 -1.09 -5.94
(0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.25) (0.03) (0.23)
TUR -2.66 0.31 0.32 1.74 -0.34 2.09
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06)
TWN -1.53 -0.12 -0.10 -0.90 -0.19 -0.71
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.02) (0.10)
TZA -3.28 -0.40 -0.36 -2.14 -0.41 -1.74
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.07)
UGA -1.58 -0.08 -0.05 -0.71 -0.35 -0.36
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04)
UKR -10.61 -2.97 -2.97 -9.09 -3.03 -6.25
(0.27) (0.10) (0.10) (0.32) (0.10) (0.23)
URY -1.11 0.03 0.05 0.18 -0.14 0.31
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
USA -1.33 -0.04 -0.04 -0.39 -0.06 -0.34
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.04)
VEN -3.27 -0.93 -0.91 -7.68 -0.94 -6.80
(0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.26) (0.03) (0.24)
VNM -8.41 -1.38 -1.36 -7.40 -1.39 -6.09
(0.17) (0.04) (0.04) (0.20) (0.04) (0.17)
XAC -1.33 -0.26 -0.23 -2.87 -0.27 -2.61
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.32) (0.02) (0.31)
XCA -1.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.75 -0.19 -0.56
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05)
XCB -1.51 -0.18 -0.15 -1.52 -0.21 -1.32
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.09)
XCF -1.75 -0.23 -0.20 -2.10 -0.24 -1.86
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.15)
XEA -10.15 -2.15 -2.13 -8.05 -2.16 -6.02
(0.12) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06)
XEC -1.81 -0.17 -0.14 -0.65 -0.18 -0.47
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02)
XEE -8.37 -1.41 -1.40 -2.84 -1.45 -1.41
(0.18) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)
XEF -3.04 -0.73 -0.70 -8.91 -0.81 -8.16
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.19) (0.02) (0.18)
XER -6.44 -1.16 -1.14 -5.43 -1.32 -4.16
(0.15) (0.05) (0.04) (0.24) (0.05) (0.20)
XNA -1.48 -0.05 -0.03 -1.33 -0.31 -1.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06)
XNF -4.11 -1.54 -1.51 -12.17 -1.54 -10.79
(0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.79) (0.09) (0.72)
XOC -1.42 -0.12 -0.10 -0.89 -0.16 -0.73
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.13)
XSA -1.64 -0.11 -0.09 -1.48 -0.27 -1.21
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06)
XSC -1.22 -0.11 -0.07 -0.67 -0.12 -0.55
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
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XSE -2.96 -0.44 -0.42 -2.05 -0.61 -1.45
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.20) (0.02) (0.17)
XSM -0.68 0.06 0.08 -0.26 -0.09 -0.18
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05)
XSU -14.84 -4.06 -4.04 -10.00 -4.07 -6.18
(0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.37) (0.13) (0.26)
XWF -3.04 -0.34 -0.30 -1.92 -0.34 -1.58
(0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.12) (0.01) (0.12)
XWS -7.29 -1.90 -1.87 -5.84 -1.91 -4.01
(0.15) (0.10) (0.10) (0.42) (0.11) (0.33)
ZAF -5.13 -0.55 -0.52 -2.88 -0.57 -2.32
(0.14) (0.04) (0.04) (0.44) (0.04) (0.41)
ZMB -1.08 -0.05 -0.02 -0.80 -0.07 -0.73
(0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
ZWE -11.99 -2.12 -2.09 -5.31 -2.13 -3.25
(0.32) (0.06) (0.06) (0.16) (0.06) (0.10)
Notes: ∆Xi denotes the percentage changes in trade flows, ∆Ri the percentage
changes in real income, ∆U i the percentage changes in welfare, ∆Ei the percentage
changes in carbon emissions, PSE the percentage scale effects, and PCE the percent-
age composition effects. The numbers in parentheses below the reported values give
the corresponding bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table C.9: Pure Carbon Tariffs (Product-Based, Extended Model)
Country ∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE PTE
ALB -1.51 0.06 0.06 0.18 -0.54 0.02 0.69
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
ARE -3.31 -0.24 -0.24 -2.17 -0.29 -2.21 0.34
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.11) (0.02)
ARG -1.12 0.02 0.02 0.74 -0.11 0.53 0.31
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.08) (0.02)
ARM -1.87 0.02 0.03 -0.15 -0.67 -0.12 0.64
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
AUS -1.63 -0.12 -0.12 -0.17 -0.12 -0.26 0.21
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.07) (0.01)
AUT -0.82 0.12 0.12 0.72 -0.23 0.71 0.24
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
AZE -6.06 -0.41 -0.41 -3.96 -0.61 -3.87 0.53
(0.17) (0.02) (0.02) (0.25) (0.03) (0.25) (0.03)
BEL -0.82 0.08 0.09 0.45 -0.09 0.45 0.09
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00)
BGD -1.56 -0.10 -0.10 -0.91 -0.13 -0.96 0.18
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01)
BGR -4.69 -0.50 -0.49 -5.30 -0.54 -5.33 0.57
(0.14) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01)
BHR -4.64 -0.36 -0.35 -3.40 -0.61 -3.22 0.42
(0.20) (0.02) (0.02) (0.19) (0.03) (0.19) (0.03)
BLR -2.53 -0.13 -0.13 -2.12 -0.22 -2.24 0.34
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01)
BOL -1.50 0.02 0.02 0.74 -0.35 0.50 0.58
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
BRA -0.90 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 0.13
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
BWA -2.85 -0.20 -0.19 -0.12 -0.20 -0.16 0.24
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
CAN -0.98 0.01 0.01 0.52 -0.08 0.37 0.22
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01)
CHE -0.85 0.02 0.02 -0.30 -0.08 -0.30 0.08
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
CHL -1.18 0.02 0.02 0.66 -0.18 0.68 0.16
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CHN -1.21 -0.03 -0.03 -0.24 -0.04 -0.32 0.12
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01)
CIV -2.67 -0.27 -0.26 -4.24 -0.36 -4.22 0.33
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.28) (0.02) (0.28) (0.02)
CMR -1.48 -0.10 -0.09 -1.10 -0.16 -1.22 0.28
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.01) (0.13) (0.02)
COL -0.99 0.01 0.01 0.72 -0.10 0.57 0.25
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02)
CRI -0.95 -0.05 -0.04 -0.37 -0.11 -0.36 0.11
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
CYP -1.72 0.06 0.06 0.06 -0.66 0.03 0.69
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
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CZE -2.47 -0.21 -0.21 -2.87 -0.26 -2.92 0.31
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01)
DEU -1.07 0.02 0.02 -0.12 -0.09 -0.17 0.14
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
DNK -1.03 0.09 0.09 0.58 -0.26 0.38 0.45
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)
ECU -1.41 -0.11 -0.11 -0.86 -0.15 -1.01 0.30
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.13) (0.02)
EGY -3.68 -0.28 -0.28 -3.14 -0.39 -3.21 0.47
(0.17) (0.01) (0.01) (0.22) (0.02) (0.23) (0.03)
ESP -1.13 0.01 0.02 -0.14 -0.11 -0.16 0.13
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
EST -1.80 -0.09 -0.09 -0.22 -0.29 -0.28 0.36
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
ETH -1.54 -0.13 -0.13 -0.33 -0.15 -0.35 0.17
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
FIN -1.35 -0.01 -0.01 -0.56 -0.15 -0.57 0.16
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01)
FRA -0.77 0.13 0.13 1.16 -0.12 1.15 0.13
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00)
GBR -0.93 0.11 0.12 0.94 -0.12 0.80 0.25
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.07) (0.01)
GEO -1.87 -0.11 -0.10 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 0.22
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
GHA -1.96 -0.18 -0.18 -2.59 -0.19 -2.69 0.30
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01)
GRC -2.40 0.09 0.10 0.66 -0.64 0.61 0.68
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02)
GTM -0.86 0.01 0.01 0.11 -0.17 0.02 0.25
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
HKG -1.87 -0.23 -0.23 -0.07 -0.23 -0.08 0.23
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HND -1.29 -0.10 -0.09 -0.25 -0.12 -0.25 0.13
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
HRV -2.30 -0.12 -0.12 -1.02 -0.32 -1.13 0.43
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01)
HUN -1.26 0.01 0.01 -0.31 -0.23 -0.32 0.24
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01)
IDN -1.62 -0.09 -0.08 -0.11 -0.10 -0.20 0.19
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02)
IND -1.47 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.09 -0.05 0.16
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
IRL -1.70 -0.07 -0.07 -0.76 -0.21 -0.78 0.23
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00)
IRN -2.74 -0.16 -0.15 -0.67 -0.25 -0.73 0.31
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.02) (0.13) (0.02)
ISR -1.78 -0.05 -0.05 -0.60 -0.21 -0.60 0.22
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.22) (0.01) (0.22) (0.01)
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ITA -1.10 0.16 0.16 1.42 -0.15 1.40 0.17
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01)
JPN -0.79 0.03 0.03 0.28 -0.04 0.30 0.02
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
KAZ -3.04 -0.26 -0.26 -1.76 -0.32 -1.77 0.34
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.17) (0.02)
KEN -1.53 -0.12 -0.11 -1.96 -0.13 -1.99 0.16
(0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.17) (0.01)
KGZ -2.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.23 -0.32 -0.23 0.32
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
KHM -0.71 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.10 -0.03 0.09
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
KOR -0.95 -0.02 -0.02 -0.27 -0.06 -0.29 0.08
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
KWT -4.72 -0.36 -0.36 -3.90 -0.56 -3.86 0.51
(0.13) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.02) (0.15) (0.02)
LAO -0.79 -0.05 -0.05 -0.65 -0.10 -0.67 0.12
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
LKA -2.20 -0.23 -0.22 -1.43 -0.23 -1.47 0.28
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01)
LTU -2.48 -0.17 -0.16 -2.93 -0.24 -2.94 0.25
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01)
LUX -0.81 0.08 0.08 -0.01 -0.26 -0.03 0.27
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
LVA -1.29 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 -0.21 -0.08 0.20
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
MAR -3.25 -0.27 -0.26 -3.95 -0.27 -4.14 0.46
(0.12) (0.01) (0.01) (0.34) (0.01) (0.35) (0.03)
MDG -2.08 -0.16 -0.16 -1.16 -0.17 -1.26 0.27
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.07) (0.02)
MEX -1.59 -0.13 -0.13 -0.76 -0.14 -0.83 0.21
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.21) (0.01) (0.21) (0.01)
MLT -1.15 0.01 0.02 0.08 -0.43 0.11 0.39
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
MNG -1.92 -0.15 -0.15 -0.11 -0.28 -0.15 0.31
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
MOZ -1.86 -0.15 -0.15 -0.28 -0.16 -0.31 0.20
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
MUS -1.66 -0.12 -0.12 -0.34 -0.17 -0.48 0.31
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02)
MWI -1.81 -0.20 -0.19 -0.84 -0.21 -0.93 0.31
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02)
MYS -3.05 -0.29 -0.29 -3.08 -0.35 -3.06 0.32
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.33) (0.02) (0.33) (0.02)
NAM -2.15 -0.19 -0.19 -0.04 -0.19 -0.03 0.19
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NGA -2.54 -0.16 -0.16 0.55 -0.21 0.42 0.34
(0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.18) (0.01) (0.19) (0.01)
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NIC -1.48 0.04 0.05 0.51 -0.67 0.50 0.69
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01)
NLD -0.75 0.15 0.15 1.65 -0.13 1.52 0.26
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01)
NOR -1.23 0.14 0.15 3.13 -0.37 2.84 0.65
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
NPL -1.68 -0.16 -0.15 -0.52 -0.17 -0.53 0.18
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
NZL -1.53 -0.13 -0.13 -0.46 -0.13 -0.51 0.18
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01)
OMN -3.95 -0.25 -0.25 -1.44 -0.30 -1.49 0.35
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.10) (0.02)
PAK -2.04 0.07 0.07 0.79 -0.47 0.78 0.48
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02)
PAN -1.46 -0.11 -0.11 -0.17 -0.12 -0.17 0.12
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PER -1.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.33 -0.08 -0.42 0.17
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01)
PHL -1.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.25 -0.09 -0.25 0.09
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00)
POL -2.16 -0.13 -0.13 -1.83 -0.24 -1.87 0.29
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01)
PRT -1.07 0.09 0.10 0.50 -0.21 0.50 0.21
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
PRY -0.77 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.15 -0.01 0.14
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
QAT -3.57 -0.21 -0.21 -2.69 -0.28 -2.72 0.30
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.11) (0.02)
ROU -3.30 -0.29 -0.29 -4.26 -0.32 -4.25 0.31
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.21) (0.01) (0.21) (0.01)
RUS -1.74 -0.04 -0.04 -0.26 -0.13 -0.41 0.28
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
SAU -3.65 -0.23 -0.23 -1.47 -0.29 -1.45 0.27
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.15) (0.02)
SEN -2.03 -0.20 -0.19 -2.01 -0.23 -2.01 0.24
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01)
SGP -1.53 -0.11 -0.11 -1.30 -0.15 -1.36 0.21
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01)
SLV -0.92 -0.03 -0.02 -0.13 -0.18 -0.13 0.18
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00)
SVK -1.68 -0.07 -0.07 -1.76 -0.19 -1.77 0.21
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00)
SVN -1.49 -0.05 -0.05 -0.25 -0.23 -0.29 0.26
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
SWE -0.64 0.16 0.17 1.66 -0.14 1.73 0.08
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00)
THA -1.11 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.10 -0.14 0.16
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01)
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TUN -3.54 -0.33 -0.33 -2.88 -0.38 -2.98 0.48
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.12) (0.02)
TUR -2.05 0.19 0.20 1.56 -0.42 1.48 0.51
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
TWN -1.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.21 -0.08 -0.22 0.08
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01)
TZA -1.80 -0.17 -0.16 -0.38 -0.17 -0.41 0.20
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
UGA -1.11 -0.03 -0.03 0.07 -0.17 -0.12 0.36
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
UKR -2.73 -0.14 -0.14 -1.17 -0.28 -1.19 0.30
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01)
URY -0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.09
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
USA -0.91 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.03 -0.16 0.10
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
VEN -2.16 -0.16 -0.16 -2.87 -0.23 -2.95 0.30
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02)
VNM -2.19 -0.16 -0.16 -0.52 -0.18 -0.55 0.22
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
XAC -3.63 -0.28 -0.27 -1.27 -0.27 -1.34 0.33
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.23) (0.01) (0.24) (0.02)
XCA -1.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.65 -0.12 -0.69 0.16
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
XCB -1.30 -0.07 -0.07 -0.70 -0.10 -0.81 0.21
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01)
XCF -3.06 -0.23 -0.23 -1.90 -0.25 -1.97 0.32
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.20) (0.01) (0.21) (0.02)
XEA -1.80 -0.18 -0.17 -0.87 -0.21 -0.95 0.29
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
XEC -2.57 -0.21 -0.20 -1.32 -0.25 -1.38 0.31
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.13) (0.02)
XEE -2.31 -0.18 -0.18 -0.20 -0.24 -0.19 0.24
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
XEF -1.80 -0.13 -0.12 -0.86 -0.17 -0.89 0.20
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
XER -2.25 -0.10 -0.09 -1.09 -0.33 -1.14 0.38
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01)
XNA -1.07 0.00 0.01 -0.43 -0.14 -0.55 0.26
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
XNF -4.40 -0.30 -0.29 -4.31 -0.42 -4.35 0.46
(0.12) (0.01) (0.01) (0.32) (0.02) (0.33) (0.03)
XOC -1.43 -0.11 -0.11 -0.52 -0.13 -0.61 0.22
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01)
XSA -1.22 -0.05 -0.05 -0.66 -0.14 -0.78 0.26
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01)
XSC -1.77 -0.17 -0.16 -1.09 -0.18 -1.21 0.30
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02)
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XSE -1.29 -0.06 -0.06 0.39 -0.28 0.25 0.42
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01)
XSM -1.22 -0.06 -0.06 -1.12 -0.09 -1.17 0.14
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00)
XSU -3.60 -0.22 -0.22 -1.10 -0.36 -1.08 0.34
(0.16) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02)
XWF -2.58 -0.22 -0.21 -0.92 -0.23 -1.02 0.33
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.10) (0.02)
XWS -3.69 -0.24 -0.24 -1.35 -0.37 -1.30 0.33
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.02) (0.13) (0.02)
ZAF -1.65 -0.10 -0.09 -0.27 -0.13 -0.38 0.24
(0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.09) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02)
ZMB -2.17 -0.21 -0.20 -0.66 -0.21 -0.80 0.34
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
ZWE -2.71 -0.22 -0.21 -0.70 -0.24 -0.72 0.26
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
Notes: ∆Xi denotes the percentage changes in trade flows, ∆Ri the percentage changes in real
income, ∆U i the percentage changes in welfare, ∆Ei the percentage changes in carbon emissions,
PSE the percentage scale effects, PCE the percentage composition effects, and PTE the percentage
technique effects. The numbers in parentheses below the reported values give the corresponding
bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table C.10: Pure Carbon Tariffs (Product-Based, Extended Model, with EIA Data for National Resource
Shares)
Country ∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE PTE
ALB -1.50 0.05 0.06 0.18 -0.54 0.03 0.69
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
ARE -3.33 -0.25 -0.24 -2.21 -0.29 -2.26 0.34
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.11) (0.02)
ARG -1.12 0.03 0.03 0.71 -0.11 0.50 0.31
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.08) (0.02)
ARM -1.87 0.02 0.03 -0.15 -0.67 -0.12 0.64
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
AUS -1.61 -0.12 -0.12 -0.14 -0.12 -0.24 0.21
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.07) (0.01)
AUT -0.82 0.12 0.12 0.72 -0.23 0.71 0.23
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
AZE -6.18 -0.41 -0.41 -4.13 -0.61 -4.04 0.52
(0.17) (0.01) (0.01) (0.23) (0.02) (0.24) (0.03)
BEL -0.82 0.08 0.09 0.45 -0.09 0.45 0.09
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00)
BGD -1.57 -0.10 -0.10 -0.92 -0.13 -0.97 0.18
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01)
BGR -4.69 -0.50 -0.50 -5.31 -0.54 -5.34 0.58
(0.14) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01)
BHR -4.61 -0.35 -0.35 -3.39 -0.60 -3.21 0.41
(0.21) (0.02) (0.02) (0.19) (0.03) (0.19) (0.03)
BLR -2.50 -0.13 -0.13 -2.08 -0.22 -2.20 0.34
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01)
BOL -1.50 0.02 0.02 0.73 -0.35 0.50 0.58
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
BRA -0.90 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.13
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
BWA -2.87 -0.20 -0.19 -0.12 -0.20 -0.16 0.24
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
CAN -0.98 0.01 0.01 0.52 -0.08 0.37 0.22
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01)
CHE -0.85 0.02 0.02 -0.30 -0.08 -0.30 0.08
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
CHL -1.18 0.02 0.03 0.65 -0.17 0.66 0.16
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CHN -1.21 -0.03 -0.03 -0.25 -0.04 -0.32 0.12
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01)
CIV -2.69 -0.27 -0.26 -4.29 -0.37 -4.26 0.34
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.27) (0.02) (0.28) (0.02)
CMR -1.51 -0.09 -0.08 -1.15 -0.16 -1.27 0.28
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.01) (0.13) (0.02)
COL -0.98 0.01 0.01 0.71 -0.10 0.56 0.25
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02)
CRI -0.94 -0.04 -0.04 -0.36 -0.11 -0.36 0.11
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
CYP -1.72 0.06 0.07 0.06 -0.66 0.03 0.69
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(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
CZE -2.46 -0.21 -0.21 -2.87 -0.26 -2.91 0.31
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01)
DEU -1.06 0.02 0.02 -0.12 -0.09 -0.17 0.14
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
DNK -1.03 0.09 0.10 0.58 -0.26 0.38 0.45
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)
ECU -1.43 -0.09 -0.09 -0.90 -0.15 -1.05 0.30
(0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.01) (0.13) (0.02)
EGY -3.73 -0.28 -0.27 -3.22 -0.40 -3.30 0.47
(0.17) (0.01) (0.01) (0.22) (0.02) (0.23) (0.03)
ESP -1.13 0.01 0.02 -0.14 -0.11 -0.16 0.13
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
EST -1.79 -0.09 -0.09 -0.21 -0.29 -0.28 0.36
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
ETH -1.55 -0.13 -0.12 -0.33 -0.15 -0.35 0.17
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
FIN -1.34 -0.01 -0.01 -0.55 -0.15 -0.56 0.16
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01)
FRA -0.77 0.13 0.13 1.16 -0.12 1.15 0.13
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00)
GBR -0.93 0.12 0.12 0.93 -0.12 0.80 0.25
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.07) (0.01)
GEO -1.87 -0.11 -0.10 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 0.22
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
GHA -1.98 -0.18 -0.17 -2.59 -0.19 -2.69 0.30
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01)
GRC -2.39 0.09 0.10 0.66 -0.63 0.62 0.68
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02)
GTM -0.86 0.01 0.01 0.11 -0.17 0.02 0.25
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
HKG -1.87 -0.23 -0.23 -0.07 -0.23 -0.08 0.23
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HND -1.28 -0.10 -0.09 -0.25 -0.12 -0.25 0.13
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
HRV -2.30 -0.12 -0.12 -1.02 -0.31 -1.13 0.42
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01)
HUN -1.25 0.01 0.01 -0.30 -0.23 -0.32 0.24
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01)
IDN -1.62 -0.09 -0.08 -0.11 -0.10 -0.20 0.19
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02)
IND -1.47 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.09 -0.03 0.16
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)
IRL -1.69 -0.07 -0.06 -0.76 -0.21 -0.78 0.23
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00)
IRN -2.72 -0.16 -0.16 -0.63 -0.25 -0.69 0.31
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.02) (0.13) (0.02)
ISR -1.78 -0.05 -0.05 -0.59 -0.21 -0.60 0.22
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.22) (0.01) (0.22) (0.01)
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ITA -1.10 0.16 0.16 1.42 -0.15 1.40 0.17
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01)
JPN -0.79 0.03 0.03 0.28 -0.04 0.30 0.02
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
KAZ -3.00 -0.27 -0.27 -1.71 -0.32 -1.73 0.34
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.17) (0.01) (0.18) (0.02)
KEN -1.54 -0.12 -0.11 -1.98 -0.13 -2.01 0.17
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.17) (0.01)
KGZ -2.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.22 -0.33 -0.23 0.33
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
KHM -0.72 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.10 -0.02 0.09
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
KOR -0.95 -0.02 -0.02 -0.27 -0.06 -0.29 0.08
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
KWT -4.83 -0.36 -0.36 -4.07 -0.57 -4.02 0.52
(0.13) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.14) (0.02)
LAO -0.79 -0.05 -0.05 -0.66 -0.10 -0.68 0.12
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
LKA -2.21 -0.23 -0.22 -1.44 -0.23 -1.49 0.28
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01)
LTU -2.46 -0.16 -0.16 -2.89 -0.24 -2.90 0.25
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01)
LUX -0.81 0.08 0.08 -0.01 -0.26 -0.03 0.27
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
LVA -1.28 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 -0.21 -0.08 0.20
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
MAR -3.26 -0.27 -0.26 -3.99 -0.27 -4.18 0.46
(0.12) (0.01) (0.01) (0.34) (0.01) (0.35) (0.03)
MDG -2.11 -0.15 -0.15 -1.18 -0.17 -1.28 0.27
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.07) (0.02)
MEX -1.59 -0.13 -0.13 -0.77 -0.14 -0.84 0.21
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.21) (0.01) (0.21) (0.01)
MLT -1.15 0.01 0.02 0.08 -0.42 0.11 0.39
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
MNG -1.86 -0.21 -0.21 -0.11 -0.30 -0.14 0.33
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
MOZ -1.86 -0.15 -0.15 -0.28 -0.16 -0.32 0.20
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
MUS -1.67 -0.11 -0.11 -0.34 -0.17 -0.48 0.31
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02)
MWI -1.83 -0.19 -0.18 -0.85 -0.21 -0.94 0.31
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02)
MYS -3.06 -0.29 -0.29 -3.13 -0.35 -3.11 0.32
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.33) (0.02) (0.33) (0.02)
NAM -2.16 -0.19 -0.18 -0.04 -0.19 -0.03 0.19
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NGA -2.55 -0.14 -0.13 0.50 -0.21 0.37 0.34
(0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.18) (0.01) (0.19) (0.01)
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NIC -1.47 0.05 0.05 0.51 -0.67 0.50 0.68
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01)
NLD -0.75 0.15 0.16 1.64 -0.13 1.51 0.26
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01)
NOR -1.25 0.18 0.19 3.02 -0.36 2.74 0.64
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03)
NPL -1.69 -0.16 -0.15 -0.52 -0.17 -0.54 0.18
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
NZL -1.53 -0.13 -0.13 -0.46 -0.13 -0.51 0.18
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01)
OMN -4.08 -0.23 -0.22 -1.55 -0.29 -1.61 0.35
(0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01)
PAK -2.04 0.07 0.07 0.80 -0.47 0.79 0.48
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02)
PAN -1.46 -0.11 -0.11 -0.17 -0.12 -0.17 0.12
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PER -1.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.34 -0.08 -0.43 0.17
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01)
PHL -1.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.25 -0.09 -0.25 0.09
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00)
POL -2.15 -0.13 -0.13 -1.81 -0.24 -1.86 0.29
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01)
PRT -1.07 0.10 0.10 0.50 -0.21 0.50 0.21
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
PRY -0.77 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.15 -0.01 0.14
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
QAT -3.53 -0.25 -0.24 -2.70 -0.29 -2.72 0.32
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.10) (0.02)
ROU -3.31 -0.29 -0.29 -4.27 -0.32 -4.26 0.31
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.21) (0.01) (0.21) (0.01)
RUS -1.70 -0.05 -0.05 -0.19 -0.13 -0.34 0.28
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
SAU -3.82 -0.22 -0.22 -1.66 -0.30 -1.64 0.27
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.14) (0.02)
SEN -2.04 -0.19 -0.19 -2.03 -0.23 -2.03 0.24
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01)
SGP -1.53 -0.11 -0.11 -1.32 -0.15 -1.38 0.21
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01)
SLV -0.92 -0.02 -0.02 -0.12 -0.18 -0.12 0.18
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00)
SVK -1.68 -0.07 -0.07 -1.74 -0.19 -1.76 0.21
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00)
SVN -1.48 -0.05 -0.04 -0.25 -0.23 -0.29 0.26
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
SWE -0.64 0.16 0.17 1.64 -0.14 1.70 0.08
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00)
THA -1.11 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.10 -0.15 0.16
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01)
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TUN -3.56 -0.33 -0.32 -2.91 -0.38 -3.01 0.48
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.12) (0.02)
TUR -2.05 0.19 0.20 1.56 -0.42 1.48 0.51
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02)
TWN -1.07 -0.03 -0.02 -0.21 -0.08 -0.22 0.08
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01)
TZA -1.82 -0.17 -0.16 -0.39 -0.17 -0.41 0.20
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
UGA -1.13 -0.02 -0.02 0.07 -0.17 -0.12 0.36
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
UKR -2.68 -0.16 -0.16 -1.10 -0.29 -1.12 0.30
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01)
URY -0.82 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 0.09
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
USA -0.91 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 -0.14 0.10
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
VEN -2.09 -0.18 -0.17 -2.73 -0.22 -2.80 0.30
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.10) (0.02)
VNM -2.21 -0.16 -0.15 -0.53 -0.18 -0.56 0.22
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
XAC -3.68 -0.25 -0.24 -1.44 -0.26 -1.51 0.33
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.23) (0.01) (0.24) (0.02)
XCA -0.99 -0.06 -0.06 -0.64 -0.12 -0.68 0.16
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
XCB -1.30 -0.07 -0.06 -0.70 -0.10 -0.81 0.21
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01)
XCF -3.10 -0.22 -0.21 -1.99 -0.24 -2.06 0.32
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.19) (0.01) (0.20) (0.02)
XEA -1.80 -0.18 -0.17 -0.87 -0.21 -0.95 0.29
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
XEC -2.60 -0.20 -0.20 -1.37 -0.25 -1.42 0.31
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.12) (0.02)
XEE -2.31 -0.18 -0.18 -0.19 -0.24 -0.19 0.24
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
XEF -1.80 -0.12 -0.12 -0.86 -0.17 -0.89 0.20
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
XER -2.23 -0.11 -0.10 -1.06 -0.33 -1.11 0.38
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01)
XNA -1.05 0.00 0.01 -0.41 -0.14 -0.53 0.26
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
XNF -4.56 -0.29 -0.29 -4.59 -0.43 -4.62 0.47
(0.12) (0.01) (0.01) (0.30) (0.02) (0.30) (0.03)
XOC -1.44 -0.11 -0.11 -0.52 -0.13 -0.61 0.22
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01)
XSA -1.22 -0.05 -0.05 -0.65 -0.14 -0.77 0.26
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01)
XSC -1.77 -0.16 -0.16 -1.09 -0.18 -1.21 0.30
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02)
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XSE -1.32 -0.03 -0.03 0.36 -0.28 0.22 0.42
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01)
XSM -1.22 -0.06 -0.06 -1.12 -0.09 -1.17 0.14
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00)
XSU -3.54 -0.23 -0.23 -1.07 -0.36 -1.05 0.34
(0.16) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02)
XWF -2.59 -0.21 -0.21 -0.93 -0.23 -1.03 0.33
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.01) (0.10) (0.02)
XWS -3.70 -0.24 -0.24 -1.36 -0.37 -1.32 0.33
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.02) (0.13) (0.02)
ZAF -1.63 -0.10 -0.10 -0.22 -0.13 -0.33 0.25
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02)
ZMB -2.19 -0.21 -0.20 -0.68 -0.21 -0.81 0.35
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
ZWE -2.72 -0.23 -0.22 -0.71 -0.24 -0.73 0.26
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
Notes: ∆Xi denotes the percentage changes in trade flows, ∆Ri the percentage changes in real
income, ∆U i the percentage changes in welfare, ∆Ei the percentage changes in carbon emissions,
PSE the percentage scale effects, PCE the percentage composition effects, and PTE the percentage
technique effects. The numbers in parentheses below the reported values give the corresponding
bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table C.11: Pure Carbon Tariffs (Production-Based, Extended Model)
Country ∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE PTE
ALB -2.37 0.00 0.01 0.21 -0.62 -0.15 0.97
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02)
ARE -3.48 -0.36 -0.35 -3.50 -0.38 -3.87 0.76
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.17) (0.01) (0.19) (0.04)
ARG -2.05 -0.06 -0.05 0.42 -0.16 -0.08 0.65
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03)
ARM -2.91 -0.06 -0.05 -1.65 -0.51 -1.64 0.51
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
AUS -1.89 -0.13 -0.13 -0.35 -0.13 -0.72 0.50
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.13) (0.03)
AUT -1.42 0.20 0.21 1.58 -0.44 1.56 0.47
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)
AZE -5.20 -0.56 -0.55 -6.46 -0.80 -6.61 0.96
(0.15) (0.02) (0.02) (0.27) (0.02) (0.29) (0.04)
BEL -1.23 0.20 0.22 1.51 -0.20 1.52 0.20
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.17) (0.01) (0.18) (0.01)
BGD -2.49 -0.17 -0.16 -3.11 -0.20 -3.28 0.38
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.12) (0.02)
BGR -9.79 -1.20 -1.20 -10.08 -1.26 -10.18 1.37
(0.20) (0.03) (0.03) (0.29) (0.03) (0.29) (0.03)
BHR -5.35 -0.51 -0.50 -4.04 -0.78 -4.09 0.82
(0.26) (0.02) (0.02) (0.23) (0.03) (0.24) (0.04)
BLR -5.62 -0.37 -0.36 -4.81 -0.48 -5.12 0.80
(0.17) (0.02) (0.02) (0.21) (0.02) (0.22) (0.03)
BOL -2.99 -0.16 -0.14 0.74 -0.38 0.24 0.88
(0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05)
BRA -0.87 0.02 0.03 0.24 -0.03 -0.06 0.32
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
BWA -5.41 -0.46 -0.44 -0.94 -0.46 -1.05 0.57
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
CAN -1.50 -0.01 -0.01 0.64 -0.10 0.21 0.53
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.06) (0.03)
CHE -0.96 0.17 0.19 -0.14 -0.16 -0.08 0.09
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01)
CHL -1.75 -0.02 -0.01 0.63 -0.23 0.64 0.22
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)
CHN -3.38 -0.11 -0.11 -0.59 -0.12 -0.80 0.33
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.10) (0.02)
CIV -1.94 -0.12 -0.10 -3.84 -0.20 -4.13 0.50
(0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.24) (0.01) (0.25) (0.02)
CMR -1.41 -0.05 -0.03 -2.18 -0.16 -2.68 0.68
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.01) (0.17) (0.03)
COL -1.55 0.00 0.01 1.33 -0.14 0.89 0.58
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03)
CRI -1.27 -0.02 -0.01 -0.31 -0.14 -0.31 0.14
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00)
CYP -3.19 -0.11 -0.10 -0.21 -0.83 -0.25 0.87
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
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CZE -4.82 -0.43 -0.43 -4.43 -0.49 -4.53 0.60
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.16) (0.02)
DEU -1.57 0.11 0.12 0.40 -0.13 0.26 0.27
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01)
DNK -1.45 0.14 0.15 1.30 -0.31 0.80 0.80
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
ECU -2.38 -0.25 -0.24 -1.35 -0.26 -1.75 0.66
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.19) (0.04)
EGY -9.04 -0.83 -0.81 -6.67 -1.05 -6.76 1.15
(0.23) (0.04) (0.03) (0.45) (0.05) (0.47) (0.07)
ESP -1.67 0.08 0.10 0.30 -0.15 0.27 0.18
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
EST -5.55 -0.54 -0.54 -1.01 -0.71 -1.15 0.85
(0.11) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
ETH -4.27 -0.44 -0.42 -2.04 -0.46 -2.38 0.80
(0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01)
FIN -2.03 0.09 0.10 0.26 -0.24 0.24 0.27
(0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01)
FRA -1.70 0.24 0.25 2.13 -0.30 2.10 0.33
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01)
GBR -1.57 0.20 0.22 1.74 -0.21 1.38 0.56
(0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.13) (0.02)
GEO -4.93 -0.44 -0.42 -1.48 -0.56 -1.51 0.59
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
GHA -3.74 -0.38 -0.36 -4.80 -0.37 -5.07 0.66
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.30) (0.01) (0.32) (0.02)
GRC -4.24 -0.12 -0.11 0.45 -0.60 0.35 0.70
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02)
GTM -1.92 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.29 -0.23 0.53
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
HKG -2.14 -0.18 -0.18 -0.03 -0.18 -0.05 0.20
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HND -3.26 -0.29 -0.28 -1.40 -0.32 -1.45 0.37
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
HRV -2.77 0.03 0.03 0.63 -0.29 0.22 0.69
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.06) (0.02)
HUN -1.90 0.06 0.06 -0.11 -0.32 -0.14 0.36
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01)
IDN -3.58 -0.21 -0.20 -0.54 -0.22 -0.82 0.50
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.18) (0.01) (0.20) (0.03)
IND -3.36 -0.15 -0.13 -0.59 -0.22 -0.75 0.37
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02)
IRL -1.42 0.11 0.12 -1.59 -0.14 -1.59 0.13
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.00) (0.14) (0.01)
IRN -8.98 -0.71 -0.70 -3.56 -0.92 -3.66 1.02
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.30) (0.04) (0.31) (0.05)
ISR -2.35 -0.02 -0.02 -2.67 -0.25 -2.68 0.26
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.37) (0.01) (0.37) (0.01)
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ITA -2.26 0.26 0.28 2.51 -0.37 2.46 0.42
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.23) (0.01) (0.23) (0.01)
JPN -1.29 0.09 0.09 0.58 -0.07 0.62 0.04
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00)
KAZ -8.76 -0.93 -0.92 -5.13 -1.11 -5.08 1.05
(0.15) (0.02) (0.02) (0.38) (0.03) (0.40) (0.06)
KEN -2.63 -0.20 -0.18 -3.19 -0.21 -3.26 0.28
(0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.25) (0.01) (0.26) (0.01)
KGZ -8.83 -0.80 -0.79 -0.83 -0.95 -0.91 1.03
(0.12) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
KHM -1.93 -0.09 -0.08 -0.82 -0.28 -0.83 0.30
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
KOR -1.26 0.02 0.03 -0.17 -0.08 -0.19 0.09
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
KWT -3.12 -0.41 -0.40 -4.59 -0.50 -4.83 0.75
(0.12) (0.02) (0.02) (0.17) (0.02) (0.18) (0.03)
LAO -0.87 -0.01 0.00 -1.05 -0.09 -1.09 0.14
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00)
LKA -3.99 -0.41 -0.39 -2.23 -0.41 -2.20 0.38
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01)
LTU -2.77 -0.05 -0.04 -3.38 -0.22 -3.39 0.24
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01)
LUX -1.22 0.15 0.16 -0.07 -0.31 -0.10 0.34
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
LVA -2.68 -0.12 -0.12 -0.86 -0.37 -0.92 0.44
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
MAR -4.83 -0.40 -0.38 -7.11 -0.40 -7.35 0.66
(0.18) (0.02) (0.02) (0.56) (0.02) (0.58) (0.04)
MDG -2.05 -0.17 -0.15 -2.95 -0.16 -3.38 0.61
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.17) (0.03)
MEX -1.69 -0.12 -0.11 -0.88 -0.13 -1.21 0.46
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.26) (0.01) (0.27) (0.03)
MLT -2.37 -0.12 -0.11 -0.54 -0.65 -0.57 0.68
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
MNG -13.30 -1.60 -1.58 -3.43 -1.72 -3.70 1.99
(0.44) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03)
MOZ -3.02 -0.29 -0.27 -3.99 -0.34 -4.12 0.48
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01)
MUS -3.55 -0.36 -0.34 -1.68 -0.43 -2.09 0.84
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.06) (0.04)
MWI -1.85 -0.22 -0.20 -0.54 -0.22 -0.99 0.67
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.05) (0.03)
MYS -4.21 -0.40 -0.39 -4.09 -0.46 -4.23 0.61
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.41) (0.02) (0.42) (0.03)
NAM -2.80 -0.26 -0.24 -1.10 -0.25 -1.06 0.20
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
NGA -3.70 -0.45 -0.44 -1.86 -0.41 -2.35 0.92
(0.13) (0.01) (0.01) (0.40) (0.01) (0.42) (0.04)
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NIC -2.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.44 -0.59 0.40 0.62
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02)
NLD -1.33 0.26 0.28 2.89 -0.28 2.54 0.62
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) (0.14) (0.02)
NOR -1.88 0.12 0.13 5.35 -0.65 4.59 1.37
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.02) (0.15) (0.04)
NPL -3.16 -0.31 -0.30 -1.78 -0.32 -1.88 0.42
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
NZL -1.32 -0.08 -0.08 -0.59 -0.07 -0.76 0.24
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.15) (0.01)
OMN -6.29 -0.62 -0.61 -3.57 -0.68 -3.75 0.86
(0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.18) (0.01) (0.20) (0.04)
PAK -3.65 -0.06 -0.05 -0.26 -0.46 -0.33 0.53
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02)
PAN -9.02 -1.03 -1.02 -3.59 -1.04 -3.52 0.97
(0.12) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01)
PER -1.16 -0.02 -0.01 -0.16 -0.08 -0.42 0.34
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.07) (0.02)
PHL -1.90 -0.09 -0.07 -1.07 -0.15 -1.07 0.15
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.01) (0.17) (0.01)
POL -5.19 -0.42 -0.42 -4.15 -0.54 -4.23 0.63
(0.13) (0.02) (0.02) (0.29) (0.02) (0.29) (0.03)
PRT -1.68 0.15 0.17 1.30 -0.31 1.31 0.30
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01)
PRY -1.74 -0.09 -0.08 -0.97 -0.26 -0.99 0.28
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
QAT -3.97 -0.36 -0.35 -6.12 -0.47 -6.45 0.82
(0.13) (0.01) (0.01) (0.25) (0.02) (0.27) (0.04)
ROU -5.27 -0.45 -0.45 -6.22 -0.49 -6.27 0.55
(0.14) (0.02) (0.02) (0.29) (0.02) (0.29) (0.02)
RUS -4.29 -0.27 -0.27 -1.96 -0.40 -2.21 0.66
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.08) (0.03)
SAU -3.89 -0.39 -0.38 -2.93 -0.42 -3.24 0.74
(0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.20) (0.02) (0.22) (0.04)
SEN -3.41 -0.34 -0.32 -3.06 -0.39 -3.08 0.41
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.20) (0.01) (0.20) (0.01)
SGP -0.86 0.04 0.04 -1.19 -0.02 -1.26 0.09
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.11) (0.01)
SLV -1.48 -0.04 -0.03 -0.20 -0.21 -0.21 0.21
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00)
SVK -2.20 0.01 0.02 -1.54 -0.24 -1.55 0.26
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00)
SVN -2.70 -0.09 -0.09 -0.12 -0.34 -0.20 0.42
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
SWE -2.18 0.28 0.29 3.59 -0.71 3.69 0.62
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02)
THA -2.46 -0.09 -0.09 -0.52 -0.18 -0.68 0.34
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.08) (0.02)
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TUN -5.95 -0.61 -0.59 -5.39 -0.69 -5.71 1.03
(0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.22) (0.02) (0.24) (0.03)
TUR -2.58 0.20 0.21 2.18 -0.43 2.04 0.58
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03)
TWN -1.52 -0.03 -0.02 -0.77 -0.11 -0.79 0.13
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01)
TZA -3.23 -0.33 -0.31 -1.60 -0.33 -1.73 0.46
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01)
UGA -1.51 -0.06 -0.04 0.28 -0.29 -0.32 0.89
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04)
UKR -10.97 -1.04 -1.04 -5.34 -1.17 -5.34 1.17
(0.28) (0.04) (0.04) (0.19) (0.04) (0.19) (0.04)
URY -1.10 0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.13 0.06 0.13
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
USA -1.31 -0.02 -0.01 -0.14 -0.03 -0.38 0.27
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01)
VEN -3.52 -0.33 -0.32 -6.07 -0.43 -6.36 0.74
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.19) (0.01) (0.21) (0.04)
VNM -8.61 -0.75 -0.74 -5.76 -0.85 -5.83 0.93
(0.17) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.02) (0.16) (0.04)
XAC -1.11 -0.33 -0.31 -1.76 -0.19 -2.27 0.72
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.27) (0.01) (0.30) (0.04)
XCA -1.04 0.01 0.02 -0.59 -0.14 -0.69 0.24
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01)
XCB -1.54 -0.05 -0.03 -0.93 -0.09 -1.32 0.48
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.08) (0.02)
XCF -1.61 -0.23 -0.21 -1.28 -0.17 -1.84 0.73
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.16) (0.04)
XEA -10.34 -1.55 -1.53 -5.65 -1.67 -5.60 1.62
(0.12) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02)
XEC -1.73 -0.12 -0.10 0.16 -0.10 -0.52 0.78
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.04)
XEE -8.34 -0.95 -0.95 -1.29 -1.00 -1.35 1.07
(0.18) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
XEF -3.07 -0.24 -0.23 -7.96 -0.33 -7.97 0.34
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.18) (0.01) (0.18) (0.01)
XER -6.54 -0.62 -0.61 -3.88 -0.82 -3.95 0.90
(0.15) (0.02) (0.02) (0.19) (0.03) (0.20) (0.03)
XNA -1.49 0.05 0.07 -0.47 -0.21 -0.81 0.55
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.05) (0.02)
XNF -4.47 -0.47 -0.45 -9.24 -0.65 -9.55 0.98
(0.16) (0.02) (0.02) (0.72) (0.04) (0.73) (0.06)
XOC -1.40 -0.08 -0.07 -0.44 -0.10 -0.76 0.42
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.13) (0.02)
XSA -1.62 -0.03 -0.02 -0.83 -0.19 -1.20 0.56
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.06) (0.02)
XSC -1.17 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.64 0.66
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.04)
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XSE -2.90 -0.35 -0.34 -0.71 -0.45 -1.07 0.81
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.16) (0.04)
XSM -0.65 0.07 0.08 -0.38 -0.06 -0.46 0.14
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00)
XSU -15.87 -1.46 -1.45 -5.18 -2.05 -4.99 1.85
(0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.18) (0.06) (0.20) (0.08)
XWF -3.01 -0.27 -0.26 -1.07 -0.27 -1.60 0.81
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.12) (0.04)
XWS -7.78 -0.75 -0.74 -3.20 -1.05 -3.24 1.09
(0.18) (0.03) (0.03) (0.26) (0.05) (0.27) (0.06)
ZAF -5.16 -0.39 -0.37 -2.05 -0.44 -2.27 0.67
(0.15) (0.02) (0.02) (0.37) (0.02) (0.39) (0.04)
ZMB -1.04 0.00 0.02 -0.62 0.00 -0.76 0.14
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
ZWE -12.00 -1.31 -1.29 -3.12 -1.36 -3.02 1.26
(0.33) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04)
Notes: ∆Xi denotes the percentage changes in trade flows, ∆Ri the percentage changes in real
income, ∆U i the percentage changes in welfare, ∆Ei the percentage changes in carbon emissions,
PSE the percentage scale effects, PCE the percentage composition effects, and PTE the percentage
technique effects. The numbers in parentheses below the reported values give the corresponding
bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table C.12: Copenhagen Accord (Appendix I, Without Tariffs)
∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE PTE LSE LCE LTE
ALB -0.05 -0.05 0.09 5.19 -0.05 5.24 0.00 -0.01 1.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.14) (0.02) (0.12) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
ARE -0.08 0.34 0.44 4.42 0.34 4.06 0.00 0.08 0.92 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.27) (0.02) (0.25) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ARG -0.21 0.19 0.32 3.11 0.19 2.92 0.00 0.06 0.94 0.00
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.38) (0.03) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ARM 0.00 0.04 0.17 1.34 0.04 1.30 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AUS 0.24 -0.77 -0.77 -23.02 -0.77 -2.92 -25.14 0.03 0.11 0.86
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.27) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
AUT 0.17 -1.52 -1.38 -37.91 -1.52 -5.00 -50.69 0.03 0.11 0.86
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AZE -0.25 1.04 1.18 6.90 1.04 5.80 0.00 0.16 0.84 0.00
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.19) (0.02) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BEL -0.03 -1.41 -1.27 -22.94 -1.41 -3.72 -23.18 0.05 0.15 0.80
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.18) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
BGD -0.06 0.01 0.14 1.87 0.01 1.86 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BGR -0.11 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01 4.24 -4.23 - - -
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) - - -
BHR -0.05 2.09 2.19 7.72 2.09 5.51 0.00 0.28 0.72 0.00
(0.01) (0.13) (0.13) (0.50) (0.13) (0.36) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BLR -0.07 0.24 0.28 0.00 0.24 3.10 -3.35 - - -
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) - - -
BOL -0.32 0.45 0.58 4.07 0.45 3.61 0.00 0.11 0.89 0.00
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.28) (0.03) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BRA -0.25 0.04 0.17 1.72 0.04 1.67 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.25) (0.01) (0.23) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
BWA -0.01 -0.10 0.10 0.07 -0.10 0.17 0.00 -1.51 2.51 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.13) (0.13) (0.00)
CAN 0.08 -0.89 -0.89 -16.66 -0.89 -1.14 -17.57 0.05 0.06 0.89
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.12) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
CHE -0.08 -0.37 -0.22 -15.94 -0.37 1.82 -20.68 0.02 -0.10 1.08
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CHL -0.29 0.04 0.13 1.65 0.04 1.61 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.22) (0.02) (0.21) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
CHN -0.41 0.06 0.07 1.36 0.06 1.30 0.00 0.05 0.95 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CIV -0.22 0.88 1.08 10.75 0.88 9.79 0.00 0.09 0.91 0.00
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.40) (0.03) (0.37) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CMR -0.12 0.41 0.61 8.13 0.41 7.70 0.00 0.05 0.95 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.28) (0.01) (0.27) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
COL -0.16 0.19 0.28 4.47 0.19 4.27 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.42) (0.02) (0.40) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CRI -0.14 -0.11 -0.01 2.99 -0.11 3.10 0.00 -0.04 1.04 0.00
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CYP -0.05 -2.33 -2.21 -57.38 -2.33 -7.58 -111.8 0.03 0.09 0.88
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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CZE -0.04 -0.72 -0.68 -15.67 -0.72 1.37 -19.34 0.04 -0.08 1.04
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DEU -0.18 -0.56 -0.41 -10.65 -0.56 2.25 -13.81 0.05 -0.20 1.15
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.09) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
DNK -0.14 -0.44 -0.30 -10.05 -0.44 2.16 -13.08 0.04 -0.20 1.16
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.07) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
ECU -0.25 0.30 0.39 4.92 0.30 4.60 0.00 0.06 0.94 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.44) (0.03) (0.40) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
EGY -0.28 0.78 0.98 6.65 0.78 5.83 0.00 0.12 0.88 0.00
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.38) (0.04) (0.34) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ESP 1.06 -2.68 -2.54 -54.23 -2.68 -9.88 -91.65 0.03 0.13 0.83
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.61) (1.25) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
EST -0.04 -0.45 -0.41 -8.48 -0.45 0.71 -9.55 0.05 -0.08 1.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ETH -0.07 -0.15 0.05 0.48 -0.15 0.63 0.00 -0.31 1.31 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
FIN 0.73 -2.41 -2.27 -39.35 -2.41 -10.91 -43.35 0.05 0.23 0.72
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.27) (0.42) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
FRA 0.01 -0.97 -0.83 -24.86 -0.97 -0.99 -30.47 0.03 0.03 0.93
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GBR 0.04 -0.83 -0.69 -21.08 -0.83 -0.64 -24.86 0.04 0.03 0.94
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GEO -0.01 -0.09 0.04 0.57 -0.09 0.66 0.00 -0.16 1.16 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
GHA -0.10 0.21 0.41 5.22 0.21 5.00 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.22) (0.01) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GRC 0.90 -4.84 -4.70 -43.30 -4.84 -10.50 -50.21 0.09 0.20 0.72
(0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.17) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GTM -0.10 -0.14 0.00 0.71 -0.14 0.84 0.00 -0.19 1.19 0.00
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
HKG -0.07 -0.13 -0.13 -0.06 -0.13 0.08 0.00 2.35 -1.35 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.13) (0.00)
HND -0.11 -0.23 -0.10 0.41 -0.23 0.64 0.00 -0.57 1.57 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
HRV 0.50 -4.00 -3.97 -48.44 -4.00 -9.46 -68.58 0.06 0.15 0.79
(0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.09) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HUN -0.08 -0.51 -0.47 -6.83 -0.51 3.10 -10.10 0.07 -0.43 1.36
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.08) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
IDN -0.35 0.12 0.25 2.09 0.12 1.97 0.00 0.06 0.94 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.27) (0.02) (0.25) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
IND -0.19 0.20 0.45 2.07 0.20 1.87 0.00 0.10 0.90 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.21) (0.02) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
IRL 0.07 -0.93 -0.79 -47.60 -0.93 -7.79 -74.32 0.01 0.13 0.86
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
IRN -0.46 0.67 0.77 3.91 0.67 3.22 0.00 0.18 0.82 0.00
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.34) (0.06) (0.27) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ISR -0.13 0.28 0.28 6.36 0.28 6.07 0.00 0.05 0.95 0.00
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.50) (0.03) (0.47) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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ITA 0.41 -1.51 -1.37 -32.31 -1.51 -3.93 -39.80 0.04 0.10 0.86
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.26) (0.38) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
JPN 1.13 -1.50 -1.48 -34.38 -1.50 -4.26 -43.72 0.04 0.10 0.86
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.33) (0.49) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
KAZ -0.10 -0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.04 2.15 -2.11 - - -
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08) - - -
KEN -0.08 0.17 0.37 4.99 0.17 4.81 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.31) (0.01) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
KGZ -0.02 0.02 0.16 0.45 0.02 0.42 0.00 0.05 0.95 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
KHM -0.03 -0.21 -0.08 0.13 -0.21 0.34 0.00 -1.67 2.67 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.12) (0.12) (0.00)
KOR -0.44 0.37 0.49 4.47 0.37 4.09 0.00 0.08 0.92 0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.38) (0.04) (0.34) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
KWT -0.09 1.58 1.68 8.58 1.58 6.89 0.00 0.19 0.81 0.00
(0.01) (0.08) (0.07) (0.43) (0.08) (0.34) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LAO 0.00 0.09 0.22 3.21 0.09 3.12 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LKA -0.12 0.05 0.18 2.25 0.05 2.20 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LTU -0.07 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.06 5.16 -5.22 - - -
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.10) (0.10) - - -
LUX -0.01 -1.17 -1.03 -31.94 -1.17 -1.00 -43.76 0.03 0.03 0.94
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LVA -0.01 -0.26 -0.23 0.00 -0.26 0.51 -0.24 - - -
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) - - -
MAR -0.55 0.60 0.80 12.48 0.60 11.81 0.00 0.05 0.95 0.00
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.40) (0.02) (0.39) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MDG -0.04 -0.07 0.13 2.42 -0.07 2.49 0.00 -0.03 1.03 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MEX -0.43 0.06 0.15 3.91 0.06 3.85 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.00
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.67) (0.03) (0.64) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
MLT -0.03 -0.60 -0.48 -40.04 -0.60 -5.83 -56.12 0.01 0.12 0.87
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MNG -0.02 -0.18 -0.05 0.05 -0.18 0.23 0.00 -3.55 4.55 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.70) (0.70) (0.00)
MOZ -0.02 -0.06 0.14 0.68 -0.06 0.74 0.00 -0.08 1.08 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
MUS -0.04 -0.17 0.03 1.15 -0.17 1.32 0.00 -0.15 1.15 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MWI -0.02 -0.10 0.10 1.94 -0.10 2.05 0.00 -0.05 1.05 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MYS -0.12 0.11 0.24 2.54 0.11 2.42 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.28) (0.02) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NAM -0.02 -0.15 0.05 -0.23 -0.15 -0.08 0.00 0.66 0.34 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
NGA -0.15 0.00 0.20 3.99 0.00 3.99 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.24) (0.01) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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NIC -0.09 0.31 0.45 3.77 0.31 3.45 0.00 0.08 0.92 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.18) (0.02) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NLD 0.22 -1.88 -1.74 -30.72 -1.88 -9.68 -27.92 0.05 0.28 0.67
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.13) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NOR 0.82 -3.20 -3.06 -54.75 -3.20 -20.36 -70.40 0.04 0.29 0.67
(0.09) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.29) (0.57) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NPL -0.02 -0.09 0.04 0.68 -0.09 0.77 0.00 -0.13 1.13 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NZL 0.82 -1.41 -1.41 -40.22 -1.41 -8.51 -50.90 0.03 0.17 0.80
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.44) (0.71) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
OMN -0.10 0.36 0.46 3.63 0.36 3.25 0.00 0.10 0.90 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PAK -0.15 0.22 0.36 2.25 0.22 2.02 0.00 0.10 0.90 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.14) (0.02) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PAN -0.03 -0.35 -0.26 -0.27 -0.35 0.08 0.00 1.31 -0.31 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00)
PER -0.25 0.14 0.23 4.11 0.14 3.97 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.43) (0.02) (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PHL -0.21 0.09 0.22 3.37 0.09 3.28 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.28) (0.02) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
POL -0.06 -0.65 -0.61 -12.15 -0.65 1.48 -14.76 0.05 -0.11 1.06
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
PRT 0.59 -2.64 -2.50 -48.00 -2.64 -8.81 -70.74 0.04 0.14 0.82
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.29) (0.52) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PRY -0.05 -0.12 -0.02 -0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 0.66 0.34 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.00)
QAT -0.02 0.42 0.52 5.60 0.42 5.15 0.00 0.08 0.92 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.28) (0.02) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ROU -0.16 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 5.25 -5.18 - - -
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.10) (0.09) - - -
RUS -0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.13 0.01 2.14 -2.28 -0.10 -16.59 17.69
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08) (0.01) (0.59) (0.59)
SAU -0.28 0.75 0.85 4.71 0.75 3.92 0.00 0.16 0.84 0.00
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.38) (0.06) (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SEN -0.24 0.40 0.60 6.96 0.40 6.53 0.00 0.06 0.94 0.00
(0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.14) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SGP -0.08 0.47 0.47 4.74 0.47 4.25 0.00 0.10 0.90 0.00
(0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.46) (0.05) (0.40) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SLV -0.10 0.06 0.15 3.89 0.06 3.83 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.24) (0.01) (0.23) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SVK -0.02 -0.66 -0.62 -9.90 -0.66 1.64 -12.06 0.06 -0.16 1.09
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
SVN 0.01 -1.40 -1.37 -42.39 -1.40 -1.03 -69.38 0.03 0.02 0.96
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SWE 0.01 -0.92 -0.78 -18.93 -0.92 -0.83 -21.21 0.04 0.04 0.92
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.16) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
THA -0.23 0.24 0.33 2.76 0.24 2.52 0.00 0.09 0.91 0.00
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.29) (0.03) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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TUN -0.13 0.10 0.30 6.25 0.10 6.14 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
TUR -0.30 0.17 0.27 4.20 0.17 4.02 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.27) (0.01) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
TWN -0.44 0.26 0.39 4.08 0.26 3.80 0.00 0.07 0.93 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.37) (0.03) (0.34) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
TZA -0.03 -0.08 0.11 0.52 -0.08 0.61 0.00 -0.16 1.16 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
UGA -0.05 -0.03 0.16 1.88 -0.03 1.92 0.00 -0.02 1.02 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
UKR -0.24 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 1.95 -1.89 - - -
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) - - -
URY -0.09 0.11 0.20 3.18 0.11 3.06 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.22) (0.01) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
USA 0.03 -0.62 -0.60 -17.00 -0.62 -0.86 -18.70 0.03 0.05 0.92
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.16) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
VEN -0.05 0.70 0.80 7.77 0.70 7.01 0.00 0.09 0.91 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.41) (0.03) (0.37) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
VNM -0.23 -0.10 0.04 0.63 -0.10 0.73 0.00 -0.16 1.16 0.00
(0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
XAC -0.14 0.06 0.26 5.21 0.06 5.15 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.32) (0.01) (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XCA -0.01 0.11 0.20 5.41 0.11 5.29 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.24) (0.01) (0.22) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XCB -0.21 0.38 0.50 5.12 0.38 4.72 0.00 0.08 0.92 0.00
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.48) (0.04) (0.44) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XCF -0.19 0.10 0.29 5.71 0.10 5.61 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.31) (0.01) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XEA -0.01 0.02 0.14 1.71 0.02 1.70 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XEC -0.27 0.18 0.38 3.33 0.18 3.14 0.00 0.06 0.94 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.28) (0.02) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XEE 0.00 -0.21 -0.17 0.25 -0.21 0.46 0.00 -0.82 1.82 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00)
XEF 0.03 -1.36 -1.22 -25.00 -1.36 -11.93 -15.82 0.05 0.44 0.51
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XER -0.40 0.51 0.64 6.68 0.51 6.13 0.00 0.08 0.92 0.00
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XNA -0.10 0.86 1.00 11.77 0.86 10.82 0.00 0.08 0.92 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XNF -0.41 1.23 1.43 12.64 1.23 11.28 0.00 0.10 0.90 0.00
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.60) (0.05) (0.54) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XOC -0.23 0.14 0.24 4.44 0.14 4.29 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.37) (0.01) (0.36) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XSA -0.04 0.15 0.28 4.41 0.15 4.25 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XSC -0.01 -0.08 0.12 2.05 -0.08 2.13 0.00 -0.04 1.04 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE PTE LSE LCE LTE
XSE -0.10 0.12 0.25 2.99 0.12 2.87 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.18) (0.01) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XSM -0.09 0.26 0.35 7.68 0.26 7.40 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.30) (0.01) (0.29) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XSU -0.29 0.79 0.92 3.04 0.79 2.23 0.00 0.26 0.74 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.03) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XWF -0.13 -0.03 0.17 2.76 -0.03 2.79 0.00 -0.01 1.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XWS -0.45 0.57 0.70 3.77 0.57 3.18 0.00 0.15 0.85 0.00
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.35) (0.05) (0.29) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ZAF -0.20 0.09 0.29 2.81 0.09 2.72 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.44) (0.02) (0.42) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ZMB -0.09 0.05 0.25 1.86 0.05 1.81 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ZWE -0.04 0.08 0.28 1.17 0.08 1.09 0.00 0.07 0.93 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: ∆Xi denotes the percentage changes in trade flows, ∆Ri the percentage changes in real income, ∆U i the percentage
changes in welfare, ∆Ei the percentage changes in carbon emissions, PSE the percentage scale effects, PCE the percentage
composition effects, PTE the percentage technique effects, LSE the log scale effects, LCE the log composition effects, and LTE
the log technique effects. Note that for countries with constant emissions, these log changes are not defined. The numbers in
parentheses below the reported values give the corresponding bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table C.13: Copenhagen Accord (Appendix I, With Tariffs)
∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE PTE LSE LCE LTE
ALB -4.92 -1.31 -1.17 -1.75 -1.31 -0.44 0.00 0.75 0.25 0.00
(0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.08) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00)
ARE -3.88 -0.17 -0.06 1.20 -0.17 1.37 0.00 -0.14 1.14 0.00
(0.14) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.11) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
ARG -2.21 -0.14 0.00 1.26 -0.14 1.41 0.00 -0.11 1.11 0.00
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.15) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
ARM -2.16 -0.26 -0.11 -0.12 -0.26 0.15 0.00 2.27 -1.27 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.17) (0.17) (0.00)
AUS -0.29 -0.69 -0.69 -23.02 -0.80 -1.33 -27.14 0.03 0.05 0.92
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.20) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
AUT -0.19 -1.45 -1.30 -37.91 -1.66 -4.27 -51.63 0.04 0.09 0.87
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AZE -6.72 -0.33 -0.19 1.09 -0.33 1.42 0.00 -0.31 1.31 0.00
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
BEL -0.20 -1.33 -1.18 -22.94 -1.44 -2.87 -24.23 0.06 0.11 0.83
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BGD -1.82 -0.23 -0.08 0.50 -0.23 0.73 0.00 -0.45 1.45 0.00
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
BGR -0.39 0.17 0.21 0.00 0.00 5.24 -5.23 - - -
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) - - -
BHR -5.17 0.26 0.37 1.68 0.26 1.42 0.00 0.15 0.85 0.00
(0.27) (0.03) (0.03) (0.17) (0.03) (0.13) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
BLR -0.20 0.36 0.40 0.00 0.28 3.64 -3.92 - - -
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) - - -
BOL -3.46 -0.24 -0.10 1.13 -0.24 1.37 0.00 -0.22 1.22 0.00
(0.14) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
BRA -2.33 -0.16 -0.02 0.73 -0.16 0.89 0.00 -0.22 1.22 0.00
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.11) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00)
BWA -3.52 -0.38 -0.16 -0.40 -0.38 -0.02 0.00 0.96 0.04 0.00
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
CAN -0.28 -0.83 -0.83 -16.66 -0.92 -0.49 -18.31 0.05 0.03 0.92
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CHE -0.14 -0.30 -0.15 -15.94 -0.35 2.51 -21.53 0.02 -0.14 1.12
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CHL -2.79 -0.30 -0.20 0.77 -0.30 1.07 0.00 -0.39 1.39 0.00
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
CHN -2.16 -0.07 -0.06 0.56 -0.07 0.62 0.00 -0.12 1.12 0.00
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00)
CIV -3.72 -0.24 -0.02 2.41 -0.24 2.66 0.00 -0.10 1.10 0.00
(0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.07) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
CMR -3.08 -0.31 -0.10 2.08 -0.31 2.40 0.00 -0.15 1.15 0.00
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.07) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
COL -2.74 -0.19 -0.08 1.39 -0.19 1.57 0.00 -0.13 1.13 0.00
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.14) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
CRI -2.46 -0.48 -0.38 0.65 -0.48 1.13 0.00 -0.74 1.74 0.00
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.09) (0.09) (0.00)
CYP -1.92 -2.37 -2.23 -57.38 -3.51 -7.32 -109.8 0.04 0.09 0.87
(0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE PTE LSE LCE LTE
CZE -0.26 -0.65 -0.61 -15.67 -0.78 2.24 -20.29 0.05 -0.13 1.08
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DEU -0.32 -0.50 -0.34 -10.65 -0.56 2.98 -14.61 0.05 -0.26 1.21
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.16) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
DNK -0.28 -0.36 -0.21 -10.05 -0.45 2.81 -13.78 0.04 -0.26 1.22
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.07) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
ECU -3.12 -0.23 -0.13 1.60 -0.23 1.83 0.00 -0.15 1.15 0.00
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
EGY -4.13 -0.21 0.01 1.45 -0.21 1.66 0.00 -0.14 1.14 0.00
(0.15) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
ESP 0.02 -2.59 -2.44 -54.23 -2.88 -8.53 -94.10 0.04 0.11 0.85
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.58) (1.21) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
EST -0.16 -0.37 -0.33 -8.48 -0.46 0.97 -9.82 0.05 -0.11 1.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ETH -2.22 -0.43 -0.21 -0.35 -0.43 0.08 0.00 1.22 -0.22 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00)
FIN 0.09 -2.34 -2.19 -39.35 -2.61 -9.89 -44.70 0.05 0.21 0.74
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.26) (0.40) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
FRA -0.27 -0.90 -0.75 -24.86 -1.01 -0.19 -31.49 0.04 0.01 0.96
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GBR -0.24 -0.76 -0.60 -21.08 -0.86 0.08 -25.72 0.04 0.00 0.97
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GEO -2.82 -0.48 -0.34 -0.48 -0.48 0.01 0.00 1.01 -0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
GHA -2.45 -0.28 -0.06 1.23 -0.28 1.52 0.00 -0.23 1.23 0.00
(0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (0.10) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00)
GRC -1.28 -4.77 -4.62 -43.30 -5.62 -9.39 -50.83 0.10 0.17 0.72
(0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.21) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GTM -2.42 -0.42 -0.27 -0.11 -0.42 0.31 0.00 3.84 -2.84 0.00
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.50) (0.50) (0.00)
HKG -2.21 -0.42 -0.42 -0.43 -0.42 -0.01 0.00 0.97 0.03 0.00
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
HND -2.28 -0.52 -0.38 -0.40 -0.52 0.12 0.00 1.30 -0.30 0.00
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00)
HRV -0.55 -3.93 -3.90 -48.44 -4.51 -8.62 -69.24 0.07 0.14 0.79
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.06) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HUN -0.25 -0.42 -0.38 -6.83 -0.54 4.10 -11.13 0.08 -0.57 1.49
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
IDN -2.38 -0.11 0.04 1.04 -0.11 1.15 0.00 -0.11 1.11 0.00
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.10) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
IND -2.14 -0.09 0.19 0.68 -0.09 0.77 0.00 -0.13 1.13 0.00
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.09) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00)
IRL -0.24 -0.86 -0.71 -47.60 -1.07 -7.34 -74.93 0.02 0.12 0.87
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
IRN -4.09 -0.08 0.02 1.29 -0.08 1.37 0.00 -0.06 1.06 0.00
(0.11) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.02) (0.10) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
ISR -3.33 -0.36 -0.36 1.15 -0.36 1.52 0.00 -0.32 1.32 0.00
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.10) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00)
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∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE PTE LSE LCE LTE
ITA -0.17 -1.43 -1.27 -32.31 -1.59 -3.00 -41.02 0.04 0.08 0.88
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.28) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
JPN -0.87 -1.39 -1.36 -34.38 -1.64 -2.53 -46.11 0.04 0.06 0.90
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.23) (0.35) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
KAZ -0.12 0.03 0.13 0.00 -0.03 2.47 -2.44 - - -
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.12) (0.12) - - -
KEN -2.01 -0.19 0.03 1.51 -0.19 1.71 0.00 -0.13 1.13 0.00
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
KGZ -2.82 -0.46 -0.31 -0.48 -0.46 -0.02 0.00 0.95 0.05 0.00
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
KHM -1.36 -0.38 -0.23 -0.34 -0.38 0.04 0.00 1.12 -0.12 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
KOR -2.98 -0.14 -0.01 1.32 -0.14 1.46 0.00 -0.11 1.11 0.00
(0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.13) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
KWT -5.51 0.02 0.13 1.75 0.02 1.73 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00
(0.22) (0.03) (0.03) (0.20) (0.03) (0.17) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
LAO -1.51 -0.18 -0.04 0.67 -0.18 0.85 0.00 -0.27 1.27 0.00
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
LKA -2.22 -0.34 -0.20 0.36 -0.34 0.70 0.00 -0.96 1.96 0.00
(0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.07) (0.07) (0.00)
LTU -0.19 0.18 0.22 0.00 0.10 5.99 -6.10 - - -
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.11) (0.11) - - -
LUX -0.20 -1.10 -0.95 -31.94 -1.25 -0.98 -43.66 0.03 0.03 0.94
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LVA 0.00 -0.22 -0.18 0.00 -0.22 0.68 -0.45 - - -
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) - - -
MAR -5.32 -0.48 -0.26 2.41 -0.48 2.90 0.00 -0.20 1.20 0.00
(0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.35) (0.06) (0.30) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.00)
MDG -2.67 -0.33 -0.12 0.26 -0.33 0.60 0.00 -1.29 2.29 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.36) (0.36) (0.00)
MEX -2.83 -0.28 -0.18 1.87 -0.28 2.16 0.00 -0.15 1.15 0.00
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.18) (0.01) (0.19) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
MLT -0.64 -0.58 -0.45 -40.04 -1.07 -5.60 -55.76 0.02 0.11 0.87
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MNG -3.48 -0.60 -0.46 -0.71 -0.60 -0.11 0.00 0.85 0.15 0.00
(0.28) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
MOZ -2.70 -0.41 -0.19 -0.30 -0.41 0.11 0.00 1.36 -0.36 0.00
(0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08) (0.00)
MUS -2.62 -0.51 -0.29 -0.22 -0.51 0.29 0.00 2.32 -1.32 0.00
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.26) (0.26) (0.00)
MWI -2.54 -0.50 -0.28 0.09 -0.50 0.59 0.00 -5.45 6.45 0.00
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (4.50) (4.50) (0.00)
MYS -1.92 -0.21 -0.07 0.74 -0.21 0.95 0.00 -0.28 1.28 0.00
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.11) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00)
NAM -2.83 -0.46 -0.24 -0.67 -0.46 -0.22 0.00 0.68 0.32 0.00
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
NGA -5.51 -0.43 -0.21 1.72 -0.43 2.16 0.00 -0.25 1.25 0.00
(0.28) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.14) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
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∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE PTE LSE LCE LTE
NIC -2.53 -0.40 -0.25 0.72 -0.40 1.12 0.00 -0.55 1.55 0.00
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.09) (0.09) (0.00)
NLD -0.05 -1.81 -1.65 -30.72 -1.94 -9.03 -28.78 0.05 0.26 0.69
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.09) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NOR 0.18 -3.14 -2.98 -54.75 -3.44 -19.62 -71.54 0.04 0.28 0.68
(0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.31) (0.62) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NPL -1.85 -0.32 -0.18 -0.12 -0.32 0.21 0.00 2.79 -1.79 0.00
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.16) (0.16) (0.00)
NZL -0.29 -1.32 -1.32 -40.22 -1.62 -5.67 -55.26 0.03 0.11 0.85
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.49) (0.80) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
OMN -5.62 -0.26 -0.15 0.78 -0.26 1.05 0.00 -0.34 1.34 0.00
(0.16) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00)
PAK -2.10 -0.18 -0.03 0.53 -0.18 0.72 0.00 -0.34 1.34 0.00
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00)
PAN -2.12 -0.61 -0.51 -0.76 -0.61 -0.15 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
PER -2.66 -0.19 -0.09 1.47 -0.19 1.67 0.00 -0.13 1.13 0.00
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.14) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
PHL -1.99 -0.22 -0.08 1.02 -0.22 1.24 0.00 -0.22 1.22 0.00
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
POL -0.32 -0.57 -0.53 -12.15 -0.69 2.29 -15.63 0.05 -0.17 1.12
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.12) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
PRT -0.48 -2.54 -2.39 -48.00 -2.95 -7.55 -72.55 0.05 0.12 0.83
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.27) (0.50) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PRY -1.90 -0.35 -0.25 -0.55 -0.35 -0.19 0.00 0.65 0.35 0.00
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
QAT -4.22 -0.10 0.01 1.78 -0.10 1.88 0.00 -0.06 1.06 0.00
(0.19) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.12) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
ROU -0.27 0.03 0.07 0.00 -0.05 6.22 -6.17 - - -
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.15) (0.14) - - -
RUS -0.05 0.08 0.08 -0.13 0.04 2.50 -2.67 -0.34 -19.34 20.68
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.12) (0.02) (0.92) (0.91)
SAU -5.29 -0.02 0.09 1.55 -0.02 1.57 0.00 -0.01 1.01 0.00
(0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.18) (0.02) (0.15) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
SEN -3.77 -0.52 -0.30 1.06 -0.52 1.59 0.00 -0.50 1.50 0.00
(0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.17) (0.04) (0.14) (0.00) (0.14) (0.14) (0.00)
SGP -2.29 -0.13 -0.13 1.21 -0.13 1.33 0.00 -0.10 1.10 0.00
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.15) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00)
SLV -2.37 -0.38 -0.28 1.28 -0.38 1.67 0.00 -0.30 1.30 0.00
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00)
SVK -0.20 -0.57 -0.53 -9.90 -0.69 2.61 -13.11 0.07 -0.25 1.18
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.08) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
SVN -0.32 -1.34 -1.30 -42.39 -1.57 -0.70 -69.66 0.03 0.01 0.96
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SWE -0.23 -0.84 -0.68 -18.93 -0.96 0.16 -22.37 0.05 -0.01 0.96
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
THA -1.99 -0.14 -0.04 0.83 -0.14 0.97 0.00 -0.16 1.16 0.00
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.11) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00)
Continued on next page
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TUN -4.73 -0.85 -0.64 -0.27 -0.85 0.59 0.00 3.18 -2.18 0.00
(0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.18) (0.03) (0.16) (0.00) (40.6) (40.6) (0.00)
TUR -3.62 -0.40 -0.30 0.77 -0.40 1.18 0.00 -0.53 1.53 0.00
(0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00)
TWN -2.56 -0.14 -0.01 1.51 -0.14 1.66 0.00 -0.10 1.10 0.00
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.12) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
TZA -2.15 -0.34 -0.12 -0.16 -0.34 0.18 0.00 2.10 -1.10 0.00
(0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.20) (0.20) (0.00)
UGA -2.89 -0.37 -0.15 0.28 -0.37 0.65 0.00 -1.34 2.34 0.00
(0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.18) (0.18) (0.00)
UKR -0.41 0.03 0.07 0.00 -0.05 2.26 -2.20 - - -
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) - - -
URY -2.21 -0.25 -0.15 0.87 -0.25 1.12 0.00 -0.29 1.29 0.00
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
USA -0.31 -0.58 -0.55 -17.00 -0.63 -0.43 -19.21 0.03 0.02 0.94
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
VEN -3.60 -0.12 -0.02 1.35 -0.12 1.47 0.00 -0.09 1.09 0.00
(0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.21) (0.02) (0.20) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00)
VNM -2.14 -0.29 -0.15 0.04 -0.29 0.33 0.00 -7.33 8.33 0.00
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (246) (246) (0.00)
XAC -6.13 -0.43 -0.21 2.35 -0.43 2.79 0.00 -0.18 1.18 0.00
(0.19) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
XCA -2.65 -0.47 -0.37 0.69 -0.47 1.17 0.00 -0.69 1.69 0.00
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.07) (0.07) (0.00)
XCB -3.05 -0.22 -0.08 1.03 -0.22 1.25 0.00 -0.21 1.21 0.00
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) (0.15) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00)
XCF -4.97 -0.39 -0.18 2.02 -0.39 2.42 0.00 -0.20 1.20 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
XEA -2.45 -0.36 -0.23 0.14 -0.36 0.50 0.00 -2.62 3.62 0.00
(0.18) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (3.18) (3.18) (0.00)
XEC -3.58 -0.29 -0.07 0.86 -0.29 1.16 0.00 -0.34 1.34 0.00
(0.12) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.09) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
XEE -3.35 -0.78 -0.74 -0.80 -0.78 -0.01 0.00 0.98 0.02 0.00
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XEF -0.28 -1.30 -1.14 -25.00 -1.46 -11.72 -15.99 0.05 0.43 0.52
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XER -4.81 -0.63 -0.49 0.59 -0.63 1.23 0.00 -1.06 2.06 0.00
(0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.15) (0.04) (0.11) (0.00) (0.50) (0.50) (0.00)
XNA -4.02 -0.35 -0.20 0.47 -0.35 0.82 0.00 -0.77 1.77 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.14) (0.02) (0.12) (0.00) (1.59) (1.59) (0.00)
XNF -7.00 -0.24 -0.02 2.16 -0.24 2.41 0.00 -0.11 1.11 0.00
(0.14) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.13) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
XOC -3.36 -0.35 -0.25 1.15 -0.35 1.51 0.00 -0.31 1.31 0.00
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
XSA -2.69 -0.32 -0.17 0.51 -0.32 0.83 0.00 -0.62 1.62 0.00
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.00)
XSC -2.36 -0.39 -0.17 0.41 -0.39 0.80 0.00 -0.95 1.95 0.00
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.00)
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XSE -3.11 -0.34 -0.20 0.63 -0.34 0.97 0.00 -0.54 1.54 0.00
(0.17) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00)
XSM -3.44 -0.34 -0.24 1.00 -0.34 1.34 0.00 -0.35 1.35 0.00
(0.12) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.09) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.00)
XSU -4.73 -0.25 -0.11 0.32 -0.25 0.58 0.00 -0.80 1.80 0.00
(0.16) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.11) (0.11) (0.00)
XWF -3.78 -0.44 -0.22 0.74 -0.44 1.18 0.00 -0.60 1.60 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.09) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.11) (0.11) (0.00)
XWS -4.66 -0.32 -0.18 0.93 -0.32 1.26 0.00 -0.35 1.35 0.00
(0.21) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00)
ZAF -2.70 -0.24 -0.02 0.93 -0.24 1.18 0.00 -0.26 1.26 0.00
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01) (0.16) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.00)
ZMB -2.86 -0.36 -0.15 0.28 -0.36 0.64 0.00 -1.31 2.31 0.00
(0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.20) (0.20) (0.00)
ZWE -2.89 -0.35 -0.13 -0.06 -0.35 0.29 0.00 5.61 -4.61 0.00
(0.13) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (2.27) (2.27) (0.00)
Notes: ∆Xi denotes the percentage changes in trade flows, ∆Ri the percentage changes in real income, ∆U i the percentage
changes in welfare, ∆Ei the percentage changes in carbon emissions, PSE the percentage scale effects, PCE the percentage
composition effects, PTE the percentage technique effects, LSE the log scale effects, LCE the log composition effects, and LTE
the log technique effects. Note that for countries with constant emissions, these log changes are not defined. The numbers in
parentheses below the reported values give the corresponding bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table C.14: Copenhagen Accord (Appendices I and II, Without Tariffs)
∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE PTE LSE LCE LTE
ALB -0.06 0.01 0.29 6.43 0.01 6.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ARE -0.13 0.69 0.90 8.33 0.69 7.59 0.00 0.09 0.91 0.00
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.48) (0.04) (0.44) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ARG -0.44 0.58 0.84 8.09 0.58 7.47 0.00 0.07 0.93 0.00
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.96) (0.07) (0.88) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ARM 0.00 0.08 0.36 2.12 0.08 2.04 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AUS 0.10 -0.79 -0.79 -23.02 -0.79 -1.54 -26.89 0.03 0.06 0.91
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AUT 0.16 -1.55 -1.24 -37.91 -1.55 -4.28 -51.77 0.03 0.09 0.88
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AZE -0.38 1.72 2.01 10.88 1.72 9.00 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.00
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.43) (0.06) (0.36) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BEL -0.05 -1.41 -1.11 -22.94 -1.41 -2.98 -24.12 0.05 0.12 0.83
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BGD -0.20 0.06 0.35 5.80 0.06 5.74 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BGR -0.13 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.02 5.24 -5.26 - - -
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.08) (0.07) - - -
BHR -0.09 3.74 3.96 13.71 3.74 9.61 0.00 0.29 0.71 0.00
(0.01) (0.23) (0.23) (0.88) (0.23) (0.61) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BLR -0.07 0.31 0.39 0.00 0.31 4.01 -4.33 - - -
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06) - - -
BOL -0.69 1.20 1.49 9.82 1.20 8.52 0.00 0.13 0.87 0.00
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.63) (0.06) (0.56) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BRA 0.57 -1.52 -1.26 -27.77 -1.52 -3.67 -31.33 0.05 0.12 0.84
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.38) (0.51) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
BWA -0.05 -0.28 0.14 0.41 -0.28 0.69 0.00 -0.70 1.70 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.00)
CAN 0.03 -0.89 -0.89 -16.66 -0.89 -0.24 -18.64 0.05 0.01 0.94
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CHE -0.09 -0.38 -0.07 -15.94 -0.38 2.43 -21.39 0.02 -0.14 1.12
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CHL 0.64 -1.62 -1.43 -26.67 -1.62 -4.65 -27.92 0.05 0.15 0.79
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.11) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CHN 1.11 -2.37 -2.35 -37.10 -2.37 -2.51 -51.31 0.05 0.05 0.89
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.26) (0.40) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
CIV -0.30 1.40 1.84 16.62 1.40 15.01 0.00 0.09 0.91 0.00
(0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.84) (0.06) (0.76) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CMR -0.18 0.72 1.15 13.34 0.72 12.53 0.00 0.06 0.94 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.60) (0.03) (0.56) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
COL -0.25 0.38 0.58 8.20 0.38 7.78 0.00 0.05 0.95 0.00
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.83) (0.04) (0.79) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CRI 0.21 -1.82 -1.63 -53.41 -1.82 -7.11 -95.73 0.02 0.10 0.88
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.08) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CYP -0.06 -2.47 -2.21 -57.38 -2.47 -7.41 -111.9 0.03 0.09 0.88
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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CZE -0.05 -0.74 -0.67 -15.67 -0.74 2.34 -20.44 0.04 -0.14 1.09
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DEU -0.21 -0.58 -0.27 -10.65 -0.58 3.02 -14.63 0.05 -0.26 1.21
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.16) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
DNK -0.15 -0.45 -0.14 -10.05 -0.45 2.87 -13.85 0.04 -0.27 1.22
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
ECU -0.40 0.62 0.82 9.02 0.62 8.35 0.00 0.07 0.93 0.00
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.84) (0.06) (0.77) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
EGY -0.46 1.20 1.63 10.07 1.20 8.77 0.00 0.12 0.88 0.00
(0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.65) (0.07) (0.57) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ESP 0.99 -2.71 -2.41 -54.23 -2.71 -9.23 -92.96 0.04 0.12 0.84
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.54) (1.12) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
EST -0.05 -0.48 -0.41 -8.48 -0.48 1.03 -9.85 0.05 -0.12 1.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ETH -0.10 -0.22 0.21 0.99 -0.22 1.21 0.00 -0.22 1.22 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
FIN 0.69 -2.45 -2.15 -39.35 -2.45 -9.89 -44.93 0.05 0.21 0.74
(0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.21) (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FRA -0.02 -0.99 -0.69 -24.86 -0.99 -0.33 -31.33 0.03 0.01 0.95
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GBR 0.01 -0.85 -0.54 -21.08 -0.85 0.05 -25.70 0.04 0.00 0.97
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GEO -0.01 -0.10 0.19 0.96 -0.10 1.06 0.00 -0.10 1.10 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
GHA -0.16 0.39 0.82 8.61 0.39 8.19 0.00 0.05 0.95 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.39) (0.02) (0.38) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GRC 0.82 -4.90 -4.60 -43.30 -4.90 -10.03 -50.89 0.09 0.19 0.73
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.14) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GTM -0.19 -0.20 0.08 1.52 -0.20 1.73 0.00 -0.13 1.13 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
HKG -0.16 -0.33 -0.33 -0.03 -0.33 0.30 0.00 10.76 -9.76 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (1.45) (1.45) (0.00)
HND -0.18 -0.34 -0.05 0.84 -0.34 1.19 0.00 -0.41 1.41 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
HRV 0.46 -4.03 -3.96 -48.44 -4.03 -8.71 -69.93 0.06 0.14 0.80
(0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HUN -0.09 -0.53 -0.46 -6.83 -0.53 4.23 -11.27 0.08 -0.59 1.51
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
IDN 0.01 -0.85 -0.57 -13.89 -0.85 -0.95 -14.05 0.06 0.06 0.88
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
IND 0.57 -1.78 -1.25 -19.46 -1.78 -2.02 -19.49 0.08 0.09 0.82
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.08) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
IRL 0.08 -0.93 -0.62 -47.60 -0.93 -7.45 -74.97 0.01 0.12 0.87
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
IRN -0.75 1.19 1.39 6.61 1.19 5.36 0.00 0.18 0.82 0.00
(0.04) (0.12) (0.12) (0.70) (0.12) (0.56) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ISR 0.22 -0.70 -0.70 -22.67 -0.70 -6.72 -19.78 0.03 0.27 0.70
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.18) (0.23) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
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ITA 0.37 -1.53 -1.23 -32.31 -1.53 -3.25 -40.75 0.04 0.08 0.88
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.27) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
JPN 0.65 -1.57 -1.52 -34.38 -1.57 -2.23 -46.66 0.04 0.05 0.91
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
KAZ -0.18 -0.01 0.19 0.00 -0.01 4.14 -4.14 - - -
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.24) (0.23) - - -
KEN -0.17 0.36 0.79 9.68 0.36 9.29 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.56) (0.02) (0.54) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
KGZ 0.09 -2.27 -1.99 -18.78 -2.27 -2.16 -17.73 0.11 0.11 0.78
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
KHM -0.06 -0.66 -0.38 0.14 -0.66 0.81 0.00 -4.76 5.76 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.51) (0.51) (0.00)
KOR 0.45 -2.31 -2.05 -27.20 -2.31 -3.47 -29.54 0.07 0.11 0.82
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
KWT -0.17 2.82 3.03 15.01 2.82 11.86 0.00 0.20 0.80 0.00
(0.02) (0.13) (0.13) (0.73) (0.13) (0.57) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LAO -0.02 0.29 0.57 12.18 0.29 11.86 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.47) (0.01) (0.45) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LKA -0.40 0.18 0.47 6.40 0.18 6.20 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.35) (0.01) (0.34) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LTU -0.07 0.11 0.18 0.00 0.11 6.33 -6.44 - - -
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.10) (0.09) - - -
LUX -0.01 -1.20 -0.89 -31.94 -1.20 -0.91 -43.84 0.03 0.02 0.94
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LVA -0.01 -0.30 -0.22 0.00 -0.30 0.62 -0.32 - - -
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) - - -
MAR -0.62 0.76 1.19 15.27 0.76 14.40 0.00 0.05 0.95 0.00
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.58) (0.02) (0.55) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MDG -0.05 -0.08 0.35 5.04 -0.08 5.12 0.00 -0.02 1.02 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.10) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MEX 0.65 -1.37 -1.18 -33.18 -1.37 -3.97 -41.75 0.03 0.10 0.87
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.30) (0.43) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
MLT -0.03 -0.73 -0.47 -40.04 -0.73 -5.67 -56.17 0.01 0.11 0.87
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MNG -0.09 -0.51 -0.22 0.33 -0.51 0.85 0.00 -1.54 2.54 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.21) (0.21) (0.00)
MOZ -0.07 -0.09 0.34 1.81 -0.09 1.90 0.00 -0.05 1.05 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MUS -0.08 -0.31 0.12 2.48 -0.31 2.80 0.00 -0.13 1.13 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MWI -0.04 -0.15 0.28 4.32 -0.15 4.48 0.00 -0.04 1.04 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MYS -0.53 0.55 0.82 10.17 0.55 9.56 0.00 0.06 0.94 0.00
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.90) (0.06) (0.84) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NAM -0.08 -0.32 0.10 -0.43 -0.32 -0.11 0.00 0.75 0.25 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
NGA -0.22 0.09 0.52 6.50 0.09 6.40 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.45) (0.01) (0.43) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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NIC -0.17 0.63 0.91 7.14 0.63 6.48 0.00 0.09 0.91 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.22) (0.02) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NLD 0.21 -1.89 -1.59 -30.72 -1.89 -9.06 -28.79 0.05 0.26 0.69
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.08) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NOR 0.80 -3.21 -2.91 -54.75 -3.21 -19.74 -71.69 0.04 0.28 0.68
(0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.25) (0.50) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NPL -0.05 -0.27 0.02 2.01 -0.27 2.28 0.00 -0.13 1.13 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NZL 0.63 -1.49 -1.49 -40.22 -1.49 -6.81 -53.59 0.03 0.14 0.83
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.34) (0.54) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
OMN -0.18 0.72 0.94 6.76 0.72 5.99 0.00 0.11 0.89 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.32) (0.03) (0.29) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PAK -0.61 0.69 0.98 6.87 0.69 6.13 0.00 0.10 0.90 0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.44) (0.04) (0.39) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PAN -0.05 -0.57 -0.37 -0.39 -0.57 0.17 0.00 1.44 -0.44 0.00
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00)
PER -0.39 0.36 0.56 8.63 0.36 8.24 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.99) (0.04) (0.94) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PHL -0.54 0.37 0.65 9.77 0.37 9.37 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.93) (0.05) (0.87) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
POL -0.09 -0.66 -0.58 -12.15 -0.66 2.45 -15.84 0.05 -0.19 1.14
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.12) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
PRT 0.54 -2.68 -2.38 -48.00 -2.68 -7.97 -72.26 0.04 0.13 0.83
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.22) (0.40) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PRY -0.11 -0.22 -0.02 -0.28 -0.22 -0.06 0.00 0.77 0.23 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.07) (0.07) (0.00)
QAT -0.04 0.79 1.00 10.01 0.79 9.15 0.00 0.08 0.92 0.00
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.49) (0.03) (0.45) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ROU -0.19 -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.06 6.57 -6.50 - - -
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.18) (0.17) - - -
RUS -0.01 0.06 0.06 -0.13 0.06 3.26 -3.46 -0.48 -25.17 26.65
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.18) (0.02) (1.35) (1.38)
SAU -0.41 1.28 1.50 7.66 1.28 6.30 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.00
(0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.71) (0.11) (0.58) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SEN -0.33 0.64 1.07 10.27 0.64 9.57 0.00 0.07 0.93 0.00
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.33) (0.01) (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SGP 0.06 -0.37 -0.37 -6.12 -0.37 2.10 -8.35 0.06 -0.33 1.27
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.28) (0.31) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04)
SLV -0.16 0.19 0.38 7.37 0.19 7.17 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.38) (0.01) (0.37) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SVK -0.03 -0.67 -0.59 -9.90 -0.67 2.75 -13.28 0.06 -0.26 1.20
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.08) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
SVN 0.00 -1.43 -1.36 -42.39 -1.43 -0.60 -70.06 0.03 0.01 0.96
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SWE -0.01 -0.95 -0.64 -18.93 -0.95 0.23 -22.47 0.05 -0.01 0.97
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
THA -0.21 -0.74 -0.55 -9.23 -0.74 1.40 -10.88 0.08 -0.14 1.07
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.18) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Continued on next page
314 Appendix C: Carbon Tariffs
Table C.14 – Continued from previous page
∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE PTE LSE LCE LTE
TUN -0.15 0.17 0.60 7.74 0.17 7.56 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
TUR -0.38 0.26 0.46 5.62 0.26 5.35 0.00 0.05 0.95 0.00
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.43) (0.03) (0.40) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
TWN -1.15 0.94 1.21 12.99 0.94 11.93 0.00 0.08 0.92 0.00
(0.02) (0.08) (0.08) (0.93) (0.08) (0.84) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
TZA -0.07 -0.14 0.29 1.12 -0.14 1.26 0.00 -0.12 1.12 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
UGA -0.09 -0.03 0.40 3.42 -0.03 3.45 0.00 -0.01 1.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.12) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
UKR -0.29 -0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.05 2.65 -2.60 - - -
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.09) (0.09) - - -
URY -0.19 0.38 0.58 8.27 0.38 7.85 0.00 0.05 0.95 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.44) (0.02) (0.42) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
USA -0.04 -0.63 -0.58 -17.00 -0.63 -0.25 -19.42 0.03 0.01 0.95
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
VEN -0.03 1.33 1.53 14.14 1.33 12.64 0.00 0.10 0.90 0.00
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.77) (0.06) (0.68) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
VNM -0.80 -0.31 -0.02 1.90 -0.31 2.22 0.00 -0.16 1.16 0.00
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XAC -0.23 0.21 0.64 9.32 0.21 9.09 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.70) (0.02) (0.68) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XCA -0.02 0.32 0.52 11.16 0.32 10.81 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.23) (0.01) (0.23) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XCB -0.29 0.64 0.91 8.23 0.64 7.54 0.00 0.08 0.92 0.00
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.74) (0.06) (0.68) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XCF -0.27 0.23 0.66 9.12 0.23 8.87 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.62) (0.02) (0.60) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XEA -0.07 0.02 0.29 7.95 0.02 7.92 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XEC -0.48 0.39 0.82 6.23 0.39 5.81 0.00 0.07 0.93 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.51) (0.03) (0.47) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XEE 0.00 -0.24 -0.16 0.37 -0.24 0.61 0.00 -0.65 1.65 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
XEF 0.01 -1.40 -1.10 -25.00 -1.40 -11.36 -16.53 0.05 0.42 0.53
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XER -0.47 0.69 0.95 8.45 0.69 7.71 0.00 0.08 0.92 0.00
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.19) (0.01) (0.18) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XNA -0.13 1.28 1.59 17.19 1.28 15.71 0.00 0.08 0.92 0.00
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XNF -0.46 1.63 2.07 16.23 1.63 14.36 0.00 0.11 0.89 0.00
(0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.99) (0.09) (0.88) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XOC -0.42 0.33 0.52 8.41 0.33 8.05 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.77) (0.03) (0.74) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XSA -0.12 0.39 0.68 11.08 0.39 10.65 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.31) (0.01) (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XSC -0.07 -0.23 0.20 8.10 -0.23 8.35 0.00 -0.03 1.03 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.28) (0.02) (0.29) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE PTE LSE LCE LTE
XSE -0.32 0.42 0.68 8.51 0.42 8.06 0.00 0.05 0.95 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.49) (0.02) (0.46) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XSM -0.17 0.61 0.81 15.47 0.61 14.77 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.41) (0.01) (0.40) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XSU -0.54 1.51 1.80 5.65 1.51 4.08 0.00 0.27 0.73 0.00
(0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.32) (0.07) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XWF -0.16 0.01 0.44 4.19 0.01 4.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
XWS -0.78 0.95 1.24 6.09 0.95 5.10 0.00 0.16 0.84 0.00
(0.02) (0.08) (0.07) (0.47) (0.08) (0.38) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ZAF 0.57 -2.01 -1.59 -43.78 -2.01 -9.90 -57.05 0.04 0.18 0.78
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.67) (1.14) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
ZMB -0.21 0.19 0.61 4.22 0.19 4.02 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.14) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ZWE -0.14 0.26 0.69 3.21 0.26 2.94 0.00 0.08 0.92 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.09) (0.01) (0.10) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Notes: ∆Xi denotes the percentage changes in trade flows, ∆Ri the percentage changes in real income, ∆U i the percentage
changes in welfare, ∆Ei the percentage changes in carbon emissions, PSE the percentage scale effects, PCE the percentage
composition effects, PTE the percentage technique effects, LSE the log scale effects, LCE the log composition effects, and LTE
the log technique effects. Note that for countries with constant emissions, these log changes are not defined. The numbers in
parentheses below the reported values give the corresponding bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table C.15: Copenhagen Accord (Appendices I and II, With Tariffs)
∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE PTE LSE LCE LTE
ALB -5.66 -1.54 -1.24 -1.81 -1.54 -0.28 0.00 0.85 0.15 0.00
(0.45) (0.40) (0.40) (1.21) (0.40) (1.17) (0.00) (222) (222) (0.00)
ARE -7.10 -0.29 -0.07 2.21 -0.29 2.51 0.00 -0.13 1.13 0.00
(0.76) (0.36) (0.36) (1.22) (0.36) (1.02) (0.00) (3.28) (3.28) (0.00)
ARG -4.24 -0.30 -0.03 1.92 -0.30 2.22 0.00 -0.16 1.16 0.00
(0.76) (0.25) (0.25) (0.46) (0.25) (0.44) (0.00) (0.22) (0.22) (0.00)
ARM -3.11 -0.39 -0.09 -0.25 -0.39 0.14 0.00 1.54 -0.54 0.00
(0.35) (0.37) (0.37) (0.57) (0.37) (0.61) (0.00) (138) (138) (0.00)
AUS -0.11 -0.74 -0.74 -23.02 -0.79 -0.69 -27.98 0.03 0.03 0.94
(0.40) (0.22) (0.22) (0.00) (0.21) (0.81) (0.90) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
AUT -0.04 -1.50 -1.19 -37.91 -1.62 -3.71 -52.57 0.03 0.08 0.89
(0.13) (0.18) (0.18) (0.00) (0.18) (0.48) (1.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
AZE -10.31 -0.46 -0.16 1.94 -0.46 2.40 0.00 -0.24 1.24 0.00
(1.59) (0.70) (0.71) (1.70) (0.70) (1.21) (0.00) (11.6) (11.6) (0.00)
BEL -0.13 -1.36 -1.04 -22.94 -1.41 -2.32 -24.96 0.05 0.09 0.86
(0.11) (0.20) (0.20) (0.00) (0.20) (0.97) (1.30) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
BGD -4.56 -0.69 -0.39 0.56 -0.69 1.25 0.00 -1.25 2.25 0.00
(0.54) (0.34) (0.34) (0.69) (0.34) (0.67) (0.00) (29.9) (29.9) (0.00)
BGR -0.37 0.18 0.26 0.00 0.03 6.10 -6.13 - - -
(0.21) (0.34) (0.34) (0.00) (0.30) (1.13) (1.31) - - -
BHR -8.66 0.53 0.75 3.14 0.53 2.60 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.00
(0.88) (0.48) (0.48) (1.82) (0.48) (1.37) (0.00) (3.92) (3.92) (0.00)
BLR -0.15 0.42 0.50 0.00 0.36 4.46 -4.84 - - -
(0.23) (0.25) (0.25) (0.00) (0.24) (0.77) (0.93) - - -
BOL -6.50 -0.58 -0.28 1.49 -0.58 2.08 0.00 -0.39 1.39 0.00
(1.55) (0.55) (0.55) (0.59) (0.55) (0.81) (0.00) (0.54) (0.54) (0.00)
BRA -0.08 -1.47 -1.20 -27.77 -1.57 -2.30 -33.15 0.05 0.07 0.88
(0.21) (0.09) (0.09) (0.00) (0.08) (0.67) (0.90) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
BWA -7.72 -0.95 -0.51 -0.91 -0.95 0.04 0.00 1.04 -0.04 0.00
(0.76) (0.67) (0.68) (0.75) (0.67) (0.66) (0.00) (24.0) (24.0) (0.00)
CAN -0.15 -0.86 -0.86 -16.66 -0.90 0.23 -19.18 0.05 -0.01 0.96
(0.60) (0.22) (0.22) (0.00) (0.22) (0.20) (0.24) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CHE -0.12 -0.34 -0.02 -15.94 -0.36 2.97 -22.06 0.02 -0.17 1.15
(0.08) (0.26) (0.26) (0.00) (0.26) (1.12) (1.47) (0.01) (0.06) (0.07)
CHL -0.45 -1.54 -1.34 -26.67 -1.84 -2.83 -30.08 0.06 0.09 0.85
(0.92) (0.65) (0.65) (0.00) (0.62) (1.56) (1.55) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
CHN -0.01 -2.32 -2.29 -37.10 -2.42 -1.81 -52.31 0.05 0.04 0.91
(1.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.05) (0.45) (0.77) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
CIV -5.21 -0.31 0.13 3.82 -0.31 4.15 0.00 -0.08 1.08 0.00
(0.80) (0.42) (0.42) (1.47) (0.42) (1.31) (0.00) (0.29) (0.29) (0.00)
CMR -4.50 -0.45 -0.01 3.50 -0.45 3.96 0.00 -0.13 1.13 0.00
(0.71) (0.57) (0.58) (1.77) (0.57) (1.44) (0.00) (2.72) (2.72) (0.00)
COL -4.38 -0.31 -0.11 1.98 -0.31 2.30 0.00 -0.16 1.16 0.00
(0.76) (0.23) (0.23) (0.40) (0.23) (0.26) (0.00) (0.17) (0.17) (0.00)
CRI -0.55 -1.78 -1.58 -53.41 -2.20 -6.20 -96.89 0.03 0.08 0.89
(0.25) (0.50) (0.50) (0.00) (0.50) (0.62) (1.36) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CYP -1.21 -2.52 -2.25 -57.38 -3.23 -7.13 -110.9 0.04 0.09 0.87
(0.02) (0.33) (0.33) (0.00) (0.33) (0.37) (1.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
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∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE PTE LSE LCE LTE
CZE -0.19 -0.69 -0.61 -15.67 -0.77 3.01 -21.20 0.05 -0.17 1.13
(0.13) (0.29) (0.29) (0.00) (0.29) (0.94) (1.21) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06)
DEU -0.28 -0.53 -0.21 -10.65 -0.57 3.57 -15.25 0.05 -0.31 1.26
(0.16) (0.11) (0.11) (0.00) (0.11) (0.19) (0.16) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
DNK -0.22 -0.40 -0.08 -10.05 -0.45 3.39 -14.43 0.04 -0.31 1.27
(0.12) (0.24) (0.24) (0.00) (0.24) (0.55) (0.63) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
ECU -4.86 -0.39 -0.19 2.30 -0.39 2.70 0.00 -0.17 1.17 0.00
(1.23) (0.40) (0.40) (0.70) (0.40) (0.87) (0.00) (0.21) (0.21) (0.00)
EGY -5.91 -0.33 0.12 2.04 -0.33 2.38 0.00 -0.16 1.16 0.00
(0.82) (0.30) (0.30) (1.05) (0.30) (0.81) (0.00) (6.17) (6.17) (0.00)
ESP 0.37 -2.65 -2.34 -54.23 -2.82 -8.18 -94.97 0.04 0.11 0.85
(0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08) (0.75) (1.65) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
EST -0.11 -0.43 -0.35 -8.48 -0.48 1.22 -10.07 0.05 -0.14 1.08
(0.05) (0.35) (0.35) (0.00) (0.35) (0.22) (0.30) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
ETH -3.34 -0.68 -0.24 -0.58 -0.68 0.10 0.00 1.17 -0.17 0.00
(0.55) (0.44) (0.44) (0.85) (0.44) (0.68) (0.00) (17.5) (17.5) (0.00)
FIN 0.33 -2.41 -2.09 -39.35 -2.55 -9.13 -46.00 0.05 0.19 0.76
(0.23) (0.20) (0.20) (0.00) (0.19) (0.21) (0.51) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
FRA -0.17 -0.94 -0.62 -24.86 -1.00 0.30 -32.14 0.04 -0.01 0.98
(0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.00) (0.12) (0.14) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
GBR -0.11 -0.81 -0.49 -21.08 -0.86 0.60 -26.39 0.04 -0.03 0.99
(0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.00) (0.18) (0.16) (0.21) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GEO -3.93 -0.70 -0.40 -0.72 -0.70 -0.02 0.00 0.97 0.03 0.00
(0.50) (0.48) (0.48) (0.57) (0.48) (0.66) (0.00) (5.00) (5.00) (0.00)
GHA -3.69 -0.42 0.02 2.03 -0.42 2.47 0.00 -0.21 1.21 0.00
(0.50) (0.38) (0.38) (0.68) (0.38) (0.39) (0.00) (0.66) (0.66) (0.00)
GRC -0.68 -4.85 -4.54 -43.30 -5.38 -9.06 -51.75 0.10 0.17 0.74
(0.06) (0.21) (0.21) (0.00) (0.21) (0.71) (1.24) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
GTM -4.14 -0.75 -0.45 -0.36 -0.75 0.39 0.00 2.07 -1.07 0.00
(0.55) (0.36) (0.36) (0.55) (0.36) (0.61) (0.00) (30.0) (30.0) (0.00)
HKG -4.49 -1.04 -1.04 -1.01 -1.04 0.03 0.00 1.03 -0.03 0.00
(0.42) (0.39) (0.39) (0.57) (0.39) (0.25) (0.00) (1.83) (1.83) (0.00)
HND -3.76 -0.87 -0.58 -0.76 -0.87 0.11 0.00 1.14 -0.14 0.00
(0.44) (0.50) (0.50) (0.79) (0.50) (0.62) (0.00) (21.3) (21.3) (0.00)
HRV -0.21 -3.97 -3.90 -48.44 -4.33 -8.03 -70.67 0.07 0.13 0.81
(0.22) (0.34) (0.34) (0.00) (0.34) (0.47) (0.95) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
HUN -0.20 -0.46 -0.39 -6.83 -0.54 5.02 -12.11 0.08 -0.69 1.62
(0.12) (0.25) (0.25) (0.00) (0.25) (0.81) (0.96) (0.04) (0.11) (0.12)
IDN -0.42 -0.79 -0.49 -13.89 -0.90 0.17 -15.29 0.06 -0.01 0.95
(0.22) (0.12) (0.12) (0.00) (0.11) (1.06) (1.17) (0.01) (0.07) (0.07)
IND -0.29 -1.68 -1.13 -19.46 -1.84 -1.21 -20.40 0.09 0.06 0.86
(0.30) (0.11) (0.11) (0.00) (0.10) (0.19) (0.22) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
IRL -0.09 -0.88 -0.57 -47.60 -0.99 -7.11 -75.50 0.02 0.11 0.87
(0.14) (0.22) (0.22) (0.00) (0.22) (0.34) (0.65) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
IRN -6.73 -0.11 0.09 2.16 -0.11 2.28 0.00 -0.05 1.05 0.00
(1.27) (0.18) (0.18) (0.86) (0.18) (0.82) (0.00) (0.68) (0.68) (0.00)
ISR -0.37 -0.60 -0.60 -22.67 -0.86 -5.60 -21.02 0.03 0.22 0.74
(0.18) (0.36) (0.36) (0.00) (0.35) (0.32) (0.58) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Continued on next page
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∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE PTE LSE LCE LTE
ITA 0.04 -1.48 -1.16 -32.31 -1.57 -2.52 -41.76 0.04 0.07 0.89
(0.18) (0.09) (0.09) (0.00) (0.09) (0.20) (0.33) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
JPN 0.04 -1.52 -1.46 -34.38 -1.61 -1.63 -47.50 0.04 0.04 0.92
(0.39) (0.07) (0.07) (0.00) (0.07) (0.43) (0.69) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
KAZ -0.10 0.07 0.27 0.00 0.02 4.54 -4.57 - - -
(0.83) (0.37) (0.37) (0.00) (0.35) (0.58) (0.79) - - -
KEN -3.31 -0.31 0.13 2.94 -0.31 3.26 0.00 -0.11 1.11 0.00
(0.46) (0.33) (0.33) (0.73) (0.33) (0.45) (0.00) (0.20) (0.20) (0.00)
KGZ -1.10 -2.25 -1.96 -18.78 -2.83 -2.17 -17.03 0.14 0.11 0.76
(0.25) (0.49) (0.49) (0.00) (0.45) (0.27) (0.63) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
KHM -2.97 -1.12 -0.82 -1.18 -1.12 -0.06 0.00 0.95 0.05 0.00
(0.47) (0.56) (0.56) (0.68) (0.56) (0.92) (0.00) (22.0) (22.0) (0.00)
KOR -0.22 -2.22 -1.95 -27.20 -2.37 -2.66 -30.54 0.08 0.08 0.84
(0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.00) (0.07) (0.28) (0.37) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
KWT -9.30 0.10 0.32 3.24 0.10 3.14 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00
(1.90) (0.79) (0.80) (2.97) (0.79) (2.25) (0.00) (2.08) (2.08) (0.00)
LAO -4.61 -0.75 -0.45 1.52 -0.75 2.29 0.00 -0.49 1.49 0.00
(0.78) (0.90) (0.90) (2.44) (0.90) (2.13) (0.00) (12.3) (12.3) (0.00)
LKA -4.72 -0.80 -0.50 1.27 -0.80 2.08 0.00 -0.64 1.64 0.00
(0.57) (0.47) (0.47) (0.60) (0.47) (0.82) (0.00) (2.15) (2.15) (0.00)
LTU -0.16 0.20 0.28 0.00 0.14 7.02 -7.18 - - -
(0.10) (0.33) (0.33) (0.00) (0.32) (1.43) (1.52) - - -
LUX -0.10 -1.16 -0.84 -31.94 -1.22 -0.91 -43.80 0.03 0.02 0.94
(0.01) (0.25) (0.25) (0.00) (0.25) (0.39) (0.44) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
LVA 0.00 -0.27 -0.19 0.00 -0.27 0.76 -0.48 - - -
(0.08) (0.33) (0.33) (0.00) (0.33) (0.65) (0.59) - - -
MAR -6.32 -0.56 -0.11 3.09 -0.56 3.66 0.00 -0.18 1.18 0.00
(0.51) (0.26) (0.26) (0.57) (0.26) (0.53) (0.00) (0.10) (0.10) (0.00)
MDG -4.70 -0.61 -0.17 0.46 -0.61 1.08 0.00 -1.33 2.33 0.00
(0.64) (0.46) (0.47) (0.55) (0.46) (0.48) (0.00) (36.8) (36.8) (0.00)
MEX 0.27 -1.33 -1.13 -33.18 -1.43 -2.91 -43.24 0.04 0.07 0.89
(0.25) (0.42) (0.42) (0.00) (0.41) (1.45) (1.65) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
MLT -0.35 -0.71 -0.44 -40.04 -0.96 -5.53 -56.04 0.02 0.11 0.87
(0.01) (0.34) (0.34) (0.00) (0.34) (0.64) (1.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
MNG -10.75 -1.78 -1.49 -1.96 -1.78 -0.18 0.00 0.91 0.09 0.00
(0.84) (0.79) (0.80) (1.05) (0.79) (0.97) (0.00) (2.29) (2.29) (0.00)
MOZ -5.11 -0.88 -0.43 -0.73 -0.88 0.15 0.00 1.21 -0.21 0.00
(0.63) (0.67) (0.67) (1.91) (0.67) (1.49) (0.00) (5.39) (5.39) (0.00)
MUS -4.69 -0.98 -0.53 -0.42 -0.98 0.56 0.00 2.32 -1.32 0.00
(0.57) (0.72) (0.72) (1.06) (0.72) (0.98) (0.00) (11.4) (11.4) (0.00)
MWI -4.49 -0.92 -0.47 0.22 -0.92 1.15 0.00 -4.12 5.12 0.00
(0.57) (0.79) (0.79) (0.62) (0.79) (0.74) (0.00) (71.7) (71.7) (0.00)
MYS -4.99 -0.44 -0.17 3.39 -0.44 3.85 0.00 -0.13 1.13 0.00
(0.64) (0.20) (0.20) (0.63) (0.20) (0.60) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08) (0.00)
NAM -5.41 -0.97 -0.53 -1.35 -0.97 -0.38 0.00 0.72 0.28 0.00
(0.84) (0.64) (0.64) (1.03) (0.64) (0.83) (0.00) (11.2) (11.2) (0.00)
NGA -8.38 -0.65 -0.21 2.83 -0.65 3.50 0.00 -0.23 1.23 0.00
(0.54) (0.50) (0.51) (1.90) (0.50) (2.11) (0.00) (1.98) (1.98) (0.00)
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NIC -4.55 -0.88 -0.59 0.25 -0.88 1.15 0.00 -3.50 4.50 0.00
(0.53) (0.73) (0.74) (0.81) (0.73) (0.60) (0.00) (80.3) (80.3) (0.00)
NLD 0.06 -1.85 -1.53 -30.72 -1.92 -8.55 -29.48 0.05 0.24 0.70
(0.14) (0.22) (0.22) (0.00) (0.22) (0.54) (0.82) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
NOR 0.49 -3.19 -2.88 -54.75 -3.33 -19.18 -72.67 0.04 0.27 0.69
(0.37) (0.24) (0.24) (0.00) (0.24) (0.25) (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NPL -4.28 -0.90 -0.60 -0.67 -0.90 0.23 0.00 1.34 -0.34 0.00
(0.61) (0.63) (0.63) (0.70) (0.63) (0.70) (0.00) (16.4) (16.4) (0.00)
NZL 0.15 -1.44 -1.44 -40.22 -1.57 -5.27 -55.99 0.03 0.11 0.86
(0.27) (0.39) (0.39) (0.00) (0.39) (1.58) (2.23) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
OMN -10.40 -0.47 -0.25 1.48 -0.47 1.96 0.00 -0.32 1.32 0.00
(1.35) (0.70) (0.70) (1.18) (0.70) (0.88) (0.00) (27.3) (27.3) (0.00)
PAK -5.17 -0.54 -0.24 1.13 -0.54 1.68 0.00 -0.48 1.48 0.00
(0.81) (0.32) (0.32) (0.54) (0.32) (0.36) (0.00) (46.9) (46.9) (0.00)
PAN -3.09 -0.98 -0.78 -1.23 -0.98 -0.25 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00
(0.33) (0.49) (0.49) (1.16) (0.49) (0.99) (0.00) (46.1) (46.1) (0.00)
PER -4.73 -0.35 -0.15 2.28 -0.35 2.64 0.00 -0.16 1.16 0.00
(0.84) (0.24) (0.24) (0.51) (0.24) (0.38) (0.00) (0.18) (0.18) (0.00)
PHL -4.20 -0.42 -0.13 3.47 -0.42 3.91 0.00 -0.12 1.12 0.00
(0.26) (0.16) (0.16) (0.94) (0.16) (0.93) (0.00) (0.07) (0.07) (0.00)
POL -0.25 -0.60 -0.52 -12.15 -0.67 3.09 -16.56 0.05 -0.24 1.18
(0.16) (0.22) (0.22) (0.00) (0.21) (0.58) (0.65) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
PRT -0.12 -2.61 -2.29 -48.00 -2.84 -6.97 -73.83 0.04 0.11 0.85
(0.18) (0.22) (0.22) (0.00) (0.22) (0.22) (0.29) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PRY -3.76 -0.76 -0.56 -1.13 -0.76 -0.37 0.00 0.67 0.33 0.00
(0.72) (0.67) (0.67) (1.62) (0.67) (2.07) (0.00) (24.2) (24.2) (0.00)
QAT -7.66 -0.18 0.04 3.04 -0.18 3.23 0.00 -0.06 1.06 0.00
(0.75) (0.42) (0.43) (1.74) (0.42) (1.50) (0.00) (4.71) (4.71) (0.00)
ROU -0.25 0.02 0.10 0.00 -0.04 7.41 -7.37 - - -
(0.20) (0.22) (0.22) (0.00) (0.21) (0.90) (0.98) - - -
RUS 0.05 0.11 0.11 -0.13 0.09 3.60 -3.82 -0.69 -27.70 29.39
(0.79) (0.17) (0.17) (0.00) (0.16) (0.68) (0.73) (1.26) (5.12) (5.54)
SAU -8.62 -0.03 0.19 2.53 -0.03 2.56 0.00 -0.01 1.01 0.00
(2.53) (0.39) (0.39) (0.49) (0.39) (0.78) (0.00) (0.17) (0.17) (0.00)
SEN -5.05 -0.71 -0.26 1.63 -0.71 2.36 0.00 -0.44 1.44 0.00
(0.61) (0.47) (0.47) (0.75) (0.47) (0.65) (0.00) (2.71) (2.71) (0.00)
SGP -0.38 -0.22 -0.22 -6.12 -0.45 2.89 -9.10 0.07 -0.45 1.38
(0.36) (0.41) (0.41) (0.00) (0.36) (1.26) (1.52) (0.06) (0.19) (0.22)
SLV -3.82 -0.63 -0.42 1.93 -0.63 2.57 0.00 -0.33 1.33 0.00
(0.44) (0.39) (0.39) (0.76) (0.39) (0.80) (0.00) (0.90) (0.90) (0.00)
SVK -0.14 -0.60 -0.52 -9.90 -0.68 3.53 -14.13 0.07 -0.33 1.27
(0.10) (0.28) (0.28) (0.00) (0.28) (1.13) (1.38) (0.03) (0.10) (0.12)
SVN -0.16 -1.39 -1.31 -42.39 -1.51 -0.36 -70.33 0.03 0.01 0.97
(0.04) (0.37) (0.37) (0.00) (0.37) (0.23) (0.63) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
SWE -0.14 -0.89 -0.57 -18.93 -0.96 0.98 -23.37 0.05 -0.05 1.00
(0.14) (0.20) (0.20) (0.00) (0.19) (0.40) (0.51) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
THA -0.55 -0.64 -0.43 -9.23 -0.78 2.14 -11.65 0.08 -0.22 1.14
(0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.00) (0.16) (0.28) (0.38) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
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320 Appendix C: Carbon Tariffs
Table C.15 – Continued from previous page
∆Xi ∆Ri ∆U i ∆Ei PSE PCE PTE LSE LCE LTE
TUN -5.62 -1.02 -0.57 -0.14 -1.02 0.89 0.00 7.49 -6.49 0.00
(0.55) (0.40) (0.40) (0.97) (0.40) (0.68) (0.00) (245) (245) (0.00)
TUR -4.63 -0.52 -0.31 1.10 -0.52 1.63 0.00 -0.48 1.48 0.00
(0.29) (0.14) (0.14) (0.30) (0.14) (0.28) (0.00) (0.29) (0.29) (0.00)
TWN -5.68 -0.21 0.07 4.87 -0.21 5.09 0.00 -0.04 1.04 0.00
(0.29) (0.22) (0.22) (0.71) (0.22) (0.56) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.00)
TZA -3.76 -0.62 -0.18 -0.36 -0.62 0.26 0.00 1.71 -0.71 0.00
(0.61) (0.47) (0.47) (0.48) (0.47) (0.52) (0.00) (22.8) (22.8) (0.00)
UGA -4.72 -0.62 -0.17 0.48 -0.62 1.10 0.00 -1.30 2.30 0.00
(0.51) (0.54) (0.54) (0.40) (0.54) (0.37) (0.00) (248) (248) (0.00)
UKR -0.41 0.03 0.11 0.00 -0.04 2.93 -2.89 - - -
(0.33) (0.26) (0.26) (0.00) (0.25) (0.37) (0.38) - - -
URY -4.27 -0.51 -0.31 1.26 -0.51 1.78 0.00 -0.41 1.41 0.00
(0.62) (0.58) (0.58) (1.49) (0.58) (1.09) (0.00) (18.5) (18.5) (0.00)
USA -0.13 -0.61 -0.56 -17.00 -0.63 0.05 -19.78 0.03 0.00 0.97
(1.17) (0.12) (0.12) (0.00) (0.12) (0.17) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
VEN -5.60 -0.22 -0.02 1.80 -0.22 2.02 0.00 -0.13 1.13 0.00
(1.54) (0.52) (0.52) (3.76) (0.52) (3.30) (0.00) (21.1) (21.1) (0.00)
VNM -5.96 -0.96 -0.66 -0.35 -0.96 0.62 0.00 2.76 -1.76 0.00
(0.63) (0.28) (0.28) (0.65) (0.28) (0.80) (0.00) (45.2) (45.2) (0.00)
XAC -9.70 -0.67 -0.22 4.13 -0.67 4.83 0.00 -0.17 1.17 0.00
(0.84) (0.74) (0.74) (1.91) (0.74) (2.58) (0.00) (0.54) (0.54) (0.00)
XCA -4.53 -0.88 -0.68 0.50 -0.88 1.39 0.00 -1.77 2.77 0.00
(0.46) (0.86) (0.86) (1.59) (0.86) (1.23) (0.00) (7.97) (7.97) (0.00)
XCB -4.34 -0.32 -0.04 1.50 -0.32 1.82 0.00 -0.21 1.21 0.00
(0.38) (0.30) (0.30) (1.02) (0.30) (0.99) (0.00) (9.71) (9.71) (0.00)
XCF -7.30 -0.57 -0.13 3.19 -0.57 3.78 0.00 -0.18 1.18 0.00
(0.78) (0.50) (0.50) (0.72) (0.50) (1.05) (0.00) (0.16) (0.16) (0.00)
XEA -6.38 -1.66 -1.39 -1.62 -1.66 0.04 0.00 1.03 -0.03 0.00
(0.37) (0.44) (0.44) (1.16) (0.44) (0.90) (0.00) (10.2) (10.2) (0.00)
XEC -6.04 -0.46 -0.02 1.73 -0.46 2.21 0.00 -0.27 1.27 0.00
(0.77) (0.43) (0.43) (0.66) (0.43) (0.41) (0.00) (1.26) (1.26) (0.00)
XEE -4.19 -1.01 -0.93 -1.03 -1.01 -0.02 0.00 0.98 0.02 0.00
(0.48) (0.42) (0.42) (0.47) (0.42) (0.12) (0.00) (0.99) (0.99) (0.00)
XEF -0.14 -1.36 -1.04 -25.00 -1.44 -11.18 -16.72 0.05 0.41 0.54
(0.17) (0.45) (0.45) (0.00) (0.45) (0.43) (0.84) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
XER -5.83 -0.75 -0.48 0.92 -0.75 1.68 0.00 -0.83 1.83 0.00
(0.49) (0.46) (0.46) (0.66) (0.46) (0.58) (0.00) (11.1) (11.1) (0.00)
XNA -5.30 -0.48 -0.16 0.91 -0.48 1.40 0.00 -0.53 1.53 0.00
(0.53) (0.61) (0.61) (3.48) (0.61) (3.14) (0.00) (3.96) (3.96) (0.00)
XNF -8.65 -0.29 0.15 2.97 -0.29 3.27 0.00 -0.10 1.10 0.00
(1.79) (0.44) (0.44) (1.79) (0.44) (1.38) (0.00) (4.77) (4.77) (0.00)
XOC -5.39 -0.56 -0.35 2.40 -0.56 2.98 0.00 -0.24 1.24 0.00
(0.78) (0.49) (0.49) (0.32) (0.49) (0.56) (0.00) (0.22) (0.22) (0.00)
XSA -5.34 -0.71 -0.41 1.24 -0.71 1.96 0.00 -0.58 1.58 0.00
(0.75) (0.57) (0.57) (2.36) (0.57) (2.13) (0.00) (19.6) (19.6) (0.00)
XSC -5.67 -1.14 -0.70 0.20 -1.14 1.35 0.00 -5.70 6.70 0.00
(0.61) (0.68) (0.68) (0.60) (0.68) (0.59) (0.00) (443) (443) (0.00)
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XSE -7.11 -0.74 -0.47 1.98 -0.74 2.75 0.00 -0.38 1.38 0.00
(0.88) (0.38) (0.39) (0.51) (0.38) (0.50) (0.00) (0.31) (0.31) (0.00)
XSM -6.23 -0.64 -0.44 1.50 -0.64 2.15 0.00 -0.43 1.43 0.00
(0.85) (0.68) (0.68) (2.76) (0.68) (2.26) (0.00) (10.2) (10.2) (0.00)
XSU -8.39 -0.41 -0.11 0.69 -0.41 1.10 0.00 -0.59 1.59 0.00
(1.78) (0.27) (0.27) (0.38) (0.27) (0.25) (0.00) (16.2) (16.2) (0.00)
XWF -5.31 -0.63 -0.19 1.04 -0.63 1.69 0.00 -0.61 1.61 0.00
(0.57) (0.40) (0.40) (0.90) (0.40) (0.93) (0.00) (115) (115) (0.00)
XWS -7.20 -0.50 -0.20 1.52 -0.50 2.03 0.00 -0.33 1.33 0.00
(0.86) (0.30) (0.30) (1.16) (0.30) (1.01) (0.00) (13.1) (13.1) (0.00)
ZAF -0.26 -1.94 -1.51 -43.78 -2.12 -7.93 -60.32 0.04 0.14 0.82
(0.11) (0.24) (0.24) (0.00) (0.23) (0.90) (1.43) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
ZMB -5.06 -0.62 -0.18 0.69 -0.62 1.32 0.00 -0.91 1.91 0.00
(0.67) (0.52) (0.52) (1.09) (0.52) (0.93) (0.00) (14.5) (14.5) (0.00)
ZWE -6.26 -0.88 -0.43 -0.36 -0.88 0.53 0.00 2.47 -1.47 0.00
(0.95) (0.73) (0.73) (0.94) (0.73) (0.27) (0.00) (31.2) (31.2) (0.00)
Notes: ∆Xi denotes the percentage changes in trade flows, ∆Ri the percentage changes in real income, ∆U i the percentage
changes in welfare, ∆Ei the percentage changes in carbon emissions, PSE the percentage scale effects, PCE the percentage
composition effects, PTE the percentage technique effects, LSE the log scale effects, LCE the log composition effects, and LTE
the log technique effects. Note that for countries with constant emissions, these log changes are not defined. The numbers in
parentheses below the reported values give the corresponding bootstrapped standard errors.
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D.1 Estimation Results
Table D.1: Gravity Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
agricult. apparel chemical equipm. food machin. metal
lnDIST -1.202 -0.789 -0.885 -0.563 -0.920 -0.768 -0.865
(0.127)∗∗∗ (0.137)∗∗∗ (0.073)∗∗∗ (0.129)∗∗∗ (0.093)∗∗∗ (0.076)∗∗∗ (0.083)∗∗∗
BRDR 0.331 0.361 0.187 0.660 0.474 0.204 0.550
(0.166)∗∗ (0.177)∗∗ (0.138) (0.216)∗∗∗ (0.152)∗∗∗ (0.127) (0.119)∗∗∗
LANG -0.078 0.455 0.208 0.064 0.375 0.077 -0.000
(0.211) (0.209)∗∗ (0.181) (0.134) (0.127)∗∗∗ (0.178) (0.235)
RTA 0.113 0.154 0.263 0.670 0.461 0.169 0.084
(0.136) (0.210) (0.106)∗∗ (0.166)∗∗∗ (0.129)∗∗∗ (0.143) (0.223)
N 19182 19182 19182 19182 19182 19182 19182
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
mineral mining other paper service textile wood
lnDIST -1.233 -1.331 -0.810 -1.006 -0.352 -0.994 -0.872
(0.124)∗∗∗ (0.224)∗∗∗ (0.292)∗∗∗ (0.084)∗∗∗ (0.053)∗∗∗ (0.091)∗∗∗ (0.194)∗∗∗
BRDR 0.553 0.087 -0.058 0.619 0.256 0.147 0.735
(0.214)∗∗∗ (0.360) (0.280) (0.152)∗∗∗ (0.094)∗∗∗ (0.147) (0.210)∗∗∗
LANG -0.050 0.199 0.106 0.259 0.255 0.297 0.062
(0.194) (0.355) (0.316) (0.184) (0.071)∗∗∗ (0.180)∗ (0.284)
RTA 0.005 0.026 -0.162 0.227 0.006 0.337 0.389
(0.168) (0.244) (0.420) (0.145) (0.077) (0.182)∗ (0.252)
N 19182 19182 19182 19182 19182 19182 19182
Notes: All regressions include importer and exporter fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by exporter and im-
porter are given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
D.2 Parametrization
In this section, we briefly describe how the model parameters can be obtained from the
data. The Cobb-Douglas utility parameters γil and γ
i
S can be calculated as the sectoral
expenditure shares. For the factor cost shares in the sectoral production functions, we
first obtain the energy cost share by dividing firms’ expenditure on intermediate inputs
from the six GTAP energy sectors (coal, electricity, gas, gas manufacture and distribution,
oil, and petroleum and coal products) by the firms’ total costs. We then distribute the
remaining cost share to the five GTAP factors (natural resources, capital, skilled labor,
unskilled labor, and land) according to the reported relative expenses for these factors.
The factor cost shares of the energy production function are determined in a similar way.
First, we obtain the fossil fuel cost share. To ensure that we fit national emission levels,
Parametrization 325
we multiply the world price of fossil fuels per ton of carbon with the country’s carbon
emissions and divide by the energy sectors’ total costs. The remaining cost share is
again distributed between the GTAP factors according to the factor expenditures. Finally,
the national fossil fuel endowment shares are calculated by dividing a country’s total
revenue from the natural resource factor by the sum of these revenues in all countries.
Table D.2 shows the implemented reduction targets illustrated in Figure 4.1 and used in
our counterfactual analyses.
Table D.2: Implemented Reduction Targets (%)
ALB 11.50 ETH 0 MEX 22.00 THA 20
ARE 0 FIN 36.34 MLT 54.29 TTO 0
ARG 18.00 FRA 35.33 MNG 14.00 TUN 0
ARM 0 GBR 22.78 MOZ 0 TUR 0
AUS 22.05 GEO 15.00 MUS 0 TWN 0
AUT 48.64 GHA 15.00 MWI 0 TZA 0
AZE 16.62 GIN 0 MYS 0 UGA 6.60
BEL 39.84 GRC 44.07 NAM 8.86 UKR 0
BEN 0 GTM 11.20 NGA 20 URY 0
BFA 6.60 HKG 48.43 NIC 0 USA 20.98
BGD 5.00 HND 0 NLD 33.31 VEN 0
BGR 11.36 HRV 36.38 NOR 38.20 VNM 8.00
BHR 0 HUN 9.87 NPL 0 XAC 1.73
BLR 0 IDN 29.00 NZL 34.23 XCA 0
BOL 0 IND 0 OMN 0 XCB 0.64
BRA 64.92 IRL 38.86 PAK 0 XCF 8.98
BRN 0 IRN 4.00 PAN 0 XEA 8.00
BWA 0 ISR 0 PER 20 XEC 0.36
CAN 44.46 ITA 38.65 PHL 0 XEE 0
CHE 49.45 JAM 7.80 POL 33.46 XEF 0
CHL 0 JOR 1.50 PRI 44.47 XER 12.38
CHN 5.02 JPN 19.30 PRT 53.27 XNA 25.10
CIV 0 KAZ 19.82 PRY 10 XNF 4.78
CMR 0 KEN 0 QAT 0 XOC 0.42
COL 20 KGZ 12.62 ROU 0 XSA 0.66
CRI 44.00 KHM 0 RUS 0 XSC 5.00
CYP 61.53 KOR 37.00 RWA 0 XSE 0
CZE 17.82 KWT 0 SAU 0 XSM 0
DEU 23.19 LAO 0 SEN 5.00 XSU 0
DNK 21.45 LKA 0 SGP 0 XWF 0.59
DOM 0 LTU 0 SLV 0 XWS 8.05
ECU 9.00 LUX 39.54 SVK 9.17 ZAF 0
EGY 0 LVA 0 SVN 44.83 ZMB 0
ESP 50.98 MAR 13.00 SWE 31.71 ZWE 0
EST 0 MDG 0 TGO 0
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D.3 Sensitivity: Different Fossil Fuel Supply Elasticities
Figure D.1: Total Emission Reductions Lost (η = 4)
Notes: This figure shows the shares of the global emission reduction due to the Paris Agreement that is
lost due to a unilateral withdrawal in the 139 different scenarios with a fossil fuel supply elasticity of
η = 4. On average, 0.9% of the global emission reduction are forgone. The loss shares range from 0.0%
for a number of very small countries to 29.5% for the US.
Table D.3: Top Five Total Reduction Losses (η = 4)
Withdrawing country USA CHN JPN BRA CAN
World reduction lost (total effect) 29.5% 14.2% 6.2% 6.1% 6.1%
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With a little help...
Figure D.2: Total Emission Reductions Lost (η = 1)
Notes: This figure shows the shares of the global emission reduction due to the Paris Agreement that is
lost due to a unilateral withdrawal in the 139 different scenarios with a fossil fuel supply elasticity of
η = 1. On average, 1.5% of the global emission reduction are forgone. The loss shares range from 0.0%
for a number of very small countries to 38.5% for the US.
Table D.4: Top Five Total Reduction Losses (η = 1)
Withdrawing country USA CHN JPN CAN DEU
World reduction lost (total effect) 38.5% 28.2% 9.3% 7.6% 7.6%
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D.4 Model Extension
D.4.1 Decomposition
Taking into account multiple fossil fuel types, country i’s emissions can be expressed as:
EM i =
∑
v∈V
κv
ρivξ
i
R (αiSEY iS +
∑
l∈L αilEY
i
l )
(1 + κvλi
rv
)rv
= ξiRα¯iE
Y˜ i
P i
κ¯i
(
ri
P i
)−1
,
where κ¯i ≡ ∑v∈V κvρivri(1+κvλi
rv
)rv
captures the average carbon intensity of a country’s fossil
fuel mix.
As in the base model, we can take the total differential and hence decompose the
emission changes into different effects, namely scale, composition, and technique, as
well as a new additional substitution effect, which captures shifts between different
types of fossil fuel (e.g. substitution of coal with less emission-intensive fossil fuels to
fulfill emission targets):
dEM i = ∂EM
i
∂(Y˜ i/P i)
d(Y˜ i/P i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
scale effect
+ ∂EM
i
∂α¯iE
dα¯iE︸ ︷︷ ︸
composition effect
+ ∂EM
i
∂(ri/P i)d(r
i/P i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
technique effect
+ ∂EM
i
∂κ¯i
dκ¯i︸ ︷︷ ︸
substitution effect
.
Scale Effect. A country’s emissions increase proportionally with the size of the economy:
∂EM i
∂(Y˜ i/P i)
= ξ
i
Rα¯
i
Eκ¯
i
ri/P i
> 0 and ∂EM
i
∂(Y˜ i/P i)
(Y˜ i/P i)
EM i
= 1.
Composition Effect. An increase in the average energy intensity of production in a
country proportionately increases the country’s carbon emissions:
∂EM i
∂α¯iE
= ξ
i
RY˜
iκ¯i
ri
> 0 and ∂EM
i
∂α¯iE
α¯iE
EM i
= 1.
Technique Effect. An increase in the national fossil fuel resource price proportionately
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lowers a country’s carbon emissions:
∂EM i
∂(r/P i) = −
ξiRα¯
i
Eκ¯
iY˜ i/P i
(ri/P i)2 < 0 and
∂EM i
∂(ri/P i)
ri/P i
EM i
= −1.
Substitution Effect. An increase in the average carbon intensity of a country’s fossil
fuel mix proportionately increases the country’s carbon emissions:
∂Ri
∂κ¯i
= ξ
i
Rα¯
i
EY˜
i
ri
> 0 and ∂R
i
∂κ¯i
κ¯i
Ri
= 1.
The decomposition in the extended model hence captures the different emission channels
very similarly to the base model, but allows to further differentiate the part of the change
that takes place conditional on economic size and sectoral structure. While countries
could simply produce more or less fossil fuel intensively (in response to a changing
fossil fuel price) in the base model, they can still do so in the model extension, but can
additionally shift between different fossil fuels based on relative price changes between
them. We follow Pothen and Hu¨bler (2018) in calling this latter channel the “substitution
effect”.
D.4.2 Parametrization
We consider three different fossil fuel types, namely oil, gas, and coal (i.e. V =
{oil, gas, coal}). The GTAP fossil fuel sectors are: oil, gas, coa, p c (Petroleum, coal
products), and gdt (Gas manufacture, distribution). We collect gas and gdt in our gas
resource and split p c between our coal and oil resources according to the respective
input expenditure shares for the GTAP oil and coa sectors.
For the carbon intensities of the different fossil fuels (κv), we rely on intensities given by
the US EIA (https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=73&t=11, accessed on August
16th, 2019). For coal, we use the average over anthracite, bituminous, lignite, and
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subbituminous coal. For oil, we use the average over “diesel fuel and heating oil” and
“gasoline (without ethanol)”. For gas, we use the value of “natural gas”.
Out of the five GTAP fossil fuel sectors, only coa, oil, and gas use the natural re-
source factor. Hence we can obtain fuel type specific endowment shares as ωiv =
NV FAiNatRes,v/
∑
j NV FA
j
NatRes,v, where NV FA
i
NatRes,v is expenditure on the GTAP
natural resource factor (NatRes) for fossil type v in country i (using the GTAP labeling
for the NV FA variable).
We calculate the fossil fuel production expenditure shares ξiR and ρ
i
v in such a way
as to exactly fit national carbon emissions from each fossil fuel type. We start by
obtaining the emissions (EM iv) from the data. Then, resource quantities by fuel type
can be obtained as Riv = EM iv/κv. We obtain the fossil fuel world market prices as
rv = (
∑
iNV FA
i
NatRes,v)/(
∑
iEM
i
v). Then, the fossil fuel type cost shares in fossil fuel
production and the fossil fuel cost share in energy production can be obtained as
ρiv = (rvRiv)/(
∑
u ruR
i
u) and ξiR = (
∑
v rvR
i
v)/(αiSEY iS +
∑
l α
i
lEY
i
l ), respectively.
